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Abstract 
Using an array of original materials from Russian regional and central archives this 
detailed study of Soviet Karelia from 1918-1919 is the first to appear in English after the 
fall of the Soviet Union. It adds to the still limited number of regional studies of the civil 
war period and using the Karelian districts as a case study discusses how the Bolsheviks 
consolidated power on the periphery, what factors hindered this process and what were the 
sources of resistance. Karelia is unique for a combination of reasons. First, it is a grain 
deficit region and so was always in need of help with the supply of grain from the Volga 
and other parts of central Russia. Second, the political influence of the Left Socialist 
Revolutionary party (Left SRs) continued for a considerable time after the events of July 
1918. The thesis explores how power was transferred in the region following the October 
revolution and how the planned political objectives of the Bolsheviks were stalled by the 
lack of political control in the districts not least of all, for most of 1918, because of the 
influence of the Left SRs. However, despite political, economic, social and military crises 
the Bolsheviks gained more experience in power as the civil war progressed and a 
semblance of order emerged from the chaos. They gained enough control over the food 
supply shortages for the population to subsist and increased their control in key Soviet 
institutions, such as the provincial security police (the Cheka) and the Red Army, which 
ultimately ensured the survival of the Bolshevik regime and victory in the civil war.   iii
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Note on dates and transliteration 
All dates referred to up to February 1918 are given from the Julian calendar which ran 
thirteen days behind the Gregorian calendar, but dates for the corresponding Gregorian 
calendar are given in brackets. All dates from February onwards are from the Gregorian 
calendar which Russia adopted as of midnight on the 31 January 1918. I use the Library of 
Congress system of transliteration for Russian except for names commonly known in 
English, for example, Trotsky instead of Trotskii and Archangel instead of Arkhangel’sk. 
The following abbreviations are used for Russian archive materials: f. for collection (fond), 
op. for inventory (opis’), d. for file (delo) and l. for page (list), and ob. for verso (oborot). 
               ix 
Note on Terms 
The Bolshevik party renamed itself the Communist party in March 1918 and I use the 
terms Bolshevik(s) and Communist(s) interchangeably throughout the text. For ease of use 
I have chosen to use the nominative form of the Russian adjective for the naming of 
parishes i.e. Shungskaia parish, not Shun’ga parish. I chose to translate all territorial 
administrative units used in the text into English but for foreign words used in the text (e.g. 
weights and measures) I have anglicised the plurals with the exception of the Committees 
of the Rural Poor which are referred to as kombedy, not kombeds. All foreign words used 
in the text are italicized with the exception of more commonly known words e.g. 
Sovnarkom, Cheka. 
 
 
Translated territorial units used in the text 
Village (Derevnia) 
Settlement (Selo) 
Society (Obshchestvo) 
Parish (Volost’) 
District (Uezd) 
Province (Guberniia) 
County (Okrug) 
Region (Oblast’) 
 
Russian weights and measures used in the text 
Verst(s)    0.66 miles or 1.06 kilometres  
Arshins(s)    28 inches or 0.71 metres 
Puds(s)    36.11 pounds or 16.38 kilograms   
Dessiatinas(s)   2.7 acres or 10,900 square metres 
Funts(s)    0.9 pounds or 0.36 kilograms 
Vedros(s)    2.7 gallons or 12.3 litres   x 
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Introduction 
This central thread of this thesis is how the Bolsheviks consolidated their hold in the 
Karelian districts after the October revolution. Like any study of revolution it is a study of 
power; who was in control and what was the nature of that power against the backdrop of 
political, economic, social and military crises. It was the Left SRs not the Bolsheviks who 
were the presiding political force in the Karelian districts for the majority of 1918 and the 
significance of local political factors was pivotal to the implementation of the capital’s 
policies. Using Soviet Karelia as a case study I aim to describe the implementation of some 
of the national government’s policies in the periphery and underline the importance of 
local conditions and practical exigencies in shaping the path of the civil war there. The 
food crisis in particular was a severe problem for central and local Bolsheviks for all of the 
civil war which was made more acute for Karelia because it was traditionally a grain 
deficit region and relied heavily on domestic imports to feed its population. The inability 
of the capital to prioritise anything but the most important military fronts and the lack of 
regular or sufficient material support meant that the Karelian districts were often forced to 
make do with their own resources to supplement the limited support that did make it 
through to them.  
 
The thesis aims to underline how chaotic conditions were throughout the civil war 
in the Karelian districts but at the same time point to some key areas from late 1918 
through which the Bolsheviks were able to increase their control. The dispatch of Red 
Army units from Petrograd, the adoption of repression as a tool of governance in 
September 1918, the election of a new provincial Cheka in October and the emergence of a 
local standing Red Army from the end of 1918 were all important steps towards gaining 
more control out of the disorder. Because of a lack of resources in the districts the 
introduction of central policies in Karelia was often a case of “one step forward, two steps 
back” but the recognition of past mistakes, a drive to increase organisation and party   2 
discipline, increase centralisation to Moscow and the tempering of repression with 
conciliation meant that local Bolsheviks survived the economic, social and military 
hardships that they faced.   
 
It is necessary to clarify from the outset the logic behind the chosen chronological 
framework of the study which covers the period from October 1917 to the end of 1919. 
The thesis is presented through a loosely chronological time frame because of the number 
of important developments which took place and overlapped one another. It was important 
to begin the thesis from October 1917 to contextualise what followed and show how the 
transition of power to the soviets occurred in a local setting. However, the core years of 
this study are 1918 and 1919, when the Soviet regime in Karelia faced and endured its 
most daunting challenge. The thesis comes to an end in the last quarter of 1919 because by 
this time the main military threat posed by the White Finns and the Allies, supporting the 
Whites, had gone. After the Allied withdrawal between September and early October 1919 
the military front stabilised before the White forces were defeated by the Red Army with 
relative ease from February-March 1920 when the military campaigns resumed. This 
approach allows for a detailed discussion of the key civil war years and the development of 
the Soviet regime while under siege.      
 
Because of word limitations and the author’s own personal choice the decision was 
taken to concentrate on the Soviet regime in Karelia. Incorporating the problems faced by 
the Allied-White Russian regime in Murmansk and north Karelia into the thesis and 
drawing comparison with the Bolshevik governments further south had the potential to 
double the length of the work and is best left as a topic for future research. The thesis has 
been influenced by all of the recent regional studies on the civil war (see below) and, of 
course, those which discuss the Bolshevik regime in particular, but Alexander 
Rabinowitch’s work on Petrograd from October 1917 to October 1918 deserves a   3 
particular mention because of its links to the first few chapters of this study. Rabinowitch 
has argued that most important in shaping the Bolshevik party, the soviets and their 
relationship to each other were the realities the Bolsheviks faced as they struggled to 
survive. Furthermore, he has emphasised that the Soviet system evolved in an ad hoc 
fashion during the formative months of its existence and it did not immediately turn into a 
highly centralised regime.
1 It will become apparent that a study of Karelia adds weight to 
many of Rabinowitch’s conclusions but also attempts to take things further. For instance 
one of the most intriguing aspects of Rabinowitch’s story is the importance he attributes to 
the Left SRs in Petrograd and within the Northern Regional Soviet government, 
established at the end of April 1918.
2 The partnership with the Bolsheviks endured the 
splits in Moscow over the Brest-Litovsk peace treaty, continued to function after the 
establishment of the food supply dictatorship and would have survived longer if the Left 
SR Central Committee had not rebelled in early July.
3  The thesis will show that the Left 
SR party was an even stronger political force in Karelia and had a lasting legacy in the 
districts, even after July 1918, when the party had been marginalised in Karelia’s 
administrative centre, Petrozavodsk. This special political dynamic and its consequences 
for the region is one of the main themes of the thesis that sets it apart from other regional 
studies.
4 
                                                 
1 A. Rabinowitch, The Bolsheviks in Power. The First Year of Soviet Rule in Petrograd. Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 2007. 
2 The decision to establish a regional government was preceded by the decision of the Petrograd Bureau of 
the Bolshevik Central Committee to create a Northern Regional Bolshevik Party Committee on 20 March 
1918. The First Northern Regional Party Conference took place on 3-6 April 1918 and was represented by 
party delegates from Petrograd, Vologda, Novgorod, Pskov, Archangel and Olonets provinces. A Northern 
Regional Congress of Soviets took place on 26-29 April 1918 and established a regional soviet government, 
the Northern Regional Union of Communes. The above named provinces entered this Northern Commune 
and were joined later by North-Dvina and Cherepovets provinces. Rabinowitch, The Bolsheviks in Power. 
260-261. For an account of the Northern Regional Bolshevik Party Committee and the Northern Regional 
government also see V.P. Khmelevskii, Severnyi Oblastnoi Komitet RKP(b). Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1972.   
3 Rabinowitch, The Bolsheviks in Power. 260-309.  
4 Others to an extent have also noted the potency of the Bolshevik-Left SR alliance in the periphery. I have in 
mind P. Holquist, Making War, Forging Revolution. Russia’s Continuum of Crisis, 1914 1921. Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2002. 136-141; 149-150; 168. Donald Raleigh’s study of Saratov also 
discusses the importance of the Left SRs but devotes more attention to the offshoot party, the Revolutionary 
Communists, which formed after the Left SR Central Committee’s uprising in Moscow in early July 1918. D. 
Raleigh, Experiencing Russia’s Civil War. Politics, Society and Revolutionary Culture in Saratov, 1917 1922. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002. 142-172.   4 
  Adopting a regional approach to the civil war allows for detailed analysis of how 
certain Bolshevik and Soviet institutions developed outside of the capital. The local focus 
of this study has highlighted discussion of the creation and development of the Cheka, the 
Red Army and the kombedy in a regional context but also lesser studied institutions such as 
desertion commissions, all bodies which were designed to give the Bolsheviks’ control. 
Karelia also contributes to our understanding of the Soviet regime during the civil war 
because it tells the story of a grain deficit region while other regional studies have so far 
concentrated on Moscow or Petrograd, central Russia’s Black Earth zone or a province 
whose harvests, on average, produced a grain surplus.
5 The food crisis was the root of 
many of Karelia’s problems and put the state’s relationship with its population to the test. 
As a result, the thesis adds to our existing knowledge of peasant-state relations during the 
civil war and helps to explain why Russia’s peasantry rebelled but ultimately sided with 
the Reds over the Whites.     
   
Finally a study of Karelia stands apart from current regional studies because the 
dynamics of the civil war were different there. In short, for much of the fighting it was a 
non-priority military zone. It was the important military fronts of the south and east where 
the fighting was won, where the superior agricultural land and industries were situated and 
where the population was most voluminous. As will become evident below Karelia 
contrasted in all these respects and was only ever given military priority at fleeting 
moments for example when the military dangers faced by the region posed a potentially 
wider threat to Petrograd in April 1919. In this respect the study therefore allows for some 
discussion of the nature of centre-periphery relations which to date has received only 
limited coverage within the growing number of regional studies.
6 It will become evident to 
the reader that the relationship between Petrozavodsk and Petrograd or Moscow changed 
between 1918 and 1919 and that local Bolsheviks demanded support from the capital but at 
                                                 
5 See footnotes 18-22. 
6 On the relationship between Saratov and Moscow see Raleigh, Civil War. 74-106.   5 
the same time resented the encroachment on local decision making which came with 
increased centralisation. 
 
 
Russian primary sources 
The research for a regional study of Karelia during the civil war has drawn upon a number 
of important primary sources. Most importantly the study has utilised the rich collections 
held in the National Archive of the Republic of Karelia (NARK) situated in Petrozavodsk. 
In 2007 the former party archive, then called the Karelian State Archive of Recent History 
(KGANI), merged with NARK. As a result, references in NARK which refer to documents 
of the party are recognisable with the letter P (e.g. f.P-1). Documents held by NARK that 
are non-party related and from the Soviet period are indexed with the letter R (e.g. f.R-1). 
The research for this thesis has also made use of the local newspapers, Izvestiia 
Olonetskogo Gubernskogo Soveta and Olonetskaia Kommuna, and central archives in 
Moscow (GARF, RGAE, RGVA & RGASPI) and London (The National Archives). More 
detail on the specific collections used from these archives can be found in the bibliography.  
 
These invaluable archival sources are supplemented with a few important 
documentary collections of which those specific to Karelia are worth mentioning briefly. 
No Soviet source can be taken at face value because of their portrayal of an all conquering 
and triumphant Bolshevik party but nevertheless one of the most useful published primary 
sources for the thesis has been the collection edited by V.I. Mashezerskii and N.F. Slavin, 
published in 1957.
7 Focusing on the years 1917-1918 I found many of the documents 
revealing and sometimes quite candid no doubt reflecting the ‘thaw’ in Soviet history after 
the death of Stalin. Furthermore, when necessary I have been able to cross check many, but 
admittedly not all, of their references which were relevant for the thesis. This collection of 
documents was taken chronologically forward by another collection published in 1964 and 
                                                 
7 V.I. Mashezerskii and N.F. Slavin, eds., Bor’ba za Ustanovlenie i Uprochenie Sovetskoi Vlasti v Karelii: 
Sbornik Dokumentov i Materialov. Petrozavodsk: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel’stvo Karel’skoi ASSR, 1957.   6 
edited by Ia.A. Balagurov and M.I. Mashezerskii. I did not find this collection so useful, 
which reflects the end of the ‘thaw’ and the Soviet regime tightening its control over 
historical publications at this time, but it was never the less informative on military aspects 
of the civil war.
8 Since the fall of the Soviet Union two further important documentary 
collections have emerged. The first published in 1993 covers the whole of the Soviet era 
but has useful documents on the revolutionary era from March 1917 to November 1920 
which were omitted in the Soviet collections.
9 This is also the case for the third of a three 
volume 300 year documentary history of the town of Petrozavodsk which was published in 
2003 and proved invaluable on certain political developments in the town during the civil 
war.
10 
 
Historiography 
This is the second study of the Soviet regime in Karelia during the civil war years to be 
written in English and the first after the fall of the USSR. The first study of the region in 
English was a PhD dissertation completed in 1967 but concentrated on Finnish-Soviet 
diplomatic relations and the Karelian autonomy movement.
11 It is the intention here to 
produce an internal history of Karelia and not to encroach on issues which centre on 
Karelia’s autonomy, Finnish nationalism or Finnish-Soviet relations except if necessary for 
means of contextualisation.
12 Other works in English language have also contributed to our 
                                                 
8 Ia.A. Balagurov and V.I. Mashezerskii, eds., Kareliia v Period Grazhdanskoi Voiny i  Inostrannoi 
Interventsii, 1918 1920. Sbornik Dokumentov i Materialov. Petrozavodsk: Karel’skoe Knizhnoe Izdatel’stvo, 
1964. Supplementing these documentary collections are memoirs and reminiscences of the civil war 
published in the 1950s and 1960s. Like the above document collections the publication in 1957 was more 
useful than that published in 1963. E.S. Gardin, P.P. Nezhel’skaia, M.I. Shumilov and M.N. Anisimova, eds., 
V Bor’be za Vlast’ Sovetov. Vospominaniia Uchastnikov Bor’by za Ustanovlenie Sovetskoi Vlasti v Karelii. 
Petrozavodsk: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel’stvo Karel’skoi ASSR, 1957; V.I. Mashezerskii, ed., Za Sovetskuiu 
Kareliiu, 1918 1920. Vospominaniia o Grazhdanskoi Voine. Petrozavodsk: Karel’skoe Knizhnoe Izdatel’stvo, 
1963.  
9 N.A. Vavulinskaia, ed., Sovety Karelii, 1917 1992. Dokumenty i Materialy. Petrozavodsk, “Kareliia”, 1993. 
20-82. 
10 N.A. Korablev, S.N. Filimonchik and D.Z. Gendelev, eds., Petrozavodsk: 300 Let Istorii. Dokumenty i 
Materialy v Trex Knigax. Vol.3. Petrozavodsk: “Kareliia”, 2003. 94-169. 
11 S. Churchill, “The East Karelian Autonomy Question in Finnish-Soviet Relations, 1917-1922.” PhD, 
University of London, 1967. 
12 For those more interested in this topic see for instance: I. Siukiiainen, Karel’skii Vopros v Sovetsko 
Finlianskikh Otnosheniiakh v 1918 1929 godakh. Petrozavodsk: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel’stvo Karelo-
Finskoi SSR, 1948; V.M. Kholodkovskii, Finliandiia i Sovetskaia Rossiia, 1918 1920. Moscow: Nauka,   7 
understanding of the civil war in Karelia and north Russia, more generally and from an 
Allied intervention perspective. The most notable works are the memoirs of Major-General 
Sir Charles Maynard and the relevant sections within the monographs by Kennan and 
Baron.
13 Soviet and post-Soviet writers have also concentrated on the military and 
intervention aspects of the civil war in the north.
14 Again it is not the intention of this thesis 
to discuss in detail the role of the intervention in the north but only when it is relevant to 
understand the actions of local soviets or the population in Karelia.      
 
The majority of published materials discussing the development of the Soviet 
regime in Karelia have originated from local historians and were published in the Soviet 
period. The most noteworthy monographs are those by Shumilov, Mashezerskii, Balagurov 
and Bogdanova.
15 These works have proved to be useful in providing a portrait of some of 
the main problems faced by local Bolsheviks and how events developed in the region but, 
of course, were constrained by their interpretation and agenda to portray the Bolshevik 
party in solely a positive light. In the post-Soviet period only one major significant work 
has been published which focused on Karelia and it sought to supersede the two volume 
                                                                                                                                                    
1975; M. Engman, “State Terrorism as Diplomacy: Aspects of Finnish-Soviet Relations, 1918-1920.” Studia 
Baltica Stockholmiensia, No.8, 1991; A.I. Rupasov, & A.N. Chistikov, Sovetsko Finliandskaia Granitsa, 
1918 1938 gg., St. Petersburg, Evropeiskii Dom, 2000. 
13 Major-General Sir C. Maynard, The Murmansk Venture. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1928; G.F. 
Kennan, Soviet American Relations, 1917 1920. Vol.2, The Decision to Intervene. London: Faber and Faber, 
1958; N. Baron, The King of Karelia. Col. P.J. Woods and the British Intervention in  orth Russia, 1918 
1919. A History and Memoir. London: Francis Boutle, 2007.  
14 See for example: V.V. Tarasov, Bor’ba s Interventami na Severe Rossii (1918 1920 gg.). Moscow: 
Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel’stvo Politicheskoi Literatury, 1958; K.A. Morozov, Onezhskaia Flotiliia v Gody 
Grazhdanskoi Voiny i Inostrannoi Interventsii (1918 1920). Petrozavodsk: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel’stvo 
Karel’skoi ASSR, 1961; V. Goldin, Interventsiia i antibol’shevistskoe dvizheniie na Russkom severe, 1918 
1920. Moscow: Izdatel’stvo Moskovskogo Universiteta, 1993; V.A., Shishkin, ed., Interventsiia na severo 
zapade Rossii, 1917 1920gg. St Petersburg: Nauka, 1995. 
15 M.I. Shumilov, Bor’ba Bol’shevistskikh Organizatsii Karelii za Pobedu i Uprochenie Sovetskoi Vlasti, 
1917 1918. Petrozavodsk: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel’stvo Karel’skoi ASSR, 1957; M.I. Shumilov, Vo Glave 
Oborony Severa Rossii v 1918 1920 gg. Iz Istorii Mestnykh Partiinykh Organizatsii. Petrozavodsk: 
Karel’skoe Knizhnoe Izdatel’stvo, 1967. V.I. Mashezerskii, Ustanovlenie Sovetskoi Vlasti v Karelii (1917 
1918). Petrozavodsk: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel’stvo Karel’skoi ASSR, 1957; Ia.A. Balagurov, Bor’ba za 
Sovety v Karel’skom Pomor’e. Petrozavodsk: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel’stvo Karel’skoi ASSR, 1958; G.N. 
Bogdanova,  a Khoziaistvennom Fronte, 1918 1920. Khoziaistvennoe Stroitel’stvo v Karelii v Gody 
Inostrannoi Interventsii i Grazhdanskoi Voiny. Petrozavodsk: Izdatel’stvo “Kareliia”, 1980.    8 
overview of Karelian history, Ocherki Istorii Karelii (1957 & 1964).
16 Published in 2001 
its authors wished to produce a more objective appraisal of the historical development of 
the region. One chapter in the collection was devoted to the revolution and civil war, from 
the February revolution in 1917 to the formation of the Karelian Labour Commune in mid-
1920 and was written by M.I. Shumilov.
17 Like its predecessor the material within it is 
useful and has been updated to give a more rounded picture of the civil war in Karelia but 
it is essentially a narrative account which makes little attempt to offer any concrete 
conclusions on the development of the local civil war or what Karelia’s experience adds to 
our overall understanding of the period in general.    
 
Essentially, this thesis seeks to contribute to the growing but still relatively few 
post-Soviet regional studies of the revolutionary period. Every historian who adopts a 
particular city, province or region of Russia naturally seeks to promote ‘their’ territory as 
being special in a particular way and to emphasise the diversity of experience during the 
revolution and civil war in spite of the inevitable wide ranging similarities that stand out 
from region to region. Analysing the diversity of the civil war in the periphery helps to 
increase our understanding of this highly influential period and reappraise the revolution 
through now more easily accessible archives.
18 Of the regional studies that have appeared 
since the late 1980s the focus has been placed away from the capitals of Moscow and 
Petrograd.
19 Instead the ‘view from below’, most notably of Russia’s peasantry and their 
                                                 
16 V.N. Vernadskii, I.I. Smirnov and Ia.A. Balagurov, eds., Ocherki Istorii Karelii. Vol.1. Petrozavodsk: 
Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel’stvo Karel’skoi ASSR, 1957; V.I. Mashezerskii, ed., Ocherki Istorii Karelii. Vol.2. 
Petrozavodsk: Karel’skoe Knizhnoe Izdatel’stvo, 1964. 
17 N.A. Korablev, V.G. Makurov, Iu.A. Savvateev and M.I. Shumilov, eds., Istoriia Karelii s Drevneishikh 
Vremen do  ashikh Dnei. Petrozavodsk: “Periodika”, 2001. 342-440. 
18 From the regional studies in the west which appeared before the opportunity arose for foreigners to travel 
to Russia’s provinces see for example: M. Fainsod, Smolensk Under Soviet Rule. London: Macmillan, 1959; 
P. Kenez, Civil War in South Russia, 1918: The First Year of the Volunteer Army. Berkeley, University of 
California Press, 1971; O.H. Radkey, The Unknown Civil War in Soviet Russia. A Study of the Green 
Movement in the Tambov Region, 1920 1921. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1976; P. Kenez, Civil War 
in South Russia, 1919 1920: The Defeat of the Whites. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977. 
19 The main exception here is A. Rabinowitch, The Bolsheviks in Power. Also see: R. Sakwa, Soviet 
Communists in Power. A Study of Moscow During the Civil War, 1918 1921. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 
1988; M. McAuley, Bread and Justice. State and Society in Petrograd, 1917 1922. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 
1991.   9 
relations with the state, has taken up a prominent position within the historiography.
20 
Other regional studies since the turn of the century have been broader in scope and 
presented a more comprehensive political, social, economic and cultural history of the 
periphery during the civil war.
21 The chronological timeframe of studying the civil war has 
also varied and some historians have sought to underline the significance of viewing 
Russia’s revolution and civil war through a broader time frame, incorporating the vital 
experience of World War One and the links between the Tsarist system, the Provisional 
government and the early Soviet regime.
22 Representing the range of interests in the civil 
war, scholars have also concentrated their efforts on examining the White regime to 
compensate for the majority of civil war works which focus on the Bolsheviks.
23      
 
Geographical and historical overview: population & economy 
Before beginning the main narrative some background information on Karelia is necessary. 
Situated between the White Sea and the Gulf of Finland Karelia is recognisable by its 
abundance of lakes, streams, marshes and forests. The Karelian people settled there some 
time approximately before 1000BC and the region would become a disputed borderland, 
                                                 
20 See for example: O. Figes, Peasant Russia, Civil War. The Volga Countryside in Revolution, 1917 1921. 
London: Phoenix Press edition, 2001; S.V. Iarov, Krest’ianin kak  Politik:Krest’ianstvo Severo Zapada 
Rossii v 1918 1919 gg. Politicheskoe Myshlenie i Massovoi Protest. St. Petersburg: “Dmitrii Bulanin”, 1999; 
I. Narskii, Zhizn’ v Katastrofe. Budny  aseleniia Urala v 1917 1922 gg. Moscow: Rosspen, 2001; E.C. 
Landis, Bandits and Partisans. The Antonov Movement in the Russian Civil War. Pittsburgh: University of 
Pittsburgh Press, 2008; A.B. Retish, Russia’s Peasants in Revolution and Civil War. Citizenship, Identity, 
and the Creation of the Soviet State, 1914 1922. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008. This has 
also been the approach of studies which have emphasised the significance of the non-Russian territories. I 
have in mind the unpublished PhD thesis by M.R. Baker, “Peasants, Power and Revolution in the Village: A 
Social History of Kharkiv Province, 1914-1921.” Harvard University, 2001. For a general study of the civil 
war based on the ‘ordinary citizens’ approach, see C. Read, From Tsar to Soviets. The Russian people and 
their revolution, 1917 1921. Routledge: London, 1996. 
21 I refer here to D. Raleigh, Civil War. 
22 P. Holquist, Making War. Retish, Russia’s Peasants also adopts this chronological time frame. Influential 
in emphasising the links between the Tsarist system, the Provisional government and the Soviet state have 
been L.T. Lih, Bread and Authority in Russia, 1914 1921. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1990 and 
J.A. Sanborn, Drafting the Russian  ation. Military Conscription, Total War, and Mass Politics, 1905 1925. 
DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2003. 
23 For a selection of works on the Whites see: Y. Kotsonis, “Arkhangel’sk, 1918: Regionalism and Populism 
in the Russian Civil War”, The Russian Review, Vol. 51, No. 4, 1992;  N.G.O. Pereira, White Siberia: The 
Politics of Civil War. Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1996; J. Smele, Civil War in Siberia. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996; A.V. Smolin, Beloe Dvizhenie na Severo Zapade Rossii: 
1918 1920 gg. St. Petersburg: Dmitrii Bulanin, 1999; L. Novikova, “A province of non-existent state: The 
White government in the Russian North and political power in the Russian Civil War”, Revolutionary Russia, 
Vol.18, No.2, 2005. 121-144.    10 
locked in conflict and torn between Swedish influence in the west and Russian influence to 
the east.
24 During the 18
th century the administrative-territorial divisions of Russian 
Karelia changed frequently, but by 1802 they stabilised and divided southern Olonets 
Karelia (Petrozavodsk, Olonets and Povenets districts) and northern White Sea Karelia 
(Kem’ district) between Olonets and Archangel provinces.
25  
 
From the beginning of the 19
th century the administrative-territorial divisions of 
Karelia remained largely intact until the establishment of the Karelian Labour Commune 
(KTK) in June 1920. Over the next two years the territories which made up the Commune 
were disputed between the capital, the KTK and the authorities in the co-existing Olonets 
province, along national and economic lines. Initially, the KTK kept a Karelian majority 
within its boundaries which included the populations of Petrozavodsk, Olonets, Kem’ and 
parts of Povenets district but omitted parts of Povenets districts and all of Pudozh, Vytegra 
and Lodeinoe Pole districts (the latter districts were made up almost entirely of Russians 
and a few Veps,
26 which formed what was left of Olonets province). However, when 
Olonets province was disbanded in September 1922 all of Povenets district and almost all 
of Pudozh district was transferred to the KTK, taking away the Karelians’ position as a 
‘national’ majority within the KTK.
27 For the purpose of the thesis Karelia will be taken to 
be the districts of Petrozavodsk, Olonets, Povenets, Pudozh and Kem’. Furthermore it 
should be noted that by the end of June 1918 the Allies or Whites occupied Kem’ until 
                                                 
24 For more detail on the geographical developments of Karelia see N. Baron, Soviet Karelia. Politics, 
Planning and Terror in Stalin’s Russia, 1920 1939. London: Routledge, 2007. 9-12. 
25 Ibid. 12-13; 15. 
26 The Vepsian people within Karelia were situated in a small pocket 25 km or so north of Voznesen’e on the 
coast of Lake Onega. They spoke a language which was incomprehensible to Russians and Finns although it 
was closer to the latter in that it was closely related to the Karelian language. On the Vepsian language and 
the Veps see T. Homen, ed., East Carelia and Kola Lapmark. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1921. 121-
124. For those interested in the Karelian language see P.M. Austin, “Soviet Karelian: the Language that 
Failed”, Slavic Review, Vol.51, No.1, 1992. 16-35.   
27 N. Baron, “Nature, nationalism and revolutionary regionalism: constructing Soviet Karelia, 1920-1923.” 
Journal of Historical Geography, 33, No.3, 2007. 585-593. By January 1924 the Karelian population 
consisted of 42.8% Karelians and Veps and 55.7% Russians. 593, fn. 120.   11 
early 1920, thus limiting the focus of this study to the remaining four districts after June 
1918. 
 
The national 1897 census found that the total number of people living in the five 
districts of eastern Karelia amounted to nearly 215,000 people.
28 From this total 
approximately 59% spoke Russian, 36% Karelian, 4% Veps and 1% Finnish.
29 The 
population rose in 1913 to roughly 285,500 people, approximately 91% of whom were 
rural inhabitants.
30 Petrozavodsk was the largest town in Karelia but had a total population 
of only 18,879 people in 1913.
31 The leading industry in the region before the revolution 
was the production and export of timber. On the eve of the First World War the main 
timber factories in Karelia were situated in Petrozavodsk and on the inlets of the White Sea 
coast and Lake Onega, a number of which were foreign owned.
32 The single largest 
industrial enterprise however was the Aleksandrovsk munitions and steel works factory 
(renamed the Onega factory after the October revolution), which was situated in 
Petrozavodsk and employed 1096 people in 1913.
33 According to a Soviet historian there 
existed a total of only 5321 industrial workers employed in enterprises that produced more 
than 1000 roubles a year in Karelia before 1914.
34 
 
The importance of the timber industry to the local economy enabled Karelia’s 
peasants to make earnings through seasonal employment in logging and floating work. 
Karelian men also traditionally travelled each year to the factories of St. Petersburg or Riga 
                                                 
28 I.P. Pokrovskaia, “Naselenie Dorevoliutsionnoi Karelii po Materialam Perepisi 1897 g.” Voprosy Istorii 
Evropeiskogo Severa, 1974. 94. For an English discussion on the size of the population see Homen, East 
Carelia. 125-130; 178.      
29 Pokrovskaia, “Perepisi 1897”. 103. 
30 Shumilov, Bor’ba. 6-7.  
31 Korablev, et al., Petrozavodsk. 26. 
32 Ibid. 133-134; Mashezerskii, Ustanovlenie. 6-8; 11-12; Homen, East Carelia. 230-234.  
33 Korablev, et al., Petrozavodsk. 133. Other industrial enterprises in Petrozavodsk operating in 1913 
included the aforementioned timber factories, a grain grinding mill, a distillery (closed in August 1914) and 
four printing works. 133-135. 
34 Mashezerskii, Ustanovlenie. 6.   12 
to work.
35 This supplementary seasonal labour was necessary because the majority of 
peasants were not able to subsist on their own land holdings alone. According to an 
economic historian of the region, 61% of the land in the four districts of Olonets Karelia 
(Povenets, Petrozavodsk, Olonets & Pudozh) in 1912 was owned by the state and 32% by 
the peasants. The bulk of the peasants allotments were however unsuitable for tillage or 
haymaking because of sections of forests, marshes and stony ground. As a result, for the 
four districts of Povenets, Petrozavodsk, Olonets and Pudozh respectively, only 8.3%, 
21.2%, 16.5% & 14.5% of the peasants’ land was suitable.
36 Because of its natural 
conditions, such as its geographical position and climate, Karelia was therefore reliant on 
food imports to support its entire populace. According to statistics calculated for the main 
foodstuffs consumed in the country, in puds and on average over the years 1909-1913, 
Olonets province suffered a deficit of 8.1 puds per person. Olonets was the third highest 
deficit province behind Moscow and Petrograd which had deficits of 10.58 and 11.98 
respectively. Archangel province had the sixth highest deficit of 7.25 behind Iaroslavl 
(7.83) and Vladimir (7.72).
37 In short, the Karelian districts were amongst the most 
demanding of all the non-grain producing regions in Russia outside of the two capitals. 
 
Fertile agricultural land was (and still is) only found to any significant extent in 
southern Karelia around Lake Onega, in particular on the Zaonezh’e peninsula and also in 
parts of Olonets district bordering Finland.
38 The latter district produced an impressive 
crop of oats which in the early part of the twentieth century was exported to St. Petersburg. 
Yet rye and wheat were still imported even to this area. Indeed rye accounted for two-
thirds of the total domestic imports for Petrozavodsk, Povenets and Olonets districts before 
                                                 
35 Baron, Soviet Karelia. 16. 
36 Bogdanova,  a Khoziaistvennom Fronte. 73-74. For Homen’s figures, which vary slightly because he 
bases them on an earlier time period and on Petrozavodsk, Povenets and Olonets districts only, see East 
Carelia. 154-155; 161. 
37 N.D. Kondrat’ev, Rynok Khlebov i ego Regulirovanie vo Vremia Voiny i Revoluitsii. Moscow: Nauka, 
1991. 313. Also see the map diagram on 441. Like all of the above figures they are, of course, contentious. 
38 Homen, East Carelia. 148-149.   13 
the war.
39 Famine could occur in the villages especially in spring when stocks were 
running low. This was especially true of areas furthest from conveyance routes and in the 
harsher regions of northern Karelia. When starvation threatened it was not uncommon for 
people to mix tree bark with grain to make bread.
40 The diet and economy of the populace 
was however supplemented by cattle, pig and sheep rearing.
41 Peddling in various goods 
across the border, especially in Kem’ district, with Finland was traditionally important for 
the local inhabitants, facilitated by the lateral waterways.
42 The hunting and fur trade also 
played an important role in the early twentieth century economy with hares, hazel-grouse, 
capercaillies and squirrels amongst the most commonly hunted animals. However, because 
of an absence of protection laws at this time animal and bird numbers fell and hunting 
became less pursued as a livelihood.
43 Finally, the fishing industry, particularly in the north 
of the region on the White Sea, which boasted 40 different species of fish with herring, 
salmon and navaga being the most important, was of great significance. On the gulf of 
Lake Onega herring was also the main catch as it was in the gulf of Soroka where fish were 
caught annually in the late autumn with as many as five to six hundred boats working the 
waters at a time.
44 
  
Petrozavodsk was only linked by rail with St. Petersburg in 1913 so imports of 
grain from the south bought and transported yearly, mainly in the summer time from 
Iaroslavl’, Vologda and Rybinsk, was undertaken along the country’s waterways.  
Additional cereals also arrived from the Moscow region, Riazan, Viatka, Saratov and 
Finland. Because domestic imports of grain were vital to the region, a host of individual 
merchants and representatives of the government and zemstvos (elected local rural 
                                                 
39 Ibid. 168. 
40 Homen, East Carelia. 136. 
41 Ibid. 168-171. 
42 Ibid. 133-134; 240-241. 
43 Ibid. 221-225. Squirrels, for their fur, were especially targeted. Between 1900 and 1908 of the 124,494 
mammals killed in Olonets province, 105,674 were squirrels. 223. 
44 Ibid. 211-221; 229-230. For some supplementary information on the fishing industry in the north of 
Karelia also see Balagurov, Bor’ba. 7-13.    14 
government institutions) were active in obtaining and transporting grain. Provinces, towns, 
communes and even villages often had their own food funds for the purpose.
45 Despite the 
lack of a railway line before the eve of the First World War Karelia’s administrative centre 
Petrozavodsk was easily linked (during the thaw) to the capital by Lake Onega, along the 
river Svir’ into Lake Ladoga and then down the river Neva. Before the war boats ran three 
times a week between Petrozavodsk and Petrograd in the summer time and regular water 
communications were established with Voznesen’e, a grain storage and transhipment point 
situated in Lodeinoe Pole district, and the towns of Pudozh and Povenets. Povenets, 
situated on the northern tip of Lake Onega, was particularly important for Karelia and 
served as a transit point for fish and timber products from further north destined for 
Petrograd and for grain products moving in the contrary direction.
46 But even when 
supplies reached Karelia distribution was made difficult because of inadequate internal 
conveyance routes. Roads were few, even in southern Karelia, where by 1905 nearly half 
the villages in Olonets district and more than half in Petrozavodsk and Povenets districts 
were still without any suitable roads for wheeled traffic.
47 
      
Significantly for Karelia the tsarist government, at the end of 1914, decided to 
construct a railway line to the port of Murmansk which was navigable all year round. The 
proposal to build a railway through Karelia originated in the 1870s and then received fresh 
impetus in the 1890s during Sergei Witte’s period as Russia’s finance minister. 
Construction work began briefly on the St. Petersburg to Petrozavodsk section in 1895 but 
was suspended because of financial problems and the fact that Siberian and other railway 
lines were considered more important. The Russian-Japanese war (1904-5) and the first 
Russian Revolution (1905-1907) again postponed construction before work on the 
                                                 
45 Homen, East Carelia. 226-227. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid. 173.   15 
Petrozavodsk section was finally completed in 1913.
48 The building of the rest of the line 
did not begin until autumn 1915 but its rapid completion was imperative for the import of 
vital foodstuffs and munitions from the Allies into the Russian hinterland during the First 
World War. A total of up to 170,000 people took part in the construction of the line at 
various times of its construction and the vast majority of labourers were malnourished and 
endured primitive working and living conditions.
49 Workers on the line were drawn from a 
number of sources and included approximately 100,000 migrant peasant workers from 
different Russian provinces, up to 40,000 Austrian, Hungarian and German prisoners of 
war, 10,000 Chinese from Manchuria, 5,500 Finns, 2,000 Kazakhs and 500 Canadian 
engineers.
50 The railway track was finally completed at the beginning of 1917 but was only 
a single track line with a number of intermittent sidings. Nevertheless, at 1,459km long 
(see Table 1), it connected Karelia to the rest of the country via rail, made supplying the 
territories close to the line easier and provided a spine to which future supplies could be 
distributed or military strategy grafted. The economic and logistical advantages of the 
railway also prompted the development of plans for a lateral line, starting at Soroka, which 
would run east and eventually connect to the Siberian railway.
51   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
48 Ibid. 245. On the problems which delayed the construction of the Murmansk railway also see A.A. 
Golubev, “Problemy proektirovaniia Murmanskoi zheleznoi dorogi v kontse XIX-nachale XX veka.” 
Voprosy Istorii Evropeiskogo Severa. 2007. 155-160. 
49 Baron, Soviet Karelia. 1-2. 
50 Exact numbers vary from source to source. The figures cited here are from: P. Agafonov and I. Pokoliavin, 
“Inostrannye rabochie na stroitel’stve Murmanskoi zheleznoi dorogi”, 3-5; and E. Kalieva, D. Rodionov and 
E. Smirov, “Stroitel’stvo Murmanskoi zheleznoi dorogi”, 16-18 in Upravlenie: Istoriia,  auka, Kul’tura. 
Tezisy dokladov 8 i nauchnoi mezhvudovskoi studentcheskoi konferentsii. Petrozavodsk: Petrozavodsk State 
University, 20-21 April 2004. Both papers in question used archive materials from the National Archive of 
the Republic of Karelia to confirm the approximate number and nationality of the Murmansk railroad 
construction workers. With regards to the Chinese workers, many were transported to work on the Murmansk 
line because of their experience in building railway lines in the Far East. See Upravlenie: Istoriia,  auka, 
Kul’tura. Tezisy dokladov 10 i nauchnoi mezhvuzovskoi studentcheskoi konferentsii. Petrozavodsk: 
Petrozavodsk State University, 25-26 April, 2006. 18-20.  
51 Homen, East Karelia. 246.   16 
Table 1 – Distance between stations on the Murmansk railway line
52 
 
Destination  Distance (km) 
Petrograd-Zvanka  122 
Zvanka-Petrozavodsk  284 
Petrozavodsk-Soroka  380 
Soroka-Kandalaksha  395 
Kandalaksha-Murmansk  278 
 
The First World War, which had an incapacitating effect on the transport system 
and economy throughout the country, also destabilised the Karelia economy.
53 
Mobilisation took away thousands of men from the countryside and fishing industry, the 
number of sown fields fell, timber firms closed down and prices rose.
54 But Karelia was no 
revolutionary hotbed. By the revolutions of 1917 the Bolshevik party only consisted of a 
small number of uncoordinated groups or cells. However, if there was a revolutionary 
centre in the region it was Petrozavodsk and the town’s workers, most notably those from 
the Aleksandrovsk factory, took part in the revolutionary events, 1905-1907 and the 
February revolution.
55 The capacity for Petrozavodsk to become a base from which the 
Bolshevik party could grow increased through the effects of the war and the 
aforementioned construction of the Murmansk railway line that linked the Karelian region 
with a stronger revolutionary hub such as Petrograd which facilitated the dispatch of 
agitators, organisers and literature. In addition the construction of the railway line created a 
number of potential supporters for the Bolshevik party in the form of railroad workers.
56 
                                                 
52 Ibid. 246. Zvanka is now called Volkhov and Soroka is called Belomorsk. 
53 For a general overview of how the First World War affected food supply in Russia see P. Gatrell, Russia’s 
First World War. A Social and Economic History. Harlow: Pearson Education Limited, 2005. 154-175. 
54 For more detail see Mashezerskii, Ustanovlenie. 19-20; Shumilov, Bor’ba. 13-15; Vernadskii, et al., 
Ocherki. 373-374. 
55 For example see Korablev, et al., Petrozavodsk. 31-35; 42-43; 45-50; 94-99. For more detail on this 
revolutionary period in Karelia see Ia.A. Balagurov, Fabrichno Zavodskie Rabochie Dorevoliutsionnoi 
Karelii, 1801 1917. Petrozavodsk: Karel’skoe Knizhnoe Izdatel’stvo, 1968. 93-123; M.N. Vlasova, ed., 
Revoliutsionnye Sobytiia v Karelii v Gody Pervoi Russkoi Revoliutsii, 1905 1907. Sbornik Dokumentov i 
Materialov. Petrozavodsk: “Kareliia”, 1981. 
56 Balagurov, Fabrichno Zavodskie Rabochie. 162-166; Mashezerskii and Slavin, Bor’ba. 21-33; P.F. 
Metel’kov and E.V. Nefed’eva, “Bor’ba Bol’shevikov Murmanskoi Zheleznoi Dorogi za Ustanovlenie i 
Uprochenie Sovetskoi Vlasti v Pervye Mesiatsy Diktatury Proletariata.” Voprosy Istorii Evropeiskogo Severa. 
1987.   17 
Structure 
The thesis is organised into eight chronological chapters. Chapter 1 traces the short term 
origins of how and when Soviet power was established in Karelia, emphasises the 
numerical and influential weakness of the Bolshevik party in the region immediately 
following the October coup in Petrograd and introduces the beginnings of the Left SR-
Bolshevik bloc in the Olonets provincial soviet executive committee. Chapters 2 and 3 
analyse the Left SR-Bolshevik alliance in more detail and emphasise, up to July 1918, how 
this relationship endured a number of local political, economic and military crises and 
functioned relatively well, sometimes in collaboration with the Menshevik Internationalists, 
despite fundamental disagreements over policy. Chapter 4 concentrates on the period after 
the ousting of the Left SRs from the Olonets provincial soviet executive committee 
following the coup by this party’s Central Committee in Moscow. It investigates how the 
Bolsheviks, now the sole party in power in Petrozavodsk, struggled to implement central 
policy in the Karelian districts because of the continued influence of the Left SRs in the 
soviets and a lack of resources. 
 
  The last four chapters of the thesis continue the focus on the development of 
Bolshevik power in Karelia and indicate that the clichéd phrase “one step forward, two 
steps back” best describes the process by which the Bolsheviks slowly increased their hold 
over the region. Chapters 5 and 6 investigate the last three to four months of 1918 and 
underline the party’s lack of control in the countryside but at the same time the beginnings 
of increased organisation and order through the introduction of the Red Terror in 
September and the reorganisation of the provincial Cheka in October. Chapter 7 examines 
further Bolshevik attempts to consolidate their authority in Karelia and how successful 
these attempts were against the background of the military dangers in the spring and 
summer of 1919. Finally, Chapter 8 explores how the Bolsheviks were able to endure the   18 
economic, military and social upheavals of 1919 and ultimately consolidate their hold over 
Soviet Karelia.   19 
Chapter 1 
Karelia’s October: Winter 1917-1918 
An analysis of the political dynamics in Karelia in late 1917 and early 1918 illustrates how 
important local factors were during the Bolshevik revolution. The Bolshevik party seized 
power in Petrograd on 25 October (7 November) 1917 but the authority of the new central 
government was fragile and there was no certainty that the rest of the country would fall in 
line with the capital. Every locality was compelled to accept or reject the authority of the 
Bolshevik government, the Soviet of People’s Commissars (Sovnarkom), and the transition 
to the Soviet regime, a process which stretched out over a period of weeks and months 
after October. This chapter will argue that because of local political factors, recognition of 
the Bolshevik revolution in Petrozavodsk was delayed by approximately three months. 
Unlike in Petrograd the Bolshevik party was weak in Petrozavodsk in October 1917 but, 
towards the end of the year, it became more influential and drew important support from 
soldiers and industrial workers. The party also began to organise and coordinate its 
activities better with the help of a few party representatives sent from Petrograd. However, 
even when the local Bolsheviks did gain a political foothold in Karelia in early January this 
was largely assisted by their support for the Left SR party which declared its own 
independence as a local party in Olonets province that same month. These Left SRs then 
entered into a political bloc with the local Bolshevik party and only then, in early February 
1918, was Sovnarkom officially recognised as the central government by the Olonets 
provincial soviet. 
 
The weakness of the local Bolsheviks 
On the eve of the Bolshevik insurrection in Petrograd the Olonets provincial soviet, on 18 
(31) October, discussed the imminent Second Congress of Soviets at which the transfer of 
power to the soviets was scheduled for debate. The Menshevik Internationalists,
1 mirroring 
                                                 
1 The First World War divided the Menshevik party into Internationalists and Defencists. The left wing 
Internationalists opposed Revolutionary Defencism which stressed the importance of a swift negotiated peace,   20 
the Menshevik central committee, believed an insurrection premature and a provocation to 
civil war and instead sounded out the party’s support for the convening of the Constituent 
Assembly. Similarly a SR representative, A.A. Sadikov, who would soon move to the left 
of the party, baulked at the passing of authority to the soviets because he believed the 
Second Congress was unrepresentative of the peasantry.
2 However, a Bolshevik 
representative of the Petrograd soviet sent north as an agitator to his native town of 
Petrozavodsk, A.A. Kopiatkevich, advocated the transition of all power to the soviets.
3 The 
news of the October insurrection in Petrograd therefore received a mixed reaction from 
soviet political elites in Petrozavodsk: the Bolsheviks greeted it eagerly, the Mensheviks 
and SRs indignantly.
4  
 
Although, as we will see below, the Bolshevik uprising in Petrograd helped local 
Bolsheviks influence events in Petrozavodsk they were not yet powerful enough to dictate 
the political discourse like their senior party counterparts in the capital because political 
opinion still favoured the Mensheviks and SRs. On 27 October (9 November) the Olonets 
provincial soviet, in a joint session with the main (glavnyi) committee of the Murmansk 
railroad and representatives of the soldiers’ committees and other public organisations 
(obshchestvennye organizatsii), officially recognised the Olonets provincial soviet as the 
highest governing authority in the province. However, at the same time, the provincial 
soviet refused to recognise Sovnarkom’s authority and the Menshevik Internationalists 
                                                                                                                                                    
but supported the defence of the country and revolution until that could be achieved. The Internationalists 
often cooperated with the Bolsheviks and Left SRs in a radical bloc in 1917, but opposed the October 
revolution. They believed the Bolsheviks were trying to build socialism but in the wrong way and by using 
the wrong methods and so tried to influence and put pressure on the Bolsheviks by putting forward 
alternative proposals. On the ‘basic currents of Menshevism’ see L. Lande “The Mensheviks in 1917”, in 
L.H. Haimson, ed., The Mensheviks. From the Revolution of 1917 to the Second World War. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1974. 6-14.    
2 Korablev, et al., Petrozavodsk. 109-111. The composition of the Second Congress of Soviets was drawn 
largely from Bolshevik dominated urban soviets and military councils. Many peasant organisations refused to 
participate. R. Pipes, The Russian Revolution, 1899 1919. London: The Harvill Press, 1990. 498.  
3 For some biographical details of A.A. Kopiatkevich see Korablev, et al., Petrozavodsk. 56; 60. 
Vavulinskaia, Sovety Karelii. 401. 
4 M.I. Shumilov, “Rozhdenie Sovetskoi Vlasti v Petrozavodske i Karelii.” Voprosy Istorii Evropeiskogo 
Severa, 1999. 84. Sadikov and Kopiatkevich were the two representatives of Olonets province present at the 
Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets. Vavulinskaia, Sovety Karelii. 481.    21 
retained the leadership of the provincial soviet.
5 So, while the Mensheviks and SRs were 
unable to halt the transition of power in the capital to the Bolsheviks, their counterparts in 
Petrozavodsk, in the absence of a sufficiently strong Bolshevik party were able to resist. 
The local Menshevik and SR parties sought a homogeneous socialist government of all 
socialist parties, including the Bolsheviks, but not a government dominated by the latter.
6 
As a result, on 5 (18) November, the Olonets provincial soviet demanded the immediate 
creation of a national homogeneous socialist government. Until this was realised the 
provincial soviet announced that it would reject the authority of any other form of central 
government and act independently of the centre.
7 
 
Local Bolshevik organisations were weak in influence at the time of the October 
revolution. In fact the first Bolshevik groups in Petrozavodsk had only been formed in the 
autumn of 1917 and one of the first Bolshevik cells, created at the Aleksandrovsk 
munitions factory, did not establish communication with the Bolshevik party Central 
Committee until October 1917.
8 Granted, as the October revolution drew closer the 
Bolsheviks gathered more political support and a few small Bolshevik organisations 
gradually established themselves sporadically across the region.
9 Furthermore, in the first 
few days and weeks following the October revolution, the provincial soviet was radicalised 
with the entry of workers from the Aleksandrovsk factory, woodworkers and soldiers from 
the local garrison.
10 But the Bolsheviks remained uncoordinated, disorganised and second 
in influence to the Mensheviks and SRs. On 6 (19) November V.M. Kudzhiev and A.A. 
                                                 
5 Mashezerskii and Slavin, Bor’ba. 99; 566, fn.36. V.M. Kudzhiev was the chairman of the Olonets 
provincial soviet (June-December 1917). The vice-chairmen were the Menshevik Internationalists N.V. 
Komarov and M.A. Kaplan. 
6 For a glimpse at how other local Menshevik party organisations developed and reacted to the Bolshevik 
revolution, some of which mirrored Karelia and others which differed, see Lande, “The Mensheviks in 1917” 
in Haimson, The Mensheviks. 68-70; 78-82. On the SRs see O.H. Radkey, The Sickle under the Hammer. The 
Russian Socialist Revolutionaries in the Early Months of Soviet Rule. New York: Columbia University Press, 
1963. 258-277. 
7 Korablev, et al., Petrozavodsk. 111-112. 
8 Ibid.534, fn. 45. 
9 Mashezerskii, Ustanovlenie. 62-64. Mashezerskii, Ocherki. Vol.2. 26-28; 30; 32. 
10 Shumilov, “Rozhdenie”. 86.   22 
Sadikov were elected the Olonets provincial delegates to the Second All-Russian Congress 
of Peasants’ Deputies which convened in Petrograd on 11 (24) November.
11 Because of 
their lack of coordination and relative weakness as a party in the region, the Bolsheviks did 
not put forward a candidate for election when voting took place for the Constituent 
Assembly in Olonets province, 12-14 (25-27) November. The Menshevik M.D. Shishkin
12 
and the SR A.F. Matveev
13 were chosen to represent the province.
14 
 
Despite their influential and numerical weakness locally the existence of a de facto 
Bolshevik government in Petrograd helped strengthen the Bolsheviks’ political position in 
Petrozavodsk, although not immediately. For example, agitators were sent from the capital. 
A representative of the Bolshevik party Central Committee arrived in Petrozavodsk in 
November 1917 and spoke out at a town meeting on 28 November (11 December) against 
the Constituent Assembly: ‘Long live the republic of Soviets of workers’, soldiers’ and 
peasants’ deputies, not the democratic republic!’ he declared. But again the Mensheviks 
and SRs still dominated local political opinion. Following speeches by the Menshevik 
Internationalists L.V. Nikol’skii and V.M. Kudzhiev the meeting resolved to support the 
Menshevik position in favour of the Constituent Assembly, ‘The calm water where the 
state ship can harbour during politically bad weather’, as Kudzhiev described it.
15  
 
Support for the Constituent Assembly in Karelia continued towards the end of 1917 
when a general gathering of more than 200 people took place in Petrozavodsk. Represented 
                                                 
11 Ibid; A. Rabinowitch, The Bolsheviks in Power. 50; 414, fn.129. 
12 For some short biographical details on Shishkin see L.G. Protasov, Liudi Uchreditel’nogo Sobraniia. 
Portret v Inter’ere Epokhi’. Moscow: Rosspen, 2008. 423; Korablev, et al., Petrozavodsk. 533-534, fn. 44. 
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533, fn. 44. 
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15 Korablev, et al., Petrozavodsk. 112-113.   23 
at the gathering were people from the Olonets provincial and Petrozavodsk district 
zemstvos, members of the duma (town and city councils), office employees, priests, doctors, 
statisticians and agronomists; all spoke out in support of convening the Constituent 
Assembly and condemned the Bolsheviks’ seizure of power.
16 These opinions were echoed 
by many in the Olonets provincial soviet at one of its sessions on 7 (20) December. The 
Bolshevik faction, of course, expressed their desire to fully recognise Sovnarkom, carry 
out all its decrees and abstained from voting on any other resolution.
17 But the Mensheviks 
and SRs within the soviet defended the convening of the Constituent Assembly, attacked 
the Bolshevik party, Sovnarkom and its decrees. V.K. Karatygin, a SR, believed that 
socialism in Russia alone was impossible and Lenin and the Bolsheviks were being naïve if 
they thought the revolution in Russia would spread to other countries. L.V. Nikol’skii also 
reproached Lenin for getting carried away with the success of the Bolshevik takeover: ‘In 
the Bolshevik party programme the slogan of the Constituent Assembly comes first, 
despite the fact that Lenin is waging a struggle against the Constituent Assembly. This is a 
mistake – the result of a hot head and the ecstasy of temporary victories.’
18  
 
Despite these criticisms, the Olonets provincial soviet adjusted its position of 
outright independence from the centre which it had declared a month earlier (see above) 
and showed a willingness to cooperate with the Bolsheviks in a limited manner; the SRs 
and Menshevik Internationalists preferred to be in contact with Sovnarkom and to make 
Olonets province an autonomous region. In spite of his criticism of Lenin and the 
Bolsheviks, Kudzhiev’s resolution of working with Sovnarkom, but conditionally, was 
accepted. It read as follows:
19 
    
                                                 
16 V.G. Badanov, “Zemskie Uchrezhdeniia Evropeiskogo Severa v 1917-1918 gg.” Voprosy Istorii 
Evropeiskogo Severa, 1999. 104. 
17 Vavulinskaia, Sovety Karelii. 31. 
18 Ibid. 30. 
19 Ibid. 31.   24 
While confirming our former position in regards to Sovnarkom and the 
question of central state authority but taking into consideration that all the 
apparatus of state power, especially in the economic sector, is in Sovnarkom’s 
hands, the Olonets provincial soviet, based on the proposition that it is impossible 
to isolate Oloniia from the state organism, we decided: 
1) To recognise the possibility of business dealings (delovie snosheniia) 
with Sovnarkom as an organ that is in de facto (fakticheski) possession of state 
authority; 
2) To subject Sovnarkom’s decrees to appraisal at a general meeting of the 
Olonets soviet and to implement those which are rational from a revolutionary-
democratic point of view and also decline those which would heighten the ruination 
of the economic, political and judicial structure of the country.  
 
  A western historian of the Mensheviks has called the Menshevik Internationalists 
‘the most energetic champions of negotiating with the Bolsheviks.’
20 Considering that the 
Menshevik Internationalists headed the Olonets provincial soviet and it was their 
resolution which was passed at the above conference, this viewpoint holds true at this time 
in Karelia. However, dictating the need for negotiation in Karelia were the local practical 
difficulties of being quarantined from the centre. Whether the Olonets provincial soviet 
liked it or not Karelia, as a grain deficit region, was economically bound to the centre.  
 
After the October revolution the Olonets provincial soviet concentrated on 
regulating the work of the local zemstvo and maintaining social order. It also tried to 
control grain profiteering but struggled to stave off growing accusations of inactivity as 
grain deliveries decreased in quantity and regularity towards the end of the 1917. At the 
end of November the provincial soviet decided to requisition food from local timber firms 
and grain traders with armed soldiers; the 55
th railroad workers’ battalion, situated in 
Petrozavodsk, was used as a requisitioning detachment in late 1917 and early 1918. Of 
course food supply detachments were not officially introduced until May 1918, as part of 
the food supply dictatorship, but the requisitioning undertaken by the 55
th railroad workers’ 
battalion was nothing unusual; similar detachments had been operating across the country 
                                                 
20 Lande, “The Mensheviks in 1917” in Haimson, The Mensheviks. 59.   25 
unofficially since the Bolshevik revolution.
21 In addition to this detachment’s efforts the 
provincial soviet created a food commission attached to the soviet to help stop speculation 
while grain seizures from local merchants and businesses also took place spontaneously.
22 
However, this was not enough and the expected grain deliveries began to decrease towards 
December.
23  
 
The rise of the local Bolshevik party 
As we have seen, the transfer of power in Karelia developed differently than in the capital. 
The primary reason for this was the weakness of the Bolshevik party and the relative 
strength of the Menshevik and SR parties who dominated local government in 
Petrozavodsk. However, despite the provincial soviet’s initial aspirations to ignore 
Sovnarkom and rule independently of the centre, it soon became apparent that this was 
impossible. Economically Karelia was reliant on Petrograd’s cooperation to secure food 
supplies but with the formation of a Bolshevik dominated government in the capital 
relations with the centre were potentially jeopardised. How could the Mensheviks and SRs 
in the Olonets provincial soviet be sure that the existence of a Bolshevik government in the 
capital would not marginalise their need for central help in gaining supplies? In addition, 
both Menshevik and SR Central Committees were in a state of paralysis owing to internal 
splits over their reactions to the October revolution. Because of a lack of organisation and 
the poor coordination of their parties’ activities they achieved little in the interval leading 
up to the opening of the Constituent Assembly.
24 The provincial party organisations could 
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22 Mashezerskii and Slavin, Bor’ba. 100-101. 
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not call upon their party hierarchies for advice or guidance on how to govern 
independently. Consequently the Olonets provincial soviet sought to negotiate with the 
Bolsheviks in Petrograd and advocated a form of autonomy whereby it could discuss and 
then discard or accept the introduction of Sovnarkom’s decrees. 
 
In contrast to the Menshevik and SR parties the Bolsheviks were proactive after 
October and continued to strengthen their grip on the country. It is clear that Sovnarkom 
began to pay more attention to the Karelian region by the end of 1917 and attempted to 
exert an element of control over it: communications were established with the local party 
in Petrozavodsk; and agitators were sent from Petrograd along with literature and weapons 
to help coordinate party work, form links with the town’s garrison and create a local Red 
Guard. At the beginning of January four more agitators, 3 Bolsheviks & 1 Left SR, arrived 
from Petrograd to help establish soviets and develop party work in the region (see below). 
And yet just as important to the Bolsheviks’ rise in power and influence in Karelia, as will 
become evident, was the break up of the SR party and the emergence of the local Left 
SRs.
25 Up to January 1918 the local SR party remained a united organisation, albeit 
composed of left, centre and right-wing groups with all the educated leaders supportive of 
Victor Chernov’s centre-left faction. Only with the arrival of a few party workers from 
Petrograd in early January did a split take place and the majority of SRs moved to the left 
to form the local Left SR party at the end of that month.
26 This occurrence brought an 
opportunity for the Bolsheviks to ally themselves with the Left SRs, gain a foothold in 
local government and form a bloc against the Mensheviks and remaining SRs. 
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1925 gg. Tom 1: Iiul' 1917 g.   Mai 1918 g. Vol.1. Moscow: Rosspen, 2000. 263. The allegiances of local 
party members following the SR party split appears to have followed the national trend; intellectuals 
remained within the parent party and the Left SRs attracted a more plebeian character. See: E. Cinella, “The 
Tragedy of the Russian Revolution. Promise and Default of the Left Socialist Revolutionaries in 1918.” 
Cahiers du Monde russe, Vol.38, No.1-2, 1997. 48.   27 
Following defeat on the Constituent Assembly issue and the unconditional 
recognition of Sovnarkom and its decrees, in November and December there were signs 
that the Bolsheviks in Petrozavodsk were beginning to put pressure on the provincial soviet 
to recognise the government in Petrograd. Organisation was important; a Bolshevik party 
Central Committee representative in Petrozavodsk helped shape the local party 
organisation by establishing joint meetings between the Bolshevik representatives of the 
Aleksandrovsk factory and the Murmansk railroad.
27 Together these two organisations 
formed a joint Bolshevik party committee in Petrozavodsk in mid-December and at the end 
of the month two of its founding members, Kh.G. Doroshin and G.S. Mirontsev, visited 
Petrograd to establish communication with the centre and receive advice on how to 
organise the party. Doroshin and Mirontsev met with Ia.M. Sverdlov who, it has been 
argued, was instrumental in forming party ties between centre and locality through his own 
personal networks.
28 Sverdlov questioned them about conditions in Petrozavodsk and 
Olonets province, offered organisational advice and supplied them with literature and 
weapons. He also promised to send an experienced Bolshevik party worker to help with 
party work.
29 On 1 (14) January 1918 a member of the Bolshevik party Central Committee 
and the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, A.I. Alekseev, arrived in 
Petrozavodsk.
30 
  
Realising that dealings with the Bolsheviks were coming to a head the Menshevik-
SR dominated executive committee of the Olonets provincial soviet tried to disband the 
55
th railroad workers’ battalion at the end of December but failed. The joint Bolshevik 
party committee in Petrozavodsk decided on 27 December (9 January) to send two party 
representatives to the battalion to agitate against the disbandment and to invite its members 
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30 Shumilov, Bor’ba. 68.   28 
to the next party meeting on 31 December (13 January).
31 The provincial soviet also 
appealed to the war ministry (Voennoe ministerstvo) in Petrograd for machine guns to 
defend Petrozavodsk and arm Red Guards not currently situated in the town. It is not 
known if the soviet explicitly stated their intentions to the capital but local Bolsheviks 
understood this move to be a threat to them. On 31 December (13 January) the 
Petrozavodsk Bolshevik party committee wrote to the party Central Committee to ask that 
the Olonets provincial soviet’s demands for machine guns be turned down.
32 The 
Bolsheviks then organised a Red Guard detachment composed of railroad workers and the 
workers of the Aleksandrovsk factory which met on 3 January to plan a demonstration for 
the following day in Petrozavodsk against the Menshevik-SR leadership of the provincial 
soviet. When the demonstration took place the 55
th railroad workers’ battalion joined in the 
protest despite the efforts of its commander to stop them doing so; he was disarmed and 
replaced.
33 Thereafter the demonstration passed without incident or bloodshed but forced 
the Olonets provincial soviet into an emergency session on the evening of the 4 and 5 (17 
and 18) January.
34  
 
At this session the representatives of the soldiers called for the full recognition of 
Sovnarkom and threatened to leave the provincial soviet and create their own soviet of 
soldiers’ deputies if the central government was not recognised. The representatives of the 
union of metal workers at the Aleksandrovsk factory and the representative of the union of 
woodworkers also supported the motion to recognise Sovnarkom. But there was still no 
consensus of opinion to permanently recognise the de facto government. Kudzhiev stressed 
that the timing of the socialist revolution was not right, that the peasantry prevailed over 
the workers in the ratio of social classes and as a consequence Sovnarkom would last but a 
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matter of months.
35 The centre SRs and other Menshevik Internationalists also supported 
the Constituent Assembly at the session. F.I. Prokhorov, a Menshevik Internationalist, 
remarked:
36  
 
Picture yourselves on a wide, deep, stormy river with flowering banks on both sides 
and all the dangers of crossing it. All of us, Bolsheviks and Mensheviks, yearn for 
socialism…we prefer to cross the river by canoe and not to take chances…The 
canoe is the Constituent Assembly. We want to be on the right track while you [the 
Bolsheviks] want to take risks. 
 
However the Bolsheviks found support in their criticism of the Mensheviks and 
remaining SRs from I.V. Balashov, a Left SR who had recently arrived as a representative 
of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee:
37  
 
The triumph of Bolshevism is only a reaction against the slack politics of 
the opportunistic socialists…And the criminal here is he who with shaky and 
overcooked (perederzhannyi) structures undermine the latest stage of the revolution 
and call for war against the soviets…The people are with us and not with this 
cowardice…Forward! To peace, to land, to freedom!  
 
  Unlike their Left SR counterparts in Petrograd who quickly dismissed their support 
for an all socialist coalition government and accepted government posts in Sovnarkom, the 
local Left SRs still advocated the formation of a socialist coalition in early January.
38 The 
Bolsheviks, realising that they were outnumbered on this issue, voted for the Left SR 
resolution to undermine the leading position of the Menshevik-SR bloc in the provincial 
soviet.
39 The Left SR resolution was passed by 67 votes to 41 but it did not change the 
provincial soviet’s political position. Supporting their previous stance, declared on 7 (20) 
December, the Olonets provincial soviet resolved that in order to help the country in its 
current financial and economic position it would only recognise a government formed from 
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all the socialist parties.
40 The soviet also resolved to call for the immediate convening of 
the Constituent Assembly and to hold new elections to the executive committee and 
presidium of the provincial soviet. These new elections were paramount to providing the 
Bolsheviks a more influential position in local government especially, when under pressure, 
Kudzhiev and his vice-chairman Komarov announced they would leave the presidium of 
the soviet.
41 Therefore when elections took place the following day the Left SRs and 
Bolsheviks had the opportunity to vote and make sure the political leadership of the 
province was in the hands of someone new.  
 
Indeed a new soviet executive committee and presidium, dominated by the Left 
SRs and Bolsheviks, was elected at the following session of the Olonets provincial soviet, 
5-6 (18-19) January. 63 representatives in total were present at the session: 18 Menshevik 
Internationalists, 17 SRs, 14 Bolsheviks, 10 representatives of the soldiers and 4 non-party 
members. The newly elected provincial executive committee consisted of 5 Bolsheviks, 6 
Menshevik Internationalists, 6 SRs (5 of whom were Left SRs), 3 representatives from the 
soldiers section and 1 non-party member.
42 The elections to the presidium of the provincial 
soviet provided the Bolsheviks with a majority. This body consisted of 2 Bolsheviks, 2 
Left SRs, 1 Menshevik Internationalist, and 1 representative of the soldiers.
43 A Bolshevik 
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affiliation of the soldiers’ representative in the presidium is unknown. Mashezerskii and Slavin, Bor’ba. 132; 
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majority was achieved when Valentin M. Parfenov was elected the new executive 
committee’s chairman and head of the presidium.
44  
 
The limits of Bolshevik authority and the beginnings of the Left SR-
Bolshevik alliance 
With the help of the Left SRs the Bolsheviks were transformed from a minority party to 
one in power within the space of a few days. Yet, the Bolsheviks’ development was only 
relative; despite their misgivings regarding a socialist coalition government they were 
forced to accept it. Moreover their growing influence in Petrozavodsk did not mean that 
they were strong throughout Karelia. The Kem’ district soviet, headed by the Mensheviks 
and SRs, did not recognise Sovnarkom and the Bolsheviks did not become the dominant 
political force there until 13 March, at which point, together with the Left SRs, they 
captured the leadership of the district soviet executive committee.
45  
 
As with the Menshevik-SR administration the Bolsheviks and Left SRs replaced, 
the administrative potential of the zemstvo institutions were exploited by the Bolsheviks 
and Left SRs. In short, the zemstvos provided a support base for the soviets in the localities, 
many of which had been formed in a makeshift manner. In fact a number of zemstvos were 
simply renamed as soviets with little change to their staff and without altering their 
structure or functions:
46 former zemstvo representatives entered the Olonets district soviet 
in mid-January 1918; in February the Tolvuiskaia parish zemstvo (Petrozavodsk district) 
was renamed the parish soviet of peasants’ deputies; and when the Povenets district soviet 
was founded in March its executive committee included members of the dissolved zemstvo, 
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including its former chairman.
47 The zemstvos remained part of Karelia’s governing 
administration up to March 1918; the Olonets provincial zemstvo was dissolved on 22 
February,
48 the Petrozavodsk district zemstvo was abolished during that same month while 
those in Kem’, Pudozh, Olonets and Povenets districts remained until March.
49 Parish 
zemstvos continued to function in Karelia into the summer of 1918.
50 
 
Similarly the duma administration continued to operate alongside the soviets. For 
example, the Pudozh town duma managed to force the Pudozh district soviet to broaden its 
membership during February 1918 after the duma’s original protest against the creation of 
a district soviet.
51 The Petrozavodsk town duma functioned up to 2 May 1918, and only 
then did a Bolshevik resolution dissolve it in spite of the SRs’ and Menshevik 
Internationalists’ complaints.
52 The fact that these non-soviet organs of local government 
remained intact and operated parallel to the soviets up to spring 1918 and in some cases 
even longer reflected the weak infrastructure of the Bolshevik and fledgling Soviet 
apparatus. The Bolshevik party were not yet influential enough to govern throughout the 
countryside without relying on the already existing governing institutions. The influence of 
the Left SRs here was also important considering that the party’s Central Committee in 
principle advocated the continuation of already existing and democratically elected organs 
to carry out various economic and social functions.
53 Local conditions therefore meant that 
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it was pragmatic for the Bolsheviks and Left SRs to work alongside the zemstvos and 
dumas until the soviets were more firmly established. 
 
Although the Bolsheviks became more influential in terms of their representation in 
the provincial soviet it is worth underlining that they were given the spring board to do so 
through their collaboration with the Left SRs. When the Left SRs convened their first 
meeting, on 28 January (10 February) 1918, its party members resolved to officially enter 
into a bloc with the Bolsheviks and elect a Left SR executive committee. I.V. Balashov 
became its chairman and A.A. Sadikov his deputy.
54 As mentioned above Ivan Balashov 
arrived as a representative of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee earlier in the 
month to help organise soviets and implement the decrees of the centre. He was joined by 
A.I. Alekseev, O.I. Toliarenok and M.M. Timonen, all of whom were Bolsheviks and 
helped establish soviets in Olonets, Pudozh and Povenets districts in January 1918.
55 The 
potential for a politically dominating Left SR-Bolshevik bloc was evident at the Third 
Olonets Provincial Congress of Peasants’ Deputies, 30 January (12 February) – 5 February 
(18 February) 1918.
56 In attendance were 44 Bolshevik delegates, 44 Left SRs, 48 
Mensheviks and Right SRs and 19 non-party representatives. In spite of protests from the 
SRs and Menshevik Internationalists, the majority of congress delegates resolved to 
endorse the dismissal of the Constituent Assembly and pass all power in Olonets province 
to the soviets, thus abandoning hopes for an all socialist coalition government.
57  
 
Therefore it was not until early February 1918, just over three months after the 
transition of power in the capital that the authority of Sovnarkom was finally recognised in 
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Petrozavodsk and this was only made possible by the cooperation between local Left SRs 
and Bolsheviks. However, following the official recognition of Sovnarkom in 
Petrozavodsk the Bolshevik party did not become the presiding political authority in the 
region; instead the emergent Left SRs became increasingly influential. A reflection of their 
influence is visible in the important portfolios they held in the Olonets provincial soviet by 
the end of February 1918: K.V. Almazov was commissar for finance; A.A. Sadikov 
commissar for agriculture and state property; A.P. Tikhomirov commissar for food and P.P. 
Panin commissar for internal affairs.
58 
 
Yet this onward march of the Left SRs did not occur without setbacks. On 1 March 
the Left SRs elected a temporary provincial party committee, but owing to the 
preoccupation of party members working in the soviets’ commissariats, a lack of finances 
and poor communications, the Left SRs found it difficult to form a permanent provincial 
organisation. By the time of the second national party congress (17-25 April 1918) this had 
still not been possible.
59 A.S. Rybak, the Olonets provincial representative, pointed out 
some of the reasons for this at the congress. He believed his province to be one of the 
remotest and most distant of all the provinces, not because of its geographical location but 
because of its accessibility. Rybak also pointed out that because of the province’s 
backwardness all events, like the recognition of Sovnarkom, took place belatedly. The 
arrival of Left SR party workers from Petrograd proved significant for the party’s 
organisational efforts but they remained constrained because, like the Bolsheviks, they had 
only a small number of intellectuals. In spite of these difficulties Rybak did state that the 
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construction of the Murmansk railroad facilitated the development of the Left SR party in 
Karelia: ‘…the influence of the party is unquestionable, its moral influence is great and 
spreads not only to the limits of Olonets province, but also to neighbouring districts and 
even to Archangel province because the Murmansk railroad passes through there...’
60 
According to Rybak the Left SRs were the dominant political force in Olonets province. 
He boasted: ‘in short, almost all local life was administered and is administered by the Left 
SRs.’
61 
  
Meanwhile the Bolsheviks suffered from the same organisational problems and 
remained an infant party in Karelia despite their strengthened position as a consequence of 
their political alliance with the Left SRs. A Petrozavodsk town Bolshevik party central 
committee did not come into existence until February 1918, at which time the party had no 
more than 100 members.
62 Party work was also undermined because members were 
overloaded with work in the soviets which meant attendance at party gatherings was poor. 
A number of ‘unreliable’ (neustoichivyi) members flocked to the party in early 1918 but 
their attendance at party gatherings was poor and the payment of contributions to the party 
suffered. The local party recognised its indiscipline and proposed to carry out a new and 
stricter registration of its members.
63 On 14 April 1918 local Bolsheviks re-organised the 
Petrozavodsk Bolshevik party central committee into a Petrozavodsk County Bolshevik 
party committee.
64 On the same day the party sent a telegram to the Secretariat of the 
Bolshevik party Central Committee stating that these re-elections had taken place. The 
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reason given by the local party for the re-elections was that the committee was too 
cumbersome (gromozdkii) because it had too many members; a smaller party committee, 
composed of seven people, would be more streamlined and more efficient because it was 
made up of ‘steadfast (ustoichivyi) and sound (zdorovyi)’ party members.
65 
 
Conclusion 
The above events reflect the importance local political factors played in the transfer of 
power to the soviets, in a peripheral region where Bolshevik influence was almost non-
existent. Despite the geographical proximity of Petrozavodsk to Petrograd the recognition 
of Sovnarkom’s authority occurred three months after the October coup and this was 
achieved not by the Bolsheviks but the Left SRs. It was their proposals put forward at the 
emergency session of the provincial soviet between 4 (17) and 5 (18) January which 
initiated a change of the ruling parties in Petrozavodsk. The Bolsheviks latched on to this 
opportunity and took up the leadership of the provincial soviet in what appears to be a Left 
SR-Bolshevik compromise; the Left SRs took up posts in the most important 
commissariats (with the exception of the military) while the Bolsheviks took the 
chairmanship of the presidium and executive committee. As will be shown in the following 
chapter the Left SR-Bolshevik bloc worked in relative harmony to endure a number of 
local crises in the spring of 1918. 
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Chapter 2 
The Left SR-Bolshevik Alliance: Cooperation Amidst Crisis, March-June 
1918 
The previous chapter showed how weak the Bolshevik party was in Karelia at the time of 
the October revolution and how, through the dispatch of party agitators and organisers 
from Petrograd and most importantly their collaboration in a bloc with the Left SRs, the 
Bolsheviks had gained a relatively strong foothold in the Olonets provincial soviet by early 
February 1918. This Left SR Bolshevik alliance within the provincial soviet remained 
united during the spring of 1918 when it faced the important task of overcoming various 
external and internal threats to the local Soviet regime. This chapter will argue that local 
political, military and economic factors shaped the revolution in Karelia and that there was 
little central control from the capital. Instead, local leaders survived the spring of 1918 
largely through their own efforts and the story of Karelia’s civil war at this time is one of 
remarkably staunch local resistance and political unity in the face of serious threats and 
challenges to Soviet power. 
 
Left SRs and Bolsheviks in Petrozavodsk were united in their condemnation of two 
policies favoured in Moscow, the Allies’ involvement in Murmansk and Trotsky’s 
insistence on appointing former tsarist offers to the fledgling Red Army. In fact the local 
Menshevik Internationalists also found common ground with their political adversaries on 
both these issues. Despite its differences with Moscow, and with minimal support from the 
centre, the Soviet regime in Karelia was also able to defeat an attack made on the region by 
White Finns in April while the unity of the Left SR Bolshevik alliance in the Petrozavodsk 
town soviet was reflected in its marginalisation of the remaining parties within this body. 
Although the revolution and civil war was shaped by political events peculiar to the region 
such as the Left SR Bolshevik alliance and the landing of the Allies, the civil war in 
Karelia was also affected by the poor economic conditions prevalent across Soviet Russia.   38 
During the spring of 1918 little central direction or control existed nationally, political 
power was “devolved” to the periphery, but Karelia was strapped for finances and on the 
brink of starvation due to the almost complete cessation of funds and grain supplies 
reaching Petrozavodsk from the capital. This led to local soviets relying on their own 
initiatives and what local resources were available to try and ease the shortages. However, 
these resources could only stretch so far and food and financial hardships contributed to a 
rebellion in Olonets town in June 1918. It was a problem which the Left SRs and 
Bolsheviks worked together to overcome, but ultimately collaboration with Moscow would 
be essential for the future.  
 
The Allied landings and the Karelian reaction 
The first landing of British soldiers in Murmansk on 6 March has been fairly well 
documented but only as far as this affected the relationship between the Murmansk soviet 
and the capital and the wider diplomatic consequences against the background of the First 
World War.
1 The relevance of the British landings in relation to the Olonets provincial 
soviet, however, has been overlooked, particularly in the English based historiography. As 
a result, how the collaboration of the Murmansk soviet with the Allies affected the Olonets 
provincial soviet demands further discussion. Essentially, the major issue for local leaders 
surrounding the landing of the Allies was the lack of coordination between the Soviet 
capital and Petrozavodsk. In other words Bolshevik authority at this stage of the revolution 
was particularly decentralised and because of a lack of contact from the centre local leaders 
were in a state of confusion over how to react to the landing of the Allies and the threat to 
the Murmansk railway line. As we shall see below this lack of communication was not the 
result of indecision in Petrozavodsk over how to react but in the capital. It was in Petrograd, 
against the background of the military threat from the Germans and the negotiations for the 
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Treaty of Brest Litovsk, where Bolshevik leaders hesitated and were unsure what their 
relationship with the Allies should be. 
   
The most striking feature of the landing of 130 or so British marines on 6 March in 
Murmansk was the fact that it occurred in concurrence not only with the wishes of the 
Murmansk soviet but the central authorities in Petrograd, most notably Trotsky.
2 In a book 
written at the height of the anti Trotsky campaign a leading Bolshevik Mikhail Kedrov 
chastised both Trotsky and the Murmansk soviet for accepting Allied aid but Kedrov made 
a valid observation concerning the effect of the telegram on local conditions:
3 
   
It brought confusion into the relations between the soviets of the Murmansk region 
and the Olonets and Archangel provinces, in that it authorised the Murmansk 
Soviet alone to conduct negotiations with the “Allies”, to assume leadership in the 
defence of the whole vast region, and to guard the entire Murmansk Railway, 
failing at the same time to apprise the other provincial centres of the measures 
taken…. 
 
Kedrov supported his assessment of the situation by producing a telegram issued by 
the Murmansk soviet sent on 5 March to all soviets along the railroad declaring that it had 
placed the district of Aleksandrovsk (Archangel province) and the railway from Murmansk 
to Zvanka under martial law on 2 March. The soviet asked all local governing 
administrations and committees to begin forming Red Army detachments and to carry out 
their work as normal while following instructions for the defence of the region from the 
Murmansk soviet and its military soviet. The latter included members of the English and 
French military missions situated there.
4 On 15 March the Olonets provincial soviet 
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executive committee declared its bewilderment at the Murmansk soviet’s apparent 
jurisdiction over the guarding of the railway line:
5 
 
We recognise that the concluding of an agreement between the Murmansk 
Soviet and the government agents of the Anglo French on the one hand contradicts 
the general direction of the politics of a worker peasants’ Russia, which rejects 
active collaboration with international imperialists, while on the other hand the 
agreement will subject the Murmansk region to the economic and military 
influence of the European governments, leading, in the end, to the development of 
separatism in conditions favourable to a capitalist system.  
We recognise that the revolutionary protection of the Murmansk railroad 
must be fulfilled exclusively by the Soviets and Railroad workers’ deputies, outside 
of any extraneous elements, and the best realisation of this goal would be through 
the sending of representatives from the Murmansk, Kem’ and Soroka Soviets to the 
Olonets provincial Soviet. 
 
This particular statement is significant because it showed that the Olonets 
provincial soviet executive committee, presided over by the Left SR Bolshevik alliance but 
also including Menshevik Internationalists, was united in its concern about the presence of 
the Allies in Murmansk and the defence of the railroad. The railway line was the spine to 
which all military strategy could be grafted and formed an important and direct link to the 
most important town in Karelia, Petrozavodsk, which in turn was an important preceding 
stop before Petrograd. It was therefore understandable that Petrozavodsk wanted to 
communicate with Murmansk, Kem’ and Soroka to find out exactly what was going on and 
where these soviets’ allegiances lay. Furthermore, from the standpoint of the Olonets 
provincial executive committee, the Murmansk soviet looked to have undermined 
Sovnarkom’s position towards the Allies which was against any kind of collaboration with 
imperialist countries. 
 
Because of the lack of clarity and the absence of any correspondence from the 
centre V.M. Parfenov and the chairman of the executive committee of the Murmansk 
railroad, L.V. Nikol’skii (a Menshevik Internationalist), contacted Trotsky’s secretary by 
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direct wire on 16 March to voice their concerns about the actions of the Murmansk soviet. 
Because of its importance it is worth quoting part of this conversation at length:
6 
 
The tactics of the Murmansk soviet is completely incomprehensible, on the 
one hand it appeals for the organisation of the Red Army for the defence of Soviet 
power, while on the other hand it is entering into a triumvirate with the 
representatives of England and France in the military soviet. It seems to be a 
strange and unintelligible fact that telegram No. 176 [from 5 March] was not 
addressed to Sovnarkom. All of this needs to be explained urgently, because the 
final tactic to be adopted towards the Murmansk soviet by the Olonets soviet and 
the soviet executive committee of the Murmansk railroad is dependent on it….  
We ask you to immediately communicate this question with comrade Lenin 
and to send his answer to us…send an answer before ten o’clock, or in extreme 
circumstances, before eleven o’clock this evening. It will have decisive 
significance. 
 ― [Trotsky’s secretary] I will convey everything to Lenin in Moscow 
immediately, but it is not likely that an answer will be given today because I will 
need to hand the note over to Moscow… 
― [Parfenov & Nikol’skii] Again we ask you to provide an answer by 
eleven o’clock, otherwise the circumstances compel us to make a final decision 
while not knowing Sovnarkom’s point of view, and it is highly possible, by all 
probability, separate from the point of view of the Murmansk Soviet which is 
fraught with serious consequences. That is all. We await your response. Good bye. 
 
The presence of the Allies therefore united local leaders in Petrozavodsk against a 
common enemy. Furthermore, Parfenov and Nikol’skii’s conversation again underlined the 
anxieties of the Olonets provincial executive committee; in their opinion what right had the 
Murmansk soviet, now supposedly in league with the Allies, to dictate terms to the other 
soviets along the Murmansk railroad in matters of defence? Was the Murmansk soviet now 
the higher authority in the region, according to some sort of agreement with Moscow? As 
the conversation highlights, Parfenov and Nikol’skii simply did not know and were 
alarmed at any proposed co operation with the Allies, hence their pressing demand for 
clarification on the matter from Lenin himself. The confusion was not assisted by the fact 
that the government and its commissariats had recently been relocated to Moscow, the first 
evacuations taking place on 10 March. Lenin did not reply to Petrozavodsk but Trotsky did 
on 22 March. His response followed a note received by him sometime shortly after 16 
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March, from a member of the Main soviet for the administration of the Northern railroad. 
It stated:
7 
 
I have spoke decisively and categorically through the apparatus with the 
chairman of the Murmansk soviet and received the answer from them that the 
aforementioned triumvirate of the Military soviet [meaning the English and French 
representatives] is working with your consent. It is incomprehensible to me that not 
even a copy of the telegrams from them to us, are being addressed to Sovnarkom. 
They have declared martial law all along the line from Murmansk to Zvanka. For 
the present I am annulling the orders…I spoke about all of this on the apparatus 
with comrade Lur’a, who was alone in Petrograd in the military commissariat. He 
did not answer me with anything concrete, having said that you are in Moscow, 
therefore I asked him to communicate with you in Moscow through the apparatus; 
up till now, however, I have heard nothing from you. 
 
  Trotsky’s reply was brief but at least it managed to clarify for the local soviets what 
the situation was:
8 
 
The Murmansk soviet is right when referring to my permission. I cannot enter into 
a polemics of principle by direct wire, concerning this comrade Lenin has 
published an article in “Pravda”, to which I refer you. It goes without saying that 
the military and technical advisors need to be watched carefully. 
 
The article Trotsky was referring to was ‘The Itch’ (o chesotke) published on 9 (22) 
February
9 and in order to understand its relevance to the confusion and lack of 
communication with Petrozavodsk it is necessary to briefly discuss the political situation in 
the capital. Peace was signed with Germany on 3 March but Lenin had been forced to 
overcome ‘left communist’ and Left SR critics over the separate peace. However, in the 
days immediately preceding the signing of the treaty Lenin was also at odds with ‘left 
communists’ and Left SRs over a different but connected issue.  
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‘The Itch’ came in the aftermath of Lenin’s endorsement of accepting Allied 
military aid for a revolutionary war against the Germans on 22 February, after the latter’s 
renewed advance on 18 February. The article also aimed to counter the opposition Lenin’s 
endorsement received from the ‘left communists’ and Left SRs who favoured a partisan 
based revolutionary war but without the interference of foreign imperialist aid.
10 Lenin 
accused his critics of suffering from the itch of ‘The Revolutionary Phrase’ which was the 
title of another article published by him in Pravda on 8 (21) February.
11 The Bolshevik 
leader defined the term as ‘the repetition of revolutionary slogans irrespective of objective 
circumstances at a given turn in events, in the given state of affairs obtaining at the time.’
12 
Lenin hoped to convince his doubters of the impracticalities of a revolutionary war and the 
need to accept Allied help against the Germans in such a revolutionary war if a separate 
peace was no longer possible. Nikolai Bukharin tendered his resignation from the 
Bolshevik Central Committee and his editorship of Pravda after the Central Committee 
voted, by a narrow majority of six votes to five, to accept a military agreement with the 
Allies on Trotsky’s proposal which was also supported by Lenin.
13 Lenin’s rationale was 
that the acceptance of help from one imperialist state in order to defend itself against the 
attack of another was acceptable if no other alternative was available and that the purpose 
of accepting the assistance was honourable i.e. for self defence and not further plunder (as 
Kerensky had sought). Anyone not understanding this, Lenin wrote, was either out of their 
mind or had contracted the itch.
14 
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Were the Bolsheviks in Petrozavodsk suffering from ‘the itch’? The obvious 
answer is that at least some of them were. Because of the shallow roots of the party in 
Karelia it is difficult to identify which Bolsheviks were ‘Leninists’ and which were ‘left 
communists’. This is made even more challenging by the fact that the First Olonets 
Provincial Bolshevik Party Conference did not take place until 6 7 August 1918, by which 
time the controversy over this matter had subsided and no mention was made of it. Of 
course Parfenov was the local party’s leading member at the time and spoke on behalf of 
the whole Olonets provincial soviet executive committee (Bolsheviks, Left SRs and 
Menshevik Internationalists) but the evidence remains too speculative to state that the 
Bolsheviks in Petrozavodsk were ‘left communists’ because of their hostility towards the 
Allies. Moreover, as we will see in Chapter 3, Bolshevik party members accepted the 
ratification of the Brest Litovsk Peace Treaty thus suggesting a significant number of 
Bolsheviks supported or came to support the ‘Leninist’ position.
15 Whatever the case, the 
important fact worth underlining here is that Petrozavodsk differed from the capital and the 
presence of a foreign foe united the Left SRs and Bolsheviks and the Menshevik 
Internationalists. The proximity of Murmansk to Petrozavodsk naturally gave local leaders 
in Karelia greater cause for anxiety than those in Petrograd or Moscow. The driving force 
of the correspondence coming from Petrozavodsk was local concerns; in the event of a 
military advance south by the Allies the Karelian region was in the front line and, as we 
will see in Chapter 3, this is what occurred. 
 
Arming the soviets: early organisation and recruitment efforts 
The evidence above indicates that the military threat faced by the Olonets provincial soviet 
executive committee in March 1918 united Left SRs, Bolsheviks and Menshevik 
Internationalists within this committee. This is made easier to understand considering that 
the military threat was accentuated by the lack of an armed force to defend the Soviet 
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regime. The Red Army, like in the majority of areas across the country at the beginning of 
1918, was still in its infancy. In Karelia its development began in earnest on 12 (25) 
January when the Olonets provincial executive committee recognised the need to organise 
a 480 person strong battalion composed of three equally numbered fighting squads 
(druzhini) from the workers of the Aleksandrovsk factory, Petrozavodsk’s other workers’ 
institutions and enterprises and the Murmansk railroad employees.
16 However, it was the 
breakdown in the Brest Litovsk peace negotiations in February 1918 which marked a 
significant turning point in the development of the Soviet army when Lenin announced the 
revolution to be in danger from the Germans.
17 It became imperative to work towards 
establishing a ‘regular’ and larger fighting force throughout the country which could 
defend the new Soviet state from the threat posed by imperialism or internal counter 
revolution. Hence on 23 February the Olonets provincial executive committee resolved to 
elect an emergency board with the authority to adopt plenipotentiary powers during periods 
of threat to the soviets.
18  
 
It is worth noting that the elections to this emergency board reflected the strong 
influence of the Left SRs. The Bolshevik chairman of the executive committee, V.M. 
Parfenov and the Left SRs A.A. Sadikov and A.M. Kuznetsov were elected its full 
members; its probationary members were the Left SRs N.I. Sidorov and I.V. Balashov. 
Thereafter, on 28 February, the Olonets provincial executive committee decided to 
organise Red Army detachments in Petrozavodsk and instruct the districts to do likewise. 
The executive committee ordered the creation of a nine man military soviet which reflected 
the cooperation of the main political parties in the Olonets provincial soviet. The military 
soviet included the three full members of the emergency board mentioned above plus the 
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Bolshevik A.V. Dubrovskii, a Menshevik Internationalist B.S. Gaupt, S.G. Borodulin 
(party affiliation unknown) and three ‘military specialists’.
19 
 
By the beginning of March 1918 the Germans were no longer advancing into 
Russian territory but in spite of the Treaty of Brest Litovsk the military threat posed by 
Germany remained and it was not known how long the peace would last. In the case of 
Karelia, Lenin’s concerns about the ability of the fledgling Soviet regime to fend off a 
German attack were fully justified. New recruits entering the ranks of the new Red Army 
were all but non existent and the number of Red Guard units remained low. 173 of the total 
230 recruits in Petrozavodsk in March came from the Aleksandrovsk factory, the majority 
of whom (150) were communists. A few small Red Guard detachments were also created 
in the district centres of Olonets province, in some villages and along the railway line but 
numbers were low.
20 In spite of the region’s manpower shortages 123 men drawn from 
party and trade union organisations in Petrozavodsk were sent to Petrograd after the capital 
appealed for the immediate dispatch of Red Army detachments to it on 4 March.
21 
  
Numbers remained low in the Red Guard because it relied on widespread support 
from the working classes while Karelia was a region, as noted in the introduction, which 
had a small urban population and few revolutionaries. This was confirmed by a report 
written sometime after 21 March but before 19 April to the All Russian Board for the 
Organisation and Administration of the Red Army by its representative in the region, I.V. 
Matveev. He noted that upon his arrival in Petrozavodsk from Petrograd on 1 March no 
Red Army existed and there were few people available to organise one. On 7 March he 
spoke at a meeting in the Aleksandrovsk factory to attract its workers to the ranks of the 
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army but with little success because, he stated, the workers of the factory had little 
enthusiasm to join the Red Army and there were very few genuine revolutionary workers.
22 
 
Resistance to former tsarist officers in the Red Army: the Skachkov case 
Nationally, the number of volunteers that made up the Red Guard was not high enough to 
defend the whole country and the revolution so a workers’ militia was substituted for a less 
class conscious but larger and more professional Red Army. This army was made up 
largely of peasant soldiers supplemented by a backbone of communists but it was the 
officer ranks of the Red Army which was its most controversial component: former tsarist 
officers. However, People’s Commissar for Military Affairs Trotsky realised the 
difficulties of forming a new Red Army without the military expertise of officers who had 
served in the tsarist army, ‘military specialists’ as he termed them. Beginning in March 
1918 and with the support of Lenin, Trotsky was able to pursue his policy of recruiting 
from the old officer corps despite strong opposition from the ‘left communists’ within the 
Bolshevik party who questioned the dependability of these officers and the adoption of a 
command structure similar to the Imperial army. Trotsky too had concerns over the 
reliability of some of the officers he aimed to conscript but sought to counter this with the 
appointment of a dual command system whereby the orders of former tsarist officers had to 
be countersigned by an appointed political commissar.
23 
 
The controversy over the use of military specialists filtered through to Karelia in 
the spring of 1918 where local leaders, unlike the capital, were united in their opposition. 
On the 5 April the chairman of the Olonets provincial soviet, V.M Parfenov, sent a 
telegram to the Military board in Petrograd expressing his displeasure at the scant support 
they were receiving and rejected the accusation, which had presumably been made on a 
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separate occasion from the centre, that the Red Guard in Olonets province was composed 
of agent provocateurs:
24 
 
The Red Army is being organised from selected elements. We are not assigning 
Skachkovs and the non party workers being sent from Petrograd. We will arrest 
provocateurs, spies, swindlers, or whoever…You are sending liars and 
provocateurs to us…We reject [your] criticism of our strenuously intensive work 
and did not deserve it. 
  
The apprehension of the ‘left communists’ in the capital based on the appointment of 
former tsarist officers to the army was therefore mirrored by the Bolsheviks in 
Petrozavodsk. Furthermore, the above telegrams showed that local leaders were attempting 
to recruit a more ‘reliable’ Red Guard by selecting workers who supported or sympathised 
with the party. Of course as Matveev’s experience at the Aleksandrovsk factory showed, 
there was little enthusiasm for joining the Red Army in Petrozavodsk and numbers were 
low, thus explaining Parfenov’s reference to Olonets province’s ‘strenuously intensive 
work.’ The capital was insensitive to these conditions and their accusations brought about 
Parfenov’s sharp response. 
  
At the same time as the Olonets Red Guard struggled to enlarge its forces, the 
Olonets provincial soviet executive committee refused to enlist officers sent to them from 
Petrograd. One such officer sent from Petrograd which sparked Parfenov’s indignation was 
Ia.P. Skachkov. A former tsarist officer, Skachkov was the commander of a battalion 
assigned by Trotsky on 28 February to defend the Finnish border and he demanded a strict 
discipline amongst his men. However, when he ordered the arrest of the chairman of the 
battalion’s soldiers’ committee along with three other soldiers the Olonets provincial soviet 
executive committee accused Skachkov of counter revolution and recruiting ‘White 
Guards’ because he had appointed former tsarist officers to his staff. On 20 March the 
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executive committee decided unanimously to arrest him and his battalion was temporarily 
disarmed. The following day a telegram was sent to Trotsky stating that Skachkov was 
under arrest and a request was made to send a representative of the People’s Commissariat 
for Military Affairs to take part in an investigation commission. In the meantime a search 
of Skachkov’s flat revealed little except a number of maps and forms, a few boxes 
containing explosives and an Okhrana notebook about trains.
25  
 
The Olonets provincial soviet executive committee was clearly uncomfortable with 
the establishment of a command structure within the Red Army which seemed to resemble, 
in part, the old Imperial army. It therefore wanted to know how many former tsarist army 
officers were in Petrozavodsk and where they were. On 23 March 1918 the executive 
committee ordered all officers residing in the town to register with the soviet and all 
officers who were unemployed and non natives of Olonets province to return to their own 
homes.
26 In Skachkov’s case, he was put on trial on 18 April by the Olonets provincial 
revolutionary tribunal which found him guilty of ‘separatist aspirations’, ‘ignoring the 
principles of revolutionary construction’ and ‘undermining the authority of the measures 
taken by the workers peasant government for the creation of a Red Army.’ He was 
sentenced to one month imprisonment and deprived of the right to serve in the army 
indefinitely.
27 According to one memoir Skachkov was arrested again sometime after and 
shot for counter revolutionary activity.
28 
 
  The Skachkov incident showed the united front put up by the Bolshevik and Left 
SR parties in opposition to the Leninists in the capital who advocated the appointment of 
former tsarist officers. Although there are no direct references to the Left SRs expressing 
their opinion of the Skachkov affair the local Left SR party leader, Ivan Balashov, spoke 
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out against the creation of a regular Red Army in Petrozavodsk on 28 March.
29 Because, in 
principle, the party advocated a militia style army to wage a revolutionary war against 
capitalism, it is therefore logical that they opposed the appointment of former tsarist 
officers. Finally, the decision to arrest Skachkov was made unanimously by the provincial 
executive committee which reflected the collaboration of Bolsheviks and Left SRs with the 
Menshevik Internationalists.  
 
The controversy over tsarist officers joining the Red Army coupled with the threat 
of the Allies also influenced a compromise of sorts between the Left SRs and the 
Bolsheviks over the formation of a regular army. For instance, although Balashov had 
spoken out against the creation of the Red Army, as part of the give and take in the Left 
SR Bolshevik alliance he agreed to sit on a commission for the organisation of a Red 
Guard and Red Army alongside 4 Bolshevik members on 8 April.
30 The establishment of a 
provincial Cheka also reflected the desire for compromise within the alliance. Later in the 
year at the opening day of a conference of Chekas from the Northern region, on 15 October, 
the Olonets provincial representative N.N. Dorofeev explained that his Cheka was formed 
in connection with the operations of the Anglo French and the Czechs.
31 On 18 April at a 
session of the Vecheka, the highest organ of the Bolsheviks’ security police, a report from 
Petrozavodsk was discussed in which the latter asked Moscow to send representatives of 
the Vecheka to Petrozavodsk to investigate a ‘White Guard’ organisation. The Vecheka 
refused, stressing that the Petrozavodsk soviet carry out the investigation independently.
32 
As a result a five member Olonets provincial Cheka was established on 19 April, almost a 
month after the Vecheka ordered all local soviets to immediately begin creating their own 
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Chekas.
33 Although it has not been possible to ascertain the party affiliation of all the 
provincial Cheka members at this time, at least two were Bolsheviks and at least two were 
Left SRs.
34 
 
United local resistance: the attack of the White Finns 
The attack and advance of the White Finns into Karelia during March to April 1918 also 
strengthened the local Bolshevik Left SR alliance and reflected its willingness to work 
with the Menshevik Internationalists as they met this military threat with little outside help 
and assembled a force capable of repelling the White Finns. The Finns crossed the border 
at three main points towards the end of March/early April with the hope of engaging the 
Red Finns based in the Kandalaksha region and capturing Kem’ town. The two most 
northern advances of White Finns were defeated on 7 and 8 April at Tolvandozero and 
Sokolozero respectively. By this time the battle for Kem’ was drawing to a climax and on 
9 April the White Finns were only 3 4 kilometres from the town. They attacked the 
following morning but were defeated and sent into retreat towards the Finnish border.
35 
However, owing to the spring thaw, the poor conditions of the roads and a lack of Soviet 
troops the White Finns remained on Karelian soil in the border parishes of Kem’ district 
until the autumn of 1918.
36 Nevertheless, on 20 April the Menshevik Internationalist 
chairman of the Murmansk railway executive committee, L.V. Nikol’skii, reported to the 
People’s Commissariat for Military Affairs that Kem’ was in Soviet hands.
37 
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Broadly speaking, when the White Finns attacked, the local soviets were left to 
defend themselves despite their lack of Red Army recruits and weapons. Although 
Matveev’s attempts to recruit troops at the Aleksandrovsk factory in March, described 
above, were largely unsuccessful, 200 workers did agree to enrol into partisan detachments 
to face the White Finns.
38 However, upon arriving in Petrozavodsk that month I.V. 
Matveev also noted that Petrozavodsk only had enough provisions to support 200 men for 
a month, there were hardly any uniforms and the barracks in the town had been destroyed 
by fire. In fact he was forced to travel back to Petrograd in March to acquire uniforms and 
weapons because all Petrozavodsk had were old Berdan rifles.
39 Despite his trip Matveev’s 
efforts were inadequate for the conflict with the White Finns and during the fighting 
Petrozavodsk received regular requests from Kem’ and Povenets districts demanding men 
and supplies.
40 The demands then passed further up the administrative chain; at the height 
of the main White Finnish push for Kem’, the People’s Commissariat for Military Affairs 
received pressing reports from Petrozavodsk on 4, 11, 12 and 13 April, stressing the 
insufficient strength of the Red forces and the urgent need for reinforcements, weapons, 
money and commanding personnel.
41 It is unclear if these demands were met by the capital. 
Matveev’s aforementioned report to the All Russian Board for the Organisation and 
Administration of the Red Army, during the White Finnish attacks, stated that the Olonets 
provincial executive committee’s demands for resources had been refused but they were 
promised help in the future. However, more than three weeks had passed by the time of 
Matveev’s report and local leaders still knew nothing about the allocation of funds to 
Petrozavodsk. Consequently, the recruitment of soldiers to the Red Army was taking place 
without uniforms or money and Matveev warned that if they did not receive funds soon it 
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was impossible to stop the enlisted men returning home: ‘I have appealed to you before 
with a request for the sending of finances, but up to now I have received no reply.’
42 
 
The defence of the region, albeit a makeshift one, was therefore made possible 
largely through local measures. For instance, more partisan detachments were created in 
Olonets and Povenets districts during March and April.
43 On 25 March the Kem’ district 
executive committee, which consisted of both Bolsheviks and Left SRs, sent out telegrams 
to all the parishes under its jurisdiction to register weapons and organise a Red Army to 
meet the advance of the White Finns. Furthermore, on 30 March a military board was 
created from representatives of the Kem’ district soviet executive committee, Kem’ 
railway station, workers from the neighbouring Popov Island and local inhabitants of Kem’ 
town.
44 A few Red Guard detachments were also formed in the surrounding towns and 
railway stations but they were few in number and poorly armed.
45  
 
More personnel and material support were therefore imperative and it came from 
almost every source available. Support arrived from Archangel on 6 April when an ice 
breaker brought 120 Red Guards, weapons and ammunition to Kem’.
46 Shortly afterwards, 
the local soviet’s position was strengthened further with the arrival of Red Guard troops 
from Petrograd under the command of I.D. Spiridonov.
47 Red Finnish troops, 800 of whom 
were based at Kandalaksha, were also brought into action and helped defeat the White 
Finns at Tolvandozero, Sokolozero and Kem’.
48 Finally, the Allies, who had landed in 
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Murmansk the previous month to defend the northern supply port against a possible 
German attack out of Finland, were called upon to help fend off the White Finnish 
incursions. A leading official of the Murmansk government at the time, G.M. Veselago, 
held a conversation by direct line with the head of the military soviet in the northern 
railway town of Kandalaksha (Kem’ district), on 8 April. The local military official in 
Kandalaksha informed Veselago that he had been contacted by the Soroka military board 
and the commander of the Kem’ military sector, a former tsarist officer, for help to defend 
Kem’. Veselago was non committal but stated he would ask Moscow.
49 Veselago himself 
did not receive a reply but the chairman of the Murmansk soviet A.M. Iuriev did and it 
came from Stalin who wired ‘Accept aid’.
50 Subsequently an armoured train with a 
combination of Russian and French troops made its way to guard Kandalaksha station.
51 
Despite this move the Allies did not become involved in any military action; instead their 
presence in Kandalaksha and this town’s willingness to accept them indirectly supported 
the Kem’ sector by acting as defensive cover for the Red Finns who were in action against 
the northern White Finnish advance mentioned above.  
 
  The defence of Karelia between March and April 1918 underlined the unity of the 
local soviets against a common enemy in the shape of the White Finns. This solidarity was 
reflected further by the need to suppress a short lived rebellion in Kem’ town which came 
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hot on the heels of the White Finns’ retreat from there.
52 Together these crises also showed 
the isolated position Karelia was in owing to the lack of any substantial support from the 
capital. During March and April Sovnarkom was preoccupied with the Germans and the 
uncertainty of how long the Brest Litovsk peace would last. Priority was given to creating 
defensive positions further south, directed against the Germans in the Baltic States, Belarus 
and the Ukraine. It was only when the White Finns crossed the border that some small 
efforts were made to support the region in the form of Spiridonov’s regiment and some 
weapons and ammunition. But broadly speaking a hastily constructed force, achieved 
through local efforts, defeated the White Finns.  
 
Some indirect support for Kem’ had come from the Allies but it was the 
Kandalaksha soviet, much closer to Murmansk in geography and opinion towards the 
Allies, which accepted the defensive cover provided by the Russian and French task force. 
Petrozavodsk had no control over what was going on there and local conditions dictated 
the need to take independent measures. On 23 April the Kandalaksha soviet received a 
telegram from Petrozavodsk ordering the withdrawal of Allied troops from there which 
was met defiantly. The SR chairman of the Kandalaksha soviet considered the order ‘an 
usurpation of soviet authority in the localities’ and believed there was a complete 
ignorance of the military situation on the part of Petrozavodsk: ‘…this compels the 
Kandalaksha soviet to consider your order insufficient (nedostochno)…the Kandalaksha 
soviet will not allow (dopustit’) any kind of centralisation.’
53  
 
Neutralising the political opposition 
Although the Left SRs and Bolsheviks were willing to put differences with Menshevik 
Internationalists to one side when it came to external military threats to the Soviet regime 
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the Left SR Bolshevik alliance marginalised the political position of the Menshevik 
Internationalists and remaining SRs in Petrozavodsk during the spring. On 3 April 1918 the 
Olonets provincial soviet executive committee met and elected a temporary presidium of 
the provincial executive committee which reflected the dominance of the Left SR 
Bolshevik alliance. The permanent election of the presidium was scheduled to take place 
but was delayed because of the White Finnish attacks which prevented some of the 
peasants’ deputies in the districts from taking part. Nevertheless three representatives each 
from the Bolshevik and Left SR parties were elected to the temporary presidium.
54 
  
The Menshevik Internationalists, the largest minority in the Olonets provincial 
soviet, were still tolerated in Petrozavodsk during the spring of 1918. The party’s minority 
standing in the town was reflected, in part, at a session of the provincial soviet executive 
committee on 15 April where two Bolsheviks, two Left SRs and one Menshevik 
Internationalist were elected to represent Olonets province at the forthcoming First 
Congress of Soviets of the Northern Region on 25 April in Petrograd.
55 However, the 
remaining SRs in Petrozavodsk were persecuted by the Left SR Bolshevik bloc from 
February 1918 and relied on it for the party’s political expression. In mid late February the 
chairman of the SRs, G.I. Prokhorov, appealed to the Olonets provincial soviet executive 
committee for information about the detainment by an investigatory commission of its 
members for publishing leaflets. On 18 February the Olonets provincial executive 
committee appealed to the investigatory commission to release the SRs but to destroy all 
copies of the published leaflets.
56 On 11 April the provincial executive committee then 
turned down an appeal from the Petrozavodsk SR party executive committee to allot them 
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premises to organise lectures because ‘your party [the SRs] does not participate and does 
not wish to take part in soviet work.’
57  
 
The dominant position of the Left SRs and Bolsheviks in Petrozavodsk was a topic 
of a heated debate at a meeting to discuss the reorganisation of the Petrozavodsk town 
soviet on 11 April.
58 A.G. Kapustkin of the centre SRs complained that his party had only 
been apportioned one place and that all parties should be represented equally within the 
soviet. V.M. Kudzhiev of the Menshevik Internationalists also expressed the desire to have 
a more equal distribution amongst the parties in the soviet and recommended five places to 
every party. His motion was supported by another member of the centre SRs, G.I. 
Prokhorov. Furthermore, Kudzhiev condemned the effect the controlling influence of the 
Left SR Bolshevik coalition was having on political freedoms: ‘At the current time there is 
a system of terror in Petrozavodsk so how, then, are opposition parties meant to elucidate 
their ideology if they are not permitted to arrange meetings where different political 
tendencies can engage with one another. How can you talk about sympathy for the lower 
strata when you do not wish to speak with them?’
59 
 
What did Kudzhiev mean by a system of terror? He was almost certainly making 
reference to a resolution at the Third Olonets Provincial Congress of Peasants’ Deputies, 
on 14 February 1918, which supported the disbanding of the Constituent Assembly, a 
resolution condemned by the Menshevik and Right SR representatives.
60 The local 
Bolsheviks’ and Left SRs’ support of the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly came as 
a serious blow to Kudzhiev and all other Menshevik Internationalists because it fatally 
undermined their political goals; the party as a whole advocated an agreement between 
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Bolsheviks, all other socialist parties and democratic organisations and the formation of a 
homogenous socialist government.
61 Moreover, Kudzhiev’s reference to a system of terror 
and the lack of political freedoms could also have been linked to the decision by the 
Olonets provincial soviet executive committee on 9 April to arrest five leading members of 
the Kadet party who had taken part in a recent meeting of the Petrozavodsk town union of 
teachers, a movement deemed to be anti Soviet.
62  
 
In the face of criticism the Bolsheviks and Left SRs stuck by one another. On 
behalf of the Bolsheviks A.A. Zuev defended their use of ‘terror’ because it was being 
used against the ‘enemies of the people’ and denounced Kudzhiev, as a member of the 
intelligentsia, for not siding with the proletariat as he had previously refused the position of 
commissar for justice.
63 Therefore if Kudzhiev was accusing the Bolsheviks of not 
listening to the lower strata of society then Zuev believed Kudzhiev too was guilty for not 
accepting the post of commissar for justice. Why Kudzhiev rejected the position is difficult 
to know for certain because he could have had the opportunity to influence and tone down 
any political repressions. It therefore may have been simply a matter of moral principle and 
Kudzhiev did not want to be involved in a Bolshevik Left SR system of justice. The 
Bolshevik seizure of power had placed the Internationalists in a dilemma over how to react; 
they wanted to support the proletariat but were repelled by the actions of the Bolsheviks. 
Arrests and the outlawing of political freedoms was something despised by both Kudzhiev 
and his party.
64 
  
When the Left SR K.V. Almazov spoke he defended the preferential representation 
of the Bolsheviks and the Left SRs within the Petrozavodsk soviet: ‘It is clear that only the 
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Bolsheviks and the Left Socialist Revolutionaries will carry out the policies of the Soviet 
government.’
65 The debates then became very heated as the SRs and Menshevik 
Internationalists repeatedly harangued the next Bolshevik speaker, I.V. Elpedinskii, and 
accused his party of forcing them underground. Valentin Parfenov, the chairman of the 
meeting, struggled to keep the gathering under control and the SRs and Menshevik 
Internationalists walked out. The proposal of the provincial executive committee regarding 
the composition of the Petrozavodsk town soviet was then passed by a majority by 33 
votes to 17 with 7 abstentions.
66 Outside of the Left SR Bolshevik coalition all political 
parties were now virtually powerless to influence the decisions of the Petrozavodsk soviet. 
There was no Menshevik SR bloc or a Menshevik political comeback in Petrozavodsk 
during the spring of 1918, as there was elsewhere.
67  
 
Local food supply initiatives 
The economic breakdown of the Soviet regime was particularly acute in Karelia and was 
recognised as a problem by the local soviets to try and alleviate. On 12 January the Olonets 
provincial soviet attempted to improve the food shortages by reshuffling the food supply 
apparatus in Petrozavodsk. The soviet selected new members to enter the provincial food 
committee and created a food commission attached to the provincial soviet to work 
together with the existing food committees.
68 However, the food commission was only a 
temporary measure and was dissolved in early February along with the existing provincial 
food committee by the Third Olonets Provincial Congress of Peasants’ Deputies. In the 
place of these food supply organs the congress created a provincial food board which 
consisted of eleven members, nine from the congress and two from the soviet of workers’ 
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and soldiers’ deputies. The food board was attached to the provincial soviet and was 
headed by a provincial commissar for food who, in light of the acute food shortages, was 
given ‘wide discretionary powers’ (shirokie polnomochiia).
69 The new commissar for food 
was A.P. Tikhomirov, the former chairman of the Lodeinoe Pole district soviet executive 
committee and a Left SR. 
 
His task was an extremely difficult one. No sooner was he appointed than regular 
reports came in from the districts telling of the food shortages and requesting more grain. 
Because of the lack of sufficient support the districts were often allowed to struggle with 
what local supplies they had and compelled to carry out makeshift solutions and initiatives. 
Some peasant parishes took it upon themselves to gather foodstuffs and targeted local 
businesses. At the beginning of February 1918 the peasants of Lekh Navoloka village, 
Shuiskaia parish, Petrozavodsk district, requisitioned 38 sacks of flour from a local timber 
firm and redistributed it around seven villages of a parish peasant society.
70 
 
The Pudozh district executive committee decided to send its commissar for finance, 
L.A. Gizhitskii, to Petrozavodsk in person on 29 January (11 February) 1918 to discuss 
and attempt to find solutions to his district’s lack of food and finances. The Pudozh district 
soviet had only recently been established on the 16 (29) January and shortly after, on the 
17 (30) or 18 (31) January, had appealed to the Olonets provincial soviet for instructions 
and the transfer of 5000 roubles for organisational expenses.
71 It is not known if this 
request was met in part, in full, or not at all but whatever the case, shortly after arriving in 
Petrozavodsk, Gizhitskii was permitted to travel to Petrograd to discuss and seek assistance 
to Pudozh district’s problems.
 He arrived in Petrograd on 14 February and during his trip 
met with a number of high ranking commissars including the People’s Commissar for 
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Finance, V.R. Menzhinskii, and M.I. Latsis, head of the Commissariat for Internal Affair’s 
department of local government.
72 The trip was a material success; Latsis authorised the 
transfer of a 10,000 rouble loan to the Pudozh district treasury and Gizhitskii secured 
another 10,000 roubles, this time an allowance, for the maintenance of the orphanage in 
Pudozh.
73 On the 15 February he also met with Lenin himself. In Gizhitskii’s account of 
the conversation with the Bolshevik leader, which lasted over an hour, he stated: ‘In 
particular I acquainted comrade Lenin with all the needs of Pudozh district at this time and 
the general situation in Olonets province with regards to living conditions. Lenin was 
particularly interested in the population’s everyday life, with the timber and fishing 
industries and other ways of life in the North.’
74 As a result of this meeting, celebrated in 
the regional soviet historiography, Lenin wrote and passed to Gizhitskii a note which was 
used to secure for Karelia two trains loads of grain from Ekaterinoslav province, part of 
which had arrived in Petrozavodsk by Gizhitskii’s return on 20 February 1918.
75 
  
Gizhitskii’s sojourn in Petrograd was significant because it showed that Lenin and a 
number of other commissars in the capital were acquainted with Karelia’s problems and 
that petitioning in person and making personal contacts had proved successful. In other 
words, responding to a telegram request for support could be shelved or ignored more 
easily than a request made in person. Gizhitskii’s meetings in the capital are made more 
significant when considering that he was not a Bolshevik. Although his party affiliation is 
unknown, when the Pudozh soviet was created he was referred to as a representative of the 
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‘working intelligentsia’.
76 His discussions with the commissars in the capital also 
underlined the ‘devolution’ of Soviet power in this period. According to Gizhitskii’s 
account the conversations he held during his stay in Petrograd led him to believe that:
77  
 
It was made specifically clear that in the localities all soviets are autonomous in 
their own affairs…only in provincial wide issues do local soviets enter into 
discussion with the provincial soviet, while Sovnarkom’s orders and decrees, of 
course, are to be carried out without fail but the methods of implementing 
them…depends entirely on the soviets in the localities.   
 
The assistance received by Gizhitskii did not solve the food shortage problem for 
the entire Karelian region, particularly in the spring when stocks were at a general low 
point. Because of the lack of sufficient support from the provincial centre or the capital the 
supply of the region with foodstuffs continued in a localised and makeshift fashion during 
the spring of 1918. Again the wealthier members of society were targeted. Up to April 
1918 local ‘kulaks’ (wealthy peasants) in Kem’ district and timber firms and ‘kulaks’ in 
Petrozavodsk district were singled out for requisitioning by soldiers and the local 
peasantry.
78 But the dilemma of food supply was often a problem of distribution. In other 
words certain districts or parishes were inevitably slightly better off than others so 
competition and rivalry between districts and parishes for scare resources was common. 
On 1 March 1918, the chairman of the Olonets district soviet, Mikhail Chubriev, sent a 
telegram to Tikhomirov asking that food products be urgently sent to the district because 
hundreds of people from the parishes had gathered in Olonets town to demand grain. 
Chubriev was however unable to meet their requests because the stores of the district food 
committee were empty and the neighbouring Lodeinoe Pole district soviet had detained 
produce destined for Olonets district. As a result, he planned to send an armed detachment 
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to Lodeinoe Pole.
79 It is not known if the armed detachment was sent but whatever the case, 
it did not solve the food supply problem in the district. 
 
A similar conflict within the parishes occurred on 20 March. The chairman of the 
Kondopozhskaia parish soviet in Petrozavodsk district informed Tikhomirov that the 
village of Lizhma had a stock of 540 puds of grain but its citizens refused to issue any to 
other villages and refused to recognise the parish soviet.
80 Presumably Lizhma still 
supported the zemstvo system but such conflicts over food stores in the Karelian districts, 
regardless of politics, can also be interpreted as the natural desire of individual district or 
parish authorities to look after the interests of their own citizens while forsaking other 
neighbouring districts or parishes. This parochial outlook was of course ironic considering 
that the Karelian districts depended on the grain surplus provinces to supply the consumer 
provinces with foodstuffs and not simply look after their own interests.  
 
The reliance on local solutions to aid the food crisis and the strain on relations this 
caused between different governing agencies resurfaced in April. On this occasion the 
competition for resources involved the executive committee of the Murmansk railroad 
which refused to release grain from its stores, rumoured in the spring of 1918 to contain up 
to ten months worth of grain (this was impossible, in reality, because of the lack of storage 
facilities). In a telegram to the Kem’ soviet on 22 April the chairman of the railroad 
executive committee, L.V. Nikol’skii, reported that the Murmansk railroad executive 
committee could offer no assistance to the isolated parishes of Kem’ district because the 
committee only had enough grain to last another month and the amount of grain in their 
stores had been grossly overestimated. Furthermore, they were obliged to supply the Red 
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Finns guarding the railway line from the White Finns. Nikol’skii in fact believed the 
railroad workers should be prioritised and asked for assistance in helping to supply them. 
After all if work on the line stopped because of a lack of food then this would have a 
disastrous effect on the transportation of provisions to the population in the provinces of 
Olonets and Archangel.
81 
 
Local finances 
The adoption of independent initiatives in Karelia to ease local problems in the spring of 
1918 was also evident in the financial sphere. On 3 April 1918 the majority of Left SRs in 
the Olonets provincial executive committee proposed that the alcohol kept in the 
storehouse in Petrozavodsk should be made available for sale. The Bolsheviks on the other 
hand believed that the alcohol should be destroyed. The desire to get rid of the alcohol no 
doubt sprang from entirely practical reasons: to remove the temptation for drunkenness and 
unruly behaviour amongst the population, especially amongst the Red Guards. Less then a 
month previously, at another session of the provincial executive committee on 11 March, a 
few civilians and Red Guards had been sent to prison for drunken and violent conduct.
82 
What to do with the alcohol however remained a contentious issue; a final decision was not 
reached despite there being a majority vote (14 votes to 8) to destroy the alcohol. As 
something of a compromise between the Left SRs and the Bolsheviks a commission was 
established to draw up plans on how its destruction would be carried out but also to discuss 
further the possibility of selling the liquor.
83  
 
A relatively trivial issue therefore brought out important differences of approach 
regarding the prioritisation of military security or finance. However, there may also have 
been a different approach to the alcohol in Petrozavodsk because of the two parties’ 
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differing approaches towards free trade; the Left SRs advocated independent initiatives 
within the economy whereas the Bolsheviks adhered to centralism and state control. That 
said, both parties realised the need for finance and the Bolsheviks apparently bowed to the 
Left SRs preference to sell the alcohol. On 31 May the Bolshevik dominated Petrozavodsk 
town soviet appealed to the provincial soviet executive committee to transfer money to the 
town soviet made from the sale of approximately 2500 vedros of vodka.
84 
 
Gizhitskii’s trip to Petrozavodsk was also used by local leaders in Petrozavodsk to 
sound out the potential for some future investment in Karelia. Before departing from 
Petrozavodsk Gizhitskii was asked by the provincial soviet to find out the progress of their 
application for the construction of a lateral railway line from Medvezh’ia Gora to Kotlas, 
which would intersect the main route to Archangel and pass near Pudozh.
85 The goal of the 
project was described as the exploitation of Pudozh’s rich forestry but naturally it would 
make supplying the district with foodstuffs easier and connect it with superior grain 
producing regions in central and southern Russia. In short it was a southern alternative to 
the northern option which would begin in Soroka and move eastwards to Onega in 
Archangel province. These plans, at such a chaotic period, appeared to be extremely 
ambitious but at the same time the construction of a railway line offered important 
economic benefits for a grain deficit region like Karelia; the change of regime must have 
brought fresh encouragement for planners and the hope for financial investment in the 
region. 
 
Nevertheless, it was grossly impractical to undertake such a project during the civil 
war when the centre’s resources were scarce and its efforts were channelled towards basic 
survival. Moreover the construction of a lateral railway line was presumably a longer term 
plan for the economic development of the Russian north; it would take time to offer the 
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beginnings of any economic improvement. Even with the completion of the Murmansk 
railway line the supply of Karelia was hamstrung by the country’s logistical problems in 
general. On 10 April the All Russian Executive Committee learned from N.P. Bruikhanov, 
of the People’s Commissariat for Food that, had it not been for the chaotic conditions of 
the railway lines, the central regions would have received 150 million puds of grain from 
Siberia instead of the 5 million puds which did make it through.
86 From 24 December 1917 
(6 January 1918) to 4 April 1918, 91 train carriage loads of vital products (predmety pervoi 
neobkhodimosti) destined for Karelia were delayed at Ekaterinburg, Vologda, Tikhvin, 
Cherepovets and Zvanka stations.
87 
 
These logistical problems encouraged local leaders to persist in their requests for a 
southern lateral railway line in Karelia lest they lose out in central financing and the 
northern line option received approval. On 27 April the chairman of the Olonets provincial 
executive committee, wrote to Moscow to complain about the plan to build a northerly 
lateral line, beginning in Soroka. He protested ardently that the plan completely overlooked 
the rich districts of Povenets, Pudozh and Kargopol’ not to mention all of Vologda. In turn 
he asked for the project to be re examined and to look further into the southern option 
beginning in Medvezh’ia Gora. He also stressed that if the line ran to Luza station on the 
Kotlas line and connected to Perm then it would shorten the transit of loads from Siberia. 
Furthermore, the rich forestry of Olonets province, the minerals in the Zaonezh’e region 
and the development of cattle rearing in the province’s parishes would open up a 
significant market of goods for trade with other regions.
88 The Olonets provincial 
executive committee’s hopes for a southern lateral line were never achieved with 
                                                 
86 Moreover, the modest improvement made possible by the opening up of water navigations nearer the end 
of March was undermined by the Treaty of Brest Litovsk which saw the loss of the Ukraine and the Southern 
Caucasus. S. Malle, The Economic Organisation of War Communism, 1918 1921. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1985. 356.  
87 RGVA, f.1, op.1, d.175, l.38. 
88 Ibid. d.213, l.12 13.   67 
preference given to the northern option; a branch line from Soroka to Obozerskaia station 
however was not operational until September 1941.
89 
 
Outside of the direct allocation of funds from the capital the most obvious way to 
produce much needed revenue was local taxation that targeted the wealthier members of 
society. This was in fact encouraged from the centre; in February 1918 the People’s 
Commissariat for Internal Affairs circulated a telegram urging soviets to tax the propertied 
classes.
90 On 22 February 1918 the Olonets provincial executive committee introduced a 
tax in the province with a total allotted target (razverstka) of 9 million roubles. All people 
having capital or enterprises of a value more than 7200 roubles were obliged to contribute 
to the target.
91 Local taxation was something agreed upon by the Left SR Bolshevik bloc in 
Petrozavodsk. However, the implementation of the taxation order depended on local 
political conditions. In Povenets district in early March 1918 the district soviet executive 
committee, which had no Bolshevik party members and consisted of a mixture of SRs, 
Mensheviks and Kadets, rejected the imposition of a tax in preference for the collection of 
a loan from the propertied classes in the district.
92 
 
Parish soviets also took it upon themselves to tax local individuals because of a 
lack of any alternative source of income.
93 At the second Spasopreobrazhenskaia parish 
congress of soviets (18 22 April) in Petrozavodsk district the delegates imposed a parish 
wide tax amounting to 93,884 roubles on local traders, mill owners and speculators. In this 
instance, the tax was introduced on a sliding scale and depended on the size of the 
enterprise subjected to pay it. For example, a wholesale merchant in the parish was 
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required to pay 15,000 roubles while on the other hand a small scale trader working from a 
stall was obliged to pay 100 roubles. 90% of the parish budget’s income for 1 April 1918 
to 1 January 1919 was compiled from the taxation of local ‘kulaks’. 35% of the collected 
tax was transferred to the Petrozavodsk district soviet with the remaining sum being used 
by the parish for road construction, medical services, schools and administrative costs for 
the parish executive committee and rural soviets. The collection of the tax was met 
aggressively in some cases: two representatives of the Spasopreobrazhenskaia parish soviet 
were attacked by the inhabitants of Pialozero village for trying to explain and implement 
the parish congress’s decisions at a peasant gathering.
94    
 
Finally, in the absence of sufficient support from the centre but encouraged by 
Sovanrkom’s decree declaring the separation of church and state which nationalised all 
church property (20 January/2 February 1918), local soviets targeted the church.
95 On 27 
January 1918 the Olonets provincial executive committee confirmed Sovnarkom’s decree 
on the separation of church and state and agreed to transfer a number of local ecclesiastical 
premises to the Commissariat of Enlightenment. The executive committee also resolved to 
make all church houses, property and land public property.
96 From the Soviet regime’s 
point of view, the church’s property was seen as a much needed source of income. This 
was evident in Olonets district where the soviet, headed by the Left SR M.F. Chubriev, 
inherited a 60,000 rouble debt from the zemstvo administration. To help ease this financial 
burden the soviet imposed a tax on the Aleksandr Svirskii monastery
97 and decided to 
make an inventory of its property.
98 In response the clergy of the monastery created a 
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Union for the Defence of Religion and the Church, numbering up to 1000 local people. In 
turn the district soviet, on 9 April 1918, declared all those standing up for the defence of 
religion to be counter revolutionaries and liable to arrest. The soviet also resolved to 
persist in recording the monastery’s property and grain produce, immediately exact the tax 
from the monastery and elect a three man delegation for the task. This delegation was 
assisted by five Red Army men and four militiamen.
99 However, the delegation was not 
successful. On 16 April the Olonets district soviet ordered its military board to 
immediately form a detachment of no less than 50 men to be sent to the Aleksandr Svirskii 
monastery, arrest the leaders of the Union for the Defence of Religion and the Church, 
carry out the planned inventory and exact the tax.
100 At this stage the local soviet’s 
interests in the monastery appears to have been primarily economical; the monastery was 
not closed down and there is no evidence of any fatalities amongst the clergy until the 
winter of 1918, by which time local circumstances had changed (see Chapter 6). 
   
These attempts to fund the soviets in Karelia highlighted the decentralised nature of 
soviet power in this period of the civil war. This was the natural response to the general 
breakdown of state finances and the inability of the centre to support provincial soviets, 
made worse by the inexperience of the Bolsheviks in implementing a new socialist 
economic system.
101 In an attempt to ease the burden on local soviets the state encouraged 
the implementation of local initiatives. In mid January 1918, addressing local soviets, the 
Bolshevik M.S. Olminskii proclaimed in Izvestiia: ‘Do not await orders from the centre! 
Get down to business yourselves! Quickly organise new taxes and collections for the 
Soviets!’
102 As seen above the capital also urged local soviets to tax the propertied classes 
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in February 1918 and many soviets throughout the country in fact survived on these 
contributions from the wealthier members of society.
103 The Karelian region therefore 
received encouragement from the centre to undertake independent taxation as a matter of 
pragmatism; the Bolsheviks wished to consolidate their hold on power but could not do so 
with a still weak Soviet and party infrastructure and limited central finances, so the capital 
temporarily but consciously allowed a level of autonomy to develop in the periphery. 
Arguably this level of autonomy helped consolidate the fledgling Soviet regime; the 
soviets and their institutions were not yet fully established throughout the periphery or 
were in a transitional phase operating alongside remaining zemstvos and dumas. Enforcing 
centralisation was pointless without the apparatus to support it; conceding central control 
in the short term for the sake of survival was therefore a means of achieving an end. 
        
In Karelia this devolution of power during spring 1918 was a double edged sword; 
local leaders complained about the lack of central support but at the same time took pride 
in their own revolution and how they had consolidated the local Soviet regime.
104 The Left 
SR Bolshevik alliance remained strong throughout the spring of 1918. From the turn of the 
year it had faced serious challenges to the Soviet regime but managed to consolidate their 
hold on local power, largely by themselves. On 5 April Parfenov sent a telegram to the 
centre about the lack of support the soviets and the Red Army had received: ‘Almost 
without any help from Petrograd the soviet has strengthened its authority in the province. 
We will stand firm for the power of the Soviets and its autonomy…The Red Army has not 
received a kopeck of money.’
105 However, despite pride in the survival of the Soviet 
regime in the periphery, local leaders in Petrozavodsk still required the centre’s support, 
especially in a grain deficit region like Karelia. In short, food supplies bound the Karelian 
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region to the centre. Bolshevik leaders in Moscow also realised that the dislocation of the 
provincial soviets from the centre hindered any attempt to organise a coordinated and 
planned course of action to ease the financial or food supply situation across Soviet 
territory. The allocation of supplies from the capital and a more centralised system to help 
the Bolsheviks gain more control over food supply distribution was introduced in May 
1918.  
 
The beginning of the food supply dictatorship 
On 13 May 1918 the All Russian Central Executive Committee responded to the country’s 
food provision crisis by introducing the food supply dictatorship. It aimed to improve the 
food shortages by tightening central control over the periphery and thus combat the 
localism of Soviet power which was making it difficult to introduce and organise any kind 
of national solution to the shortages. The decree had its origins in the grain monopoly 
established by the Provisional Government in March 1917 but reinforced the principles of 
centralisation and coercion under the People’s Commissariat for Food to obtain the 
peasants’ surpluses. The Commissariat for Food was given plenipotentiary powers and 
license to do as it pleased in order to secure grain. These included the right to meet 
resistance to grain requisitioning with armed force, dismiss or reorganise local food supply 
organs and dismiss any employees who interfered with or disrupted the commissariat’s 
work.
106 The decree also formed the basis for future legislation, such as the creation of 
food supply detachments (prodovol’stvennye otriady) and the kombedy, which widened the 
People’s Commissariat for Food’s powers to retrieve foodstuffs from the peasantry. 
  
The introduction of the food supply dictatorship did not have an immediate effect 
in the Karelian districts because of local political factors (e.g. see Chapter 3), grain 
shortages and delays in transportation from Soviet held grain surplus provinces. By May 
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grain deliveries to Olonets province had come to a complete halt, there was nothing in the 
local stores, many districts were beginning to starve and rebellions were predicted.
107 
These conditions were confirmed by telegrams received from Pudozh district at the end of 
May. On the 23 May 1918 the chairman of the Pudozh district soviet asked for the prompt 
dispatch of food for the starving population of the district because his soviet had no means 
of its own to solve the problem and no money to pay its employees. He predicted an 
uprising if there was any delay in supplying the district with food.
108 At the same time the 
Pudozh soviet could not afford to wait for the help it sorely needed and as a result more ad 
hoc local measures were introduced. On 30 May the Pudozh soviet established a special 
commission to carry out searches of local merchants in the district centre.
109 
 
On the 31 May 1918 the Olonets provincial food commissariat sent an urgent 
telegram to its representative in Moscow, A.F. Martynov, to ask the People’s Commissar 
for Food, Aleksandr Tsiurupa, for the quick dispatch of grain to Olonets province and to 
hasten the dispatch of six carriages of sugar which had been assigned to Petrozavodsk 
station.
110 The author has not been able to ascertain when Martynov travelled to Moscow 
and exactly why he was there but it does appear he was establishing personal contacts with 
commissars in the centre and acting as a lobbyist to try and secure grain for his region and, 
by doing so, attempting to improve the flow of information between the capital and 
Petrozavodsk. After all the petitioning of central authorities in person had worked when 
Gizhitskii travelled to Petrograd the previous February. The Olonets provincial food 
commissariat also asked Martynov to inform officials in Moscow that four districts of 
Olonets province were completely starving with the remainder only having enough food to 
last them another week. As a result, there were now instances of people dying of hunger 
and supplies via the waterways had come to a halt because there was no food to feed the 
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boats’ crews.
111 Despite Martynov’s presence in the capital there was no rapid solution to 
the shortages in Karelia. On 3 June Petrozavodsk received a report from the Povenets 
district soviet which asked for the quick dispatch of grain in order to avoid ‘a hunger 
catastrophe’.
112 The Olonets provincial commissar for food Tikhomirov informed Moscow 
that people had begun to slaughter horses to eat and people were falling ill because of 
starvation. He asked the centre to send even a partial load of grain because without it work 
in the province would become impossible and stop completely. He concluded that if grain 
did not arrive immediately then the provincial food board would not hold itself responsible 
for the consequences.
113 An example of the consequences that he predicted occurred in 
Olonets town on 10 June when an armed peasant rebellion broke out. 
 
The Olonets rebellion  
The causes of the Olonets district rebellion were two major problems facing Karelia in the 
spring of 1918: financial and food supply shortages. On 23 March, Chubriev, the Left SR 
chairman of the district soviet, sent a telegram to the food commission in Petrozavodsk to 
ask it to urgently dispatch a minimum of two months worth of cereal products to Olonets 
district. He predicted grave consequences if his requests were not met, in particular for the 
children of the district who he believed would die of starvation. Because of the shortages 
Chubriev also believed the population was on the brink of rebellion and demanded that the 
provincial centre take immediate action.
114 Chubriev was correct and armed clashes did 
occur, although not until over two months after the above request was made. This delay 
does not necessarily imply that his original demands were met. On 10 May the Olonets 
district commissar for food reported to the provincial commissar for food that because of 
the reduction in the amount of grain reaching the district many of the region’s population 
had been forced to consume rye and barley seed to feed their families and livestock. As a 
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result there was a huge shortage of seed for spring sowing which meant a significant 
number of fields would go unsown thus proving disastrous for the future. The commissar 
therefore asked for three carriage loads of barley seed without which famine in Olonets 
district would inevitably occur.
115  
 
On 3 June, on the eve of the rebellion, the Olonets provincial food board received a 
warning telegram from Chubriev who asked the provincial centre to secure the dispatch of 
food products to the district because demands for bread were being made by hundreds of 
people arriving in Olonets town on a daily basis. Without it, he believed, correctly as it 
turned out, bloodshed was unavoidable.
116 Dissatisfaction was also commonplace because 
of the 9 million rouble tax, introduced by the provincial soviet in February. Complaints 
were so numerous that the local soviet convened a congress of representatives for those 
subjected to pay the tax. The soviet asked for five delegates to be sent from each parish but 
Rypushkal’skaia parish alone sent up to 50. Of the few hundred representatives who 
attended everyone also came to demand more bread. The atmosphere at the gathering on 
10 June was intense and at some point negotiations deteriorated; local citizens burst into 
the town food store and captured the town’s weapons store. They then encircled the 
buildings of the soviet and the district executive committee, carried out a number of arrests, 
including Chubriev, disarmed the local Red Army detachment and released a number of 
people from the town prison.
117 The rebels then created a five man organisational bureau, 
tried to widen the mutiny and demanded an end to the tax. However, their efforts were 
combated by a combination of soft and hard measures by individuals loyal to the soviets. 
The secretary of the Rypushkal’skaia parish soviet, the Bolshevik F.I. Egorov, wrote and 
distributed leaflets with appeals to the peasantry to defend the soviets and called the 
organisers of the revolt enemies of the working people. Bolsheviks from other parishes of 
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the district also took part in agitation work condemning the rebellion and former front line 
soldiers held meetings and talks explaining the wrongs of the uprising.
118  
 
However, it was the arrival of Red Army troops from outside the district which 
brought the rebellion to a head. Before his arrest a member of the soviet had managed to 
make a report to the Lodeinoe Pole soviet informing them of events. In turn Petrozavodsk 
was informed and under the overall command of I.V. Matveev both soviets dispatched 
detachments of Red Army men to the Aleksandr Svirskii monastery where they awaited 
news on the situation in Olonets, seizing some of the monastery’s food stores and later 16 
of its horses for good measure. However, before the Red Army men arrived in Olonets 
town, the rebels tried to delay the troops’ arrival by forcing Chubriev under threat of 
execution to sign a telegram stating that armed assistance was not needed. According to 
Matveev’s memoirs the ruse did not succeed because Chubriev ‘signed the telegram in 
such a way that I would know things were not okay.’ In response he sent a telegram back 
with his own bluff stating he had a force of more than 500 men ready to advance on 
Olonets (Matveev’s detachment alone had only 85 men). It appears to have worked. The 
rebels sent a seven man delegation to negotiate at the Aleksandr Svirskii monastery where 
it met with two members of the provincial Cheka, its chairman I.V. Elpidinskii and the Left 
SR A.S. Proskuriakov. The rebels agreed to restore the soviet, free the arrested soviet 
officials and Red Army men, disarm themselves and hand in their weapons on the 
condition that Matveev’s Red Army detachment did not march on Olonets. This was also 
agreed to by the two provincial Chekists on condition that they were allowed to travel to 
the town to make sure the demands were met. However, in the end the detachment made 
for Olonets as the rebels dragged out the uprising in the hope of help from the White Finns, 
which did not materialise. Fearing reprisals the rebels surrendered their weapons, released 
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the arrested prisoners and some even expressed the desire to join the ranks of the Red 
Army.
119  
 
  The abortive revolt in Olonets town reflected common peasant discontent at the tax 
levy and the shortage of food. However, at this point in the history of the civil war in 
Karelia, their complaints were not aimed solely at the policies of the Bolsheviks but at the 
Olonets district soviet as a whole which, as we will see, was dominated by the Left SRs. 
But that is not to say that the rebellion was necessarily anti Left SR. Regardless of the 
local authority in control the opposition was characterised by its focus on the material 
shortages faced by the local Olonets soviet, which, as we have seen, was a common 
problem faced by soviets throughout Karelia and one which provincial authorities 
struggled to control. Furthermore, the rebellion’s suppression was accomplished with a 
combination of ‘educational’ measures alongside brute force, a tactic which would be 
repeated in quelling other rebellions later in the civil war. Two Red Army detachments 
were required from outside the district to put the rebellion down and two of the insurgents 
were killed.
120 It was also reported in the provincial Izvestiia on 5 October 1918 that a 
further two individuals connected to the uprising had been executed by the Olonets district 
Cheka.
121 Such measures however went hand in glove with efforts to distribute propaganda 
and agitate amongst the peasantry. After the rebellion was suppressed Chubriev 
telegrammed the Olonets provincial soviet executive committee on 13 June to send ten 
agitators to Olonets ‘for preparing the population’ for the planned Third Olonets district 
peasant congress on 20 June.
122   
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Conclusion 
What is most striking about the Soviet regime, only a few months old in the spring and 
early summer of 1918, is that it was able to maintain its hold on the periphery during this 
period of crisis. The case of Karelia shows that a local Left SR Bolshevik alliance 
controlled the Olonets provincial soviet executive committee and the two parties remained 
united and worked together, sometimes in collaboration with Menshevik Internationalists, 
to consolidate the Soviet regime at a time of localised war, rebellion and economic strife. It 
did so with nothing but limited help from the capital but it was only a matter of time before 
central and local leaders came to understand that the survival of the regime would depend 
on more coordinated and centralised action. The Karelian region had pulled through a 
difficult period, largely through its own efforts, but as one of the highest Soviet grain 
deficit regions, communication with and support from the capital was essential. The 
introduction of the food supply dictatorship marked an important stage in the state’s 
attempts to take control of food supply and distribution. However, as we shall see in the 
following chapter, the implementation of central decrees was dependent on local political 
and economic conditions.    78 
Chapter 3 
The Left SR-Bolshevik Alliance: From Compromise to Collapse, March-July 
1918 
Although the Left SR-Bolshevik alliance in Petrozavodsk worked well during the spring 
and summer of 1918 growing disagreements began over policies determined at the centre. 
The first cracks in the Left SR-Bolshevik alliance emerged against the background of the 
Brest-Litovsk peace treaty and the decision of the Left SR commissars to withdraw from 
Sovnarkom in protest. However, unlike in Moscow, but similar to the situation in 
Petrograd, the local alliance continued to work well after March 1918. The reason for this 
was partly the Left SRs’ willingness to compromise but also their growing dominance in 
Petrozavodsk. This dominance reflected the general growth of the party; one Russian 
scholar has estimated that by July the number of Left SR party members stood at 
approximately 150,000.
1 In Karelia this influence meant that the Left SRs were in a 
position to block Sovnarkom’s policies when elections took place at the Fourth Olonets 
Provincial Congress of Soviets (25 June-2 July 1918) and capture the chairmanship of the 
provincial executive committee.  
 
The Left SR-Bolshevik alliance in Karelia would have continued but for the 
uprising of the Left SR Central Committee in Moscow on 6 July which weakened the Left 
SR party’s position across the country and undermined the Left SR-Bolshevik alliance in 
Karelia. This chapter will argue that the Left SRs’ uprising in Moscow presented the 
Bolsheviks with the opportunity to gain control over provincial capitals where they were 
not yet dominant by demanding that local party committees remove from the local soviets 
all Left SRs who did not condemn the actions of their own Central Committee. The 
Bolsheviks controlled the news about the uprising in Moscow and were therefore able to 
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wrong foot the local Left SRs. By exploiting this knowledge and their control of the army 
and the Olonets provincial military commissariat the Bolsheviks forced the Left SRs to 
leave the Olonets provincial soviet executive committee. The Bolsheviks then established 
their own Olonets provincial revolutionary executive committee. 
 
Brest-Litovsk and bowing to the Bolsheviks 
On 6 March the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was signed by Sovnarkom at Lenin’s insistence, 
despite opposition from the Left SRs and within the Bolshevik party from the ‘left 
communists’. The Bolshevik leader argued that the new socialist state needed a short term 
respite to protect the revolution and only peace could stop the Bolshevik regime falling the 
same way as Tsar Nicholas II and Alexander Kerensky.
2 In protest at the peace treaty, 
ratified at the Fourth All-Russian Congress of Soviets (15-16 March 1918), the Left SRs 
resigned from Sovnarkom on 18 March. Broadly speaking the majority of Left SRs 
despised the treaty and deemed it as an attack on the gains of the revolution. To them the 
Bolsheviks had turned their back on the party’s revolutionary principles by negotiating 
with an imperialist power, had ignored Left SR protests when signing the terms of the 
peace and were now taking orders from the Germans. However, at the Second Left SR 
Party Congress on 19 April 1918 differences within the leadership were clear. The leading 
Left SR Boris Kamkov commented: ‘…our party is truly revolutionary…We cannot get 
involved in double dealing.’
3 On the other hand Mariia Spiridonova, the leader of the Left 
SR party, supported the Bolsheviks’ decision to sign the peace, opposed withdrawing from 
Sovnarkom and believed that it was better to work from a position of power alongside the 
Bolsheviks in spite of the treaty: ‘The withdrawal is a crime against the peasantry, because 
from their point of view it was necessary that the apparatus of central power be in our 
hands.’
4 Despite this lack of agreement at the top on whether or not to withdraw from 
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Sovnarkom in protest at the signing of the Brest-Litovsk treaty, the decision to leave was 
approved at the party congress.
5  
 
In Petrozavodsk, the local Left SRs were similarly divided, but ultimately adopted a 
stance closer to Spiridonova’s position. At a session of the Olonets provincial soviet on 7 
March, local Left SRs and the Bolsheviks clashed over Brest-Litovsk. A Bolshevik 
representative followed the Leninist party line: ‘A breathing space is needed…Let the 
Soviet government become stronger, let the problems of food supply improve, let socialist 
consciousness grow and then we will no longer fear the imperialists.’
6 In response the Left 
SR leader Ivan Balashov spoke out against the peace treaty and called for the organisation 
of an armed struggle against the Germans.
7 After the peace was ratified at the Fourth 
Congress of Soviets, a general Bolshevik party meeting in Petrozavodsk on 12 March 
resolved to accept the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty in the belief that it would be short lived 
and the revolution would soon spread to Germany and Austria anyway.
8 On the other hand 
Balashov continued to oppose the peace and at a mass gathering in Petrozavodsk on 28 
March he appealed for an ‘uprising’ (vosstanie) against the illegal peace.’
9  
 
Whether or not Balashov supported the withdrawal from Sovnarkom is not clear 
but, mirroring the diversity of opinions in the capital within the Left SR party, not all local 
Left SRs were supportive of a withdrawal. At the Second Left SR Party Congress in April, 
Arkhip Rybak, the Olonets provincial representative informed the congress that ‘large-
scale disagreements’ existed amongst the Left SRs in Olonets province over the decision to 
withdraw from Sovnarkom. However, Rybak did announce that the majority, by the time 
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of the party congress, had bowed to the idea of supporting the official party line (to 
withdraw from Sovnarkom).
10 
 
Despite their criticisms of the Brest-Litovsk peace and acceptance of the party 
Central Committee’s withdrawal from Sovnarkom the Left SRs in Karelia did not wish to 
follow the example of the capital by splitting with the Bolsheviks. By 22 April the Left 
SRs had become the dominant political party in the Olonets provincial soviet. This 
dominant position was achieved by the arrival of peasant deputies from the districts which 
allowed the elections for a permanent presidium of the provincial soviet’s executive 
committee to take place. Local Soviet historians have suggested that a number of 
Bolshevik deputies were absent from the proceedings and because of this the Left SR 
leader, Ivan Balashov, captured the leadership of the presidium by 22 votes to 19.
11 
Whatever the case, the result was a shock for the Bolsheviks; they walked out of the soviet 
executive committee session, and threatened to take no further responsibility for the 
functioning of the soviet and to recall all their members from it.
12 In response the Left SRs 
agreed to compromise with the Bolsheviks; at the following executive committee session 
on the 23 April new elections took place, not for the chairmanship of the presidium but the 
provincial soviet executive committee as a whole. The Bolshevik candidate Petr Anokhin 
defeated the Left SR candidate, P.P. Panin, by 26 votes to 22.
13  
 
The compromise therefore appears to have allowed for new elections to take place 
to the provincial soviet executive committee which resulted in a Bolshevik remaining 
chairman of this committee (which had been the case before the elections anyway) and the 
presidium. At the same session of the executive committee on 23 April and as part of the 
compromise two Left SRs became the presidium’s deputy chairmen, another Left SR took 
                                                 
10 Anderson, et al., Partiia, 264. 
11 Mashezerskii, Ustanovlenie. 159; Doroshin, Anokhin. 24. 
12 Mashezerskii, Ustanovlenie. 159; Doroshin, Anokhin. 25. 
13 NARK, f.R-28, op.1, d.87, l.27; Doroshin, Anokhin. 25.   82 
up the position of treasurer while two Bolsheviks became the presidium’s secretaries.
14 
The presidium therefore consisted of three Bolsheviks and three Left SRs. 
 
The Left SRs in Karelia had shown that they did not want to upset the Left SR-
Bolshevik alliance. In other words the Bolsheviks had called the Left SRs’ bluff at a time 
when tensions were at a peak between the two parties. Were the Left SRs willing and ready 
to take on the responsibility of governing Olonets province alone? If they were then the 
move would be unprecedented and could only have wider and disruptive repercussions for 
the party and their relationship with the Bolsheviks. Naturally, they sought to increase their 
authority in the province through the soviets so they could modify Bolshevik policy but 
there is no evidence to suggest that they wished to rule on their own, especially in the face 
of the various problems facing the region (see Chapter 2). Like the situation in Petrograd, it 
appears that local Left SRs did not want to contribute to the instability of the Soviet regime 
and so suppressed their differences with the Bolsheviks and sought compromise.
15 The 
Left SR Olonets provincial representative at the national party congress in April, Arkhip 
Rybak, reflected this standpoint when he announced: ‘regarding the Bolsheviks we, of 
course, kept to precautionary tactics, in the sense that we did not take a stand in open 
opposition to them, but endeavoured to hold them back…’
16   
 
Resisting the food supply dictatorship 
“Holding the Bolsheviks back” proved more difficult for the Petrozavodsk Left SRs after 
Moscow introduced the food supply dictatorship in the middle of May 1918. The official 
introduction of food supply detachments, subordinated to the People’s Commissariat for 
Food on 27 May, and particularly the introduction of the kombedy on 11 June put Left SRs 
and Bolsheviks at loggerheads. The Left SRs opposed the Bolsheviks’ attempts to 
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centralise the economy and utilise violence to obtain grain. The food supply detachment 
decree appealed to local food organs, particularly in the grain deficit regions, to form 
special detachments of ‘conscious’ workers who supported the soviets. The decree also 
ordered local food organs to use the detachments primarily for agitation purposes and for 
organising the working peasantry against the ‘kulaks’.
17 Although this degree made no 
official mention of armed force, the responsibilities of the detachments had been guided a 
few days earlier in Lenin’s ‘Theses on the Current Situation’, written on 26 May. These 
theses recognised that the detachments would be used for agitation but also championed 
the importance of prioritising ‘a war on grain’ over the coming months and emphasised the 
need to militarise its collection by way of armed detachments.
18 The detachments were 
subordinated to the People’s Commissariat for Food and came together in what became 
known as the Food Army. 
 
  With regards to the kombedy Lenin aimed to instigate and promote class war in the 
countryside by using the kombedy as alternative political organs in the countryside which 
were subordinated to central Bolshevik policy. They were to be elected from the poorer 
strata of peasant society and were responsible for identifying grain surpluses, organising 
the collection of grain from so called ‘kulaks’, redistributing grain and putting a stop to 
free trade and speculation. With this, Lenin wanted to isolate the poor peasantry, turn them 
against the more affluent ‘kulaks’ and win over large sections of the countryside to 
Bolshevism. The Left SRs however complained about the ambiguity of splitting the 
peasantry and distinguishing ‘poor’ from ‘kulak’. In other words how should one define a 
poor or a rich peasant? Moreover, the Left SRs believed – correctly as it turned out - that 
the peasantry would resist the state’s attempts to use the kombedy alongside the food 
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supply detachments to extract surpluses from the countryside and that a violent struggle 
between town and countryside would ensue.
19 
 
Shortly after the decree establishing the food supply detachments was introduced 
Petrozavodsk received a telegram from Moscow, circulated to all non-grain producing 
provinces at the time, which instructed the provincial commissariat for food to begin 
forming detachments. Within the telegram Aleksandr Tsiurupa, the People’s Commissar 
for Food, reiterated the decree of 27 May and asked for ‘conscious’ and ‘recommended’ 
workers from soviet and trade institutions to be hastily dispatched to the grain producing 
regions where they would come under the control of the local food authorities. Before 
these workers were sent to different regions around the country Petrozavodsk was 
requested to record a list of all those who wished to take part in the detachments and then 
send them to the People’s Commissariat for Food in Moscow. On arrival detachment 
members would receive a short 3-5 day training course before their onward journey.
20 
 
The formation of the food supply detachments in Karelia was first discussed at a 
session of the Olonets provincial soviet executive committee on 31 May 1918. There a 
conflict of interests emerged between local Bolsheviks and Left SRs, which threatened the 
implementation of central policy. The Bolsheviks endorsed Sovnarkom’s food supply 
policies but the Left SRs believed that sending ‘punitive expeditions’ into the countryside 
would only strengthen the discord between town and countryside and disrupt commodity 
exchange (tovaroobmen) between the two. The Left SRs proposed tighter communications 
between the peasantry and the food supply organisations and the taking of ‘decisive 
measures’ (they did not specify what these might be) to deliver vital products (predmety 
pervoi neobkhodimosti) to the countryside in exchange for grain at corresponding prices. 
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To the frustration of the Bolsheviks the Left SRs dominant position in the provincial soviet 
executive committee prevailed and it was their proposal which was adopted; Sovnarkom’s 
decree to create food supply detachments was rejected.
21 
 
However, on 12 June, the Petrozavodsk town soviet resolved by a majority vote, 
opposed only by the Menshevik Internationalist party, to create food supply detachments 
because of the general food shortages in the town. Notably, the proposal to form food 
supply detachments at this meeting was tabled not by the Bolsheviks but the Left 
Menshevik Internationalists.
22 Surprisingly, there is no evidence that the Left SRs objected 
to the decision, this was left solely to the Menshevik Internationalist M.A. Kaplan who 
stressed that the detachments would set the peasantry and the proletariat against one 
another.
23 Nevertheless, even if the Left SRs had protested it is unlikely that it would have 
changed the resolution because they were outnumbered by the Bolsheviks in the 
Petrozavodsk town soviet, who supported the Left Menshevik Internationalists’ motion.  
Although the precise make up of the Petrozavodsk town soviet on 12 June is unknown, on 
2 May 1918 it consisted of 33 Bolsheviks, 12 Left SRs, 5 Left Menshevik Internationalists, 
2 Menshevik Internationalists and 2 Anarchists.
24 
 
Why did the Left SRs in the Petrozavodsk town soviet not object to the introduction 
of the food supply detachments? Firstly, at the same session, the town soviet also resolved 
to create a military revolutionary committee. This was significant because it helped the 
Bolsheviks tighten their control in the town by creating a potentially alternative source of 
authority in times of emergency. The Bolsheviks announced that the motivation for the 
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creation of such a committee came from the current food crisis and the recent rebellions in 
Olonets province at the time (in Olonets town). As a result they proposed to give the new 
committee ‘unlimited powers.’ The Left SRs protested but showed their willingness to 
compromise by proposing that a Cheka should be created and attached to the town soviet 
instead. However, the Menshevik Internationalists M.A. Kaplan and V.M. Kudzhiev 
immediately recognised that a new committee with ‘unlimited powers’ would limit the 
rights of the town soviet’s executive committee and widen the opportunity for political 
terror. Ultimately their efforts to block the military revolutionary committee were in vain; 
the Left Menshevik Internationalists voted with the Bolsheviks for the creation of the 
military revolutionary committee which consisted of 3 Bolsheviks, one Left Menshevik 
Internationalist and 1 Left SR.
25 It is therefore reasonable to suggest that with the creation 
of this new emergency committee the Left SRs felt powerless to stop the introduction of 
food supply detachments in Petrozavodsk and this is why they did not object. 
    
However, the evidence available also indicates that the lack of protest from the Left 
SRs in the Petrozavodsk town soviet concerning the introduction of food supply 
detachments can be attributed to the fact that the severity of the food shortages left little 
alternative. In the past week the Petrozavodsk town soviet had appealed to Sovnarkom for 
help because crowds of starving people were besieging the soviet on a daily basis.
26 Local 
Left SRs in the Petrozavodsk town soviet were therefore willing to put their political 
differences to one side and work together with the Bolsheviks for the sake of easing the 
food crisis. Finally, the Left SRs could be confident that the introduction of the food 
supply detachments would not be introduced on a provincial wide scale as they had already 
blocked their introduction in the provincial executive committee. In short, practical 
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exigencies and their need to compromise brought about a mute response from the Left SRs 
in the Petrozavodsk town soviet.  
 
  In spite of the Bolsheviks’ success in the Petrozavodsk town soviet, the vast 
majority of food detachments did not leave the town until the end of August (see Chapter 
4). The Left SRs’ silence on the matter also seemed vindicated when the inability of the 
Bolsheviks in the Olonets provincial soviet to introduce Moscow’s decrees surfaced later 
in the month. This led to frustrations in the Soviet capital where Bolshevik leaders were 
eager to centralise grain collection and dispatch food supply detachments to the grain 
surplus provinces as quickly as possible. On 21 June Petrozavodsk received another 
circular telegram, this time from the military commander of the Food Army, G.M. 
Zusmanovich, demanding haste in the forming of food detachments: ‘Comrades, do not 
waste a minute, an armed force is needed for the struggle with the kulaks for bread, the 
quicker you dispatch food supply detachments the better for us.’
27 However the Olonets 
provincial soviet, like a number of other soviets across the country, was not responsive. 
Petrozavodsk received further telegrams, this time from Tsiurupa on 26 and 27 June, 
complaining about the inactivity of the provincial soviets and the sluggishness of some 
local organs in forming food supply detachments.
28 
 
  In short, the introduction of the food supply dictatorship showed, in this instance, 
that it was the special political dynamics in Petrozavodsk which determined the successful 
introduction of the food supply detachments. Unlike in Petrograd, where the Bolsheviks’ 
organisation of food supply detachments gathered pace immediately after the decree from 
27 May, in spite of Petrograd Left SRs’ complaints, the Left SRs in Petrozavodsk 
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succeeded in defying Moscow and hindered the establishment of the detachments.
29 
However the Left SRs also adopted a delicate balance of policy and pragmatism; where 
they had no opportunity to change Bolshevik policy, as the example of the Petrozavodsk 
town soviet showed, they were willing to compromise with the Bolsheviks to keep 
disruption amidst an economic crisis to a minimum. Therefore in spite of growing political 
differences in Petrozavodk there was still life in the Left SR-Bolshevik alliance.
30 The Left 
SRs’ ability to impede the implementation of Moscow’s policies, but willingness to 
continue working with the Bolsheviks, was proven once more at the Fourth Olonets 
Provincial Congress of Soviets. 
 
The Fourth Olonets Provincial Congress of Soviets (25 June – 2 July 1918) 
Out of a total number of 189 delegates who attended the Fourth Olonets Provincial 
Congress of Soviets 62 were Bolsheviks, 47 were Left SRs and 80 were non-party.
31 
Proving that the Brest-Litovsk peace was still a contentious topic amongst the delegates the 
treaty was central to discussions at the evening session of the 27 June. On behalf of the 
Bolsheviks the chairman of the Olonets provincial soviet executive committee Petr 
Anokhin addressed the congress. He defended his party Central Committee’s decision to 
conclude peace and responded to Left SRs who had spoken out for an annulment of the 
Brest-Litovsk Treaty.
32 Anokhin stressed the practicalities of concluding a separate peace 
with the Germans because following the February revolution the army was entirely 
exhausted and no longer wished to fight. Furthermore, he stressed that a respite was needed 
in order to consolidate and reinforce the revolution which would then allow for a future 
and final attack on worldwide capital.
33 Anokhin proclaimed:
34 
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We had to conclude peace. What our comrades say, like our comrades the Left SRs 
are saying just now, is that it would have been better to have given up Petrograd 
and Moscow in order not to conclude the Brest peace, it would have been better to 
die rather than conclude a shameful peace. But it must be said that peace cannot be 
shameful if it offers democracy to the workers and peasants, it is not shameful but 
perhaps only unfortunate. 
 
The food supply detachments were then discussed and also defended by Anokhin:
35 
    
It is said to us that with such detachments, such punitive expeditions, as 
they are being called by a few representatives of the parties, we will not obtain 
grain. They say that we can only get it with barter and with the deepening of class 
self-consciousness amongst the peasantry. It is correct comrades, barter is a good 
thing, the deepening of self-consciousness amongst the peasantry is a good thing, 
but the deepening of class self-consciousness is the question of tomorrow…the 
question of today demands the most energetic and extreme measures in order to 
feed every person…who at the current time is starving, they need to be fed, 
therefore the food supply detachments at the current time are a necessity. They are 
not being sent to the village with weapon in hand to say: give us everything there is 
– a funt or 20 puds of flour, give us everything in one pile and you will be left with 
no grain. No, the detachments are being sent, together with the poor peasants who 
are swelling with hunger, to take the kulaks’ grain, grain which is rotting in barns 
and grain that has still not been threshed. This grain must be taken and given to 
those peasants who are starving and swelling with hunger…  
   
What is most striking about Anokhin’s comments is, although he defended the Leninist 
party line on peace and food supply, he refused to openly criticise the Left SRs with harsh 
polemics; they were still referred to as the Bolsheviks’ comrades and he was in agreement 
with them over the long term goals of the regime. This contrasted starkly with the capital 
where Lenin lambasted the Left SRs on 22 May for being weak willed and defenders of the 
kulaks.
36 Instead Bolshevik speakers at the Olonets provincial congress singled out 
common enemies in the shape of the Mensheviks and Right SRs, mirroring the actions of 
both parties in the Petrozavodsk town soviet the previous April (see Chapter 2). A 
Bolshevik commissar from Petrograd, G.E. Evdokimov, reproached V.M. Kudzhiev of the 
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Menshevik Internationalists for criticising the Bolsheviks’ policies and called the Right 
SRs and Mensheviks ‘stooges of the capitalists’ and ‘lackeys of the bourgeoisie’.
37 
  
The Left SRs addressed the congress in a similar manner to the Bolsheviks; despite 
their disagreements with Bolshevik policy they refrained from openly attacking them. For 
instance, the Left SRs stuck unswervingly to their international vision of the revolution. 
Their resolution on the international situation criticised any collaboration with the 
imperialist powers such as Japan, Germany, France and England, who were now on 
Russian soil, had cut off eastern, southern and northern parts of the country and were 
attempting to destroy the gains of October. The Left SRs therefore called for the 
cancellation of all agreements or treaties with these ‘enemies of the people’ and the 
beginning of a merciless struggle against them. The Left SRs resolution on the internal 
policies of the Soviet regime also condemned the introduction of armed food supply 
detachments and the kombedy. Echoing what they said at the end of May 1918 the Left 
SRs believed the detachments would cause fratricidal war in the countryside and destroy 
the revolution. Instead the Left SR faction believed in commodity exchange and the 
independence of the working peasantry who would have the strength to take kulak 
surpluses by themselves.
38 In typical Left SR fashion, the party’s critique of Bolshevik 
policy was prophetic but its representatives were sketchy on how viable implementing 
commodity exchange was in a period of acute economic ruin.
39 
 
Regardless of the Left SRs’ critique of the Bolsheviks’ policies the former did not 
openly condemn the latter during the session, which suggest there was still life in the Left 
SR-Bolshevik alliance. Instead, like the Bolsheviks the Left SRs singled out the alliance’s 
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common adversaries. Ivan Balashov attacked local Mensheviks and Right SRs for, in his 
opinion, their condescension towards the peasantry: ‘All these opposition socialists who 
speak assume that they are the only intelligent ones and all of this gathering is made up of 
blockheads. But the peasants have intellect, although they are not educated and this 
intellect tells them which path to follow.’
40   
 
At the end of the congress the Left SRs’ resolutions declared all agreements with 
the capitalist countries void and rejected the sending of food supply detachments to the 
countryside and the organisation of the kombedy. These resolutions were passed by a slim 
majority of five votes.
41 However, the Left SRs did not get everything their own way at the 
congress; the threat posed by the recent advance of the Allies from Murmansk (see below) 
helped convince the majority of voting delegates to support the Bolshevik resolution for 
the creation of a regular Red Army.
42 Despite this setback, the Left SRs’ still provided half 
of the 18 delegates elected to attend the Fifth All-Russian Congress of Soviets (4-10 July 
1918).
43 The strength of their position was also apparent at a session of the newly elected 
Olonets provincial executive committee on 3 July. When voting took place for the 
executive committee’s presidium Petr Anokhin, the Bolshevik candidate, was defeated by 
the Left SR leader Ivan Balashov for the chairmanship of the executive committee which 
now consisted of 18 Left SRs and 12 Bolsheviks.
44 At a Bolshevik party gathering in 
Petrozavodsk later that month a party member recalled events at this time: ‘Our status 
became difficult. We were not in the position to carry out the policies of the October 
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revolution and all its achievements. Before us were two alternatives: either to go with the 
Left SRs or to leave the executive committee.’
45 The Bolsheviks initially chose the latter 
and threatened to relinquish all their responsibilities for governing the region but, unlike in 
April, the ruse did not succeed this time and they quickly changed their mind. 
 
The movement of the Allies 
The main reason for the Bolsheviks’ change of heart was the panic created by the landing 
of approximately six hundred, mostly British, Allied troops in Murmansk at the end of 
June. This event occurred as the civil war intensified across the country from May to the 
summer of 1918. The Bolsheviks in Moscow divided up the country into military fronts 
with Karelia coming under the jurisdiction of the Northern Front which was created in July 
1918. Under the command of General D.P. Parskii the front consisted of two armies: the 
6
th and 7
th Red Armies. The former covered a sector from Viatka up to Lake Onega and the 
latter from Lake Onega to Pskov.
46  
 
Following the retreat of the White Finns from northern Karelia in May a provincial 
military commissariat was created on 16 May 1918. All district military commissariats 
were also organised by the beginning of July.
47 Still, despite the establishment of military 
commissariats the number of Red Army troops remained low. Part of the reason for this 
was that the military commissariats at this time relied on the enlistment of volunteers and a 
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mass mobilisation of troops was not carried out until the end of November 1918.
48 In the 
meantime the military commissariats were forced to cast the net wide for recruits and 
enlisted a number of Chinese who remained in the region after being sent there to help with 
the construction of the Murmansk railway line.
49 However, by 20 July 1918 Boris Pozern, 
the commander of the Petrograd County sector of the Northern Front, sent a telegram to 
Petrozavodsk asking them to put a stop to the enrolment of Chinese into the army, 
presumably for fear that these troops would develop partisan tendencies.
50  
 
The landing of the Allies followed a congress of district military commissars (24-
25 June) where reports proved that only limited progress had been made in organising 
military units since the defeat of the White Finns. At the congress the provincial military 
commissar Dubrovskii explained that communications with the districts were also 
troublesome and he had no detailed information on the Red Army from Pudozh or 
Povenets districts. There were now 500 Red Army men in Petrozavodsk and up to 150 men 
in each of the other districts within Olonets province which he had information for. At the 
same time the military commissariat in Petrozavodsk still relied on partisan detachments 
alongside regular Red Army men to guard the borders of the district. In fact Povenets 
district had nothing but partisan detachments. On the other hand reinforcements had 
arrived from Petrograd in the form of 100 men for border defence, 14 men for the staff of a 
Petrozavodsk division and a field radio station and a unit of radio-telegraph operators 
(iskrovaia komanda) of 21 men. Two army detachments, also sent from Petrograd, under 
the command of a Captain Orlov, L.M. Komlev, V.N. Kolosov and I.D. Spiridonov were 
also situated along the Murmansk railway line.
51 Although all figures relating to numbers 
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in the army are contentious, a Soviet source suggests states that Spiridonov’s troops which 
arrived in April numbered roughly 350 men and were responsible for guarding the railway 
section from Kem’ to Petrozavodsk. Komlev’s detachment, sent in May, numbered 450 
men and was responsible for the Northern sector from Kem’ to Murmansk.
52  
  
As the June congress of military commissars clearly shows, the ability of the Red 
Army to meet the challenge of the Allies was weak. This was proven by 3 July when units 
of General Charles Maynard’s ‘Syren’ force had moved rapidly south, occupied the 
Northern section of the Murmansk railway line, disarmed the railroad guard, secured Kem’ 
town and arrested a number of leading members of the local soviets, killing three members 
of the Kem’ district soviet in the process.
53 There was genuine alarm in Petrozavodsk and 
it came as a total surprise; I.V. Balashov had dissolved the Olonets provincial soviet 
executive committee immediately following the Fourth Olonets Provincial Congress of 
Soviets until 16 July so some of the new committee members elected straight from the 
congress could return home to sort out their own personal and public affairs.
54  
 
Preparations for the defence of the region were therefore left to the special 
commissar representing Moscow in the region, S.P. Natsarenus, who informed Lenin on 3 
July that he had declared the Murmansk and White Sea region under martial law.
55 
Natsarenus estimated the size of the Allied forces to be between 12,000 and 15,000 troops 
but in reality the total size of ‘Syren’ force at this time amounted to no more than 2500 
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troops of various nationalities and varying degrees of medical fitness.
56 However, without 
this information and with a further advance south imminent the Bolsheviks who had 
threatened to leave the newly elected provincial soviet executive committee decided to 
remain in it.
57 The Petrozavodsk town soviet also united around the advance of the Allies, 
condemned the Murmansk soviet and resolved to defend the revolution. In vibrant mood 
the Petrozavodsk soviet called on all workers to the defence of the revolution:
58 
 
The Petrozavodsk soviet calls on all workers…to decisively repulse the insolent 
imperialists of the Anglo-French coalition. Having raised the sword, they will 
perish from the sword, and let all obvious (iavnyi) and secret (tainyi) accomplices 
of the imperialist predators remember that they will be wiped from the face of the 
earth in the most merciless manner before their allies have the time to come to their 
aid. 
  Down with the international brigands of capital and their servants the 
Mensheviks and Right SRs 
  Long live the dictatorship of the proletariat and the poor peasantry! 
  Long live the revolutionary Red Army! 
  All to the defence of the Socialist Fatherland! 
      
So on the eve of the Left SR Central Committee’s uprising in Moscow on 6 July 
local Bolsheviks and Left SRs braced themselves to meet the threat of the Allies together. 
Military help from the centre, despite warnings from local leaders was delayed. No later 
than 3 July the Red Army’s All-Russian General Staff’s head of operations informed the 
Chief of Staff that troop reinforcements for the Murmansk railroad had been turned down 
by the Extraordinary Commission for the Defence of Conveyance Routes because there 
was a shortage of accommodation and provisions for the troops along the railway line.
59 
Local forces and leaders were therefore compelled to do all they could in the meantime to 
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defend themselves.
60 On 5 July Natsarenus declared martial law in the whole of Olonets 
province and along the Murmansk railway line from Murmansk to Zvanka and the 
provincial military commissariat was made responsible for the defence of the region.
61 On 
the same day, the Olonets provincial military commissariat also resolved to evict all non-
native inhabitants of the town who were not assisting the soviet; to recruit former officers 
to work alongside the soviet; register all weapons and provisions; and punish anyone 
caught damaging cables and wires in Petrozavodsk. Finally, all establishments and citizens 
were required to prepare for a possible evacuation of Petrozavodsk on the Petrograd to 
Vologda railway line.
62 
  
The new military crisis therefore breathed further life into the Left SR-Bolshevik 
alliance; Natsarenus appealed for help from Moscow as the provincial military 
commissariat and the Petrozavodsk town soviet hurried to construct a defence capable of 
holding back the Allies. It also gave the Left SRs and Bolshevik parties the opportunity to 
put recent differences to one side and provided a solid base for further collaboration. 
However, this opportunity was destroyed by events in Moscow. 
 
The Left SR ‘uprising’ in Petrozavodsk 
On 6 July 1918 the Left SRs assassinated the German ambassador in Moscow, Count 
Wilhelm Mirbach. Left SR military units then took control of the telegraph building in 
Moscow from where P.P. Prosh’ian sent messages around the country declaring their 
justification for Mirbach’s assassination, criticising the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and calling 
for a revolutionary war against imperialism. The Cheka headquarters were also taken over 
for a short time and its head, Felix Dzerzhinsky, placed under arrest. Yet, the so called Left 
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SR uprising came to nothing. More than 400 Left SR party members attending the Fifth 
All-Russian Congress of Soviets were surrounded inside the Bolshoi theatre by troops 
loyal to the Bolsheviks, some Left SRs were subsequently imprisoned and then gradually 
released. Following a small confrontation the uprising was suppressed by the Bolsheviks. 
According to the official statistics 13 of the leaders were shot on 7 July.
63 
   
The historiography of the Left SR uprising in the provinces remains generalised 
and only some of the few recent regional studies have detailed the event in a local 
context.
64 In the case of Petrozavodsk events in Moscow were pivotal to undermining the 
Left SR-Bolshevik alliance, forcing the Left SRs out of the provincial soviet executive 
committee and handing control to the local Bolsheviks. Owing to the detention of many 
Left SR delegates in Moscow the Bolsheviks had the advantage of dictating to the nation 
what had occurred from their own point of view.
65 Most important in the immediate 
aftermath of the uprising in Moscow was the fact that the Left SRs’ communications with 
their local organisations had been blocked by the Bolsheviks at a crucial moment. It is 
clear that a lack of knowledge of what had occurred in Moscow put local Left SRs in an 
awkward position and they did not know how to react.
66 Ia.V. Leont’ev, a leading Russian 
historian of the Left SRs, has attempted to characterise the different scenarios of the Left 
SR uprising around the country from roughly June to October 1918. He believes an 
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‘information war’ took place in Petrozavodsk and that the Left SRs were ‘squeezed out’ 
from their positions in the provincial soviet executive committee.
67 
 
    It is not known if the messages which were sent out by Prosh’ian on 6 July were 
received in Petrozavodsk. If the messages did arrive in the town then it is dubious if local 
Left SRs learnt about them because the provincial head of posts and telegraphs was a 
Bolshevik. Therefore the first news of what had happened in Moscow does not appear to 
have reached Petrozavodsk until 8 July when the Petrograd Military Commissariat sent out 
a circular telegram, not to the soviets, but to all military commissariats under its 
jurisdiction. This meant that because the Olonets provincial military commissariat was 
headed by the Bolsheviks (see below), they heard the news first.
68 The commissariat was 
informed that the uprising in Moscow had been liquidated and the Left SRs in Petrograd, 
after some small skirmishes, had been disarmed. Finally and most importantly the 
Petrograd Military Commissariat ordered any Left SRs who did not disassociate 
themselves from the actions of their counterparts in the capitals to be removed from all 
positions of responsibility.
69  
 
The following day, 9 July, the local Left SRs, having heard the news, made an 
announcement at a session of the Olonets provincial soviet executive committee and 
backed their party. They upheld their determination to defend the gains made by the 
revolution, the authority of the soviets and the class struggle against international 
imperialism: ‘The faction [of Left SRs] confirms that it will not deviate from this position’. 
Secondly, the Left SRs declared that the telegraph communications received about events 
in Moscow had been one-sided and as a result it was still not clear to them what had 
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exactly occurred. How the party was going to react could only be decided with the 
participation of all its delegates, a number of whom were currently dispersed around the 
countryside. In the meantime the Left SRs defied the Bolsheviks and concluded that: ‘...the 
Left SR party has always fought for the rights of the working people and it will not desert 
them now, so it proposes to its members to remain in all positions entrusted to them by the 
labouring peasants of the Olonets region.’
70  
 
Regardless of these statements the Bolsheviks moved quickly in response to the 
information received from the Petrograd Military Commissariat. On the 10 July the 
provincial military commissar, A.V. Dubrovskii, issued an order to all military units in the 
province not to carry out any orders forthcoming from Ivan Balashov or any other Left SR 
without the sanction of the provincial military commissariat or the Petrozavodsk town 
revolutionary committee.
71 On the night of 11/12 July the Left SR headquarters in 
Petrozavodsk were raided; all weapons and ammunition found were removed and taken to 
the Red Army headquarters while some of the Left SRs were arrested.
72 Balashov’s flat 
was also surrounded but he was not at home and his flat was left undisturbed.
73 On the 14 
July the Petrozavodsk County Bolshevik party committee decided to form a four man 
Cheka specifically for the task of disarming all members of the Left SR party.
74 Two days 
later an order was received from Grigorii Petrovskii, the People’s Commissar for Internal 
Affairs, which asked for Left SRs to be immediately removed from all leading posts, 
departments of administration and provincial and district Chekas. Naturally they were to be 
replaced with communists.
75 
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On the same day that Petrozavodsk received the order from Petrovskii, 16 July, a 
session of the provincial soviet executive committee took place where the Left SRs were 
presented with a request from the Bolshevik A.A. Zuev: he asked the local Left SRs to 
announce what their own position was in relation to what had happened in Moscow and to 
explain whether or not they supported the Left SR Central Committee. Arkhip Rybak 
refused to make any announcement because it was still unclear to the local Left SRs what 
had occurred in the capital and he instead responded indignantly that the Bolsheviks had no 
right to demand an explanation. Dubrovskii dismissed Rybak’s retort and announced that it 
was entirely clear that the Left SRs had undertaken a rebellion in Moscow. This he said 
had been confirmed by Bolsheviks arriving in the province from the capital. In response 
the Left SR, A.A. Sadikov, announced a resolution in the name of the party which stated 
that they did not believe any kind of uprising had taken place and that all actions against 
the party which had subsequently taken place were intolerable. Sadikov demanded the 
immediate cessation of any repressive measures or violence against the party’s 
organisations and its members, the restoration of the party’s press and the freedom to 
convene party congresses.
76  
 
  V.M. Parfenov then spoke out on behalf of the Bolsheviks and declared it no longer 
possible for his party to work with the Left SRs in the provincial soviet executive 
committee. Next he asked the Left SRs to explain what their position was towards their 
Central Committee and if they were willing to adhere to the decisions of the Fifth All-
Russian Congress of Soviets.
77 Rybak replied that only with the arrival of the Left SR 
representative from Moscow, A.P. Tikhomirov, an eyewitness to events, could the whole 
issue be fully understood. Moreover, justifiably from his viewpoint, the Bolsheviks had no 
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right to demand an answer to Parfenov’s propositions because the Bolsheviks were in the 
minority within the executive committee, whereas the Left SRs were in the majority. 
Parfenov refused to budge and again categorically demanded an exact answer to the 
Bolsheviks’ questions but agreed to wait for the arrival of the Left SR representative from 
Moscow while suggesting that the Bolshevik representative at the Fifth All-Russian 
Congress of Soviets, A.F. Kopnin, should also be consulted.
78 After a short recess Sadikov 
announced the Left SR’s resolution:
79 
 
In response to the question from the Bolshevik faction the Left SR faction – 
recognises the decisions of the Fifth All-Russian Congress and announces that at no 
time did the Left SR faction or the party bring disorganisation to the ranks of the 
workers and peasants and always obeyed the will of the higher organ – the 
decisions of the All-Russian Congress of Soviets and now will again submit to all 
the plenipotentiary decisions of the Fifth congress passed by all the authorised 
representatives of the peasants and workers and not only one faction. Furthermore 
the faction protests against the methods of the Bolshevik faction within the higher 
organ of authority in Olonets province, having expressed in publication only parts 
of the adopted resolution…the [Left SR] faction demands in the name of the 
Olonets provincial executive committee the proclamations in writing of all the 
work of the mandate commission at the Fifth All-Russian congress, not excluding 
the objection of its members, now arrested, but elected and authorised members of 
the congress and for full clarification of the true representation at the congress 
before every peasant and worker.  
 
The above statement showed that the local Bolsheviks did not receive full 
recognition from the Left SRs of the resolutions of the Fifth All-Russian Congress of 
Soviets because they were only representative of the Bolshevik party. Furthermore, the 
Left SRs resented the fact that the local Bolsheviks had retained important information 
about the congress for themselves.
80 It does not appear that the Bolsheviks were willing to 
share this information and the Left SR ‘uprising’ in Petrozavodsk came to a head. In a 
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further Bolshevik resolution Parfenov stated that because the Left SRs considered the 
decisions of the Fifth congress to be only representative of the Bolshevik faction and not 
the congress as a whole and because they continued to dodge the issue of whether they 
were willing to implement the settlements made at the Fifth All-Russian Congress of 
Soviets, all Left SRs endorsing the politics of their party central committee must 
immediately leave their posts in the provincial executive committee. All authority in the 
region was to pass to a new Olonets provincial revolutionary executive committee.  
 
This effectively marked the beginning of the end for the Left SRs in provincial 
politics. Sadikov announced that they agreed to leave the executive committee and the 
commissariats but suggested this was only because of the Bolsheviks’ presence within the 
provincial military commissariat. As a result, the Left SRs were forced to obey the ‘coarse 
strength of the Bolsheviks, founded on the point of a bayonet.’
81 On 16 July a new 
provincial soviet revolutionary executive committee was formed and began to appoint 
commissars to its commissariats. The committee was chaired by Anokhin and made up 
entirely of Bolsheviks.
82 The following day Anokhin informed Lenin and the district 
soviets about the transition of authority in Petrozavodsk and asked the district soviets to 
inform him about the party structure of their executive committees.
83 
 
Understanding the Left SR ‘uprising’ in Petrozavodsk 
Nothing remotely like events in Moscow took place in Petrozavodsk. In a similar vein to 
Petrograd, news of the uprising in the capital came as a surprise, Left SR headquarters 
were surrounded, searches took place and those Left SRs who failed to condemn their 
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Central Committee were forced to leave the Olonets provincial soviet executive committee. 
How then did the Bolshevik party in Petrozavodsk manage to oust the numerically more 
influential Left SR party from the Olonets provincial soviet executive committee and take 
sole power in a new revolutionary executive committee? In a national context Ettore 
Cinella claims that: ‘Where the left Populists had the majority the Bolsheviks used sheer 
force in disbanding the Socialist Revolutionary soviets…’
84 However, the evidence for 
Petrozavodsk challenges this observation. Sadikov’s parting shot mentioned above that the 
Bolsheviks’ strength was ‘founded on the point of a bayonet’ is important to understanding 
why the Bolsheviks were able to gain control in Petrozavodsk but ultimately it was only 
the threat of force and the party’s dominance of the provincial military commissariat that 
was required. Instead more important to the local Bolsheviks was the fact, described above, 
that the information of events in Moscow was relayed to them first. On the other hand local 
Left SRs were left dawdling and, as we will see, did not know how to react which 
ultimately led to a split within the party. 
 
In the months and weeks leading up to the expulsion of the Left SRs the Bolsheviks 
had taken control of the military bodies in Petrozavodsk and Karelia as a whole (although 
the precise stages and the means of how this was achieved are not revealed in the sources). 
It cannot be simply coincidence that the Olonets provincial and the district military 
commissariats were almost all headed by Bolsheviks but rather this seems to indicate a 
conscious Bolshevik policy in the north.
85 The Olonets provincial military commissariat 
was headed by two military commissars, A.V. Dubrovskii and M.F. Tarasov; both were 
Bolsheviks as was the commissariat’s secretary, M.G. Varfolomeev.
86 The most important 
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positions in Karelia’s district military commissariats were also dominated by communists. 
From the ten military commissars whom headed the military commissariats in 
Petrozavodsk, Olonets, Povenets, Pudozh and Kem’, nine were communists.
87  
 
Therefore the Left SRs may have held many of the important posts in the provincial 
soviet executive committee but it was the Bolsheviks who controlled the military 
commissariats. Although the historiography of the Left SRs military capabilities is limited 
Lutz Hafner has refuted any suggestion that the Left SRs in Moscow were inferior to the 
Bolsheviks in military matters.
88 Neither was the lack of Left SR influence within the 
Olonets provincial military authorities mirrored by the situation in other parts of the 
country; at the time of Mirbach’s assassination the Left SRs headed ten provincial military 
commissariats.
89 Why, then, did the Left SRs pay so little attention to the Red Army and 
military matters in Petrozavodsk? The answer lies somewhere in between practical and 
theoretical issues. The Left SRs had been willing to cede military influence to the 
Bolsheviks in return for occupying other important provincial commissariats, partly in 
order to keep the alliance intact, but also because the party were ideologically against the 
raising of a fixed and permanent army. It believed in the spontaneity of the masses, that 
they would to rise up if the revolution came under threat and their perception of the 
viability of this option in Karelia was encouraged by the spontaneous formation of partisan 
detachments during the attack of the White Finns, and the continued existence of these 
detachments throughout the region. The local Left SRs therefore kept their distance from 
supporting Bolshevik attempts to establish a regular army. 
  
However it would be wrong to suggest that the Left SRs had no influence among 
the military units in Petrozavodsk because the party did have military expertise within their 
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ranks. For instance, before moving to Petrozavodsk, Ivan Balashov had been head of the 
Left SRs’ All-Russian Battle organisation in Moscow.
90 Furthermore, when Balashov and 
Rybak addressed a general meeting of the recently arrived Red Army Oranienbaumskii 
battalion on 14 July they succeeded in persuading the soldiers’ to adopt resolutions which 
were strongly pro-Left SR.
91 Balashov and Rybak’s success amongst the battalion’s troops 
came in spite of the fact that the majority of its soldiers were supposedly aligned with the 
Bolshevik party. At the First Olonets Provincial Bolshevik Party Conference in August 
1918 the battalion’s representative noted that 225 of the 278 soldiers in the battalion were 
‘in the [Bolshevik] organisation.’ However he also noted that the battalion’s commander 
and commissar were Left SRs.
92The Left SRs therefore did for a time have the ‘real’ power 
in Petrozavodsk. This fact was underlined at the Fourth Left SR Party Congress (2-7 
October 1918) where the Olonets provincial delegate remembered that the previous July: 
‘both of us were scared of one another: we were scared that they would arrest us and they 
were scared that we would arrest them.’
93 
    
Yet the Left SRs’ attempt to redress the military balance which was in the 
Bolsheviks’ favour was short lived; the following week, at another Oranienbaumskii 
battalion gathering on 21 July, the soldiers’ resolutions were toned down and not so 
supportive of the Left SRs. Rumours circulated from an unknown source after their last 
gathering that the battalion was adopting negative slogans concerning the revolution and 
the Soviet regime. The battalion’s soldiers unanimously denied this but the provocation, 
wherever it stemmed from, had a significant effect; the troops now condemned the Left SR 
Central Committee for attempting to draw Russia into a war with Germany but at the same 
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time expressed the desire to work hand in hand with those Left SRs who had condemned 
the actions of their own central committee.
94 
 
The threat of military force therefore existed on both sides but there was no 
exchange of fire in Petrozavodsk between local Left SRs and Bolsheviks, no fatalities and 
nowhere near the 260 or so arrests made in Petrograd. Instead, the evidence points to the 
relative docility of the local Left SRs when it came to withdrawing from the provincial 
soviet executive committee. They had no desire to provoke an armed conflict with their 
former alliance partners and perhaps felt strong enough to bide their time in the belief that 
the Bolsheviks would not be strong enough to rule alone. The change in the political 
dynamics in Petrozavodsk was forced more significantly by the Left SR Central 
Committee’s uprising in Moscow which in the short-term handed local Bolsheviks control 
of the Olonets provincial soviet executive committee: to repeat, the transfer of power to the 
local Bolsheviks was facilitated by the fact that the Bolshevik party heard the news first 
about what had happened in the capital. In turn this allowed the Bolsheviks to set the pace 
of events and take a leading role in the provincial soviet executive committee sessions in 
Petrozavodsk. Furthermore, by setting an ultimatum to the Left SRs to either accept the 
decisions of the Fifth All-Russian Congress of Soviets or face expulsion from local 
government, the Bolsheviks induced a split within the Left SR party in Petrozavodsk.
95 
 
Some Left SRs were ready to accept the decisions of the Fifth All-Russian 
Congress of Soviets and for that matter a few Bolsheviks outside of the provincial soviet 
appealed for unity during this crisis and had no desire for a split between the two parties. 
At a meeting of the Murmansk railroad soviet, reported in the provincial Izvestiia on 14 
July, a representative of the Left SRs announced that the disorder occurring in the centre 
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between the Bolsheviks and the Left SRs should not be echoed in the north when the 
seriousness of the current situation (the attack of the Allies) should unite everyone around 
the soviets. He further added that the assassination of Mirbach had not been committed by 
the Left SRs but by the Allies or the Germans. With reference to the recent southern 
advance of the Allies the Bolshevik, A.A. Khoroshevskii, also stressed the importance of 
unity, especially on the Murmansk railroad, and appealed for the Left SRs not to separate 
from the communists. Another Bolshevik by the name of Pakhomenko also felt pulling 
together under the current difficult circumstances was desirable.
96 
  
Nevertheless, calls for unity were not representative of the entire membership of 
the local Left SR party. This was expressed at the same meeting of the Murmansk railway 
soviet in Petrozavodsk. A.A. Sadikov spoke out on behalf of the Left SRs and summarised 
what many members of his party had repeatedly been saying: the destruction of the 
revolution was coming ever closer as a result of the dictates of the Germans (i.e. the Treaty 
of Brest-Litovsk). Was it not better to appeal for the worldwide revolution than die without 
a fight? Khoroshevskii believed the Left SRs were being entirely unrealistic in wishing to 
resume the war with Germany and responded condescendingly: ‘It is pointless to construct 
fantastical plans on soapy bubbles because our army is in no condition to fight.’
97 The Left 
Menshevik Internationalists also voiced their opinion through their representative L.V. 
Nikol’skii who, like Khoroshevskii, believed that fighting the Germans was impossible.
98 
Ultimately, the lack of a general agreement within the Left SR party was reflected when 25 
of the party’s delegates in the Murmansk railroad soviet resolved to condemn the actions of 
their Central Committee while 16 supported it.
99 
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  Despite differences of opinion neither Left SRs nor Bolsheviks resorted to military 
force against one another. The past six months or so had seen the Left SRs willingly 
compromise with the Bolsheviks in a relatively effective alliance. Despite disagreements 
the Left SRs had also become the dominant force in the provincial soviet and they wished 
for this democratically achieved success to continue. In other words the evidence points to 
the unwillingness of the Left SRs to retain their position in Petrozavodsk through force. 
Likewise the Bolsheviks, despite their presiding military influence in Petrozavodsk did not 
need or necessarily want to resort to force to push the Left SRs out of the provincial soviet 
executive committee. The Bolsheviks acted pragmatically when it came to the immediate 
future of their former allies, primarily because the Bolsheviks still required them for 
administrative purposes. The void left by the expulsion of the Left SRs in Petrozavodsk 
was evident at the first session of the new Olonets provincial revolutionary executive 
committee which consisted of only 12 members; at the last session of the old executive 
committee on 16 July the committee had consisted of 24 members.
100 Although the 
Bolsheviks added to the committee sometime thereafter and its numbers rose to 23 
members, they accepted V.M. Lanev, a teacher and Left SR who had disassociated himself 
from his Central Committee.
101 
 
More important to the Bolsheviks gaining control of Petrozavodsk was the reaction 
of the local Left SRs to events in Moscow. The Left SRs now faced the dilemma of either 
condemning their own party Central Committee in favour of remaining in a position of 
power but subordinate to the Bolsheviks or going their own road in open opposition. 
Statistics for the reaction to the Left SR uprising in the Northern and North-Western region 
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of the country as a whole show that the Left SRs in the wider region were effectively split 
in two. 42% of Left SR organisations condemned their party Central Committee after the 
July uprising while 58% supported it. In short, there was no unity within the Left SRs in 
these different localities and no circumstance whereby a consensus of opinion was reached 
on how to react.
102 
 
Conclusion 
The uprising in Moscow on 6 July was disastrous for the Left SRs in Petrozavodsk. Before 
the uprising the Left SRs and Bolsheviks were united in the face of various crises as shown 
in the previous chapter and, as shown above, their alliance remained intact to meet a new 
military threat from the Allies despite growing and major disagreements on how to respond 
to the centre’s policies. Political power was still localised and distinct from the capital and 
Karelia was a region governed by both Left SRs and Bolsheviks. However, events in 
Moscow left local Left SRs bewildered, the party split in two over how to react and lost its 
presiding position in the Olonets provincial soviet executive committee. In contrast, the 
Bolsheviks received the opportunity to become the presiding authority in the Olonets 
provincial soviet and it was an opportunity they were willing to take. 
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Chapter 4 
Problems in the Periphery: Politics and Resources, July-November 1918 
Ettore Cinella claims that ‘Throughout Russia that July [1918] there was an enormous 
purge of the local soviets (provincial, district and rural soviets), and by the end of the purge, 
the Left SRs had been expelled from all the organs of power.’
1 However, this was not the 
case in Karelia where the Left SRs kept their positions within the soviets and soviet 
executive committees in Olonets, Povenets, Pudozh and Petrozavodsk districts up to 
October and November 1918.
2 In fact provincial Bolsheviks and district Left SRs 
sometimes found themselves cooperating even after July, for instance regarding the control 
of the local Cheka. In Petrozavodsk itself the Left SRs continued to have a presence for a 
time, but only a minor one. They were expelled from the Olonets provincial soviet 
executive committee in July but they had some influence in the press after this; on 14 
August, in the provincial Izvestiia, the Petrozavodsk Left SR party committee appealed to 
all its members to attend a general meeting of the party scheduled for the following day.
3 It 
also appears that some Left SRs were tolerated by the Bolsheviks for their administrative 
experience and capabilities; up to the beginning of October the leader of the Olonets 
provincial Left SR party Ivan Balashov remained a member of the Petrozavodsk town 
soviet.
4 Thus although the local Bolsheviks, for the first time, had the opportunity to 
govern the region the way they wanted without the likelihood that their proposals would be 
blocked and without the need for compromise with the Left SRs, their control of the region 
was far from absolute.  
   
  As we will see below and in the forthcoming chapters the Bolsheviks’ path towards 
control across Karelia was uneven and progressed with various setbacks. However, the 
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party recognised the need to “Bolshevise” the districts and attempted to do so through a 
number of measures: the sending of communist agitators to the periphery; the use of the 
Cheka and the Red Army; the gathering of information; increased communication between 
centre and peripheral party organisations; increased propaganda; the threat of force and 
isolation from supply plans. This chapter will argue that local Bolshevik leaders in 
Petrozavodsk now sought to introduce the capital’s decrees which had previously been 
blocked by the Left SRs at the Fourth Olonets Provincial Congress of Soviets but struggled 
to do so for much of the remainder of 1918 because of their lack of political dominance in 
the districts. Even the creation of a network of Bolshevik institutions during the second 
half of 1918 designed to give the communists control over the districts, such as the 
kombedy, registration control commissions, food supply detachments and the Cheka, failed 
to achieve this end. However, the effectiveness of these institutions was only partly 
hamstrung by political factors; equally as important in hindering the implementation of 
central Bolshevik policies was the lack of financial, personnel and material resources. In 
short from summer to winter 1918 Bolshevik policies faced practical as well as political 
stumbling blocks in the Karelian districts. 
 
Food supply: the need for action 
The food shortages that existed in the Karelian districts up to early June 1918 have already 
been described in Chapter 2 and in Chapter 3 where the main aims of the kombedy and 
food supply detachment decrees were briefly outlined. Broadly speaking, these two 
instruments of governance were introduced as part of the food supply dictatorship to give 
the Bolsheviks greater political influence and control in the countryside while at the same 
time help ease the food crisis. This crisis which faced the new Olonets provincial 
commissar for food, I.F. Petrov, showed no signs of abating after the Left SRs left the 
Olonets provincial executive committee. On 29 July the commissar for food in Pudozh 
district reported in a telegram to Avdeevskaia parish that a number of parishes were   112 
starving and people were dying in Iangozerskaia parish.
5 The need to ease the food 
shortages by introducing the capital’s food supply policies therefore became all the more 
important. 
 
Because the region relied heavily on food supplies from other Russian provinces, 
developments in other parts of the country during the civil war, near and far, directly 
affected the civil war in Karelia and accentuated the food shortages there. S.P. Natsarenus 
informed Lenin towards the end of June that he expected the evacuation south of more than 
10,000 to 15,000 people who did not wish to remain under an Allied regime. He asked for 
the transfer of a sum of money to him and the urgent dispatch of foodstuffs to last 15,000 
people a period of ten days because the local stores could not meet the demand.
6 The 
number of people moving south was not as high as Natsarenus expected but by the middle 
of July hundreds of people not wishing to live under the Allies did move south, many of 
whom were reported to have gathered at Segezha.
7 The commandant of the Petrozavodsk 
sector of the Murmansk railway, V.P. Solunin, explained the effect this movement of 
people had in Petrozavodsk:
8  
 
Upon taking up my post as commandant, on 16 July, I found a fully loaded station, 
all the lines were crammed with carriages with evacuated loads and with evacuated 
employees and workers, the station was choked in every sense of the word and 
evacuated workers wandered around with the homeless crowds.  
   
Karelia’s food supply problems were also affected by the revolt and conquests 
achieved by the Czechoslovakian Legion which on 25 May, stranded in Russia after the 
Treaty of Brest Litovsk, rebelled against the Soviet authorities in the east. By the end of 
July 1918 large sections of the Trans Siberian Railway from Samara to Vladivostok were 
captured by the Whites with the assistance of the Czechs. Its significance for Karelia was 
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underlined in a telegram on the 24 July sent by Lenin to Natsarenus. In response to a recent 
request for foodstuffs, Lenin wrote:
9     
 
I am passing your telegram on to the Commissariat for Food. The food situation is 
as bad as it can be. We shall hardly be able to help. Everything that is best and most 
reliable has to be organised for sending detachments to the Czechoslovak front. 
Without victory over the Czechoslovaks there will be no more grain. 
 
The Czech mutiny had cut off the eastern grain producing regions from the grain deficit 
regions which placed increased pressure on the producing provinces not affected by the 
Czech uprising or the Treaty of Brest Litovsk. At the First Olonets Provincial Bolshevik 
Party Conference (6 7 August, 1918) I.F. Petrov noted: ‘our orders in Siberia have been 
met but owing to the movement of the Czechs they have been delayed.’
10 The Olonets 
provincial Izvestiia reported on 8
 August that not one delivery of grain had reached the 
Olonets provincial commissariat for food for the current month.
11 Secondly, as Lenin’s 
above telegram testifies, the Czech mutiny forced the central Bolshevik government to 
prioritise its resources and send them to the most threatened military fronts. The Czech 
front therefore took precedence over Karelia and Petrozavodsk. Petrov explained at the 
First Olonets Provincial Party Conference in August that the plan to dispatch 100 workers 
to Petrozavodsk from Petrograd had been changed. Instead the workers were redirected to 
the Czechoslovak front.
12  
 
Of course the food crisis was not a problem isolated to the Karelian districts; the 
food supply dictatorship was introduced because food supply was a nationwide problem. 
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For local Bolshevik leaders in Petrozavodsk this meant that it was common for food loads 
directed to them to be commandeered by other district or provincial authorities. In early 
August 1918 a carriage load of wheat flour from Saratov and a load of oats, transhipped at 
Niandoma station in south western Archangel province for Petrozavodsk, was seized at 
Tikhvin station in Cherepovets province by the local soviet. According to the local 
Izvestiia report all that reached the provincial food board so far for August was a carriage 
load of hempseed oil and 45 boxes of enamel crockery.
13 At the First Olonets Provincial 
Bolshevik Party Conference Petrov noted that a total of 130 carriage loads worth of grain 
had been unhooked and appropriated at a number of stations en route to Petrozavodsk.
14 In 
short, the further food loads had to travel the greater the chance they were going to be 
hijacked by other districts along the way or pilfered at stations which were not prepared to 
receive them.
15 To quote one historian of the railways during the civil war: ‘Transporting 
grain by rail was like carrying water in a leaky bucket ― it was a good idea to move as 
rapidly as possible.’
16 If this was the case then Olonets province was at a distinct 
disadvantage because whether loads came from the south or east of the country they would 
have to go through a number of important urban centres and transit points before reaching 
the Murmansk railway line and Petrozavodsk. Other local soviets naturally took the 
opportunity to seize food loads when the opportunity arose and prioritised their own food 
supply needs over those of other needy regions such as Karelia. However, the stop for 
Olonets province, which would allow the Karelian districts to be supplied, was often at the 
end of the line.  
 
                                                 
13 Izvestiia Olonetskogo Gubernskogo Soveta, 8 August 1918.  
14 NARK, f.P 4, op.1, d.2, l.15. 
15 A study of Saratov during the civil war has noted that the pilfering of grain carriages at stops and stations 
reached ‘colossal proportions.’ Raleigh, Civil War. 296. 
16 R. Argenbright, “Bolsheviks, Baggers and Railroaders: Political Power and Social Space, 1917 1921.” 
Russian Review, Vol.52, No.4, 1993. 517. On the advantages of working in a position on the railroad system 
and pilfering along the line during the civil war see 516 517.    115 
Therefore something had to be done to ease the food supply crisis which by August 
had reached crisis point for local leaders. Because Karelia was a grain deficit region it did 
not come into conflict with food supply detachments to the same extent as the grain 
producing provinces. The anger of the local population was saved for the local 
commissariat for food and its apparent inability to supply the region. Petrov sent a 
telegram to the provincial revolutionary executive committee on 10 August which stated 
that huge crowds had appeared at his commissariat to demand an extra issue of grain but 
there was nothing to give them. As a result, the crowds threatened to take up arms in revolt 
and dissolve the food commissariat.
17 In the short term, independent local measures were 
adopted which suggests that some grain was still available in Petrozavodsk; on 12 August 
the provincial revolutionary executive committee ordered the Petrozavodsk town soviet to 
urgently organise a general issue of baked bread instead of flour to the town’s citizens. 
While this distribution of bread was being organised, the town soviet would continue to 
issue flour to the population, and would do this weekly instead of fortnightly.
18 However, 
the provincial revolutionary executive committee also resolved to appeal to Sovnarkom 
and the Northern Regional government in Petrograd which hitherto had failed to respond to 
repeated telegrams from Petrozavodsk for help.
19 
   
The food crisis made the implementation of the party’s food supply dictatorship 
decrees even more important. At the First Olonets Provincial Bolshevik Party Conference 
in early August I.K. Berztys, a prominent local party committee member, announced:
20  
 
Our task at the current moment is to organise food supply detachments and the 
village poor. We need to implement the grain monopoly and establish fixed prices. We 
must compel the kulaks to obey our system by force. We need to monopolise all food 
products…the class struggle must be organised in connection with the food issue. 
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In the short term the crisis continued unabated amidst the continued failure of appeals for 
help from the centre. On 20 August Petrov sent another telegram to the People’s 
Commissar for Food with a heightened sense of urgency. He stressed that not one carriage 
load of grain had reached Olonets province according to the supply orders for the months 
of July and August and that if grain was not delivered to him in the next few days the 
Olonets provincial commissariat for food would cease to operate, he would resign and 
refuse to accept any responsibility for the consequences.
21 Local Bolsheviks received more 
bad news shortly thereafter. On 26 August the Olonets provincial revolutionary executive 
committee found out that Petrov’s request to receive a monetary loan from the centre to 
purchase food stuffs had been turned down.
22 
  
Help from the centre, which was not forthcoming, was therefore pivotal to the 
survival of the Karelian region but at the same time the food supply crisis added fresh 
impetus to the formation of the kombedy and the food supply detachments. For the first 
time since the removal of the Left SRs from the Olonets provincial executive committee 
Bolsheviks in Petrozavodsk had the opportunity to introduce the central government’s food 
supply policies without the opposition of their coalition partners. However, as we shall see 
below, the introduction of the kombedy, a registration of the harvest and the creation of the 
food supply detachments was troubled and continued to be hindered by political obstacles 
in the Karelian districts.   
 
The introduction of the kombedy 
Local Bolsheviks placed great emphasis on the use of agitators in the creation of Bolshevik 
institutions in Karelia.
23 On 4 August the Petrozavodsk County Bolshevik Party Committee 
decided to dispatch communists, three to each district of Olonets province, to establish 
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food supply detachments, kombedy and carry out a register of food products.
24 On 20 
August a meeting of the communists chosen to organise the kombedy in the districts 
decided which communists would go to which districts.
25 An organisational bureau was 
also set up to co ordinate the dispatch of these organisers who became an important link 
with the countryside and whose aim was to increase Petrozavodsk’s knowledge of 
conditions in the countryside and promote the party there. In Karelia they were required to 
gather information about the kombedy and to dispatch literature and newspapers to the 
districts.
26 The presence of Red Army units also hastened the establishment of the kombedy. 
A member of the Povenets district soviet executive committee, F.E. Pottoev, noted that the 
communist party members of the 166
th Beloraiskii regiment, part of the 6
th Beloraiskii 
battalion which arrived in the district in July, was particularly active in establishing 
kombedy.
27 A considerable number of Bolshevik organisers were also sent from Petrograd; 
the Northern Regional Bolshevik Party Committee dispatched 58 agitators to Olonets 
province from September to December 1918 along with a fifty five man food supply 
detachment which helped with the registration of the harvest (see more on this detachment 
below).
28 The presence of Bolshevik agitators was clearly important to the establishment of 
the kombedy and helps to explain the rise in the number created during August and 
September 1918 (see below).  
 
However, a study of Karelia also highlights how important local soviets were in 
initially resisting these Bolshevik institutions. A local Soviet historian stressed that the 
formation of the kombedy in Karelia was effectively delayed by the Left SR majority in the 
                                                 
24 Mashezerskii and Slavin, Bor’ba. 410 12. The following Bolsheviks were elected to undertake this task: 
A.N. Svetitskii, N.A. Smirnov, T.D. Anisimov, P. Morozov, Kh.G. Doroshin, F.Z. Shumilov, Shchirovskii, 
P.V. Kulagin, A.A. Zuev, A.S. Metelkin, N.N. Dorofeev, D.Z. Akulov and Solomkin.   
25 Additional party members were assigned to take part in the organisation of the kombedy to those named in 
the above footnote. Dispatched to the Karelian districts were: K.A. Luzgin, F.Z. Shumilov, Ivanov (Povenets 
district); N.N. Dorofeev, Basinov, Iudanov (Pudozh district); Fedorov, Ivanov, Men’shikov (Olonets district). 
NARK, f.P 2, op.1, d.10, l.1  
26 NARK, f.P 2, op.1, d.10, l.1 2. A.S. Metelkin was elected the head of this organisation bureau.  
27 Memoirs of F.E. Pottoev in Gardin, et al., Vlast’ Sovetov. 198 199. 
28 Shumilov, Bor’ba. 152.    118 
provincial soviet and the district soviets of Olonets, Pudozh and Povenets.
29 In some 
instances the kombedy were only established in the parishes in August and September 
when the soviets were reorganised and the influence of the Bolsheviks began to rise. This 
trend was reflected in the information gathered from the 718 kombedy delegates from 
Olonets province questioned at the First Congress of Kombedy of the Northern Region (3 6 
November 1918). Only 4 kombedy were established in June, 16 in July, 192 in August, 343 
in September and 163 in October.
30 
 
The case of the Tulguba village kombed in Sunskaia parish, Petrozavodsk district, 
reflected the importance of Bolshevik party organisers to the introduction of the kombedy 
but also the ability of local soviets to frustrate their introduction. At one of its sessions on 
16 August the Olonets provincial revolutionary executive committee learned that local 
‘kulaks’ had not distributed agricultural land proportionately (by the number of people per 
family) and refused to issue grain surpluses. As a result, some of the villagers in Tulguba 
made a complaint. In response the Olonets provincial revolutionary executive committee 
decided to assign two party members and a member of the food board to Tulguba to 
organise a kombed and address the peasants’ complaint.
31 However sending these agitators 
had no immediate effect because on 2 September the Olonets provincial revolutionary 
executive committee found out that the ‘kulaks’ of Sunskaia parish did not recognise the 
authority of the kombed. It is clear that the ‘kulaks’ referred to belonged to the parish 
soviet which refused to create a parish kombed. On 2 September the provincial 
revolutionary executive committee ordered the Sunskaia parish soviet to immediately 
organise kombedy in the villages and not to hinder the kombedy which had already been 
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created.
32 Finally, on 8 September the Sunskaia parish soviet informed the Petrozavodsk 
district executive committee that a parish kombed had been elected.
33  
 
However, even after their creation the kombedy were still resisted by the Sunskaia 
parish soviet. A letter to the chairman of the provincial revolutionary executive committee 
on the 3 October, from a Bolshevik organiser sent to the parish, noted that individuals in 
the parish soviet were unsympathetic to the Bolsheviks. The Bolshevik organiser therefore 
asked for an official letter to be sent to him which ordered the abolition of the parish soviet 
and the transfer of authority to the parish kombed. The provincial revolutionary executive 
committee resolved to elect a new parish soviet by calling a congress of representatives of 
all the kombedy in the parish.
34 This congress would elect a new parish soviet which 
naturally would be sympathetic to the kombedy and the Bolsheviks would, they hoped, 
gain a firmer administrative hold over Sunskaia parish.
35 
 
Sending agitators from the centre was seen as a viable means of facilitating the 
formation of kombedy but they did not have an immediate effect in Karelia because local 
soviets were able to hinder the introduction and functioning of the kombedy. The 
importance of local political factors in relation to the implementation of the kombedy was 
also evident in Pudozh district. In response to a request from the newly formed provincial 
revolutionary executive committee the Pudozh district executive committee informed 
Petrozavodsk on 18 July it was made up of three Bolsheviks, one Left SR and nine non 
party socialists.
36 Despite being outnumbered by the Bolsheviks the Left SRs’ influence 
amongst the non party members of the Pudozh district soviet was strong. On the 19 July 
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the Pudozh district executive committee heard a report from their Left SR representative in 
the provincial executive committee which stated that he had been dismissed by the 
Bolsheviks in Petrozavodsk and that provincial executive committee representatives 
belonging to the Bolsheviks and their sympathisers were being dispatched from the 
districts to Petrozavodsk. In response the non party socialist members of the district 
executive committee protested against the dismissal of the Left SR representatives from 
Petrozavodsk. They believed that the joint efforts of the district executive committee 
members were beneficial to the Soviet regime as a whole and the dismissal of the Left SRs 
would undermine their work amongst the peasantry.
37 A few days later, on the 24 July, the 
Pudozh district executive committee then informed the Olonets provincial commissar for 
food that it refused to organise kombedy in the district and questioned the need for these 
organs of power in the countryside because their introduction had been discussed and 
rejected by a recent district congress of soviets and the Fourth Olonets Provincial Congress 
of Soviets. As a result the Pudozh district executive committee concluded that the 
provincial soviet should not assume that kombedy would be organised in the district.
38  
 
The influence of the Left SRs in the Pudozh district soviet executive committee in 
relation to the creation of the kombedy at parish level became apparent in the case of 
Berezhnodubrovskaia parish where the Bolsheviks created a twenty five member party 
organisation on 15 August.
39 The Bolsheviks therefore had a relatively strong influence in 
this particular parish and two weeks later, on 29 August, the executive committee of the 
parish soviet appealed directly to Sovnarkom for support. It explained that the parish soviet 
operated ‘independently and without the knowledge of the kulak Pudozh district soviet’ 
and that the Pudozh district soviet had refused to introduce the kombedy or food supply 
detachments. The parish soviet therefore asked Moscow to dispatch a Bolshevik organiser 
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and orator to it. Furthermore, the soviet informed the capital that they were not receiving 
any central decrees because their telegrams were being withheld by the head of the posts 
and telegraphs department. As a result they had to rely on the newspapers for information. 
Nevertheless, even gathering information from newspapers was problematic; the parish 
soviet stressed it had no more than a third of the issues, the newspapers were not in 
sequence and any issue with important information was withheld by the Pudozh district 
head of posts and telegraphs.
40  
 
However, by this time the provincial executive committee was running out of 
patience with the Pudozh district executive committee. On 26 August the Olonets 
provincial revolutionary executive committee reviewed the decision made by the Pudozh 
district executive committee to reject the creation of the kombedy and transferred the 
matter to the provincial Cheka which was assigned the task of ‘winning over’ all those in 
the Pudozh district executive committee who had not introduced the decrees coming from 
Moscow.
41 The involvement of the Cheka worked and on 4 September the Pudozh district 
soviet executive committee decided to immediately begin the organisation of the kombedy 
and asked the provincial revolutionary executive committee to send it instructions and 
agitators.
42 On 30 September a Bolshevik agitator then arrived in Pudozh and addressed the 
district executive committee about the organisation of a Bolshevik party cell and managed 
to convince ten executive committee members to join the party. The same agitator also 
informed the Bureau of the party Central Committee on 2 October that within the nineteen 
member Pudozh district soviet executive committee there were now ten Bolsheviks, four 
Bolshevik sympathisers, two Left SRs and three non party members.
43 The changing 
character of the Pudozh district executive committee appears to have facilitated the 
creation of a kombed in Berezhnodubrovskaia parish; a kombed was organised there by 1 
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October. On this date the parish kombed informed the provincial revolutionary executive 
committee that other kombedy had been organised within the parish and were working well. 
Moreover, a number of ‘kulaks’ had been sent to the front to dig trenches.
44  
 
   The kombedy were also blocked at district level in Olonets district where the Left 
SRs were even more dominant than in Pudozh district. In August at the Fourth Olonets 
district congress of soviets a Left SR dominated district executive committee was elected 
which refused to send representatives to the Olonets provincial revolutionary executive 
committee and blocked the implementation of the kombedy decree.
45 However, as stated at 
the beginning of this chapter, the political hindrances which stalled the establishment and 
functioning of Bolshevik institutions were aggravated by a lack of local resources. The 
Bolsheviks believed that speculation in bread was undermining attempts to alleviate the 
food crisis and the creation of the kombedy was seen, in part, as a practical remedy for the 
distribution of bread to the needy. However, in some parishes there was very little to 
distribute. On the 8 September a provincial Cheka commissar made a report on speculation 
in Siamozerskaia parish, situated near the Finnish border in Petrozavodsk district. The 
commissar made a note of the near critical food shortages prevalent in the border parish 
and believed that he did not discover any speculation in grain because there was very little 
to speculate with and local soviets had resisted the kombedy:
46 
  
According to the words of a few peasants there is hardly any speculation in grain 
because it has been exchanged for vital products from Finland, for example in 
Veshkelitsa, Siamozera, Korza, Ugmoila and other villages in Siamozerskaia parish. 
For approximately three weeks there was an entire lack of vital products: kerosene, 
tea, matches, cigarettes etc and this is why the peasants were forced to trade their 
last pounds [of grain] with Finland for these products. The reason for this trade is 
that not a single village has a kombed, everywhere there are soviets in which 
prominent kulaks, deacons, priests etc are at work and assist (sposobstvovat’) all 
this [trade]…the new harvest of potatoes is almost all the peasants have in surplus.      
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Upon hearing the report the provincial revolutionary executive committee decided at a 
meeting on the 29 October to pass the matter onto the Petrozavodsk County Bolshevik 
Party Committee to appoint party agitators to Siamozerskaia parish.
47 
 
A common problem in the organisation of the kombedy was also a lack of 
information. Some parishes did not know how to go about creating these bodies and 
requested informed personnel to set them up. On 8 September the peasants of a village in 
Konchezerskaia parish, Petrozavodsk district, appealed to the Petrozavodsk County 
Bolshevik Party Committee for help in the forming of a kombed. The villagers explained 
that they had no instructions or guidance on how to form one and asked for organisers to 
be sent to their village to show them what to do.
48 Similarly, on 11 September, the Olonets 
district Bolshevik party committee wrote to the Petrozavodsk County Bolshevik Party 
Committee about the forming of kombedy and food supply detachments. A lack of money 
was underlined as a key problem hindering the establishment of these institutions but the 
committee also asked for literature and instructions.
49  
 
The registration of the 1918 harvest 
The creation of the food supply detachments and kombedy in late spring/early summer was 
of course timely; the harvest period was approaching and at the very least local leaders 
hoped that the shortages would ease because of the increased availability of grain produced 
by the fresh crop. On 22 July the Olonets provincial commissariat for food I.F. Petrov 
endeavoured to ensure that his province would make the most out of its own harvest by 
introducing the decree, to be implemented by all district, parish and rural executive 
committees, for the registration of all grain products in the forthcoming harvest. The 
decree stipulated the creation of registration control commissions (uchetno kontrol’nye 
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komissii) in all rural settlements (sel’skie obshchestva). The commissions were to contain 
no less than three members from the local soviet and elected from the ranks of the 
Bolshevik party.
50 Also, as their name suggests, the commissions were designed to give the 
Bolsheviks mastery over the harvest and it is significant that membership of the 
commissions was restricted to Bolshevik party members of local soviets; the Bolsheviks 
were aware of the potential resistance their food supply policies would meet in the district 
and parish soviets.  
 
For whatever reason the history of the registration control commissions, until now, 
has received no coverage in the regional studies of the civil war.
51 Broadly speaking these 
commissions were established to make sure that an accurate account of the harvest was 
made which in turn would assist the provincial centre to calculate how much grain to 
distribute and in what quantities in the coming months. As well as making an account of 
the grain harvested other produce such as potatoes and turnips were to be registered along 
with livestock numbers. All citizens were obliged to meet the requests of the registration 
control commissions while those who did not were liable to have their property confiscated 
and to be deprived of their rations. Realising their lack of control over the districts and 
parishes, the Bolsheviks buttressed their policies with threats and force; the decree also 
made it compulsory for an armed guard to be attached to each commission. The cultivation 
of the entire harvest was set to be completed by the 1 November 1918 after which 
surpluses were to be strictly controlled by the local soviets and handed over for storage to 
cooperatives, if they existed, or to public storehouses. All district and parish soviets were 
requested to acknowledge their acceptance of this decree by the 15 August, soviets not 
submitting to the decree would be excluded from the general plan of supply.
52 
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Important to the success of the harvest registration was the kombedy which would 
be involved in helping carry it out. As a result, on the 8 September the Olonets provincial 
commissar for food tried to push through their creation by using the food crisis to his 
advantage. I.F. Petrov threatened that he would cease the distribution of rationed products 
to districts and parishes which, within the space of 25 days, had not created a kombed.
53 
Because of their lack of control in the districts and the potential for resistance to harvest 
registration local Bolsheviks therefore relied on threats to implement their decrees. Petrov 
also announced on 8 September that all district and parish executive committee members 
who did not carry out the registration of the harvest would have their names published in 
the newspapers for sabotage or inaction. Furthermore, the local population were asked by 
the provincial food commissariat to hand over information about the harvest to parish 
soviets. Anyone failing to do so voluntarily would have their harvest registration carried 
out regardless and without the benefit of this information. Finally, anyone giving false 
information about the size of the harvest for 1918 would have their produce requisitioned 
and they would be sent to prison for no less than three months.
54 
 
Increased organisation, force and threats were therefore pivotal features of the 
Olonets provincial food commissariat’s efforts to ease the region’s food problems. No 
matter how successful the harvest proved to be the region would still rely on food imports 
but they would at least have a short term solution if all went well. In the meantime the food 
commissariat would do its utmost to make an accurate analysis of the crop in the districts 
and parishes so distribution could be centralised and made easier in the future. Such a drive 
suggests that a registration of foodstuffs in the region had not been undertaken recently and 
as a result the soviets wanted to reinforce what they knew about the availability of food 
stuffs and the population in different parts of Olonets province. On the surface the role of 
the registration control commissions was quite simple: to make grain distribution easier in 
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the future by way of an accurate account of what was produced during the harvest season. 
However, the registration control commissions’ task was more profound than this. The 
introduction of these commissions pointed to the Bolsheviks’ future planning; an accurate 
harvest registration would help Petrozavodsk acquire a greater knowledge of the periphery 
which could be used to hold greater control over food supply and the population in the 
future. 
 
The need to register the harvest in Karelia was made yet more urgent because the 
People’s Commissariat for Food in the summer of 1918 announced that it would not 
transport grain to the grain deficit provinces unless it was satisfied that these provinces had 
done everything possible to gather their own grain supplies.
55 However despite the 
organisational and administrative instructions issued by the provincial commissariat for 
food to register the harvest, the process of registration did not run smoothly. Firstly, as 
stated above, it appears that the kombedy were heavily involved in the harvest registration 
but their assistance depended on their creation in the countryside which was often 
belated.
56 For instance, not until 25 September did a gathering of communists in Boiarskaia 
parish, Pudozh district, decide to organise kombedy in the villages and to appoint one 
member of the party and two from the parish soviet to register the harvest. They would be 
joined by two Red Army men and the gathering decided to also use the kombedy.
57 
Because the kombedy were resisted in a number of districts and parishes this therefore must 
have had an adverse effect on their ability to help in the registration of the harvest. 29 
kombedy were established in all of Boairskaia parish’s settlements (seleniia) but not until 1 
October.
58 In short, although directives were issued from Petrozavodsk there was no 
guarantee that these directives would be implemented or carried out in a way Bolshevik 
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leaders assumed they would be; implementation at local level determined the success of 
the Bolsheviks’ policies issued from above and at this stage of the civil war in Karelia both 
political and material stumbling blocks hindered the party’s attempts to ease the food crisis.
   
On 29 August the provincial commissariat for food asked the provincial 
revolutionary executive committee to instruct all district and parish executive committees 
to issue ‘open passes’ (otkrytye listy) to individuals sent by the provincial food board to 
make an account of the harvest so that these representatives could collect horses for free 
from the village communities. Village authorities were also asked, without hindrance or 
delay, to issue these ‘open passes’ to registration officials sent to them.
59 However, the 
inward flow of state officials into the countryside to register the harvest gave rise to a 
number of frictions; some parishes and rural settlements resisted and dug their heels in. 
Ivan Petrov announced at the Second Provincial Bolshevik Party Conference in December 
1918 that the localities in the districts hindered the registration of the harvest and refrained 
from carrying it out.
60  
 
Resistance: the case of Avdeevskaia parish 
A case in point was Avdeevskaia parish, Pudozh district, which resisted the registration of 
the harvest, primarily because of political differences with the district and provincial 
authorities. Up to the registration of the harvest and despite several attempts by the district 
soviet, the Avdeevskaia parish zemstvo had refused to organise a soviet from as far back as 
March 1918.
61 At a session of the Pudozh district soviet on 10 July 1918 two soviet 
representatives who had visited Avdeevskaia parish reported that the parish zemstvo 
secretary, P.I. Moshnikov had spoken out against the soviets and the Pudozh district soviet 
resolved to ‘take the appropriate measures’ if he continued to agitate against them.
62  
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A month later the situation in the parish remained the same. On 24 August the 
provincial Izvestiia reported that the parish zemstvo continued to function and a soviet still 
did not exist in Avdeevskaia parish. P.I. Moshnikov, having arrived in January 1918, was 
credited with the proposal not to recognise the soviet (presumably he was a SR of some 
sort). The newspaper report, written by someone more supportive of the soviets, concluded: 
‘it is necessary to straighten out this counter revolutionary, this wolf in sheep’s clothing.’
63 
Moshnikov was indeed ‘straightened out’ a few days later following a session of the 
Pudozh district soviet executive committee on 29 August when the committee ordered the 
district military commissar to arrest Moshnikov along with a member of the Avdeevskaia 
parish land department for counter revolutionary agitation.
64 However, even with 
Moshnikov out of the picture Avdeevskaia parish still refused to submit to the rule of the 
soviets and their requests to register the harvest. Therefore, in tune with the provincial 
decree from 22 July mentioned above, the Pudozh district soviet resolved on 6 September 
to break off all dealings with Avdeevskaia parish and exclude it from the general supply 
plans. All state employees such as medical, militia and teaching personnel were also 
recalled. All departments attached to the soviet, the provincial revolutionary executive 
committee and the provincial Cheka were informed and asked to take the appropriate 
measures to implement the district soviet’s decision.
65  
 
The withholding of food was therefore a weapon in itself that could be used by the 
Bolsheviks to break the will of those who did not submit to the authority of the soviets. In 
fact the parish was effectively denied all state support: welfare, education and police, 
which would make it difficult for Avdeevskaia parish to survive. These blockade tactics 
were necessary in order to push through unpopular Bolshevik policies in areas where the 
party lacked political support. In the case of Avdeevskaia parish these tactics worked; a 
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parish gathering on the 15 September 1918, attended by district and provincial soviet 
representatives, saw the majority of attendees accept the decision to acknowledge the 
soviets.
66 However, Avdeevskaia parish’s resistance to the soviets and unwillingness to 
register the harvest was not an isolated case. In short, hindrances to the Bolsheviks’ 
policies posed by local parish politics persisted and were felt for a considerable time after 
these issues had been settled in the national and provincial centres. For instance, on 29 
August the executive committee of the Pudozh district soviet decided to arrest the 
chairman and secretary of the Vershininskaia parish soviet which had turned against the 
soviets, refused to recognise them and called for the convening of the Constituent 
Assembly, thus suggesting the continued influence of the SRs.
67 Furthermore, a member of 
a kombed in Rugozerskaia parish, Povenets district, was shot by peasants during the 
harvest for threshing their grain.
68 Danilovksaia parish in Povenets district also refused to 
register the harvest.
69  
 
Resistance to harvest registration similarly took place at district level. At a 
provincial conference of district Chekas (16 18 September 1918) the chairman of the 
Olonets district Cheka stated that the Left SR dominated Olonets district executive 
committee refused to register the harvest and claimed that it had clashed with the 
organisers sent to the district to implement it.
70 
 
Harvest registration fails 
The resistance experienced by the Bolsheviks to the registration control commissions and 
from the soviets in general made attempts to gather a comprehensive account of the harvest 
an arduous task. As stated in the 22 July decree, armed support attached to the 
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commissions was compulsory and some time in late September a food supply detachment 
of fifty five members arrived in Petrozavodsk from Petrograd to help with the registration 
of the harvest.
71 On the 25 September the Olonets provincial revolutionary executive 
committee put the food detachment at the disposal of the provincial food board and 
proposed to the detachment’s commander, a certain Nikolaev, to also produce an account 
of the harvest.
72 Although the provincial commissariat for food now had more manpower 
behind it to undertake an account of the harvest the food supply detachment’s arrival 
created unforeseen problems in the form of interference by Nikolaev in the running of the 
provincial commissariat for food. The Olonets provincial commissar for food, Ivan Petrov, 
was clearly angered by Nikolaev’s intrusion and protested to the provincial revolutionary 
executive committee on 7 October:
73 
 
Comrade Nikolaev appears at the office of the food board on a daily basis, 
interfering in all the work of the provincial commissariat for food and producing 
chaos and disorder there, as a result of which, it is absolutely impossible to 
systematically carry out the urgent tasks of the provincial commissariat for food. 
  Moreover, Nikolaev has the pretension (pretenziia) to impede the fulfilment 
of my orders. 
  For the satisfactory running of the provincial commissariat for food such a 
situation cannot be tolerated any longer and henceforth I will no longer be held 
responsible until the provincial commissariat for food and I am personally 
protected from the interference of comrade Nikolaev, therefore I ask the provincial 
revolutionary executive committee and the communist party to take measures so 
that Nikolaev will no longer hinder the work of the provincial commissariat for 
food, otherwise I will be forced to resign.   
 
The intrusion of non local administrators in the provincial food commissariat was 
evidently met with hostility. Local Bolsheviks needed material and personnel support to 
implement their policies but as Robert Service observed in his study of the party during the 
revolution and civil war local officials requested assistance on the one hand and pushed it 
away with the other.
74 Up until September, as shown above, the Karelian region had 
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received relatively little support in terms of food supply; deliveries were delayed, arrived 
in small quantities and had in fact ceased in August. As a result, the region was often 
forced to endure its problems, make do with its own resources and undertake its own 
initiatives. Clashes, even between Bolshevik party members, became inevitable when this 
level of autonomy was invaded. In the above case Nikolaev had arrived from Petrograd 
with little knowledge of the Karelian region and its local leaders and flexed his authority 
above the heads of those who hitherto were in charge. According to I.F. Petrov Nikolaev’s 
interference only brought confusion and disorganisation to the food commissariat. Petrov 
in fact handed in his resignation on 18 October, the Nikolaev problem proving to be the 
final straw in a reign which saw Petrov unable to ease Olonets province’s food supply 
problems. Stating the complete break down in his health as the reason for his resignation, 
Petrov was replaced by S.K. Pukhov on 11 November 1918.
75   
 
Therefore the Bolshevik party was attempting to gain control over the districts and 
food supply, but its efforts were hamstrung on a number of levels. As articulated above 
political obstacles needed to be eradicated; the Bolsheviks required a stronger influence in 
the districts and a singular vision if their policies were going to be a success. In Karelia 
during the summer and early autumn of 1918 the party aspired for this leverage but in 
reality it did not exist in a number of parishes. Reports from Olonets and Petrozavodsk 
districts at the First Olonets Provincial Bolshevik Party Conference in early August 
showed that the party was weak in the countryside. Some representatives spoke of the 
‘many kulaks’ or ‘counter revolutionaries’ who existed in their parishes and who supported 
the Constituent Assembly or produced anti Bolshevik propaganda. Others spoke of the 
poor education of the local population and the need for Bolshevik cells and agitators to 
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explain the party’s programmes.
76 Having highlighted these problems the conference 
delegates resolved to organise more party cells and improve communication and 
coordination between all local party organisations, cells and groups and the Petrozavodsk 
County party committee. To help them do this the Northern Regional Party Committee 
allocated 50,000 roubles to the Petrozavodsk County party committee following the recent 
Northern Regional Party Conference at the end of July.
77   
 
By the middle of September it was apparent that the registration of the harvest had 
been a failure but political considerations only partly explain why it failed. The Fifth 
Olonets Provincial Congress of Soviets (25 31 January 1919) noted that the peasants had 
concealed grain in every possible way.
78 In other words the registration process had fallen 
short of its expectations because the peasantry were wary about the role of the registration 
control commissions.
79 Moreover, Bolshevik party delegates at the Second Olonets 
Provincial Bolshevik Party Conference (10 13 December 1918) discovered that 
communications with the districts were problematic and undermined harvest registration. 
The answering of telegrams was frequently delayed, which meant in turn that telegrams 
sent from Petrozavodsk which informed Petrograd and Moscow about local conditions and 
the harvest results were also received belatedly. Therefore future supply orders could not 
be calculated accurately.
80 Pukhov remarked at the Second Olonets Provincial Bolshevik 
Party Conference that his commissariat was under pressure from the Northern Regional 
Commissariat for Food concerning the yet to be presented figures for the recent 
registration of the harvest.
81 An increased effort to relay reliable harvest results to the 
regional capital therefore prompted the Fifth Olonets Provincial Congress of Soviets which 
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met in January 1919 to ask all local food organs to carry out a re registration of the harvest, 
targeting citizens suspected of having concealed grain.
82 
  
The lack of reliable Bolshevik party workers in the Karelian districts underscores 
why these delays had occurred. At the Second Olonets Provincial Bolshevik Party 
Conference in mid December the new provincial commissar for food Pukhov blamed non 
party workers for frequently delaying replies to inquiries made by the provincial food 
commissariat: ‘I am not accusing comrade workers in the localities because they are also 
probably not in a position to attend to all their administrative offices, but I want to say that 
this latent sabotage and reluctance of the clerical employees to work puts us in a critical 
situation.’
83 Because of the weakness of the Bolshevik party in the Karelian districts the 
soviets were forced to cast the net wider for employees which meant the recruitment of 
individuals who were either incapable of carrying out their administrative responsibilities 
or, as this case also perhaps suggests, were unsupportive of the Bolsheviks’ policies and 
wilfully sabotaged the Bolsheviks’ attempts to implement central policy. 
  
However, the ability of the Bolsheviks to maximise their knowledge of the harvest 
and compile an accurate account of what the Karelian districts produced was undermined 
by more than political and personnel difficulties. On 31 July the Olonets provincial 
commissariat for food resolved to send one of its members, M. Polozov, to Moscow to 
convey how critical the food situation in Karelia was and to ask for the immediate dispatch 
of rye seeds, without which half the area suitable for sowing in the province would remain 
unsown.
84 Therefore, while plans began in earnest to register the forthcoming harvest the 
region did not even have enough seeds to sow the land in the first place. The serious 
problem posed by a deficiency in seed and belated sowing was described in a report from 
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Kuzarandskaia parish, Petrozavodsk district from 20 August. The parish land department 
reported that the spring and summer of 1918 had been cold, with predominating northern 
winds and drought which had damaged the quality and quantity of the harvest. Moreover 
rye seed for sowing had not arrived on time and the period for planting had passed. Older 
seed was subsequently used but it covered only part of the land and did not stretch to cover 
all plots. Although sowing continued belatedly it was considered impossible to expect 
positive results because of the delay.
85 
 
Evidently the harvest and its registration had been affected by uncontrollable 
natural conditions. On 28 January 1919 the Fifth Olonets Provincial Congress of Soviets 
(25 31 January) noted that: ‘the registration of grain produced lamentable results in 
connection with the natural disasters around the province, the expected crop was not 
gathered in.’
86 Because of the harsh and changeable climate at the time crops were 
susceptible to weather damage during growth; I.F. Petrov noted in early August, at the 
First Provincial Bolshevik Party Conference, that up to 100 dessiantinas (approximately 
2700 acres) of sown land in Olonets province had been beaten down by hail.
87 Furthermore, 
on 18 September Petrov informed Aleksandr Tsiurupa in Moscow that he was sending him 
samples of the winter and spring crop from Povenets and Pudozh districts which had been 
damaged by frost. He asked for help and explained that the majority of the grain crop in 
Olonets province had been damaged by frost and consequently a lot of it had not been 
gathered in.
88 A military report from the time underlined the effect climatic conditions had 
on the harvest in north Karelia: ‘To the north of Povenets all the corn shoots were killed by 
frost; the population took almost nothing from their own fields except very small potatoes 
and they are already suffering from starvation.’
89 
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The formation of Karelia’s workers’ food supply detachments 
By August 1918 the responsibility for Karelia’s food supply shortages widened as a 
number of food supply detachments from the region were formed and dispatched to the 
grain surplus provinces of Soviet Russia for the first time (see Table 2). On 3 August the 
central Bolshevik government appealed to all workers’ organisations to form their own 
detachments, from the working population and poor peasants, to purchase grain at fixed 
prices from the countryside. They could retain half of the grain collected for their 
sponsoring organisation with the remaining half kept by the provincial agencies of the 
People’s Commissariat for Food. However, any monetary or armed support was to be 
financed locally. In essence it was a switch to heavily taxed independent purchases.
90 The 
workers’ detachments were co ordinated through a new organisation called the Military 
Food Bureau, which was a subsection of the All Russian Central Soviet of Trade Unions 
and existed alongside the People’s Commissariat for Food’s Food Army.
91 On 6 August 
Sovnarkom reinforced the food supply detachment’s decree and declared that individuals 
who refused to bring grain to collection points or cooperatives would be arrested, 
imprisoned for no less than ten years, have their property confiscated and would be 
banished from their own peasant societies indefinitely. Refusal to hand over grain would 
be met with force and anyone offering armed resistance would be liable to be shot on the 
spot.
92     
 
The first workers’ food supply detachment to be formed in the Karelian region was 
in Petrozavodsk and emerged from the Aleksandrovsk factory’s Bolshevik party 
organisation (kollektiv) on 23 August 1918. The numbers of this detachment were added to 
three days later at a general gathering of factory workers. Following Bolshevik party 
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agitation a further 68 workers voluntarily signed up to the Aleksandrovsk factory’s food 
supply detachment.
93 Over a period of two weeks this detachment, alongside a few others, 
was dispatched from Petrozavodsk to Moscow and then onwards to a grain producing 
province. 
 
Table 2 – Dispatch of food supply detachments from Petrozavodsk, 24 
August-9 September 1918
94 
 
Place of origin & date of dispatch from Petrozavodsk  Destination 
province 
 umber of 
members 
Povenets district, 24 August 1918  Simbirsk  18 (14)* 
Vytegra district, 24 August 1918  Kursk  71 
Aleksandrovsk munitions factory & the Union of publishers 
(Petrozavodsk), 30 August 1918  Kursk  79 + 10 
Petrozavodsk town food board, 31 August 1918  Kursk  57 
Murmansk district committee of posts & telegraphs, 6 September 
1918  Kursk  75 
Extra detachment from the Murmansk district committee of posts 
& telegraphs, 9 September 1918  Kursk  10 
  Total  320 (316) 
 
As the table shows, apart from the detachment formed in Povenets district which was sent 
to Simbirsk province (Alatyr’ district), all of the above detachments were sent to Kursk. 
The Kursk detachments were dispatched together with a member of the provincial 
commissariat for food, A.F. Martynov, who was assigned to help co ordinate and look 
after the interests of the detachments.
95  
 
As the first few food supply detachments departed the region and registered in 
Moscow debates surrounding the formation of more detachments took place in Olonets 
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district. The chairman of the Left SR dominated Olonets district executive committee, M.F. 
Chubriev proposed to his committee on 3 September to begin forming food detachments 
and the motion was accepted.
96 What were the reasons for this switch in Left SR principles? 
Chubriev stated that it was because of the food crisis, which is an entirely reasonable point. 
The district had experienced a peasant uprising the previous June because of food 
shortages and the deficit became particularly acute in Karelia in August 1918 as the arrival 
of grain loads to Petrozavodsk completely stopped. Furthermore, Chubriev could simply 
have been paying lip service to the creation of the detachments, knowing full well that his 
district would struggle to introduce them because of the general problem of a lack funding 
(see below). Despite Chubriev’s proposal being accepted by the district soviet executive 
committee the author has not found any further evidence about food supply detachments 
being formed in Olonets district. Alternatively, Chubriev was flexible in his ideological 
views. At some point, presumably before the end of the year, he joined the Bolshevik party 
and was still a member of the Olonets district executive committee up to December 1919.
97    
 
Because workers’ food supply detachments could be sponsored independently 
political hindrances, such as the presence of the Left SRs in the soviets, were less 
obstructive if the means existed to create the detachments. However, despite the initial 
surge in August and early September to form workers’ food supply detachments their 
growth was stunted because of the amount of money necessary to send the detachments to 
the grain producing provinces. On 9 September 1918 the Olonets provincial food board 
informed two delegates from Alekseevskaia parish, Olonets district, that the provincial 
food commissariat had received a telegram from Tsiurupa, on the 3 September, explaining 
how the detachments were to be funded. Tsiurupa explained that the means for travel 
expenses and daily allowances would not be issued by the People’s Commissariat for Food, 
whose funds were limited, but by the provincial commissariat for food. Yet, the provinces 
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were hardly any better off and the Olonets provincial commissariat for food had its 
requests for additional funds turned down. As a result, it was forced to inform all district 
committees to temporarily stop forming food detachments until the question of more 
money from the centre had been clarified.
98  
 
A few days later, on 13 September, the Olonets provincial commissar for food, I.F. 
Petrov, sent a telegram to the People’s Commissariat for Food stating that he did not have 
the means to sustain the food supply detachments and asked to be informed immediately 
whether or not their creation was to continue and who was to be accountable for them.
99 
The following day, at a session of the Petrozavodsk County Bolshevik Party Committee, 
its members also discussed the issue and concluded that it was pointless to form 
detachments because they could not support them.
100 Further evidence indicates that the 
problem of providing the practical means for the detachments to operate could also simply 
move further down the administrative chain. On 14 September the Olonets provincial 
commissariat for food instructed the Povenets district food commissariat to form a food 
detachment, and directed that its transportation to Moscow should be supported with 
provisions and money from the district soviet.
101 Therefore the forming of food supply 
detachments may well have appeared the ideal Bolshevik solution to supplying the 
consuming regions, like Karelia, but it is evident that the availability of local resources was 
underestimated and caused problems.  
 
The Anarchists’ food supply detachment 
As shown in Chapter 3, before July, it was only the Petrozavodsk town soviet which had 
advocated the introduction of food supply detachments because their creation was blocked 
by the Left SRs in the provincial soviet executive committee. However, the first of 
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Karelia’s food supply detachments emerged from the Petrozavodsk town soviet in July 
1918 in the form of a group of Anarchists. Why were the Anarchists operating on behalf of 
the Bolshevik authorities? On a national level the relationship between the Bolsheviks and 
the Anarchists polarised after the October revolution as the latter criticised the Bolsheviks, 
by and large, for their centralisation policies and the Brest Litovsk peace treaty. The 
Bolsheviks arrested a large number of Anarchists in Moscow on 11 12 April 1918 and 
again in the aftermath of the bombing of the headquarters of the Moscow Communist party 
committee, on 25 September 1918, which had involved the Anarchists.
102 However, as the 
civil war deepened the spectre of a White counter revolution compelled a number of 
Anarchists to set their ideological principles to one side and collaborate with the Bolshevik 
regime.
103  
 
A group of Anarchist Communists appear to have supported the Bolsheviks in 
Petrozavodsk although their relationship with the Bolsheviks in Petrozavodsk is not 
entirely clear. The available evidence suggests that because of the relative weakness of the 
Bolsheviks in the soviets and a lack of resources the Anarchists were used as willing 
participants in the requisitioning of goods from local individuals. On the 10 July the 
Petrozavodsk town soviet resolved to allow the Anarchists to search the flat and take the 
belongings of a local individual suspected of having a quantity of silver and foodstuffs.
104 
At this time it suited the Bolsheviks to use the Anarchists since the formers’ proposal to 
introduce food supply detachments had been blocked by the Left SRs at the Fourth Olonets 
Provincial Congress of Soviets. Because of the Anarchists’ minority standing as a political 
force in the Petrozavodsk the Bolsheviks could easily distance themselves from them in the 
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future if required.
105 However, more importantly, recounting a short history of the 
Anarchists’ operations as a food supply detachment within Karelia’s borders suggests that 
the Bolsheviks’ authority did not extend to the periphery of the region in the autumn of 
1918. On 19 September, the Anarchists left Petrozavodsk with the goal of requisitioning 
concealed stores of grain and other valuables from local ‘kulaks’. They returned four days 
later with an impressive cargo of grain, textiles, gold, silver and other goods worth a total 
of 2 million roubles.
106 Despite the result their mission did not run smoothly and reflected 
frictions and confusion within local soviets over the appearance of the Anarchists operating 
on behalf of Petrozavodsk. 
  
Flying their black flag the Anarchists travelled along the river Svir’ and arrived in 
Pid’ma village, Olonets district, from the direction of the Voznesen’e inlet, on 21 
September. Upon arrival some of the armed detachment disembarked, declared themselves 
to be Anarchists and that they intended to visit the home of a known merchant. A few days 
previously however the merchant’s house had been sealed off by the local soviet because 
he had allegedly failed to pay a one off 32,000 rouble tax. News of the Anarchists’ arrival 
quickly spread over the village and members of the local kombed and a member of the 
district executive committee, who happened to be in the village at that time, arrived on the 
scene. They vehemently protested the proposed actions of the Anarchists and declared that 
no one had the right to break the seal placed on the merchant’s house and carry out 
searches without the authority of the soviet. The Anarchists were forced to return from 
where they came while the Pid’ma soviet contacted Vosnesen’e and Lodeinoe Pole to 
clarify the identity of the requisitioning detachment.
107   
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  The reaction of the local government representatives in Pid’ma shows that 
communications with Olonets district and its parishes were poor. This can partly be 
explained by the fact that the political make up of Olonets district were different from 
Petrozavodsk at this time because its soviet executive committee was dominated by the 
Left SRs. It is therefore questionable whether or not the dispatch of the Anarchists from 
Petrozavodsk would have occurred with the knowledge or consent of the Olonets district 
soviet executive committee. Whatever the case the proposed actions of the Anarchists, 
which bypassed the local soviet, were not welcomed by the Olonets district soviet 
representative or members of the local kombed. In short, despite the introduction of a 
kombed, a Bolshevik inspired institution designed to give the party a foothold in the 
countryside, the soviet was still the highest governing body. Although this suggests that the 
introduction of the kombed was a failure in Pid’ma at this time, the kombed’s resistance to 
the Anarchists could quite simply have been a case of a kombed existing without any 
communist party members, which was common (see Chapter 6), poor communication as 
articulated above, or both. The next and last time the Anarchists’ food supply detachment 
was dispatched around Olonets province (to Vytegra district), in October 1918, it was in 
response to an order from the Olonets provincial food commissar and the detachment 
carried with it a special order signed by the Bolshevik ‘extraordinary commissar’ in the 
region, S.P. Natseranus.
108 
 
The Cheka, the soviets and the Left SRs: the Timofeev affair 
The problems the Bolsheviks faced in not having complete control of the soviets were 
exemplified by the history of the Cheka in Karelia in 1918. Generally, local Chekas were 
required to report on their activities to their respective soviet and co operate closely with 
all soviet institutions. However, the Chekas were also to be strictly subordinated to their 
next superior Cheka, which created an unclear system of authority and established the 
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potential for future frictions (see below and Chapter 6). Local soviets were authorised to 
take action against the Cheka in the event of abuses of authority while the Cheka were 
licensed do the same against erring soviets. The development of the Cheka in Karelia 
therefore took place against the background of these overlapping power structures and 
unclear messages from Moscow concerning which body was the overriding authority in 
local government; the Vecheka or the soviet executive committees.
109  
 
The Cheka’s evolution in Karelia, therefore, particularly in the summer and autumn 
of 1918, was affected by the balance of forces in the hierarchy of the soviets. By mid July 
1918 the Left SR party in the Olonets provincial executive committee had been forced out 
of this body and a new provincial revolutionary executive committee was created whose 
members, with one exception, were all Bolsheviks. However, that was not the case at 
district level, for example in Olonets, where the unclear lines of authority between the 
Cheka and the soviets were clouded by the fact that the Olonets district executive 
committee was dominated by Left SRs. In spite of this the Olonets district Cheka did not 
find support from the Bolshevik provincial soviet revolutionary executive committee in 
Petrozavodsk. Indeed, for a short time, the Left SR Olonets district soviet executive 
committee, working with the Bolshevik provincial soviet revolutionary executive 
committee, which was equally opposed to the Cheka’s independence, thwarted the local 
Cheka’s efforts to exert more control over the district. 
 
On 29 August Petrozavodsk received a telegram signed by Felix Dzerzhinsky, the 
head of the Vecheka, which was sent around Soviet held provinces, informing them that 
the Territorial Liaison department (Inogorodnyi otdel) of the Vecheka had received a 
massive amount of information concerning the frictions which existed between different 
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local organs of authority and local Chekas.
110 One such report may have came from 
Karelia and detailed the recent conflict between the Olonets district Cheka chairman and 
the district soviet executive committee which arose against the background of the acute 
food shortages throughout the whole of the Karelian region in August 1918. The relevance 
of these food shortages in the districts became apparent at a session of the Olonets district 
soviet executive committee on 3 September 1918. At this session the soviet’s military 
commissars, F.M. Fedulov and P.I. Kunzhin, spoke out in protest against the recent actions 
of the district Cheka chairman, Timofeev. At the end of August Timofeev had, they 
declared, demanded rations from the store of the military commissariat but Fedulov 
refused because there was barely enough food to satisfy the needs of his own soldiers. 
Timofeev then asked for his name to be put down for rations for people attached to the 
military commissariat and stated that he would deliver a secret Sovnarkom decree 
supporting the move. However, Kunzhin explained that he never received any such order 
so when Timofeev confronted him Kunzhin explained that he had no grounds to supply 
him with any supplies from the military commissariat. Timofeev then lost his temper, 
threatened to arrest Kunzhin and began to shout at both him and Fedulov calling them 
saboteurs and scoundrels.
111 
 
Timofeev did not deny that he had verbally abused the district military commissars 
but suggested that the Cheka was the supreme authority in the district. He referred to a 
previous incident in the district when the commander of the Red Army’s 3
rd Gatchina 
regiment, which had arrived in Karelia in July 1918, requisitioned a number of horses and 
foodstuffs in Vidlitskaia parish without permission to do so. Timofeev believed in this 
situation the district executive committee was the higher authority but this had occurred 
before the establishment of the district Cheka. After the Cheka’s creation he was adamant 
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that it should be independent and he believed that the district Cheka was subordinate only 
to the provincial Cheka and the Vecheka and was in no way obliged to submit any of its 
reports to any institution other than the higher Cheka authority. Suggesting his future 
intentions, Timofeev also proclaimed: ‘for the time being the executive committee is 
operating and will not be temporarily disbanded.’
112  
 
A Menshevik Internationalist member of the district soviet, M.D. Ermakov, 
immediately recognised the prevailing issue: ‘which of us now has authority, the executive 
committee or the Cheka?’
113 In his opinion the All Russian Central Executive Committee 
and Sovnarkom were the highest authorities and the Cheka was but one of its executive 
organs: ‘At the current moment we have a Soviet constitution, affirmed at the Fifth All 
Russian Congress of Soviets, in which it clearly states that authority belongs to the 
executive committees…regarding questions of a local character, the soviets in the localities 
are sovereign.’
114 His belief that the district military commissars were perfectly correct to 
stand up to Timofeev was supported by a Left SR member of the district executive 
committee who believed that because the Cheka was elected by the soviet executive 
committee it was therefore responsible to the soviet.
115  
 
Therefore Left SRs and Menshevik Internationalists shared some common ground 
with the Bolsheviks in their opposition to the Cheka’s independence and wished to work 
through the elected executive committees and within the legal boundaries set by the Fifth 
All Russian Congress of Soviets. This united front against the Cheka between Left SRs 
and Bolsheviks became clearer following 4 September at the next district executive 
committee session. The committee resolved to support the decision of the district military 
commissars for the reasons stated by Ermakov above: they had received no orders to 
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suggest that Timofeev’s demands for rations were legitimate. Moreover, the committee 
stated its alarm at Timofeev’s statement that the district executive committee ‘for the time 
being’ would not be disbanded, thus suggesting that he did intend to disperse the executive 
committee at some point. As a result, the district executive committee turned to the 
provincial revolutionary executive committee and appealed for Timofeev’s removal: ‘such 
tricks by departmental individuals are destroying the revolution and disturbing the state 
apparatus…we consider Timofeev’s future sojourn as a member of the executive 
committee and chairman of the Cheka intolerable.’
116     
 
In response the Olonets provincial revolutionary executive committee decided to 
send two representatives, one from the revolutionary executive committee and one from 
the provincial Cheka, to Olonets to resolve the conflict.
117 11 days later Petrozavodsk 
received a telegram from the Olonets district executive committee chairman, M.F. 
Chubriev, asking for Timofeev’s removal from all his posts and for some clarification on 
the limits of his authority because he had been issued right of entry into the presidium of 
the district executive committee, he was interfering in its work and scolded its members 
with abusive language on a daily basis.
118 On 16 September the Olonets provincial 
revolutionary executive committee assured the Olonets district executive committee that all 
mandates issued to Timofeev were now void, the Cheka was subordinated to the district 
executive committee and it had exclusive authority in the district.
119 However, on 16 
September Timofeev was able to counter the Olonets district executive committee’s wish 
to remove him from his position at the Olonets provincial conference of district Chekas 
(16 18 September 1918). Timofeev argued that the Olonets district executive committee 
was made up entirely of Left SRs and the surrounding soviets were dominated by ‘kulaks’. 
Because of this he explained, as mentioned above, the district executive committee was 
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sabotaging the decrees coming from the centre (the registration of the harvest and the 
kombedy) and wished to nullify the Cheka by turning it into a subdivision of the executive 
committee. Timofeev therefore appealed for the support of the conference and the 
provincial Cheka.
120 
 
  The Chekists stuck by one another. At the Olonets provincial conference of district 
Chekas the delegates resolved unanimously that Timofeev had acted lawfully by 
demanding food for the Cheka from the district military commissariat because the People’s 
Military Commissariat had taken on the responsibility to supply the Cheka and its 
detachments with foodstuffs. Moreover, because the Left SR district executive committee 
had not broken off with its central committee its activities were under the observation of 
the provincial Cheka. The conference also annulled the decision of the provincial executive 
committee to remove Timofeev from his responsibilities without a proper investigation 
into the affair. Finally, because the Olonets district executive committee was hindering the 
implementation of the kombedy and the registration of the harvest, the conference proposed 
to the provincial executive committee and the County Bolshevik party committee to 
consider disbanding the Olonets district executive committee and replacing it with a 
Bolshevik military revolutionary committee until the convocation of a district peasant 
congress.
121  
 
However, the saga did not end here as the Left SR district executive committee and 
the provincial executive committee refused to back down. On the 23 September M.F. 
Chubriev, sent a telegram to the chairman of the provincial revolutionary executive 
committee to ask why the decision to remove Timofeev from his position had been 
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annulled by the provincial Cheka conference and requested an urgent and full explanation 
regarding which body was the higher authority in the province.
122 It is clear that the 
provincial revolutionary executive committee stood their ground because on the 4 October 
1918 they confirmed the appointment of a new Bolshevik chairman of the Olonets district 
Cheka, who had been proposed by Chubriev two days previously. This came at a time 
when Timofeev had been called to Petrograd by the Northern Regional party committee, 
presumably in connection with the whole affair.
123  
 
The Olonets district soviet executive committee therefore managed to curb the 
expansion of the Cheka’s authority through the removal of an unruly Chekist but it had 
shown the limitations of Petrozavodsk’s control over the Cheka in the districts well into 
1918. The Timofeev incident underlined the unclear boundaries of the Cheka’s authority 
and showed how this was reflected at a grass roots level through individuals who believed 
they had the right to arbitrarily exercise power over the soviets and its institutions. The 
Timofeev case was also distinct because of the continued existence of the Left SRs in the 
districts and their collaboration with the Bolshevik provincial revolutionary executive 
committee to achieve a common goal: Timofeev’s removal and the restriction of the 
Cheka’s autonomy. The influence of the Left SRs had been eliminated in the capitals in the 
summer but not in Karelia where they continued to be a dominant political force in the 
districts and the Bolsheviks could not penetrate the Olonets district executive committee 
politically. Furthermore, what is striking about the Timofeev affair is that the Bolshevik 
provincial executive committee was willing to put differences with the Left SRs aside to 
tackle a common foe in the form of the Cheka.  
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The shortage of Bolshevik cadres in Olonets district 
Collaboration between the Bolshevik Olonets provincial revolutionary executive 
committee and the Left SR Olonets district executive committee is best understood as a 
short term measure of expediency not a local policy based on principle. This became clear 
in early to mid November 1918 when the Olonets district executive committee was 
disbanded. However, the incident which provoked the dissolution was a local matter 
involving local Bolsheviks. The break up of the Left SR Olonets district executive 
committee was initiated by a few soldiers affiliated to the Bolshevik party, many of whom 
were not native to the district and had been sent there in July as part of the Red Army’s 3
rd 
Gatchina regiment. However, because of the numerical weakness of the Bolsheviks in the 
district the party faced the dilemma of reducing its presence in the Red Army and district 
Cheka by filling positions in the district executive committee with Bolshevik party 
members from these institutions. As a result, local Bolsheviks initially sought a 
compromise with the Left SRs; the communists proposed formalising a coalition 
arrangement suggesting that one of their party members should chair the district executive 
committee while its other members were to be selected from ‘the most loyal [to the 
Bolsheviks] Left SRs and Internationalists.’
124 The Left SRs refused, however, and 
thereafter the Bolsheviks armed themselves and dispersed the Left SR Olonets district 
executive committee by force.
125 
 
On 15 November 1918 the provincial Olonets revolutionary executive committee 
informed Moscow and Petrograd that the Olonets district executive committee had been 
disbanded because it was dominated by the Left SRs who had not disassociated themselves 
from their Central Committee and hindered the introduction of decrees from Moscow. A 
new district revolutionary executive committee was formed which consisted of five 
Bolshevik members, one of whom was a Chekist. The committee had its first session on 18 
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November.
126 However, there were continued hints of coalition; out of the need for 
competent and experienced personnel a few Left SRs and Menshevik Internationalists were 
selected to work in the presidium of the Olonets district revolutionary executive committee 
on 25 January 1919. A Menshevik Internationalist who only joined the Bolshevik party in 
October 1918, M.D. Ermakov, became the chairman of the district presidium. His deputies 
were the Bolshevik F.M. Fedulov and the Left SR M.F. Chubriev.
127 Therefore local 
Bolsheviks, Left SRs and Menshevik Internationalists were willing to work together for the 
common good of the Soviet regime and practical considerations, such as the need for 
capable soviet administrators, took precedence over previous party differences. When 
referring to the involvement of non Bolshevik party workers in Olonets district the 
Bolshevik F.I. Egorov remembered: ‘despite their political delusions they were people 
committed to Soviet rule.’
128 
 
The creation of the district Chekas 
The Timofeev affair describes the arbitrary nature of the district Chekas and their clashes 
with the soviet executive committees. It was at the First All Russian Conference of Chekas 
in Moscow (11 14 June 1918) where the delegates resolved to establish a centralised and 
hierarchical network of Chekas attached to the soviets at each administrative level from 
Moscow down to the provinces and the districts.
129 It is doubtful if any other lower level 
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Cheka from Karelia attended this conference as district Chekas appeared belatedly. The 
Olonets district Cheka was not formed until 15 August 1918, the Pudozh district Cheka 
until the 9 September and the Povenets district Cheka no later than mid September.
130 Of 
course, this delay could be attributed to the lack of Bolshevik support for this institution in 
the districts but the evidence available confirms that it was primarily practical issues which 
hindered the creation of the district Chekas in Karelia. 
  
At the Olonets provincial conference of district Chekas the representative of the 
Murmansk railroad Cheka outlined the difficulties of creating a railroad Cheka owing to a 
lack of premises, funds and workers. He explained that frictions had also occurred with 
other organisations such as the military commander of the 2
nd communist regiment who 
had seized the premises of the railroad Cheka for itself.
131 The representative of Povenets 
district also asked for funds and workers which he described as being in extremely short 
supply. Because of these shortages a makeshift solution was adopted; all work against 
counter revolution was undertaken by the Red Army’s Beloraiskii regiment, which since 
arriving in Karelia from Petrograd in July had carried out four executions. Another two 
executions had been carried out by a representative of the provincial Cheka and the 
Vecheka.
132 
 
The chairman of the Pudozh Cheka, O.M. Shishov, stated that his Cheka consisted 
of three members (2 Bolsheviks & 1 Left SR). He announced that in his district there was 
support for the Constituent Assembly and agitation against the soviets. To combat this 
Shishov asked for funds and workers to be sent for his Cheka.
133 He was supported by the 
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chairman of the provincial Cheka, I.V. Elpedinskii, who believed that the bourgeoisie 
wished to penetrate the soviets and soviet executive committees and turn them into ‘kulak’ 
dominated soviets. He proposed to Shishov ‘to pay serious attention to the local executive 
committee’ in Pudozh and take all steps to combat the spread of ‘black hundred 
proclamations’ around the district.  On the basis of all the district Cheka reports 
Elpedinskii resolved to forward a proposal to the Olonets provincial revolutionary 
executive committee and the Petrozavodsk County party committee to supply a number of 
responsible workers from the party for work in the district Chekas.
134  
 
Like the introduction of the food supply detachments and the kombedy the creation 
of district Chekas was hindered by a lack of finance. At the conference of district Chekas 
in Petrozavodsk the delegates were informed that because of a shortage of money it was 
impossible for the provincial Cheka to subsidise the district Chekas.
135 To improve the 
finances of the provincial and district Chekas the conference therefore resolved to appeal 
to the Vecheka to increase the special costs (ekstraordinarnye raskhody) assigned to 
district Chekas and the provincial Cheka to 5000 roubles and 15,000 roubles a month 
respectively because Olonets province was a border province and ‘overflowing with Allied 
spies, Whites and counterrevolutionaries.’
136 Because of a lack of funds district Chekas 
were also encouraged to implement a decision made at the First All Russian Conference of 
Chekas on 12 June ‘to borrow’ funds accumulated from confiscated and requisitioned sums 
of money and fines when it was not possible to receive advances from the People’s 
Commissariat for Internal Affairs or any other responsible organisation. In theory the 
borrowed money was to be paid back when advances were received.
137 Furthermore, the 
provincial Cheka planned to submit a request to the Vecheka for passes to be issued to 
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members of the district Chekas which would allow them to travel for free along the railway 
line.
138 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter underlines the lack of Bolshevik control in the districts in Karelia during 1918 
and the continuing influence of the Left SRs. Although after July 1918 the Left SRs lost all 
effective power to the Bolsheviks in Petrozavodsk their presence in the Karelian districts 
remained strong. In the case of Olonets district they were the dominant political party in 
the soviet executive committee up to November 1918, a considerable time after they had 
lost all power in Petrozavodsk, Petrograd and Moscow. Why then did the Left SRs remain 
strong in Karelia? In short, it was because the Bolsheviks were weak. We know from the 
introduction that Karelia was a predominantly agricultural region with few industrial 
workers, which, in principle, meant that its social base was more supportive of the SRs 
than the Bolsheviks. Chapter 1 also showed that the SRs were numerically and influentially 
stronger in the Olonets provincial soviet until the beginning of 1918 and when this party 
split locally the majority of its members moved to the left. Also important in understanding 
the reason for the continued strength of the Left SRs, as we have seen in this chapter in the 
cases of Pudozh and Olonets districts, is that Bolshevik cadres in the districts remained few. 
Therefore the Bolsheviks, until they were numerically and/or influentially stronger, had no 
choice but to allow Left SRs to remain in the periphery because they needed people to run 
the soviets.   
 
The significance of the continued presence of the Left SRs in Karelia was that 
Bolshevik policies could be resisted for longer. Central policies such as the introduction of 
the kombedy, the registration of the harvest, food supply detachments and the Cheka 
formed the basis for extending the Bolsheviks’ authority into the periphery but it was local 
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conditions which determined the successful introduction of Bolshevik institutions and 
policies. The implementation of central policy was of course dependent on more than 
politics; equally if not more important was the availability of local resources to carry out 
the capital’s directives. Because of the country’s economic crisis the Bolsheviks in 
Petrozavodsk could introduce central policy but it was highly dependent on the provincial 
and district soviets’ resources.    154 
Chapter 5 
Consolidating Power (I): Failing to Control the Countryside, July-December 
1918  
The previous chapters have shown how the Bolsheviks struggled to gain political control 
over the whole of Karelia. In Petrozavodsk the policies of the centre were introduced and 
by July 1918 the alliance with the Left SRs was no more; the Petrozavodsk town soviet 
executive committee and the Olonets provincial soviet revolutionary executive committee 
were under Bolshevik control. However, the Bolsheviks struggled to implement the 
capital’s decrees outside of Petrozavodsk because of the party’s lack of influence in the 
district and parish soviets and the lack of resources there for much of the remainder of the 
year.  
 
The following two chapters aim to take the story further and argue that the path to 
Bolshevik control in Karelia from the summer of 1918 was altogether uneven, a “one step 
forward, two steps back” scenario. This chapter will focus for the most part on the 
obstacles the Bolshevik party faced in consolidating their position in the last few months of 
the year, or the “two steps back”. For instance, the Bolsheviks struggled to construct the 
Red Army in Karelia and struggled to win over the peasantry. It argues that although the 
Red Army detachments sent north from Petrograd to defend the Karelian region helped 
strengthen the Bolsheviks’ influence in the districts, the local government did not have the 
infrastructure to support large troop numbers and struggled to provide for its troops. The 
recruitment of a local Red Army did not begin until the end of November 1918, only after 
the local harvest was gathered, and it was met hostilely by sections of the peasantry. The 
Bolsheviks struggled to consolidate their rule in Karelia because of the resentment shown 
towards them by the peasantry, which was fuelled by the provocative actions of the 
kombedy, the Bolsheviks’ failure to improve the food supply situation and the lack of   155 
reliable party cadres in government institutions. This meant that by December 1918 
peasant unrest in Karelia was endemic and famine a real possibility.  
 
Military training, mobilisation, barracks and supplies 
The creation of a new Red Army to defend the fledgling Soviet regime was an early 
Bolshevik priority and as shown in Chapter 3 the establishment of military commissariats 
took place in Karelia from late spring 1918. The need to establish a standing army in the 
north was also accentuated by the threat of the Allies at the beginning of July 1918. The 
sparsity of troops recruited locally and the reliance on reinforcements from Petrograd, a 
large part of whom had recently been disarmed by General Maynard’s Syren Force, 
convinced leading Bolsheviks to dispatch a further four Red Army units to Karelia in July 
1918 to defend the northern approaches to Petrograd. The 3
rd Gatchina Regiment of 
approximately 500 men was directed to Olonets district along with the Starorusskii 
Battalion of 300 men.
1 The Oranienbaumskii Regiment, which had 278 men, was sent to 
Petrozavodsk.
2 Finally, the 6
th Beloraiskii Battalion, comprising 600 Russian & Latvian 
recruits, was sent to Povenets.
3  
 
How much actual fighting these detachments took part in at this stage is difficult to 
know for certain because the Allies’ main operations after their initial advance south were 
aimed at consolidating their position; the remnants of the White Finns to the west had to be 
expelled.
4 However, the available evidence suggests that these detachments served a dual 
purpose: a garrison force which was on hand to meet the threat of the Allies or internal 
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unrest; and a galvanising political force that would help the Bolsheviks’ gain influence and 
control in the districts and parishes. In his memoirs the future chair of the Olonets district 
soviet revolutionary executive committee remembered that: ‘The arrival of the 3
rd Gatchina 
regiment in July 1918 breathed new Bolshevik life into Olonets.’
5 The founders of the 
party organisation in Olonets town were in fact from the Gatchina regiment.
6 From its 
arrival to the end of the year the communists in the Gatchina regiment also went round 
Olonets town and district undertaking political work and establishing party cells.
7 Chapter 
4 has also already shown that the Red Army were used to disperse the Left SR dominated 
district executive committee in mid-November 1918 and that Bolshevik party members of 
the Gatchina regiment joined the new district revolutionary executive committee and the 
district Cheka. 
   
The influence of the Beloraiskii Battalion in Povenets was comparable. A member 
of the Povenets district soviet executive committee remembered that the work of the 
district military soviet only really began in August when a Bolshevik commissar from the 
Beloraiskii Battalion and a former officer from Petrovsko-Iamskaia parish were appointed 
its military commissars.
8 The discussion of the kombedy in Chapter 4 also illustrated the 
relative importance of soldiers from the 166
th Beloraiskii regiment in establishing kombedy 
in Povenets district. Furthermore, this regiment was instrumental in helping establish 
parish military commissariats.
9 A Bolshevik party representative at the Second Olonets 
Provincial Bolshevik Party Conference noted that the Beloraiskii troops were the most 
active component of the party in Povenets province.
10 Finally, mirroring events in Olonets 
town at roughly the same time, the communists of the 166
th Beloraiskii regiment acted 
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together with the Povenets town Bolshevik party organisation to disperse the Povenets 
district soviet on 14 November 1918; some of the communists from the 166
th Beloraiskii 
regiment then joined the newly established district soviet revolutionary executive 
committee.
11 
 
So the sending of Red Army units from Petrograd gave the Bolsheviks not only an 
increase in manpower to defend the Karelian districts but, equally as important, it gave 
them the manpower to establish Bolshevik institutions, support local Bolsheviks and 
increase the party’s presence in the periphery. However, these positive achievements mask 
some of the underlying problems which faced local Bolsheviks in raising their own army. 
Compulsory military training, decreed by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee on 
22 April 1918, did not begin in Karelia until June 1918.
12 Mikhail Shumilov, writing in the 
1950s, stated that the Petrozavodsk County Bolshevik party committee dispatched 
instructors to the districts to help implement the decree and the ‘toiling masses’ met the 
compulsory training decree ‘with great enthusiasm.’
13 Other sources suggest that the 
implementation of military training was varied. On 15 October 1918 the head of military 
training in the Olonets provincial military commissariat, wrote to A.V. Dubrovskii to 
explain that the registration of the population subject to military training was incomplete in 
a few districts ‘because of local conditions’. Out of the 26,406 people subject to military 
training at that time only 1384 were actually being trained.
14  
 
The mention of ‘local conditions’ was almost certainly a reference to the lack of 
communication with the periphery. The districts had enlisted former tsarist officers and 
non-commissioned officers as instructors, 25 in total were working for the Petrozavodsk 
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district military commissariat, but no figures had been received from any other district.
15 A 
report from 20 November in the provincial Izvestiia also suggests that the local population 
in Petrozavodsk did not meet the general military training decree ‘with great enthusiasm.’ 
The Petrozavodsk military commissariat reported that after a short period of time people 
stopped attending military training in the town.
16 
 
If training was problematic then gaining recruits in the first instance was equally 
difficult. The evidence available reinforces Evan Mawdsley’s assertion that mobilisation in 
the Northern provinces was hindered because of the geography and climate which meant 
large forces could not be raised locally and commitments to other fronts meant troop 
numbers in the north remained low.
17 In a report to the People’s Commissariat for Military 
Affairs on 22 August S.P. Natsarenus complained that despite repeated telegrams to be 
relieved he remained, up to that point, the sole commander of the front, of the military staff 
and the front quartermaster. The staff for a new Olonets division had arrived but it did not 
have any of its own units because it was newly formed and was made up of regiments 
temporarily assigned to it from other divisions. Natsarenus also informed Moscow that 
there was a lack of volunteers for the Red Army and the forming of new units was 
hampered because of the location of military headquarters at the front and the immediate 
rear. He believed the headquarters should be relocated because the proximity of the Allies 
dissuaded volunteers from enlisting and the local population sympathised with the enemy. 
Most importantly, Natsarenus recognised the need for ‘heroic measures’ in order to 
organise food shops (prodmagaziny) with supplies because current provisions were 
running out.
18 
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Since the previous spring local Bolsheviks had relied on a combination of outside 
reinforcements, volunteers and partisan units. The party wanted to introduce a more 
centralised standing army but local conditions undermined the opportunity to carry this out 
immediately and effectively. At the First Olonets Provincial Bolshevik party Conference 
(6-7 August 1918) Arsenii Dubrovskii, the provincial military commissar, criticised the 
creation of partisan units whose actions he believed were impossible to coordinate because 
of their independent and local character. Dubrovskii, like leading Bolsheviks in the capital, 
believed the way forward for the Soviet regime was the creation of a single and centralised 
army in which the smallest military unit would be connected to the centre. He wished to 
carry out a general mobilisation of the ‘toiling masses’: only communists, the ‘town 
proletariat’ and the ‘village poor’ would be recruited. However, because of the food crisis 
and the priority of the harvest, recruits from the peasantry were exempt from mobilisation 
until after the crops had been gathered in.
19  Because the vast majority of Karelia’s 
population was rural this meant that a locally raised Red Army would remain small in 
number and the Bolsheviks would have to rely, for the most part, on those forces already 
sent to it from Petrograd. The first mass peasant mobilisation campaign in Karelia did not 
begin until 28 November 1918.
20 
 
According to some sources, in addition to the regiments sent from Petrograd, the 
number of volunteers who enlisted in the Red Army dramatically increased from the 
summer of 1918. A post-Soviet Russian source, which omits any direct references, states 
that a total of 7000 volunteers signed up to the Red Army in Olonets province during the 
summer of 1918.
21 This added to the 2
nd Communist Regiment in Petrozavodsk which, in 
early August, numbered approximately 1000 members (in reality only 140 of this force 
were considered communists and 180 communist sympathisers).
22 Not all troops would 
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have been combatants but these numbers still seem high even when taking into 
consideration the absorption of Red Guard units into the regular Red Army. Mikhail 
Shumilov states that there were approximately 1600 volunteers throughout Olonets 
province by the summer of 1918 while another historian of the Russian north during the 
civil war states that by 20 September 1918 the 6
th Red Army alone had a total of 9879 
troops, 2847 of whom were situated in the Petrozavodsk sector.
23 Allied intelligence 
estimated that in the middle of August 1918 the number of Red troops in the region stood 
at approximately 4500.
24 Another regional historian of the civil war in Karelia has also 
adopted this figure for the autumn of 1918.
25      
 
Of course, attempting to establish fixed numbers for the Red Army at any stage 
during the civil war is a difficult and ultimately inconclusive task because of the 
fluctuation in numbers as a result of casualties, transfers and desertion. The purpose here is 
to demonstrate firstly that the raising of a local Red Army was hindered up to the winter of 
1918 because of local conditions and the priority of the harvest, and, secondly, that help 
from Petrograd in the supply of troops was vital to creating a sizeable force in Karelia 
capable of countering both external and internal threats to the Bolshevik regime. However, 
whatever figure is adopted for the number of volunteers entering the Red Army during the 
summer and autumn of 1918, the relatively large increase in troop numbers before the first 
peasant mobilisation campaign in November requires some explanation. The presence of 
Red Army units sent from Petrograd undoubtedly influenced recruitment. As articulated 
above, the regiments in Olonets and Povenets were a visible presence as they travelled 
round their respective districts, engaging in political work, establishing kombedy, party 
cells and military commissariats. Clearly local perceptions of the military strength of the 
two warring sides in the region, and a reluctance to commit to the weaker side, or fear of 
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the stronger side, had a direct impact on mobilisation. In other words local populations 
decided if the Allies or the Red Army were the stronger military force and made a decision 
to enlist based on this perceived strength. S.P. Natsarenus identified the relevance of this in 
his report above when he stressed the importance of moving recruitment bases further 
away from the front line because of the proximity of the Allies. 
 
On the other hand, local perceptions of the strength of opposing military forces and 
opportunism only partly explain the rise in troop numbers in Karelia prior to the general 
mobilisation campaign. For example, following the October revolution hundreds of 
thousands of people abandoned the capitals for provincial towns during the civil war; 
between 1917 and 1920 the population of Petrograd decreased from 2.5 million to 
722,000.
26 In all probability a number of those made for Petrozavodsk. On 21 September 
1918 the provincial Izvestiia reported that the population of Petrozavodsk had risen sharply 
from approximately 16,000 to 45,000 inhabitants.
27 Local historians do not discuss the 
demographic changes in Karelia during the civil war and the archival sources do not reveal 
enough evidence to make any concrete assertion concerning where all these people came 
from. Nevertheless, the considerable rise in Petrozavodsk’s population, caused by de-
urbanisation in Petrograd undoubtedly offered a wider recruitment pool. 
 
Although recruitment took a step forward in terms of quantity it was 
simultaneously hamstrung by the inability of the military commissariat to adequately 
maintain its soldiers through a lack of resources. In turn the prestige of the Red Army was 
undermined and discontent rose amongst its soldiers. At a general meeting of the 
Petrozavodsk garrison on 24 August the soldiers complained that they had not received 
important items such as tobacco or bedding from the day of the garrison’s formation 
                                                 
26 D. Koenker, “Urbanization and Deurbanization in the Russian Revolution and Civil War,” The Journal of 
Modern History, Vol.57, No.2, 1985. 424-425; 441. 
27 Izvesttia Olonetskogo Gubernskogo Soveta, 21 September 1918.   162 
despite the fact this supply order had been decreed by the capital. The men also discovered 
that none of the military units in Petrozavodsk and its environs had received any 
allowances (dovol’stvie).
28 They blamed the Olonets provincial military commissariat’s 
department of supply ‘which is consciously committing sabotage by not displaying up till 
now the maximum energy to deliver to Olonets province the necessary foodstuffs, the 
result of which is that we, the Red Army troops, are left with literally one rotten 
cabbage.’
29 The troops’ complaint indicated that food shortages were made worse by a lack 
of capable personnel within the military commissariat. Indeed, the department of supply 
attached to the provincial military commissariat wrote to Dubrovskii on 22 August stating 
its need for specialist employees for the forming of sub-divisions within the department of 
supply because the employees sent to them had no military background or were entirely 
unsuitable for office work.
30             
 
Mobilisation was also hindered by the lack of infrastructure in the region to 
garrison large troop numbers. The influx of people, presumably some of whom came from 
Petrograd, was added to by people who had evacuated zones occupied by the Allies (see 
Chapter 4). From 14 August to 18 October 4028 refugees were also reported to have 
reached Masel’ga station and many may also have found their way to Petrozavodsk.
31 The 
result was a housing crisis. On 18 September a meeting of the town soviet took place 
where the details of the crisis were outlined by the chairman of the accommodation 
commission and the head of the housing department. They both foresaw that the crisis 
would only get worse in the forthcoming winter because Red Army men at that time were 
sleeping outside under the open sky. To try and solve the crisis the town soviet agreed to 
immediately begin constructing housing, register all homes of the bourgeoisie, clarify the 
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statistical data for the number of people living in the town and rid Petrozavodsk of all the 
‘unnecessary bourgeois and idling elements.’
32 
 
The lack of barracks for soldiers was a problem echoed in other towns within 
Karelia and the approach of winter made construction work imperative. On 14 September 
the local military soviet ordered the building of barracks for 100-120 men at Segezha 
station, proposed the extension of the barracks at Medvezh’ia Gora to house 540 men and 
to immediately adapt all suitable structures at Nadvoitsy and Onda stations for 400 and 100 
men respectively.
33 The lack of housing also frustrated the provincial military commissar’s 
attempts to carry out his orders to billet and train Red Army reserves. On 26 October M.F. 
Tarasov asked the Petrozavodsk town soviet to supply the provincial military commissariat 
with premises adequate for 700 to 1000 Red Army men who would be trained in 
Petrozavodsk before being sent to the front. In response the chairman of the soviet’s 
accommodation commission announced that because of the housing crisis the Red troops 
could occupy all large buildings whose living space had not already been requisitioned and 
occupied by workers (ne v uplotnennom vide). A commission was then set up to review all 
the large buildings in the town.
34 
 
The double-edged nature of Red Army recruitment in Karelia, whereby attempts to 
raise numbers were hindered by a lack of resources, was again visible following the 
Armistice in November 1918. The opportunity arose to mobilise returning prisoners of war 
but it placed further strain on local resources. At the end of December the Olonets 
provincial revolutionary executive committee resolved to set up special commissions to 
oversee the passing of former prisoners of war through the districts on their way home to 
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places occupied by the Allies. The executive committee also resolved to appeal to all local 
communist parties to influence returning soldiers ‘in the spirit of socialism.’
35 However, 
the return of released prisoners of war further burdened the infrastructure and resources of 
an already pressurised local government. From 25 November hundreds of hungry, poorly 
clothed and shod Russian prisoners of war from Germany and Austria began to arrive in 
Petrozavodsk, many suffering from the cold and frostbitten toes.
36  
 
In part response to the inability of the state to support its Red Army a number of 
Red Army units across Karelia partook in what appears to have been authorised but heavy-
handed requisitioning raids, which contributed to the growth of general rural unrest that 
expressed itself at the end of the year in a number of parishes across the region (see below). 
A case in point was an incident involving a small Red Army detachment in Pudozh district 
in early October 1918 which had been issued a mandate from the special military 
commissar of Pudozh and Kargopol’ districts, carried out searches of the local 
‘prosperous’ population and assaulted some of the civilians who resisted. Clothing, 
military equipment and foodstuffs were taken and almost everyone searched was arrested, 
imprisoned in the cellar of a house and forced to pay a fine for their release based on a 
sliding scale from 50 to 3000 roubles. Some of the requisitioned and confiscated items 
were taken away by the Red Army and the remainder given to the chairman of the 
kombedy to distribute amongst the poor. Of the collected monies a sum of 2500 roubles 
was taken for the costs of the Red Army detachment before the same procedure was 
repeated in the neighbouring Vershininskaia parish on 11 October.
37 A total of 58,650 
roubles were gathered from the two parishes, part of which was to be given back to the 
parish party committees.
38 
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The continuation of the food crisis 
The largest burden on local Bolsheviks was connected to the problems in the Red Army: 
the region’s food supply crisis. Because of the non-arrival of grain to Olonets province in 
August and the lack of grain in the stores of the provincial and Petrozavodsk town 
commissariats for food local Bolsheviks resorted to their own efforts to alleviate the crisis. 
The Olonets provincial food commissariat decided on 2 September to permit all citizens of 
Petrozavodsk and other district towns to go into the countryside and purchase foodstuffs at 
a fixed price for personal use from the peasantry. This included grain purchases no higher 
than the monthly ration (fifteen funts for every member per family). The urban population 
received permission forms (ustanovlennye blanki razreshenii) from the provincial 
commissariat for food or the district commissariats for food from the 14 September, 
without which the buying of foodstuffs in the countryside was prohibited. Furthermore, the 
conveyance of foodstuffs to the towns was to be carried out unimpeded and protected from 
requisitioning.
39 
 
How successful this devolved but regulated venture was is unknown. It appears that 
the provincial food authorities temporarily passed responsibility for alleviating the food 
crisis onto the individual, albeit with the support and approval of the provincial 
government. In other words urban dwellers were responsible for gathering foodstuffs in the 
countryside but at fixed prices and armed with nothing but official paperwork to convince 
peasants to comply with the order. Naturally, without something else to offer the villages 
or the threat of armed force there was little incentive for peasants to sell foodstuffs who, 
because of price regulations, could not freely market their grain to make a profit. Town 
dwellers were simply being asked to do the same as the kombedy or the food supply 
detachments; they were not going to trade but seek out and take foodstuffs at fixed prices. 
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Still, local Bolsheviks had little option but to invent new ways of trying to solve the food 
shortages as they strived to gain more control over food supply. For example on 22 
September local Bolsheviks complained to the People’s Commissariat for Food about the 
food supply orders passed to the Trading union (Optosoiuz) which was responsible for 
making sure orders assigned to Olonets province were fulfilled. Because of the inaccurate 
size of the supply orders and their belated arrival the provincial food commissariat sent a 
telegram to the People’s Commissariat for Food stating that the provincial food authorities 
would henceforth carry out its own food supply orders independently and requested that 
the Trading union be denied the right to fulfil supply orders for Olonets province.
40 
 
Other measures were taken by local Bolsheviks to try and ease the crisis but, were 
hindered by familiar obstacles. Because of the shortage of experienced workers in the food 
supply departments and the delay of grain supply orders arriving from the producing 
provinces the provincial commissariat for food passed on some of the responsibility for 
supply to local cooperatives. At the Fifth Olonets Provincial Congress of Soviets (25-31 
January 1919) S.K. Pukhov explained that these cooperatives had the responsibility for 
obtaining and distributing food products. However, the provincial food commissariat’s 
faith in the cooperatives was undermined because local soviets refused them the right to 
purchase food products or because the people sent by the cooperatives to make the 
purchases were completely inexperienced and did not know how to undertake the task.
41   
 
Although local Bolsheviks tried to make the most of what foodstuffs remained in 
Olonets province to ease the food crisis they still realised that the whole population could 
not survive without local leaders’ co-ordination with the central authorities. They therefore 
persevered in appealing to Moscow for support. On 23 September the Olonets provincial 
revolutionary executive committee resolved to petition Petrograd and Moscow for help in 
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easing the food crisis and to send provincial representatives to the centre to explain the 
local situation to the central authorities in person.
42 This seems to have had an immediate 
effect; on 26 September one of these representatives informed the Petrozavodsk town 
soviet that it was due to receive 26,000 puds of grain. However, local Bolsheviks remained 
sceptical of the centre’s ability to keep its word and so the town soviet resolved to send a 
telegram to Moscow to stress that all orders for the province be supplied in full and on 
time.
43 Because of their past experiences with the central authorities Petrozavodsk was 
more conscientious in making sure supplies reached the town. Likewise, local Bolsheviks 
had learned their lesson from the previous spring and summer when grain loads destined 
for Petrozavodsk were appropriated or transhipped at railway stations en route. For 
example, the Olonets provincial revolutionary executive committee sent another telegram 
to Moscow on 4 October asking for the urgent dispatch of grain but under armed escort. 
An Olonets provincial representative would meet the load at Zvanka station for its onward 
transfer to Petrozavodsk.
44 
 
Despite local efforts to supply the Karelian districts and a slight improvement in 
Bolshevik organisation to make sure grain loads being assigned to the region arrived, many 
parishes remained on the brink of starvation. A telegram from the Povenets district military 
commissar informed the provincial revolutionary executive committee on 14 October that 
the people of Lazarevo village in Bogoiavlenskaia parish were leaving for the Murmansk 
region because they believed it to be better supplied.
45 At the end of the year Petrozavodsk 
informed Moscow and Petrograd that episodes of people moving to areas occupied by the 
Allies had increased because of the lack of food under the soviets.
46 Povenets district was 
                                                 
42 NARK, f.R-28, op.1, d.23, l.557. 
43 Izvestiia Olonetskogo Gubernskogo Soveta, 4 October 1918. 
44 NARK, f.R-28, op.1, d.23, l.566. 
45 Ibid. l.585. 
46 NARK, f.R-98, op.1, d.64, l.78. At the Second Olonets Provincial Bolshevik Party Conference in 
December a representative from Povenets district noted that because of the food shortages one peasant 
society near the front line had defected to the area occupied by the Allies. NARK, f.P-4, op.1, d.8, l.23.   168 
particularly affected by starvation in mid-October and because of this disease in the area 
spread. On 19 October Petrozavodsk received a telegram from Povenets which stated that 
the members of the Petrovsko-Iamskaia and Porosozerskaia parish soviets were ill and 
bedridden. The district executive committee begged for grain and asked the provincial 
authorities to petition Petrograd and Moscow on their behalf to dispatch ten carriage loads 
of grain, under armed escort, within a week.
47 The effect of food shortages was also felt in 
Pudozh district. The Olonets provincial Izvestiia reported on 1 November that an 
unprecedented epidemic had taken hold in Kenozero village, Trikhnovskaia parish; 23 
people were already dead, the village had no doctors and the hospital in the neighbouring 
Vershininskaia parish had no medicines.
48   
 
Amidst the chaos local Bolsheviks tried to introduce some kind of order and 
pinpointed some of the failings which could be improved in the food commissariat. 
Following I.F. Petrov’s resignation S.K. Pukhov refused to take up his new post as 
provincial commissar for food because of the poor running of the food board; almost all 
food stores were manned by people working on their own, who were illiterate and who did 
not compile any accounts. Therefore the food board’s bookkeeping was incomplete and 
even had outstanding paper work for 1917. On 7 December Pukhov demanded the 
appointment of an auditing committee (Revizionnaia Komissiia) to fully investigate the 
finances of the storehouses and premises of the food board. Until this was done Pukhov 
categorically refused to take up his position as provincial commissar for food.
49  
 
At the very least Pukhov was taking a stand to try and eradicate the food 
commissariat’s failings. However, identifying problems was far easier than fixing them. 
The Bolsheviks did not have enough capable individuals to go around which brought 
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disorganisation to the food commissariat and its departments and failed to alleviate or 
made worse the shortages in the region. Local Bolsheviks had a number of ongoing 
projects but did not have the personnel locally or enough central support to be able to 
effectively staff institutions such as the kombedy, the food supply detachments, registration 
control commissions, the Red Army and the Cheka, not to mention the running of soviets 
and party committees. At the First Olonets Provincial Bolshevik Party Conference in 
August Pukhov’s predecessor, I.F. Petrov, noted the food commissariat’s lack of workers 
because the most able had been sent around the province ‘for the organisation of the 
village poor’. As a result, there were no employees in the commissariat for food who 
sympathised with the Bolshevik party.
50 Personnel problems remained an issue of concern 
at the Second Olonets Provincial Bolshevik Party Conference where a party representative 
expressed his concern about the selection of workers in local food supply committees: ‘We 
need to think more about the selection [of workers], while remembering the important role 
of food supply agents at the current time…’
51  The disorganisation of the food board and 
the need for a more capable staff was illustrated further by the initial findings of the 
auditing committee requested by Pukhov. It found that because of the late arrival of 
monetary accounts from the districts and parishes, which were also considered to be poorly 
organised, the combined debt to the provincial commissariat for food was approaching one 
million roubles.
52 
 
Despite Pukhov’s complaints he did take up his position as the provincial 
commissar for food. Nevertheless, shortages continued and he experienced similar 
problems to his predecessor: the late and inadequate arrival of supplies and an inability to 
supply all the Karelian districts effectively. Out of a planned 674 carriage loads of grain 
designated to Olonets province for October, November and December 1918 only 161 
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arrived, or 24% of the planned order.
53 On 11 December a military report for the Petrograd 
district noted that Povenets district’s population was feeding itself almost exclusively on 
straw and moss. Rugozerskaia and Porosozerskaia parishes were particularly bad which 
was made worse by Spanish flu and a typhus epidemic. The report noted that the majority 
of those who fell ill were dying.
54 Similar problems were noted in Olonets district. A 
session of the second Vidlitskaia parish congress of soviets on 17 December learned that 
the local population in a few villages were mixing flour and baked bread with straw, 
sawdust and other surrogates which in turn endangered the civilians’ health.
55  The 
Bolshevik authorities therefore struggled to gain control of food supply and as a result the 
local population suffered. The food crisis provoked peasant revolts before the end of the 
year, but the shortages were only one longer term cause of this unrest; the intrusion of the 
kombedy also contributed to discontent in the countryside. 
 
The kombedy: employees, tax and mills 
Despite consolidating its position in the provincial and district soviets before the end of the 
year the party struggled to exert its influence over the peasantry. As a lever of control the 
kombedy were unable to improve food distribution, lacked any formal revenue and were 
compelled to rely ever more on force. The belated appearance of the kombedy in parts of 
the countryside, a lack of dedicated Bolshevik personnel within them and poor 
communication with the districts were also constant problems facing the kombedy and 
local party workers. On 2 October a Bolshevik organiser sent to Pudozh informed the 
Bureau of the party Central Committee that there were few kombedy in this district. Indeed 
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he proclaimed that there was ample work for a few Bolshevik organisers in the region but 
he was compelled to work alone to establish more kombedy.
56 Communications with the 
countryside were also problematic. On 4 October 1918 the Pudozh district food board 
asked all parish soviet executive committees to report when kombedy had been created, 
where and how many existed. However, by 17 October some parishes had still not 
replied.
57     
 
The evidence available for Karelia suggests that some kombedy members were a 
mixture of former soldiers who had served in the war, individuals who had returned to their 
home villages from working in Petrograd and local peasant activists.
58 Statistics drawn 
from questionnaires filled out by the delegates at the First Congress of Kombedy of the 
Northern Region in November also suggest that the majority of kombedy members in 
Karelia were settled inhabitants. The questionnaires revealed that from a total of 718 
delegates questioned from Olonets province, 86% were local individuals and 75% were 
married.
59 72% of the delegates also answered that they were peasants who worked the 
land (khlebopashets krest’ianin) and only 13% recorded their profession as being that of 
‘workers’. The wealth of the congress delegates also indicates that members of the 
kombedy were settled peasants; 19% had a house and some land while the majority, 75%, 
had a house, land and livestock.
60 Further statistics from the congress in Petrograd point 
out that the Bolshevik party was only ever loosely in control of the kombedy; not one 
kombed delegate questioned from Olonets province had been a Bolshevik party member 
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before the October revolution.
61 Furthermore, out of a total of 299 delegates questioned 
from the Karelian districts at the congress only 7% were communists.
62 Finally, a 
significant minority of kombedy members in Olonets province had experience of serving in 
parish soviets (30%).
63 
 
Evidence from the Karelian districts emphasises the need for caution when 
generalising about Bolshevik institutions such as the kombedy because local populations 
had different experiences. Some kombedy served a useful purpose. For example, a village 
kombed in Olonets district decided to construct a blacksmith’s workshop, a sawmill and 
repair the local grain mill. Furthermore, the same kombed provided two puds of grain for 
the families of two peasants sent to form model regiments of the village poor at the end of 
November 1918 (see below) and distributed the remaining 13 puds which it had gathered 
around 179 other families.
64 Nevertheless, despite the differences found from region to 
region, many features of the kombedy were ultimately the same; in the absence of many 
responsible and dedicated Bolshevik cadres a number of kombedy members abused their 
positions, clashed with the soviets and the peasantry and became hated figures in the 
countryside. Because of this the kombedy were phased out following the Sixth All-Russian 
Congress of Soviets (see below and Chapter 7).
65 
  
An example of why the kombedy acquired a negative reputation surfaced in Karelia 
at the end of October when the new head of the Olonets provincial Cheka, Oskar Kanter, 
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expressed his concerns about the composition of the kombedy. On 30 October 1918 he 
informed the Petrozavodsk County Bolshevik party committee that the kombed in Ialguba 
village, Petrozavodsk district, was unreliable because relatives of kombed members were 
favoured. For instance, one citizen of Ialguba had a large amount of goods requisitioned 
only for the bulk of it to be distributed to the wives of the kombed members.
66 Kanter 
believed that the reason for the inefficiency of the Ialguba kombed was poor Bolshevik 
party organisation; the party had no suitable premises to hold meetings, a problem, 
incidentally, that the village kombed did nothing to remedy. Kanter therefore called for an 
investigation into the kombed of Ialguba village.
67 
 
The scope for kombed members to act irresponsibly was broadened because of the 
institution’s financial constraints. Broadly speaking, very few kombedy received financial 
aid from higher authorities and instead relied on financing themselves by taxing local 
enterprises or simply had no formal revenue at all. The introduction of a national 10 billion 
rouble Revolutionary tax (Chrezvychainyi nalog) marked a shift in the financial fortunes of 
the kombedy but at the same time aggravated its relationship with the peasant population. 
Sanctioned by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, on the 30 October 1918, the 
tax’s primary goal was to raise funds for the Red Army but it also aimed to continue the 
class struggle by focusing on the urban and rural bourgeoisie while exempting the poor. As 
a result, the tax had not only financial but political significance.
68 The decree opened up 
the door for the kombedy to obtain money from the population because the kombedy took 
part in the creation of parish, village and peasant settlement tax commissions, introduced 
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local tax levies and were officially in charge of tax collection.
69 Because of the ambiguity 
surrounding the definition of what constituted a ‘poor peasant’ or a ‘kulak’ the grounds for 
imposing arbitrary taxes on the population by highhanded kombedy members widened and 
the relationship between the kombedy and the peasantry became increasingly strained. This 
was exacerbated by the use or threat of force exercised by the kombedy when it undertook 
its duties. For example, a local peasant remembered that a Red Guard detachment helped 
the Spasopreobrazhenskaia parish kombedy gather the Revolutionary tax.
70 
 
  In Karelia the kombedy began collecting taxes even prior to the introduction of the 
Revolutionary tax. On 11 October a Bolshevik sympathiser cell in Nekkul’skaia parish, 
Olonets district, entrusted a village kombed with the collection of 4010 roubles from 
seventeen individuals believed to be more prosperous; the money would be used to support 
the kombed up to the 1 January, 1919.
71 Furthermore, on 20 October the Vodlozerskaia 
parish soviet executive committee in Pudozh district entrusted the kombedy with the 
collection of an income-tax from the propertied classes in accordance with local directives 
only a few days earlier. However, this executive committee also called a general parish 
meeting to explain the purpose of the tax.
72 
 
Regardless of the introduction of the Revolutionary tax, difficulties arose in the 
paying of kombedy members which naturally undermined the effectiveness of the 
institution. On the 5 November, the chairman of the Kolodozerskaia parish kombed in 
Pudozh district informed the district food board that his kombed needed financial help to 
pay its members.
73 On the 21 November the provincial commissar for food, S.K. Pukhov, 
wrote to the Olonets provincial revolutionary executive committee stating that the 
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provincial food board received daily demands for the issue of a salary to kombedy 
members.
74 The following day the provincial revolutionary executive committee discussed 
this payment question. The provincial food board believed that work in the kombedy 
should be paid because it was a time consuming job and dragged its members away from 
their own agricultural work. At the same time because there had been no instructions from 
Moscow or elsewhere concerning this finance problem and there was no means to rectify it 
with the local budget the provincial food board was forced to refuse the issue of a salary to 
kombedy members. The issue was then referred to the Northern Regional Bolshevik Party 
Committee in Petrograd for clarification on how to pay kombedy members.
75 
 
Trying to combine work in the kombedy with its members’ own work therefore 
proved difficult. The Sviatozerskaia parish kombed in Petrozavodsk district appealed to the 
Petrozavodsk County Bolshevik party committee on the 21 November for extra manpower 
to locate and requisition grain; help was needed because the parish kombed only had two 
people for the task but they had preoccupations with their own work outside of the 
kombed.
76 On the 23
 November the Petrozavodsk County Bolshevik party committee 
received further evidence of the difficulties in combining kombedy work with members’ 
other work. The Murmansk railroad Bolshevik party committee asked for an organiser of a 
kombed to be released from his duties because he was an important employee of the 
Murmansk railroad Cheka.
77  
 
The introduction of an order from the capital putting tax collection at the disposal 
of the kombedy meant they could use this legislation as a lever to gain influence and 
authority in the countryside; this was the ideal. However, the kombedy only ever had, at 
best, marginal control because they were crippled by the basic practical necessities 
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required to make its influence felt in the countryside. This was also apparent in the efforts 
of the kombedy to gain control over food supply. As part of being responsible for 
registering, requisitioning and distributing food products around Olonets province 
Karelia’s kombedy were given control of all grain mills in September 1918. Of course the 
timing of the decision was significant because it came at the same time as the harvest. On 
17 September the Olonets provincial commissariat for food issued a circular in the Olonets 
provincial Izvestiia to all district, town and parish executive committees and kombedy 
stating that all mills would be confiscated without compensation and transferred to the 
authority of the kombedy. If a kombed had not been formed then the mills were to be 
placed provisionally under the charge of the local cooperative.
78 
 
The transfer of grain mills to the kombedy was designed to give the Bolsheviks 
more control in food supply distribution which would be facilitated by efforts to improve 
communications and knowledge between the countryside and the district and provincial 
centres. In practical terms the kombedy were responsible for the supervision of grinding 
grain into flour in the mills and were required to report monthly to the district and town 
executive committees regarding the amount of grain ground over the previous month in 
each mill. In turn the district and town soviet executive committees were required to pass 
the information onto the Olonets provincial commissariat for food. The kombedy were also 
required to elect three members from amongst themselves and form a food board. This 
board would then be placed in charge of administering individual mills. However, like the 
Bolsheviks’ other food supply policies, noted in Chapter 4, the party were compelled to 
couple the introduction of their orders with the threat of force; anyone obstructing the 
transfer of mills to the kombedy would be brought before the revolutionary tribunal and 
have all their property confiscated.
79 
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With other Bolshevik orders issued from the capital or Petrozavodsk, local 
conditions meant that the decree was interpreted according to the needs and assessment of 
local individuals. On 2 October 1918, at a general gathering of village kombedy members 
from Sviatozerskaia parish in Petrozavodsk district, the vast majority of representatives 
decided that the mills in the parish should remain the property of their current owners but 
the kombedy would have close control over them. The mill owners and managers of the 
mills were responsible for receiving the grain, grinding it and then handing it back to 
whoever had brought it. However, the grain would only be accepted upon the presentation 
of a ticket received from the village kombed which stated the weight and quality of the 
grain to be ground. The mill owners were held responsible for any repairs the mills 
required but from the money received from grinding the grain, which was set at 30 kopecks 
per pud, the mill owners would receive 20 kopecks. The kombedy would keep the 
remaining 10 kopecks.
80 The improvised implementation of this directive most probably 
made more sense to the village peasants; the task of grinding grain remained with 
individuals who could do the job and mill owners were responsible for any costly repairs 
that may be required. On the other hand the task of the kombedy was primarily supervisory 
which freed its members from becoming over burdened working for an institution that 
struggled to pay its members.  
 
Resistance to the strict nationalisation of mills was not isolated. On 25 October 
kombedy representatives in Kizhskaia parish, Petrozavodsk district, adopted a similar 
position to the peasants of Sviatozerskaia; they refused to take mills away from their 
owners but chose to place them under the strict administrative control of the kombedy.
81 
Nevertheless, some villages did accept the need to nationalise the mills, for example in 
Boiarskaia parish, Pudozh district. However, other problems specific to that region 
surfaced to undermine the kombedy. On the 12 November 1918 the Pudozh district food 
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board received a telegram from Boiarskaia parish stating that the parish had one mill, 
which was working at full speed under the control of a village kombed which also supplied 
the mill with fuel. It appears that this region was relatively well supplied in grain at the 
time because the telegram stated that the parish mill could not cope with serving the whole 
population. Instead Boairskaia parish had to rely on a large part of its ground grain coming 
from two neighbouring parishes: Krasnovskaia and Bogdanovskaia (the latter was in 
Kargopol’ district). The parish executive committee therefore proposed the construction of 
two new mills, only then would the parish be able to satisfactorily supply the local 
population.
82 
 
Sowing discontent and the militarization of the kombedy 
The kombed project was undermined by a number of practical obstacles which centred on a 
lack of human and material resources in the periphery and the bulk of evidence available 
from the Karelian districts indicates that the kombedy were institutions which the peasantry 
resented. A citizen of Siamozerskaia parish, Petrozavodsk district, wrote to the 
Petrozavodsk district soviet on the 1 January 1919 complaining that in his absence, at the 
end of the previous November, a chest belonging to him had been forced open by the order 
of the chairman of the Priazha village kombed. The contents of the chest, mainly clothes, 
linen and general household items, were then distributed between the members of the 
kombedy and some of the villagers. This happened despite his wife producing a sealed 
certificate from the Petrozavodsk district soviet which stated that the chest and its contents 
should not to be confiscated; the kombed took the certificate but it was never returned. The 
owner of the chest protested that the chairman of the kombed had committed an illegal act 
and that the loss had deprived himself and his family of their clothes and linen.
83 
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The commissar for post and telegraphs of Porosozerskaia parish, Povenets district, 
also had reason to complain about a local kombed. On 20 November the provincial 
revolutionary committee learned at one of its sessions that the kombed had requisitioned 
the last supplies of bread from drivers delivering the post. Because of this communications 
had come to a halt. The Olonets provincial revolutionary executive committee therefore 
decided to order all district soviets to prohibit any similar occurrences happening in the 
future and to make sure drivers received the fixed food supply ration. The committee could 
not assign new drivers because of the lack of forage for the draught animals.
84  
 
Further evidence suggests that once established the kombedy became more 
militarised in order to fulfil their obligations. In Povenets district, no later than 26 
September 1918, a village kombed in Miandusel’gskaia parish asked the Olonets provincial 
revolutionary executive committee to send it weapons, ammunition and an instructor to 
form an armed militia. The kombed members pointed out that in the village ‘the life of the 
poor is becoming impossible because of the kulaks, speculators, saboteurs and counter-
revolutionaries agitating amongst the poor against the authority of the Soviets.’
85 In 
response Petr Anokhin forwarded the request onto the Olonets provincial military 
commissar, Dubrovskii, to see if he could meet the request; Dubrovskii then sent thirteen 
rifles and a corresponding number of cartridges to the kombed.
86  
 
Finally, the militarised character of the kombedy was evident at the First Congress 
of Kombedy of the Northern Region in November 1918; nearly 30% of the questioned 
delegates from Olonets province at the congress were in military service.
87 This was 
significant for the immediate future as the militarization of kombedy went hand-in-hand 
with the institution’s effective dissolution as many of its most active members were 
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compelled to join the ranks of the Red Army. The Northern Regional Congress of 
Kombedy resolved on 5 November to create special model regiments of the village poor. 
Every kombed was ordered to appoint two ‘reliable’ peasants before sending them to the 
military commissariat in Petrograd by 23 November. The decision to form these regiments 
all over the country was approved at the subsequent Sixth All-Russian Congress of Soviets 
(6-9 November 1918) on the proposal of this regional congress.
88 The regiments’ 
formation was discussed at a session of the Olonets provincial revolutionary executive 
committee on 15 November which resolved to send copies of the telegram received from 
Petrograd, which ordered the creation of these regiments, to all district soviets, the military 
commissariat and the Petrozavodsk County Bolshevik party committee. The order placed 
emphasis on the need to create these regiments hastily.
89 On 20 November, the 
Petrozavodsk town Bolshevik party committee decided to send a total of 25 individuals 
around Olonets province to organise the model regiments and to reorganise the parish 
soviets.
90 
 
It was at the Sixth All-Russian Congress of Soviets on 9 November that the 
Bolshevik leadership decided to hold re-elections to parish and village soviets and merge 
the kombedy with them.
91 In essence it signalled the failure of the kombedy in the 
countryside but it also reflected the Bolsheviks’ wish to salvage what they could from the 
project. Leading Bolsheviks wished to increase the size of the Red Army and sought to use 
the kombedy to achieve this aim by appointing its best employees before the merger with 
local soviets began in earnest.
92 Furthermore, the move to create model regiments of the 
village poor reflected the capitals’ objective to further centralise state control. As noted 
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above, model regiments of the village poor were not to remain in the Karelian districts to 
fight against the Allies but were required to travel to Petrograd before being dispatched 
elsewhere. 
 
The success of the order to establish model regiments of the village poor depended 
on the ability of the periphery to implement it but the regiments’ formation was hindered 
by now familiar problems of early Soviet state building. On 22 November the provincial 
military commissariat wrote to the Petrozavodsk County Bolshevik Party Committee about 
the appointment of three commissariat members for agitation work around the province 
and the formation of the model regiments: ‘The three mentioned comrades hold 
responsible posts and if they are appointed to work routinely in the commissariat then the 
fixed mobilisation between the 20 and 28 of November, will come to a complete halt.’
93 As 
a result the military commissariat asked the party committee to take on the responsibility 
for forming the model peasant regiments themselves.
94  
 
Ia.K. Berztys, a leading member of the Petrozavodsk County Bolshevik Party 
Committee also complained to the Northern Regional Party Committee that although his 
committee had sent agitators around the province for propaganda purposes many of the 
kombedy ‘no doubt containing kulaks’ viewed these new regiments as enemies, as former 
penal regiments (byvshie arestanskie polki), with a malevolent element within them which 
affected recruitment. Berztys however recognised that it was the task of the agitators sent 
around the districts to disperse such opinions.
95 On the other hand the dispatch of agitators 
was held back by financial difficulties. On 22 November the Olonets provincial soviet 
revolutionary executive committee concluded that it did not have the means to support the 
agitators appointed around the province for the organisation of model regiments of the 
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village poor. As a result the committee decided to cut down the number of agitators to 
lessen the overall costs of their appointment throughout the province.
96  
 
The concluding period of the kombedy project which began in November 1918 
therefore reflected the problems which plagued the institution from the start; its intrusion 
in the countryside was generally resisted and it was undermined by a lack of human and 
material resources. It did not give the Bolsheviks’ control over the parishes but instead 
contributed to a sequence of peasant rebellions in Karelia before the end of the year.  
 
Peasant unrest 
Given the pressures upon them caused by the food shortages, army mobilisation, 
requisitioning and the intrusion of the kombedy the people of Karelia rose up in open revolt 
against the Bolshevik regime. In Olonets district the local population remained burdened, 
after their previous short lived rebellion in June, by tax levies and food shortages. A 
military report for Olonets district in December 1918 described the food supply situation 
there as ‘mournful’ because bread products were only being released in insignificant 
amounts. The town population was struggling to survive on small rations of oat and rye 
flour, some potatoes and a small amount of meat while those in the parishes were living 
almost exclusively on potatoes and dairy products.
97 F.I. Egorov, the Bolshevik chairman 
of the Olonets district revolutionary executive committee, recalled that a number of 
parishes had been affected by the year’s poor harvest and many peasants were attempting 
to make bread with a mixture of flour and sawdust. Egorov also noted: ‘the supply norms 
were the absolute minimum, the receipt of food and the issuing of rations was often 
delayed…the food board was regularly besieged with crowds of starving people.’
98  
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Because of a lack of support from elsewhere the Olonets district revolutionary 
executive committee tried to alleviate the problem by organising an independent scheme 
for the purchase of livestock; a register of herds was carried out and a prohibition placed 
on the private sale of livestock.
99 How successful this was is unknown but nevertheless 
new reasons for discontent amongst the population materialised in the form of opposition 
to Red Army mobilisation and requisitions of supplies, including clothing, at the onset of 
winter.
100 The combination of taxes, mobilisation, food shortages and requisitioning 
provoked the outbreak of a peasant rebellion in Vedlozerskaia parish on 16 December 
1918. 
 
Originating in Savinovskoe peasant society a small group of local individuals 
instigated the uprising and managed to rouse the entire parish against the local military 
commissariat and the soviet. The latter, consisting of communists and communist 
sympathisers was routed and a soviet militia man was killed.
101 The unrest also spread to a 
number of other peasant societies within the parish and a rebellion broke out in 
Rypushkal’skaia parish during the same month.
102 In order to quell the uprising the 
Bolsheviks used both hard and more conciliatory tactics; the district revolutionary 
executive committee carried out agitation work in the border parishes while a Red Guard 
detachment of around 100 men was dispatched from Olonets town to suppress it by 
force.
103 
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A numerically larger peasant rebellion took place in early December, this time 
across the Zaonezh’e peninsula.
104 The poor food supply situation again prompted 
discontent. On the 2 November 1918 the provincial commissar for food, I.F. Petrov, 
reported in the local Izvestiia that supplying vital products to the region was extremely 
difficult and there was little hope that the situation would improve in the future.
105 A 
member of the Povenets district executive committee also believed the rebellion was 
motivated by opposition to the kombedy.
106 However the introduction of the military draft 
proved to be the final straw. A Bolshevik agitator, A.P Sidorov, reported the details of the 
uprisings to the provincial executive committee based on a trip around the parishes of the 
peninsula. According to his report he arrived in Shungskaia parish on the evening of the 4 
December and found out that disturbances had been taking place there for the past four 
days, the reasons for which were largely caused by army mobilisation. ‘Unfeasible 
demands’ were set by mobilised soldiers which included provision for their families, bread 
and other allowances for their families and themselves, good footwear, weapons, uniforms 
and transportation by carts or by boat to Povenets town.
107 
 
The mobilised men refused to move and began to threaten the local authorities. The 
soldiers then called a meeting which resulted in the disbandment and disarming of the local 
kombedy; a few members of the kombedy were then beaten up, their flats searched and 
various accusations and slanders cast against them. The rebels also threatened to burn 
down the building of the military commissariat. At the height of the revolt an agitator from 
Petrograd arrived but was denied the opportunity to speak. However, the telegraph line, 
which had been cut on 30 November, was fixed on the 1 December which allowed contact 
to be made with Povenets town and the Petrograd official requested the dispatch of an 
                                                 
104 The parishes of the Zaonezh’e peninsula were all part of Petrozavodsk district with the exception of 
Shungskaia parish which was part of Povenets district. 
105 Izvestiia Olonetskogo Gubernskogo Soveta, 2 November 1918. 
106 Memoirs of F.E. Pottoev in Gardin, et al., Vlast’ Sovetov. 202. 
107 NARK, f.P-4, op.1, d.82, l.39.   185 
armed detachment. 70 troops with two machine guns were sent.
108 Upon their arrival the 
uprising in Shungskaia parish was suppressed and its ringleaders placed under arrest.
109    
 
Yet this did not put an end to the civil unrest in the region as the mood of rebellion 
spread south to Tolvuiskaia parish. On 5 December Sidorov arrived in the parish and took 
part in a village soviet meeting where he attempted to explain the significance of 
mobilisation and find out why the disturbance had occurred. The following day Red Army 
and local communist party representatives clarified that the uprising had occurred 
simultaneously with the revolt in Shungskaia and was instigated by a few members of the 
parish soviet executive committee and ‘the prosperous class’. The army and party 
representatives decided to arrest the instigators. On 7 December Sidorov was again on the 
move upon receiving information that a rebellion had also taken place in Velikogubskaia 
parish.
110 Upon arrival here Sidorov made contact with the local military commissar and 
the chairman of the local executive committee to find out what had occurred. He attended 
and spoke at a peasant congress on 8 December and was joined by a representative of the 
Bolshevik party from Petrograd. However, Sidorov struggled to keep the gathered crowds 
at bay who called for him to be dragged to the nearest hole in the ice. The peasants then 
threw various slanders at the local soviet and the military commissar who was accused of 
taking bribes. The gathering then became more heated and the peasants decided to disarm 
the military commissariat and fight against the governing authorities.
111       
   
At this point the military commissar refused to hand over his weapon and four Red 
Army men arrived. The crowds, feeling intimidated, left the congress. However, the 
following day one of the peasants travelled around the countryside gathering signatures in 
support of the resolution to disarm the military commissariat. The authorities likewise did 
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not remain idle; Sidorov, awaiting political and armed reinforcements from Petrozavodsk, 
continued to gauge the mood of the peninsula’s peasantry by attending another heated 
village gathering. By the time he returned to Velikogubskaia shortly thereafter the 
reinforcements from Petrozavodsk had arrived. Sidorov then proposed the convening of a 
joint meeting of the representatives of all governing organisations in the area, including the 
Cheka, in order to draw up a list of ‘saboteurs’ and ‘speculators’ to be passed over to 
members of an investigatory commission.
112 Discontent on the Zaonezh’e peninsula 
continued to simmer as Sidorov continued his rounds, attending further heated peasant 
gatherings from the 19 to 23 December. In his report Sidorov described the general mood 
of the populace to be fickle with anger vented at local military commissars and members of 
the kombedy.
113 In conclusion he believed that all the uprisings in the peninsula were 
linked and that special messengers, paid by the peasants, had been sent around the parishes 
to coordinate the rebellions which were sparked by grain shortages and the army draft.
114 
 
Thus the rebellions on the Zaonezh’e peninsula in December 1918 were the result 
of a combination of factors. The recurring food shortages proved to be the base for general 
discontent in the region which was sparked into open revolt by the Bolsheviks’ first 
attempt in Karelia to mobilise a local Red Army. The introduction of army mobilisation 
proved too much for certain sectors of the population to cope with and some peasants 
refused to fight for a regime which offered little to them in return. The revolts reflected the 
Bolsheviks failure to engage with the local population through the overly coercive and 
under resourced kombedy or local military commissariats, the very institutions which were 
entrusted with implementing the Bolsheviks’ economic, military and political policies. In 
turn these institutions became the focal point of the peasants’ anger. Military commissars 
and officials were killed in another peasant uprising in Porosozerskaia parish (Povenets 
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district) between December 1918 and January 1919.
115 The actions of the local Cheka also 
provided a reason for the local population of the Zanoezh’e peninsula to lose patience with 
the Bolshevik regime. One of the peasants arrested for being involved in the December 
rebellion stated under interrogation in March 1920
116 that he became dissatisfied with the 
Soviet government because in the autumn of 1918 the provincial and Povenets district 
Chekas fined his brother 2000 roubles for speculation and confiscated all the articles he 
had been trading with. Because this was not part of the 10 billion rouble Revolutionary tax, 
introduced in late October, both brothers were still liable to payout a further 3000 
roubles.
117 
 
The Second Olonets Provincial Bolshevik Party Conference (10-13 December 
1918) 
The use of some loyal Red Army units and a few party men meant that the Bolsheviks 
were ultimately strong enough to suppress the unrest in December. Nevertheless, the 
outbreak of the rebellions in the first instance reflected the Bolsheviks’ lack of control over 
the Karelian parishes. At approximately the same time as the spate of peasant uprisings in 
Karelia the Second Olonets Provincial Bolshevik Party Conference took place.
118 This 
conference is important because it highlighted the Bolshevik party’s progress in Karelia, 
the problems that it faced, its future objectives, the importance of local factors and its 
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relations with the capital cities of Petrograd and Moscow. It short, it reflected the modest 
improvements that the regime had made since the last party conference in August but 
highlighted some significant problems which remained and undermined the Bolsheviks’ 
influence across the region. 
 
The proceedings of the party conference suggest that only limited material help was 
assigned to Karelia by higher Bolshevik authorities because of the need to prioritise 
resources. Elena Stasova, the secretary of the Northern Regional Bolshevik Party 
Committee, who was present at the conference, turned down the Petrozavodsk County 
Party Committee’s request for cadres of researchers and teachers (nauchnye sily) from 
Petrograd because they were needed there. Instead Stasova stated that the local party 
committee would have to resort to ‘self-education’ (samoobrazovanie).
119 In other words 
the Karelian districts were compelled to fall back on their own limited resources. A 
representative from Pudozh town remarked at the conference that his party organisation 
had established a party club and canteen and organised meetings and lectures but all party 
work taking place outside of the town was undertaken through local means.
120 Furthermore, 
because the Petrozavodsk County Party Committee’s hopes for fresh recruits from 
Petrograd were in vain, it resolved to bolster local military, food supply and economy 
departments and administrative personnel with members from local party cells.
121     
 
To repeat, the party conference portrayed a picture of small improvements but 
against the background of continuing setbacks to the Bolsheviks’ influence and control of 
the Karelian region. The conference acknowledged the large growth in the number of party 
cells and collectives across Olonets province but regretted the hindrances placed on the 
development of the party because of a lack of material resources and agitators and the 
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inefficiency of communication between the local and party centres.
122 For instance, the 
party recognised its weakness in Olonets and Povenets districts; the representative from 
Olonets district pointed out the existence of continuing sympathies towards the SRs while 
the Povenets representative commented on the weakness of the party in his district outside 
of the troops from the Beloraiskkii regiment.
123 Further evidence also suggests the party 
was concerned over the reliability of its new members. Previously, on 19 September, the 
Petrozavodsk County Bolshevik Party Committee chairman pointed out to his party that 
‘alien elements’ were filtering into their ranks and therefore, besides being recommended 
by two senior party members, the entrance of new party candidates should be subject to 
discussion before a confirmation hearing at a general meeting of the respective party 
organisation.
124 To help increase the party’s influence the conference resolved to improve 
the education and organisation of party members while making sure they paid the correct 
contributions.
125 The conference also underlined the need for ‘the strictest discipline’ of its 
members and a party auditing commission was elected.
126 In December, following a purge 
of party members in Olonets province, 90 members left the party.
127   
   
The lack of Bolshevik party influence in the districts and the still decentralised 
nature of Bolshevik power were underlined further at the party conference when party 
delegates stated a preference for a degree of regional self-government. The Olonets 
provincial commissar for internal affairs, I.A. Danilov, explained that the localities 
frequently disagreed with orders issued from Moscow and Petrograd but stated his belief in 
a regional system of government because Soviet Russia was too big to centralise all 
government administration. With the acquisition of further territory during the civil war 
Moscow would only overload itself with more requests and correspondence with the 
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provinces. These statements mirrored wider opinion amongst most, but not all, of the 
provinces within the Northern Region and followed the Third Northern Regional 
Bolshevik Party Conference (1-4 December 1918).
128 Elena Stasova defended a Regional 
government system:
129 
 
The idea of regional self-government came from below. When people’s 
commissars were transferred to Moscow, Petrograd was besieged with requests 
from the localities. At present Moscow is putting spokes in our wheels and accuses 
us of separatism, but we continue to defend the suitability of a Northern region, 
based on the voice of the working people. 
 
What Stasova meant by accusations of separatism is touched upon elsewhere but 
the signs suggest that friction existed between Petrograd and Moscow over matters of 
centralisation and regional control.
130 This is further confirmed by Rabinowitch’s evidence 
that Zinoviev, Stasova and other leading Petrograd Bolsheviks all believed governing 
authority needed to be shared between Petrograd and Moscow after the latter became the 
new capital.
131 Regardless of relations between the two capitals the Second Olonets 
Provincial Bolshevik Party Conference echoed the resolutions of the Third Northern 
Regional Bolshevik Party Conference to support the preservation of a Northern Region.
132 
 
Although Stasova was against centralisation to Moscow she nevertheless sought to 
centralise the party apparatus within the Northern Region in order to increase Petrograd’s 
control over the Northern provinces. However hindering this, Stasova proclaimed, was the 
nature of the party’s history: ‘In general we need to recognise that the long years working 
underground left a deep imprint on the party and it is not possible to immediately give up 
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these old practices and guidelines.’
133 Even so, Stasova repeated the goals of the Northern 
Regional Party Conference; the party must be reorganised, beginning with the strict 
centralisation of the functions of every party cell, organisation and committee: ‘Henceforth 
there will be no occurrences, for example, of agitators from Smolny being sent to a district 
without the knowledge of the provincial committee.’
134 However, strict centralisation 
throughout the regional, provincial, district and parish administrative chain depended on 
the ability to implement change at a local level; centralisation was conditional, based on 
the centre’s ability to offer material, personnel or financial support. A Bolshevik party 
representative complained about the decision to abolish the free distribution of central 
party newspapers because, he said, small cells could not afford to pay for them. As a result, 
party work would remain the task of a narrow group of members.
135 Improving the 
financial means of the party at all levels, by being economical in the use of existing funds 
and overseeing the correct payment of party dues by every member, became a key party 
objective. To help local Bolsheviks achieve a level of financial efficiency the conference 
resolved to establish a finance-control apparatus.
136      
 
The success of party work locally was therefore dependent on the resources which 
were available in the provinces and districts. The conference resolved that its immediate 
objectives were to increase party agitation amongst the peasantry but, as a leading local 
party representative, Ia.K. Igoshkin, pointed out, agitation would inevitably fail if the 
peasantry was not supplied with food and other vital products.
137 Furthermore he noted the 
important link between the quality of Red Army recruits and food supply:
138  
 
All the strength of the party’s struggle must be directed towards the creation of new 
communist cells and the development of already existing communist cells in the 
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Red Army…In addition we need to develop the most intensive work amongst the 
masses from which new forces for our army will be drawn, that is from among the 
poor and middle peasantry. The party is compelled to apply all its strengths towards 
the settlement of the food supply problem, while understanding that “a healthy 
spirit is only possible in a healthy body.” 
  
To be sure, some form of centralisation was required if the local Bolsheviks’ most 
pressing problem, that of food supply shortages, could be solved. At the very least 
information flows between national, regional and provincial centres required improvement. 
The hunger problem was a national one but Moscow’s attempts to improve the situation 
often had little positive effect in the Karelian districts. On 10 December Sovnarkom 
decided to allow all workers’ and trade organisations the right, with permission of their 
local soviet, to buy up and import products that were not part of the food monopoly such as 
potatoes, milk, vegetables, poultry and fruit.
139 I.F. Pukhov informed the Second Olonets 
Provincial Bolshevik Party Conference that he hoped the formation of provincial and 
district purchasing commissions would help soften the province’s food distribution 
problems.
140 However, people from other provinces turned to Karelia to demand the right 
to purchase such non-monopolised products, which the region had very little of in the first 
instance; what was available was required for local needs.
141 As a result the Olonets 
provincial revolutionary executive committee was forced to dispatch a telegram of 
complaint to Petrograd to stop sending these purchasing commissions north because of the 
severe food situation in Olonets province and because there was not enough food even for 
its own population.
142 
 
There was a lack of understanding in the centre about how severe the food 
shortages were in Olonets province. Further evidence of this was furnished by a party 
representative’s recent trip to Moscow. The Second Olonets Provincial Party Conference 
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found out that on V.T. Gur’ev’s trip he was asked by a member of the central food 
commissariat how many districts of Olonets province were occupied by the English.
143 
This was a significant concern for the Bolsheviks in Petrozavodsk because no districts of 
the province were occupied by the Allies at this time. Were supply loads therefore arriving 
in smaller and infrequent amounts because there was an assumption in the capital that only 
parts of Olonets province required supplies? Another party representative also expressed 
his astonishment at this revelation and repeated the provincial commissar for food’s 
statement that the centre had little idea of the province’s food supply requirements.
144 
Consequently, the Olonets provincial soviet revolutionary executive committee tried to 
improve its food supply situation by seeking provincial representation in Moscow. On 13 
January the provincial commissariat for food decided to allow one of its members, M. 
Polozov, to go to the capital to ask Lenin for a representative from Olonets province, with 
full voting rights, to be brought into the People’s Commissariat for Food.
145 
   
Despite Moscow’s and Petrograd’s wishes for centralisation local Bolsheviks 
wanted the best of both worlds. In other words they desired material help from the central 
authorities to alleviate the food, finance and personnel shortages but at the same time 
wanted to avoid excessive central intrusion and retain a form of self-government in order 
to use these resources according to local knowledge and conditions in the periphery. At the 
party conference Pukhov complained that the central military and food commissariats 
recently ordered the Olonets provincial commissariat for food to deliver 1200 puds of meat 
and 10,000 puds of hay to the department of supply attached to the provincial military 
commissariat. Local Bolsheviks also received orders from the capital to allow local timber 
and factory workers the right to purchase meat (which was not part of the 10 December 
order above) and to create a purchasing commission attached to the department of supply 
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which would run parallel to the purchasing commission attached to the provincial 
commissariat for food.
146  
 
As we shall see in Chapter 8 the centre’s increased control over Petrozavodsk, in 
the aftermath of the Eight Bolshevik Party Congress, expressed itself when Petrograd 
flexed its authority over Petrozavodsk following a military crisis in the spring of 1919. 
Furthermore, despite local Bolsheviks’ concern over the increasing encroachment on local 
decision making Karelia’s food supply problems bound Petrozavodsk to the centre. As a 
grain deficit region, irrespective of local initiatives, local Bolsheviks realised, as shown 
above, that better communication and understanding between Petrozavodsk and Petrograd 
and/or Moscow were of greater importance to easing the food crisis and Karelia’s 
problems more generally. 
 
Conclusion 
The road to Bolshevik control was uneven; in the last few months of 1918 the party’s 
control or potential for increased control was continually hamstrung by a lack of resources 
and the party struggled to increase its influence in the countryside. Because of the lack of a 
local Red Army Karelia was defended by a makeshift force of various regiments sent from 
Petrograd. These regiments were important in establishing a few party cells in the districts, 
disseminating Bolshevik propaganda, assisting the formation and work of the kombedy and 
providing members for local soviets, military commissariats and the Cheka. However, the 
mobilisation and maintenance of a local Red Army was near impossible because of the 
priority of the harvest season and the inability of the local soviets to maintain it. Food 
shortages continued to plague local Bolsheviks. They made every effort to make sure that 
some small quantities did make it to them and learned from their past experiences; they 
now continued to complain and lobby the capital for supplies and requested armed escorts 
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for their designated loads which would be met at key stations en route to make sure they 
were not transhipped elsewhere. They also sought to gain more control over domestic 
imports by increasing their influence in the central supply organs. A nucleus of dedicated 
party workers in Petrozavodsk constantly worked to try and solve the region’s 
administrative and material problems. In a letter to a fellow party member on 18 December, 
Elena Stasova recognised the problems of food supply in Olonets province but commended 
the local party workers she met at the recent provincial party conference:
147  
 
I left the conference with the most gratifying feeling because, in the first 
place, it is evident that in Olonets province there are very good workers in the 
centre who strain every nerve to make sure soviet and party work is up to scratch. 
True, there are a lot of shortcomings, but it is little wonder because life puts more 
and more demands on soviet and party workers, makes our goals more complex, 
but does not give us any more people [to tackle these challenges].  
 
However, in spite of the efforts of individuals in Petrozavodsk, by the end of the 
year the Olonets provincial revolutionary executive committee remained weakened by 
chronic food shortages; part of the population of Povenets district faced famine, some 
peasants were dying of starvation and disease while others went over to Allied held 
territory. The prestige of the local regime was undermined by its inability to ease these 
shortages, made worse by the intrusion of the kombedy in the countryside. The end result 
against the background of Karelia’s first general mobilisation campaign was wide-scale 
peasant revolt. In short, the Bolsheviks appeared to be little better off than the previous 
summer when they faced similar economic, social and military problems. 
                                                 
147 Perepiska. Vol.5. 266.   196 
Chapter 6 
Consolidating Power (II): The Role of the Cheka, August-December 1918 
This chapter will focus on the last four to five months of 1918 and show that despite 
continuing chaos there were signs that the Bolsheviks were laying further foundations to 
tighten their control over the Karelian districts. One sign came in the form of the 
declaration of the Red Terror by the Bolshevik government on 5 September 1918. From 
this point onwards repression became an official instrument of governance that the 
Bolsheviks could use to consolidate and expand their influence. A study of Karelia 
suggests that the intensity of the Red Terror outside the capital depended on local 
conditions and so the unruly period of the Cheka, in the few months after the declaration of 
the terror decree, was extreme in some instances but short in duration. However, the Cheka 
in Karelia was notably undisciplined and so the Bolsheviks took “one step forward” by 
reforming it. In early October 1918 a new provincial Cheka was elected and a more unruly 
Cheka chairman was replaced with a more disciplined appointment, Oskar K. Kanter. This 
reform of the Cheka proved an essential prerequisite for the consolidation of Bolshevik 
rule and its origins go back to the summer of 1918. From this time it is possible to trace the 
malpractice which individual Chekists were involved in and how this was gradually 
stamped out under Kanter’s chairmanship of the provincial Cheka.  
 
The introduction of the Red Terror 
On 5 September 1918 Sovnarkom issued its declaration of the Red Terror which came in 
the wake of the assassination of Mikhail Uritskii, the head of the Petrograd Cheka, and the 
attempt on Lenin’s life on 30 August. It gave increased responsibility to the Vecheka and 
its subordinate branches to protect the Soviet regime by arresting and executing class 
enemies and all individuals involved in counter-revolutionary organisations, plots or 
rebellions. In short, the right to apply summary justice was given to the Cheka.
1 Largely 
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because of the influential position of the Left SRs in the local Left SR-Bolshevik alliance 
the role of the Cheka was limited in Karelia and even after the removal of the Left SRs 
from the Olonets provincial soviet executive committee in July there was no dramatic 
change of policy. The sources suggest that the Red Terror in Petrozavodsk did not explode 
into a fury of violence, rather, local Bolsheviks pursued terror as a form of governance and 
control but it was applied ‘moderately.’  Without going into the intricacies of what 
constitutes terror it is enough to state that the term ‘moderate’ is used here not to trivialise 
the horrific nature of the Red Terror but to stress that the evidence for Karelia indicates 
that in approximately the last quarter of 1918 the number of executions carried out by the 
Cheka remained relatively low.
2 A selected number of executions took place against 
individuals defined by the Bolsheviks as the enemies of the new Soviet state, i.e. former 
police officials, former tsarist army officers, priests and rebels who took up arms. However 
the threat of executions, investigations, arrests and fines and the subsequent intimidation 
caused by this through publication in the local press were the more common features of the 
state’s repressive system in Karelia at this time.  
 
Shortly before the Red Terror became official Petrozavodsk received a telegram 
from G.I. Petrovskii, the People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs, circulated to all soviets 
on 3 September, about the introduction of revolutionary terror on a nationwide scale. 
Petrovskii called for an intensification of the terror: all Right SRs were to be arrested; 
hostages were to be taken from amongst the bourgeoisie and former tsarist officers; and 
mass shootings were to be applied at the least sign of resistance from the White Guards. 
Regarding the latter point the telegram stressed: ‘Local provincial executive committees 
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must display special initiative in this respect.’
3 Therefore the terror had been introduced 
and encouraged centrally but the decree was clearly reliant on the interpretation and 
implementation of local Bolsheviks. On 4 September the Petrozavodsk County Bolshevik 
Party Committee discussed the implementation of the Red Terror and proposed to the 
provincial revolutionary executive committee to: 1) execute all those arrested and guilty of 
counter-revolutionary activity; 2) impose a 500,000 rouble levy (kontributsiia) on the 
bourgeoisie and make its payment compulsory and attached to the threat of execution if it 
was not paid within a week;
4 3) introduce corresponding class based rations; 4) mobilise 
the bourgeoisie for community service; 5) discharge all Right SRs from their working 
posts.
5 Subsequently, on 9 September, the provincial revolutionary executive committee 
also resolved to distribute Petrovskii’s telegram to all district and parish soviets for their 
information and the Red Terror’s implementation.
6 At the same time the revolutionary 
executive committee assigned the provincial Bolshevik party committee specific rights 
over the detention of prisoners: all arrested White Guards and hostages could only be 
released upon the decision of the Petrozavodsk County Bolshevik party committee.
7 
 
On 5 September the Petrozavodsk town soviet also decided to implement the Red 
Terror decree. It unanimously agreed to introduce Petrovskii’s order, to arrest all Right 
SRs in Petrozavodsk, arrest several representatives of the bourgeoisie and a number of 
officers and hold them as hostages.
8 Shortly thereafter a list was composed and 18 so 
called bourgeois individuals and officers were arrested. Amongst those imprisoned were 
people who belonged to groups targeted as the Bolshevik revolution’s main enemies: the 
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chairman of the centre SRs G.I. Prokhorov; two Right SRs; a former member of the town 
duma who had previously been affiliated to the Kadets; a priest; and three officers.
9 On 7 
September the Petrozavodsk town soviet decided that only 20 hostages should be detained 
at any one time and only for a period of two weeks, after which time a second group of 
people would be identified for arrest upon the release of the first group.
10 On the same day, 
the Cheka announced to the citizens of Petrozavodsk in the provincial Izvestiia that they 
had taken hostages and the first attempt by anyone to take action against the soviets or 
soviet workers would result in the execution of all the hostages.
11 
 
Shortly after this announcement further threats were issued by the Cheka and 
published in the press to act as a deterrent. On 17 September the provincial Cheka 
announced that there had been an attempt to take the life of the Bolshevik ‘extraordinary 
commissar’ in the region, S.P. Natsarenus. The newspaper announcement reported that any 
repeat attempt against Natsarenus or any other soviet worker would result in the immediate 
execution of all hostages in prison at that time.
12 
 
  There is little evidence to suggest that immediately prior to or following the 
declaration of the Red Terror ‘unreserved mass shootings’ took place in Karelia as 
Petrovskii had encouraged in the face of White resistance. The actual targets of the Cheka 
were leading figures within the Left SRs. At the start of October Ivan Balashov, the head 
of the local Left SR party and still a member of the Petrozavodsk town soviet, was arrested 
and held for two weeks without any charges being brought against him.
13 The Left SR 
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party tried to drum up some support at the Aleksandrovsk munitions factory on the eve of 
the anniversary of the October revolution but events in Petrograd, at roughly the same time, 
gave local Bolsheviks the perfect opportunity to further undermine all remaining Left SRs 
in Petrozavodsk. Following the failed rebellion on 14 October by sailors of the Second 
Baltic Fleet Detachment, who were sympathetic and strongly influenced by the Left SRs, 
the Olonets provincial revolutionary executive committee, on 29 November, approved the 
decision taken by the provincial Cheka to close down the local Left SR party committee.
14 
On 27 November the provincial Cheka had searched the Left SRs’ party headquarters, 
removed its literature and all other items and then sealed off the premises. In the 
newspaper report which detailed the search the Left SRs were demonised by the 
Bolsheviks, thus mirroring the Petrograd Bolsheviks’ stance following the Baltic Fleet 
sailors’ rising. The report described the local Left SRs as ‘turning white’ and ‘political 
minors’.
15 
 
The primary reason for the relative moderation of the provincial Cheka was the 
different trajectory of the White movement in the north than for example, in the south 
where a host of former tsarist army officers had flocked to form the ‘Volunteer Army’ in 
early 1918.
16 In Petrozavodsk, after the skirmishes with the White Finns in the spring of 
1918, the Bolsheviks did not have to worry about being attacked by a White Army because 
such a force did not yet exist in any sizeable form. It was not until after the Armistice in 
November 1918 that the Allies and the Russian White Army issued a general mobilisation 
order in the zones occupied by them.
17 In his memoirs General Maynard recalled that in 
October 1918:
18 
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I had failed to secure more than a handful of Russian recruits; and though 
mobilization was spoken of, the population was small, and most the men of military 
age were required for work on the railway and at the various posts. Thus, before a 
Russian army of any material assistance to me could be built up, it would be 
necessary to extend the area from which recruits could be drawn.  
 
The Allied forces therefore did include a small contingent of mobilised Russian troops by 
autumn 1918 and, of course, it was the Allies who posed the greatest military threat to the 
Bolsheviks, but they did not make any major advance south of Soroka until mid-February 
1919 when they defeated the Red Army at Segezha. 
 
Therefore the civil war front in Karelia as it existed at the time of the introduction 
of the Red Terror was not particularly threatening and this may explain why executions 
appear to have remained few. However, the proximity of the Allies and the potential for 
the growth of a White Army in Murmansk did prompt mass arrests in Petrozavodsk. 
According to Allied intelligence reports, by the end of August 1918 many arrests among 
officers and educated classes had been made in the town.
19 Furthermore, at the Cheka 
conference of the Northern Region in Petrograd in October 1918 a member of the Olonets 
provincial cheka, N.N. Dorofeev, also stated that upon its creation the provincial Cheka’s 
attention was immediately drawn towards former officers, a number of whom were 
arrested but released upon further investigation.
20 Admittedly shootings did take place: on 
13 September three military officers and a policeman were shot by the provincial Cheka.
21 
But in general the Olonets provincial Cheka arrested and detained suspects rather than 
carry out a mass of executions. The head of the Murmansk railroad Cheka explained at the 
Cheka conference of the Northern Region in October that his Cheka had arrested 260 
officers although ‘many were released’. A total of nine individuals were executed.
22  
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However, if the Cheka was relatively moderate in carrying out executions it was 
not immune from the spy psychosis inherent in any security force. The presence of the 
Allies in particular fuelled the suspicions of the Cheka and the hunt for spies formed a 
significant part of the institution’s investigatory work. On 15 October, at the opening day 
of the conference of the Northern Region Chekas, the Murmansk railroad Cheka chairman 
remarked that his Cheka had uncovered ‘a few spy organisations.’
23 One such ‘spy 
organisation’ involved two members of the Murmansk railroad military soviet, A.A. 
Khoroshevskii and I.F. Pruss and the head of defence for the Murmansk railroad, a Captain 
Orlov. The Cheka arrested all three men on 7 October for alleged ‘criminal dealings with 
the Anglo-French.’
24 The arrested individuals were accused of passing important military 
secrets to the Allies and therefore assisting their southern advance. Suggesting an element 
of cooperation within the Cheka hierarchy, members of the Vecheka from Petrograd 
arrived especially to investigate the case and assist the members of the Murmansk railroad 
and provincial Chekas.
25 How the investigation turned out is not known but Pruss and 
Orlov were deemed suspicious enough to be escorted to Moscow on 12 October while 
Khoroshevskii was released.
26  
 
Little more is known of the affair but Allied intelligence suggests that Captain 
Orlov was innocent and he was not working for them. Indeed, as the Allies understood it, 
Orlov had been arrested for communicating with the Germans.
27 The arrest of Orlov was 
also met with protests at a meeting of some of the staff (kollektiv sluzhashchikh) who 
worked under him for the defence of the Murmansk railroad. At a gathering on 11 October 
these employees expressed their surprise and disappointment at Orlov’s arrest. They 
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believed it ‘improbable’ that he was involved in any kind of counter-revolutionary activity 
because he was in regular contact with the administrative personnel for the defence of the 
railway line and all his orders, it appeared to them, were based solely on strengthening 
Soviet authority in the region. At some point in the recent past Orlov had himself been 
responsible for rooting out espionage in the region and anyone suspected of espionage was 
arrested on Orlov’s orders and handed over to the provincial Cheka. Orlov’s work record 
convinced the gathering that his arrest was ‘malicious fabrication by someone who thought 
ill of Orlov.’ Consequently the employees for the defence of the Murmansk railroad 
appealed to the investigatory commission responsible for Orlov’s case to free Orlov.
28  
 
At the Second Olonets Provincial Bolshevik Party Conference the Orlov case arose 
once more, this time casting doubt over Orlov’s innocence; a party representative 
announced that Orlov along with a few others was sympathetic towards the English.
29 It 
would seem he was arrested because of his status as a former tsarist officer, in charge of 
military units and combating espionage, which raised suspicions on the part of the Cheka 
and contributed to his arrest and subsequent transfer to Moscow. Orlov had also been 
involved in communications with the Allies when that was Soviet policy. He had 
communicated with the English Admiral Kemp in Murmansk at the end of June or early 
July concerning negotiations between S.P. Natsarenus and the Allies.
30 Furthermore, Orlov 
was outspoken, he had previously been arrested but bailed in mid-August for angrily 
protesting the arrest of one of his colleagues at the town commissariat of defence in 
Petrozavodsk. Witnesses recalled that Orlov abused members of the Petrozavodsk town 
soviet while drunk, threatened them with his revolver and reminded those present that he 
was an officer and would arrest and disarm everyone. This previous altercation was 
significant and although he was issued bail his case was forwarded to eight different higher 
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governing institutions in Olonets province, Moscow and Petrograd.
31 In other words 
Orlov’s arrest in October appears to have been an action taken against possible betrayal, 
encouraged by the presence of the Allies and his previous behaviour. Orlov’s fate is 
unknown and his name is absent in local sources from this point which suggests he did not 
return from Moscow. 
 
The attack on religion and terror in Olonets district 
As well as seeing enemies among anyone who had contacts with the Allies, however 
legitimate, the Cheka strongly believed the Orthodox Church to be a centre of opposition 
to the regime and showed little moderation when dealing with it. The conflict with the 
Aleksandr-Svirskii monastery mentioned in Chapter 2 flared up again in autumn 1918 
when the provincial revolutionary soviet executive committee decided to seize the 
monastery’s wealth, discredit the Orthodox Church and close down the ‘Union for the 
Defence of Religion and the Church’ which was affiliated to the monastery.
32 On 29 
October the provincial Izvestiia reported that the federation of Anarchists from 
Petrozavodsk accompanied by representatives of the provincial Cheka, the district Cheka 
and the chairman of the local kombed had made an inspection of the monastery on 22 
October. Over the next two days a Red Army unit under the control of the provincial 
Cheka confiscated the monastery’s valuables and property and arrested a number of 
clergymen on 23 October.
33 However, during the searches and confiscations the Chekists 
and Red Army men humiliated the monks by insulting their religious beliefs: they refused 
to remove their caps; barked out orders; got drunk on the monastery’s wine; and even 
opened up a shrine containing the remains of St. Aleksandr. According to a member of the 
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All-Russian Synod the Red Army men then invented a story, which was later published in 
the newspapers, that inside the shrine was a wax doll.
34 Atrocities followed: five of the 
clergymen arrested previously on 23 October were shot on the night of the 11/12 
November by the Olonets district Cheka, including the monastery’s father superior, 
Archimandrite Evgenii.
35 
  
Understanding this act is troublesome because the history of the Olonets district 
Cheka before and after these executions shows that, like the provincial Cheka, executions 
were limited and arrests and fines were more common. However, it appears to have been a 
shock measure that bypassed the Left SR dominated district executive committee which 
had refused to send representatives to the Olonets provincial soviet revolutionary executive 
committee and resisted the introduction of the kombedy and harvest registration (see 
Chapter 4). According to the provincial Cheka’s report the executions carried out by the 
Olonets district Cheka occurred with the sanction of the provincial Cheka and the 
provincial soviet revolutionary executive committee.
36 The shootings were therefore an 
extreme but intentional act perpetrated by the district Cheka with pressure and support 
from the provincial Cheka and provincial revolutionary executive committee to gain 
control in a longer standing feud with the monastery in a district where the Left SRs still 
dominated and where the Olonets district soviet executive committee was keen to curb the 
actions of the Cheka (see the Timofeev affair in Chapter 4).
37   
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Aleksandr. Vdovitsyna, “Aleksandro-Svirskii Monastyr’” in Urok Istorii Daet Arckhiv. 105. A commission 
set up on 19 December 1918 by the presidium of the Soviet of Commissars of the Northern Region to 
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35 Vdovitsyna, “Aleksandro-Svirskii Monastyr’” in Urok Istorii Daet Arckhiv. 99-100. 
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Chekist malpractice and the need for reform 
The Cheka in Karelia did not resort to wide scale executions in the last quarter of 1918 but 
it was corrupt, unruly and disorganised and change was required to resolve these 
deficiencies. In Chapter 4 we saw how the unclear boundaries of the Cheka’s authority in 
Olonets district (the Timofeev affair) led to clashes with the soviets and its institutions. A 
similar style conflict between the Cheka and the soviets overlapped the Timofeev affair 
and involved the chairman of the Olonets provincial Cheka I.V. Elpedinskii. On 9 August 
1918 Elpedinskii and another Chekist went to Vidlitskaia parish in Olonets district, got 
drunk, carried out searches in the local ironworks factory and then assaulted some local 
officials and stole their money.
38 The Elpedinskii case is important because it underlined 
the unclear lines of the Cheka’s authority in relation to the soviets. This became apparent at 
the provincial conference of district Chekas when Elpedinskii’s fellow Chekists believed 
they had the right to overrule the soviets and the party in order to keep the provincial 
Cheka chairman in his position, which they indeed managed to do for a short time. 
 
On 17 August the Olonets provincial revolutionary executive committee decided to 
act against the unruly Elpedinskii and recommended that a new chairman, I.I. Terukov, a 
native of Petrozavodsk, be appointed the chair of the Olonets provincial Cheka. However, 
by supporting Terukov’s nomination to the chairmanship of the provincial Cheka, the 
executive committee brought itself into conflict with the Cheka which did not support the 
move. The executive committee’s support for Terukov also complicated matters because 
his appointment was only a recommendation and Elpedinskii still officially remained 
chairman. The provincial Cheka at its session of 20 August discussed the ‘dual authority in 
                                                 
38 NARK, f.P-2, op.1, d.9, l.2. Born in 1887 Ivan Elpedinskii served in the Baltic fleet between 1908 and 
1909 before being discharged for health reasons. He became a member of the Bolshevik party in 1911 and 
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the Cheka’ and decided ‘to take all matters into our own hands and not to permit outside 
interference’ but ‘to work under the supervision of the provincial executive committee.’ In 
other words the provincial Cheka agreed that the executive committee could check up on it 
but not tell it what to do. Elpedinskii remained the chairman of the provincial Cheka while 
Terukov was appointed the head of the provincial Cheka’s department for combating 
counter-revolution.
39 
 
However, when Elpedinskii’s deeds in Vidlitskaia parish came to light at a session 
of the Petrozavodsk Country Bolshevik Party Committee on 29 August it condemned his 
actions. The party committee’s reaction was uncompromising: Elpedinskii’s behaviour was 
described as ‘disgraceful’ and it was proposed to dismiss him from all his elected positions 
and exclude him from the party.
40 Clearly, this mirrored the stance taken by the provincial 
revolutionary executive committee but also represented further Bolshevik party resistance 
towards the Cheka because not all members of the Petrozavodsk County Bolshevik Party 
Committee presidium sat on the provincial revolutionary executive committee in the 
summer of 1918.
41 On 30 August the provincial revolutionary executive committee 
restated its decision to remove Elpedinskii from all elected posts, including that as 
chairman of the provincial Cheka.
42 Ivan Terukov was then appointed temporary head of 
the provincial Cheka which, on 11 September, was made permanent.
43 However, having 
heard a statement from Elpedinskii himself, the Petrozavodsk County Bolshevik Party 
Committee backtracked from its original decision when it met on 14
 September because it 
believed that the statement cast a different light on the incident. What exactly was within 
Elpedinskii’s statement is not known but his appeal to review his case was accepted out of 
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respect for his previous work within local government
44 and ‘the current difficult time for 
the revolution’, presumably reference to the threat of the Allies and the recent declaration 
of the Red Terror on 5 September. As a result, the party committee decided to only 
temporarily exclude Elpedinskii and up to the conclusion of the investigation into the affair 
allow him to continue to work in soviet institutions.
45 
 
Elpedinskii’s position as chairman of the provincial Cheka was supported by his 
fellow Chekists at the first Olonets provincial conference of district Chekas. On 17 
September Cheka delegates stressed that the charges against him were ‘groundless’, it was 
‘the wish of the bourgeoisie to wrest him from the ranks of the proletariat’, ‘an artful ruse 
by counter-revolutionaries’ and that the County Bolshevik Party Committee had made a 
mistake and acted too hastily in supporting these accusations. The conference decided 
unanimously to sanction Elpedinskii’s rehabilitation, asked him to continue his work in the 
provincial Cheka and to work in soviet institutions.
46 Terukov’s chairmanship of the 
provincial Cheka lasted less than two weeks and Elpedinskii was reinstated. Terukov 
remained in the provincial Cheka and was appointed the Cheka’s head of staff for 
employees on 24 September.
47 Elpedinskii had therefore won the backing of his fellow 
Chekists and eventually the local party committee to remain provincial chairman of the 
Cheka, in contrast to the wishes of the provincial revolutionary executive committee. But 
re-elections to the Olonets provincial Cheka in early October (see below) meant that his 
victory was short lived and he was replaced.
48 
                                                 
44 At the First Olonets Provincial Bolshevik Party Conference, the Bolshevik commissar for post and 
telegraphs Ia.F. Igoshkin commended Elpedinskii. The Union for Post and Telegraphs initially refused to 
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and telegraph workers. At the Second Olonets Provincial Bolshevik Party Conference Igoshkin also 
commented that Elpedinskii had played an integral role in establishing a party cell in Suna, Petrozavodsk 
district. Mashezerskii and Slavin, Bor’ba. 502; 527.  
45 RGASPI, f.67, op.1, d.69, l.36; NARK, f.R-28, op.1, d.17, l.44. 
46 NARK, f.R-411, op.1, d.1, l.15-15ob. 
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The Elpedinskii affair is not only a good example of why the Olonets provincial 
Cheka was reformed through re-elections in October 1918 but it highlights an important 
point in the development of local power relations after the exit of the Left SRs from the 
provincial executive committee. Against those local Bolsheviks in the Cheka who 
supported this institution’s autonomy, other Bolsheviks struggled to preserve the authority 
of the soviet executive committees which to them were, in one historian’s words: ‘the 
pinnacle of revolutionary power.’
49 The Vecheka’s over-lordship was not welcomed by 
local Bolsheviks who opposed the autonomy of the Cheka which had been encouraged by 
unclear statements from Moscow. Dzerzhinsky’s circular telegram from 29 August 
announced that the Chekas should be in ‘close contact…with all local organs of soviet 
authority’ but at the same time:
50 
  
the Chekas are unquestionably autonomous in their own work and must carry out 
implicitly all orders issued by the Vecheka, the highest organ to which they are 
subordinated. The Chekas are only accountable to the soviets, but in no 
circumstances are the soviets or any of its departments to countermand or suspend 
the orders of the Chekas issued from the Vecheka. 
     
As Leggett has pointed out, this telegram seemed to undermine the authority of the 
executive committees.
51 In short local Chekas needed only to concern themselves with 
their own institution’s ruling body and their interpretation of its orders. As indicated at the 
Olonets provincial conference of district Chekas statements like Dzerzhinsky’s struck a 
chord with local Chekists who supported their own comrades and overruled the opposition 
of the provincial executive committee and the Petrozavodsk County Bolshevik party 
committee. For local Chekists the Chekas were, as Dzerzhinsky underlined above, 
‘autonomous in their own work’. 
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Reforming the Cheka 
It was clear from the point of view of the local soviets that something had to be done to 
curb the autonomy of the Cheka and the encouragement this body received from above. 
The introduction of the Red Terror decree, discussed above, further encouraged local 
Chekas to make arrests, so much so that the provincial and Murmansk railroad Chekas 
came into conflict with one another.
52 On 19 September a board (kollegiia) member of the 
People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs, V.A. Tikhomirnov, sent a circular telegram to 
all provinces and districts which reflected the debates which were going on in the capital 
surrounding the Cheka and the soviets. He stated that: ‘The Vecheka insists upon the 
independent existence of the local Chekas’ but ‘we [The People’s Commissariat for 
Internal Affairs] consider it necessary to incorporate them as government subdivisions.’
53 
Leaders of the provincial soviet in Petrozavodsk were also keen to put a stop to the 
arbitrary nature of the cheka and resolved on 20 September to relay Tikhomirov’s telegram 
by informing the districts that the Chekas were divisions or sub-divisions attached to the 
soviets and subordinated to them, i.e. the provincial Cheka to the provincial executive 
committee and the district Chekas to the district executive committees.
54 
  
The following month, on 5 October, Petrozavodsk received another circular 
telegram from Tikhomirnov which blamed the soviets for the arbitrary nature of the Red 
Terror:
55  
 
…a considerable majority of soviets have not taken the appropriate decisive 
measures in securing the rear of our armies from all possible provocative 
statements and counter-revolutionary conspiracies and a few other soviets, not 
infrequently, have directed the red terror not against the eminent bourgeoisie and 
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old authorities but against the petty bourgeoisie and the philistinism of the 
intelligentsia (intelligentsia obyvatel’shchiny).   
 
The telegram failed to take into account the contradictory statements that were 
coming from the capital concerning the independence of the Chekas but asked all 
provincial executive committees to clarify for the local soviets the type of hostage to be 
taken and that the ‘petty bourgeoisie’ could be released if the soviets forced them to work 
in labour companies (trudovye roty).
56 The Olonets provincial revolutionary executive 
committee recognised the ‘tactless activity’ of its provincial Cheka at this time and at one 
of its sessions on 8 October decided to reorganise the institution and carry out new 
elections to the provincial Cheka. The resolution passed by the committee stressed that 
new Cheka members should only be elected from experienced party workers and that 
Chekas were subordinate to the revolutionary executive committee and were to act in close 
communication with the department of soviet administration and the department of 
justice.
57  
 
This re-organisation of the provincial Cheka saw the Latvian Oskar Kristianovich 
Kanter appointed Olonets province’s new Cheka chairman. Born into a peasant family in 
Riga on 10 April 1885, Kanter finished four years of schooling at the Riga town 
gymnasium and in 1903 joined the Bolshevik party. In 1908 he was arrested and sentenced 
to four years penal servitude before being exiled to Karelia from 1914-1917. From 
September 1917 to February 1918 Kanter served as the secretary of a local regional council 
(uprava) in Petrograd province and in April 1918 was sent from the former capital to 
Olonets province to help organise local party organs and soviets.
58 Kanter’s appointment 
marked a significant turning point in the history of the provincial Cheka. As we shall see 
below and in Chapter 8, following his appointment the provincial Cheka progressively 
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operated less chaotically. He was the ideal person for his new position: he was young; a 
long standing member of the Bolshevik party; educated; an experienced revolutionary and 
organiser; and familiar with the region. It is testimony to his success as chairman of the 
Olonets provincial Cheka that he held the post for over two years (until 10 December 1920) 
and was elected to the joint presidium of the Karelian Labour Commune and Olonets 
provincial executive committee in August 1920.
59 
 
Kanter’s task was a difficult one; he faced a number of problems in running the 
provincial Cheka and it would take time to stamp his authority on the institution. 
Principally he had to: restore order to a hitherto unruly organisation while continuing its 
investigations; find reliable cadres to work in the Cheka; eliminate individual Chekist 
malpractice; and build a better relationship between different state agencies. However his 
work was hindered from the outset because of the chaotic state in which he found the 
Cheka. For one thing, the provincial revolutionary executive refused to hand over its 
records to the newly elected staff.
60 This would suggest that the Cheka’s former members 
had something to hide. One such incident which may have influenced this decision 
involved two Chekists who were accused by the provincial Cheka of abusing their position 
at a session on 1 October 1918. They arrived drunk at Petrozavodsk prison and without 
permission took a prisoner who had been arrested as a former gendarme into their vehicle 
to the outskirts of the town to shoot him. However, while en route the prisoner jumped 
from the moving vehicle and vanished without a trace. By April 1919 he had still not been 
found.
61 
 
                                                 
59 Ibid. For the rest of his impressive and eventful career see: Ibid 205-208.  
60 NARK, f.P-2, op.1, d.14, l.67. 
61 NARK, f.P-2, op.1, d.9, l.10; f.P-4, op.1, d.17, l.13. One of the guilty Chekists was excluded from the party 
indefinitely and deprived of the right to work in the soviets. The other was fully rehabilitated and allowed to 
continue working in soviet institutions because of his previous work in the party and soviets.    213 
Despite the re-election of the provincial Cheka disorganisation and abuses of 
authority within this body continued but, fairly quickly after Kanter’s appointment, the 
Cheka was operating in a relatively more structured manner and members began to be 
disciplined for their crimes. Between the 31 October and 4 November a member of the 
provincial Cheka, Vasilii Bogdanov, along with three provincial Cheka employees carried 
out a general search of the merchants situated in the village of Ladva, Petrozavodsk district, 
and used torture in order to locate their valuables. Furthermore, on the way back to 
Petrozavodsk some of the requisitioned goods were taken to the flat of one of Bogdanov’s 
collaborators and therefore did not find its way to the provincial Cheka. However, by 
chance the commissar for the defence of the town came across the individuals at the 
moment they were sharing out the requisitioned goods and all four were arrested. Initially 
the provincial Cheka wished to execute the individuals but after a session of the provincial 
executive committee the sentences were reduced to imprisonment and compulsory labour 
on the basis that the individuals were young (Bogdanov was 19 years old) and under 
extreme strain due to their work in the Cheka. Bogdanov received seven years and on 18 
December, at a session of the Olonets provincial Bolshevik party committee, he was 
excluded from the party along with his associates.
62    
 
Such malpractices by individual Chekists can be attributed to the fact that because 
of its responsibilities the Cheka was different than other Soviet agencies. It was an internal 
security/political police force which operated under an officially declared Red Terror and 
was trusted to investigate and root out counter-revolution. Because the lines of the Chekas’ 
authority in relation to the soviets was far from clear, it is perhaps not surprising that the 
Cheka attracted careerists or criminal elements. The cheka lacked both members who 
would not tarnish the name of the soviets through malpractice and administratively capable 
individuals. This inevitably placed an increased burden on tried and tested administrators 
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and generated competition between institutions for them. On 25 November Kanter 
complained to the Petrozavodsk County Bolshevik party committee, which two days 
previously had appointed the bookkeeper of the provincial Cheka as secretary of the 
revolutionary tribunal. Kanter explained that the bookkeeper’s departure would have a 
considerable effect on the Cheka’s accounts and that he was irreplaceable.
63  
 
Because of the lack of reliable personnel it was common for individuals to take up 
more than one responsible post and to sit on several committees. For example, during the 
civil war Oskar Kanter was a member and secretary of the Olonets provincial executive 
committee, chairman of the provincial Cheka, a member of the provincial military 
revolutionary committee and the Red Army committee of assistance.
64 He was not the only 
Chekist taking up a number of positions within the provincial authorities. Kanter wrote to 
the agitation-propaganda department attached to the local Bolshevik party committee on 24 
December to complain about the overwork of one of the Cheka department’s members, 
K.A. Luzgin, who had recently been appointed to the agitation-propaganda department. He 
explained that Luzgin worked for ten hours a day as an investigator within the Cheka’s 
department for combating counter-revolution and malfeasance (prestuplenie po dolzhnosti) 
while in his free time worked in another commission attached to the revolutionary tribunal. 
As a result, Kanter asked the agitation-propaganda department to free Luzgin from his 
duties for the general benefit of the Cheka.
65 
 
A lack of capable administrators was also reflected in the severe lack of 
organisation, including the most basic of clerical tasks, within the provincial Cheka. A 
report compiled by an auditing committee at the end of March 1919 into the provincial 
Cheka’s department for the struggle with counter-revolution and malfeasance found that no 
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record of those arrested had been made, there was no record of a weapons registration, lists 
of the local bourgeoisie and former officers or even the addresses of employees and 
workers working in soviet institutions for 1918 or 1919.
66 Furthermore, journal entries for 
the activities of the department either did not exist or were in complete disorder. For 
example, the list of those arrested only contained the name of the individual but detailed 
nothing about when they were due for release or how long they had been imprisoned for. 
In order to find this out one had to actually travel to the prison and question the official in 
charge. Paperwork was left untied, unstamped with the Cheka’s seal and some remained 
unsigned by the person responsible. To add to the confusion many orders were also left 
undated and some distributed under various individuals’ signatures from the office 
secretary to the filing clerk. Over 100 important orders and documents, such as the minutes 
of the session from the 11 September which resolved to execute four individuals on 13 
September (see above), could not be found by the auditing commission.
67          
 
Because entry into the Cheka was prohibited for those in society who were targeted 
by the revolution such as members of the intelligentsia, merchants and bureaucrats 
(precisely those who were likely to have a higher level of education), the provincial Cheka 
came to rely on workers and Bolshevik party members or sympathisers which increased 
the illiteracy rates of its cadres.
68 Inevitably the Cheka attracted some careerists and 
criminal elements although, beginning with the appointment of Kanter, the provincial 
executive committee and the local Bolshevik party committee were beginning to pay more 
attention to the quality of the cheka’s members. At a session of the Second Olonets 
Provincial Bolshevik Party Conference on 12 December a party member warned against 
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the influx of ‘improper elements’ into the party while another proposed the ‘shadowing’ 
(slezhka) of Chekas for ‘ethical behaviour considerations.’
69   
 
There were also bloody incidents in the districts after the reorganisation of the 
Cheka. For instance in Olonets district after the dismissal of the Left SRs from the district 
executive committee in mid-November 1918, the suppression of a peasant rebellion in 
December was notably bloodier. Some of the rebels managed to escape to Finland but two 
were shot on the spot while others were caught and arrested.
70 However, proper procedures 
were followed. On the 10 January the chairman of the Olonets district Cheka, Pavel 
Chigar’kov, informed the Olonets provincial executive committee that attempts were made 
on the lives of local officials by the rebels and asked for permission to carry out executions. 
In response the executive committee appealed to the provincial Cheka: ‘to urgently send a 
few reliable members to Olonets town having given them wide plenary powers to 
investigate this affair. If it is necessary take the most drastic measures.’
71 Such measures 
were taken; at one of its sessions on 16 January 1919 the Olonets district Cheka decided to 
execute a further six leaders involved in the rebellion. Furthermore, the eleven remaining 
leaders who had escaped were declared outlaws and if discovered the population was given 
an open invitation to shoot them.
72 
 
In mid-January 1919 the Olonets district Cheka was also disciplining its members 
for malpractice and acted with an element of responsibility. On 16 January the case of a 
Cheka commissar from Olonets district, V. Matsnev, was discussed at a district Cheka 
session. Matsnev had been under arrest for a short time for illegally confiscating 
timepieces during the search of the Nikiforovskii monastery. The Cheka resolved that the 
short spell of imprisonment was a satisfactory punishment, the case was discontinued and 
                                                 
69 Izvestiia Olonetskogo Gubernskogo Soveta, 14 December 1918. 
70 Korablev, et al., Istoriia Karelii. 393; NARK, f.R-29, op.1, d.175, l.1; NARK, f.P-13, op.2, d.7, l.3.   
71 GARF, f.R-393, op.13, d.249, l.7-8. 
72 NARK, f.P-13, op.2, d.7, l.3; Olonetskaia Kommuna, 22 January 1919.   217 
the gathering resolved to return the timepieces to the monastery.
73 When the Pudozh Cheka 
faced a short lived military mutiny at the end of 1918, it too acted in conjunction with the 
higher authorities. On 10 December the chairman of the Pudozh Cheka, O.M. Shishov, 
withheld cigarettes to be distributed to mobilised Red Army troops and incited a short-
lived mutiny: Shishov was briefly detained and the following day two Red Army men were 
killed and one injured for attempting to run away. Restoring order, a further 22 Red Army 
men were arrested; 12 were soon released but 10 were sent to the provincial Cheka.
74 Later 
when the Pudozh district Cheka acted without authority it received a rebuke from the 
provincial Cheka for the execution of four prisoners in early January without provincial 
approval.
75 
 
An end to political terror 
Disciplining and changing the structure of the Cheka in Karelia was complemented at the 
end of 1918 by Lenin’s announcement of a political amnesty, firstly for factions of the 
Menshevik party and then later for the SR party. The majority of local Bolsheviks reacted 
positively to this move but it was not the first time the local Bolsheviks hailed the arrival 
of former political adversaries to the ranks of the party. In September 1918 15 members of 
the Left Menshevik Internationalists, including their leader L.V. Nikol’skii, joined the 
Bolshevik party who welcomed the move. Under the title ‘A moral victory’ the Olonets 
provincial Izvestiia reported on 24 September that the victory of the Bolshevik forces at 
Kazan had been complemented by a victory for the ideas of communism in Petrozavodsk; 
the Left Menshevik Internationalists disbanded and placed all their funds at the disposal of 
the Bolsheviks. The acquisition of 15 members of the Left Menshevik Internationalist 
party was regarded as a moment of triumph and the newspaper report described Nikol’skii 
as ‘one of our most outstanding public figures’.
76 
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During discussions at the Second Olonets Provincial Bolshevik Party Conference 
(10-13 December 1918), local Bolshevik leaders welcomed new capable political 
administrators to compensate for the shortage of Bolshevik party cadres. Yet, there was no 
consensus between local Bolsheviks over the entrance of former political opponents into 
the party. In response to protests against the new soft-line approach towards the 
Mensheviks and SRs and calls for the continuation of the Red Terror another party member, 
A.F. Kopnin, stated his belief that the Mensheviks’ and SRs’ entry into Bolshevik 
institutions should be accepted but strictly regulated. He also supported the conciliatory 
move towards other socialist parties because of the need for more workers throughout the 
region and because the departure of communists to the front would leave the localities 
considerably weakened. The Olonets provincial revolutionary executive committee 
chairman, Petr Anokhin, also supported the Leninist stance:
77   
 
…when the stray Marxist-Mensheviks seek to make contact with us we 
should not be vindictive because in the past they were our brothers. Nor will we 
cast off the petty bourgeois ranks of the peasantry who have been inspired by the 
ideas of communism. To be afraid of them means not to believe in our own moral 
strength which is becoming stronger all the time.   
 
After Anokhin’s speech Elena Stasova supported Lenin’s olive branch to the other socialist 
parties and rejected the continuation of terror politics. The conference passed this 
resolution with three votes against it and six abstentions.
78 The policy seemed to work. A 
report from Lizhma station at the December party conference noted that a small number of 
Left SRs, who had dominated this locality up to August 1918, entered the local Bolshevik 
party organisation alongside a few Mensheviks.
79 However, conciliation was always kept 
within strict limits. At the end of the year the Bolsheviks had flexed their authority in the 
provincial press when they came into conflict with a group of journalists in December over 
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the balance of views being reported in the local Izvestiia concerning the Soviet regime.
80 
Five days later the Bolsheviks merged Izvestiia with two other local newspapers and 
renamed it Olonetskaia Kommuna. Its three man editorial board were all Bolshevik party 
members.
81  
 
Conclusion 
The above chapter has shown the inroads the Bolsheviks made into consolidating their 
regime and the role played by the reorganisation of the provincial Cheka. The Red Terror, 
which was perpetrated moderately in Karelia in terms of the number of executions carried 
out, gave local Bolsheviks a lever of control to strengthen the party’s position while the 
election of a new provincial Cheka chaired by Oskar Kanter, despite continued sporadic 
malpractice, meant a relatively better organised and orderly Cheka was evolving by the 
beginning of 1919. As we have seen in the previous chapter, at the end of 1918 the Second 
Olonets Provincial Bolshevik Party Conference took place and pointed to some of the key 
principles which they believed would help strengthen the party’s position. Chief amongst 
these were the need for stricter discipline amongst members. The above chapter has 
suggested that stricter discipline was to some extent already under way with the election of 
a new provincial Cheka and from this point clashes with the soviets, which had been a 
prominent feature of the Cheka’s activities until this time, began to disappear. Furthermore, 
a general political amnesty to the Bolsheviks’ former political opponents was receptive in 
Petrozavodsk and served to bolster the administrative capabilities of the local Soviet 
regime.  
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Nevertheless, as the preceding chapters have shown, by the beginning of 1919, 
although the Bolshevik party had reformed the provincial Cheka and reinforced its political 
position in Petrozavodsk, it still struggled to exert control over the districts because of the 
incessant food shortages and a lack of reliable cadres to run government institutions. The 
intrusion of the kombedy and the Red Army in the countryside had also contributed to the 
outbreak of peasant rebellion at the end of 1918 and a decline in the prestige of the Soviet 
regime. The Bolsheviks needed to improve the food supply situation and build stronger 
links to the countryside but as we will see in the next chapter this was easier said than done. 
By the spring and summer of 1919 the party faced its most intense military crisis when the 
Allies and White Finns attacked simultaneously and peasant rebellion once again erupted 
in the Zaonezh’e peninsula. 
   196 
Chapter 6 
Consolidating Power (II): The Role of the Cheka, August-December 1918 
This chapter will focus on the last four to five months of 1918 and show that despite 
continuing chaos there were signs that the Bolsheviks were laying further foundations to 
tighten their control over the Karelian districts. One sign came in the form of the 
declaration of the Red Terror by the Bolshevik government on 5 September 1918. From 
this point onwards repression became an official instrument of governance that the 
Bolsheviks could use to consolidate and expand their influence. A study of Karelia 
suggests that the intensity of the Red Terror outside the capital depended on local 
conditions and so the unruly period of the Cheka, in the few months after the declaration of 
the terror decree, was extreme in some instances but short in duration. However, the Cheka 
in Karelia was notably undisciplined and so the Bolsheviks took “one step forward” by 
reforming it. In early October 1918 a new provincial Cheka was elected and a more unruly 
Cheka chairman was replaced with a more disciplined appointment, Oskar K. Kanter. This 
reform of the Cheka proved an essential prerequisite for the consolidation of Bolshevik 
rule and its origins go back to the summer of 1918. From this time it is possible to trace the 
malpractice which individual Chekists were involved in and how this was gradually 
stamped out under Kanter’s chairmanship of the provincial Cheka.  
 
The introduction of the Red Terror 
On 5 September 1918 Sovnarkom issued its declaration of the Red Terror which came in 
the wake of the assassination of Mikhail Uritskii, the head of the Petrograd Cheka, and the 
attempt on Lenin’s life on 30 August. It gave increased responsibility to the Vecheka and 
its subordinate branches to protect the Soviet regime by arresting and executing class 
enemies and all individuals involved in counter-revolutionary organisations, plots or 
rebellions. In short, the right to apply summary justice was given to the Cheka.
1 Largely 
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because of the influential position of the Left SRs in the local Left SR-Bolshevik alliance 
the role of the Cheka was limited in Karelia and even after the removal of the Left SRs 
from the Olonets provincial soviet executive committee in July there was no dramatic 
change of policy. The sources suggest that the Red Terror in Petrozavodsk did not explode 
into a fury of violence, rather, local Bolsheviks pursued terror as a form of governance and 
control but it was applied ‘moderately.’  Without going into the intricacies of what 
constitutes terror it is enough to state that the term ‘moderate’ is used here not to trivialise 
the horrific nature of the Red Terror but to stress that the evidence for Karelia indicates 
that in approximately the last quarter of 1918 the number of executions carried out by the 
Cheka remained relatively low.
2 A selected number of executions took place against 
individuals defined by the Bolsheviks as the enemies of the new Soviet state, i.e. former 
police officials, former tsarist army officers, priests and rebels who took up arms. However 
the threat of executions, investigations, arrests and fines and the subsequent intimidation 
caused by this through publication in the local press were the more common features of the 
state’s repressive system in Karelia at this time.  
 
Shortly before the Red Terror became official Petrozavodsk received a telegram 
from G.I. Petrovskii, the People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs, circulated to all soviets 
on 3 September, about the introduction of revolutionary terror on a nationwide scale. 
Petrovskii called for an intensification of the terror: all Right SRs were to be arrested; 
hostages were to be taken from amongst the bourgeoisie and former tsarist officers; and 
mass shootings were to be applied at the least sign of resistance from the White Guards. 
Regarding the latter point the telegram stressed: ‘Local provincial executive committees 
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must display special initiative in this respect.’
3 Therefore the terror had been introduced 
and encouraged centrally but the decree was clearly reliant on the interpretation and 
implementation of local Bolsheviks. On 4 September the Petrozavodsk County Bolshevik 
Party Committee discussed the implementation of the Red Terror and proposed to the 
provincial revolutionary executive committee to: 1) execute all those arrested and guilty of 
counter-revolutionary activity; 2) impose a 500,000 rouble levy (kontributsiia) on the 
bourgeoisie and make its payment compulsory and attached to the threat of execution if it 
was not paid within a week;
4 3) introduce corresponding class based rations; 4) mobilise 
the bourgeoisie for community service; 5) discharge all Right SRs from their working 
posts.
5 Subsequently, on 9 September, the provincial revolutionary executive committee 
also resolved to distribute Petrovskii’s telegram to all district and parish soviets for their 
information and the Red Terror’s implementation.
6 At the same time the revolutionary 
executive committee assigned the provincial Bolshevik party committee specific rights 
over the detention of prisoners: all arrested White Guards and hostages could only be 
released upon the decision of the Petrozavodsk County Bolshevik party committee.
7 
 
On 5 September the Petrozavodsk town soviet also decided to implement the Red 
Terror decree. It unanimously agreed to introduce Petrovskii’s order, to arrest all Right 
SRs in Petrozavodsk, arrest several representatives of the bourgeoisie and a number of 
officers and hold them as hostages.
8 Shortly thereafter a list was composed and 18 so 
called bourgeois individuals and officers were arrested. Amongst those imprisoned were 
people who belonged to groups targeted as the Bolshevik revolution’s main enemies: the 
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chairman of the centre SRs G.I. Prokhorov; two Right SRs; a former member of the town 
duma who had previously been affiliated to the Kadets; a priest; and three officers.
9 On 7 
September the Petrozavodsk town soviet decided that only 20 hostages should be detained 
at any one time and only for a period of two weeks, after which time a second group of 
people would be identified for arrest upon the release of the first group.
10 On the same day, 
the Cheka announced to the citizens of Petrozavodsk in the provincial Izvestiia that they 
had taken hostages and the first attempt by anyone to take action against the soviets or 
soviet workers would result in the execution of all the hostages.
11 
 
Shortly after this announcement further threats were issued by the Cheka and 
published in the press to act as a deterrent. On 17 September the provincial Cheka 
announced that there had been an attempt to take the life of the Bolshevik ‘extraordinary 
commissar’ in the region, S.P. Natsarenus. The newspaper announcement reported that any 
repeat attempt against Natsarenus or any other soviet worker would result in the immediate 
execution of all hostages in prison at that time.
12 
 
  There is little evidence to suggest that immediately prior to or following the 
declaration of the Red Terror ‘unreserved mass shootings’ took place in Karelia as 
Petrovskii had encouraged in the face of White resistance. The actual targets of the Cheka 
were leading figures within the Left SRs. At the start of October Ivan Balashov, the head 
of the local Left SR party and still a member of the Petrozavodsk town soviet, was arrested 
and held for two weeks without any charges being brought against him.
13 The Left SR 
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party tried to drum up some support at the Aleksandrovsk munitions factory on the eve of 
the anniversary of the October revolution but events in Petrograd, at roughly the same time, 
gave local Bolsheviks the perfect opportunity to further undermine all remaining Left SRs 
in Petrozavodsk. Following the failed rebellion on 14 October by sailors of the Second 
Baltic Fleet Detachment, who were sympathetic and strongly influenced by the Left SRs, 
the Olonets provincial revolutionary executive committee, on 29 November, approved the 
decision taken by the provincial Cheka to close down the local Left SR party committee.
14 
On 27 November the provincial Cheka had searched the Left SRs’ party headquarters, 
removed its literature and all other items and then sealed off the premises. In the 
newspaper report which detailed the search the Left SRs were demonised by the 
Bolsheviks, thus mirroring the Petrograd Bolsheviks’ stance following the Baltic Fleet 
sailors’ rising. The report described the local Left SRs as ‘turning white’ and ‘political 
minors’.
15 
 
The primary reason for the relative moderation of the provincial Cheka was the 
different trajectory of the White movement in the north than for example, in the south 
where a host of former tsarist army officers had flocked to form the ‘Volunteer Army’ in 
early 1918.
16 In Petrozavodsk, after the skirmishes with the White Finns in the spring of 
1918, the Bolsheviks did not have to worry about being attacked by a White Army because 
such a force did not yet exist in any sizeable form. It was not until after the Armistice in 
November 1918 that the Allies and the Russian White Army issued a general mobilisation 
order in the zones occupied by them.
17 In his memoirs General Maynard recalled that in 
October 1918:
18 
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I had failed to secure more than a handful of Russian recruits; and though 
mobilization was spoken of, the population was small, and most the men of military 
age were required for work on the railway and at the various posts. Thus, before a 
Russian army of any material assistance to me could be built up, it would be 
necessary to extend the area from which recruits could be drawn.  
 
The Allied forces therefore did include a small contingent of mobilised Russian troops by 
autumn 1918 and, of course, it was the Allies who posed the greatest military threat to the 
Bolsheviks, but they did not make any major advance south of Soroka until mid-February 
1919 when they defeated the Red Army at Segezha. 
 
Therefore the civil war front in Karelia as it existed at the time of the introduction 
of the Red Terror was not particularly threatening and this may explain why executions 
appear to have remained few. However, the proximity of the Allies and the potential for 
the growth of a White Army in Murmansk did prompt mass arrests in Petrozavodsk. 
According to Allied intelligence reports, by the end of August 1918 many arrests among 
officers and educated classes had been made in the town.
19 Furthermore, at the Cheka 
conference of the Northern Region in Petrograd in October 1918 a member of the Olonets 
provincial cheka, N.N. Dorofeev, also stated that upon its creation the provincial Cheka’s 
attention was immediately drawn towards former officers, a number of whom were 
arrested but released upon further investigation.
20 Admittedly shootings did take place: on 
13 September three military officers and a policeman were shot by the provincial Cheka.
21 
But in general the Olonets provincial Cheka arrested and detained suspects rather than 
carry out a mass of executions. The head of the Murmansk railroad Cheka explained at the 
Cheka conference of the Northern Region in October that his Cheka had arrested 260 
officers although ‘many were released’. A total of nine individuals were executed.
22  
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However, if the Cheka was relatively moderate in carrying out executions it was 
not immune from the spy psychosis inherent in any security force. The presence of the 
Allies in particular fuelled the suspicions of the Cheka and the hunt for spies formed a 
significant part of the institution’s investigatory work. On 15 October, at the opening day 
of the conference of the Northern Region Chekas, the Murmansk railroad Cheka chairman 
remarked that his Cheka had uncovered ‘a few spy organisations.’
23 One such ‘spy 
organisation’ involved two members of the Murmansk railroad military soviet, A.A. 
Khoroshevskii and I.F. Pruss and the head of defence for the Murmansk railroad, a Captain 
Orlov. The Cheka arrested all three men on 7 October for alleged ‘criminal dealings with 
the Anglo-French.’
24 The arrested individuals were accused of passing important military 
secrets to the Allies and therefore assisting their southern advance. Suggesting an element 
of cooperation within the Cheka hierarchy, members of the Vecheka from Petrograd 
arrived especially to investigate the case and assist the members of the Murmansk railroad 
and provincial Chekas.
25 How the investigation turned out is not known but Pruss and 
Orlov were deemed suspicious enough to be escorted to Moscow on 12 October while 
Khoroshevskii was released.
26  
 
Little more is known of the affair but Allied intelligence suggests that Captain 
Orlov was innocent and he was not working for them. Indeed, as the Allies understood it, 
Orlov had been arrested for communicating with the Germans.
27 The arrest of Orlov was 
also met with protests at a meeting of some of the staff (kollektiv sluzhashchikh) who 
worked under him for the defence of the Murmansk railroad. At a gathering on 11 October 
these employees expressed their surprise and disappointment at Orlov’s arrest. They 
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believed it ‘improbable’ that he was involved in any kind of counter-revolutionary activity 
because he was in regular contact with the administrative personnel for the defence of the 
railway line and all his orders, it appeared to them, were based solely on strengthening 
Soviet authority in the region. At some point in the recent past Orlov had himself been 
responsible for rooting out espionage in the region and anyone suspected of espionage was 
arrested on Orlov’s orders and handed over to the provincial Cheka. Orlov’s work record 
convinced the gathering that his arrest was ‘malicious fabrication by someone who thought 
ill of Orlov.’ Consequently the employees for the defence of the Murmansk railroad 
appealed to the investigatory commission responsible for Orlov’s case to free Orlov.
28  
 
At the Second Olonets Provincial Bolshevik Party Conference the Orlov case arose 
once more, this time casting doubt over Orlov’s innocence; a party representative 
announced that Orlov along with a few others was sympathetic towards the English.
29 It 
would seem he was arrested because of his status as a former tsarist officer, in charge of 
military units and combating espionage, which raised suspicions on the part of the Cheka 
and contributed to his arrest and subsequent transfer to Moscow. Orlov had also been 
involved in communications with the Allies when that was Soviet policy. He had 
communicated with the English Admiral Kemp in Murmansk at the end of June or early 
July concerning negotiations between S.P. Natsarenus and the Allies.
30 Furthermore, Orlov 
was outspoken, he had previously been arrested but bailed in mid-August for angrily 
protesting the arrest of one of his colleagues at the town commissariat of defence in 
Petrozavodsk. Witnesses recalled that Orlov abused members of the Petrozavodsk town 
soviet while drunk, threatened them with his revolver and reminded those present that he 
was an officer and would arrest and disarm everyone. This previous altercation was 
significant and although he was issued bail his case was forwarded to eight different higher 
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governing institutions in Olonets province, Moscow and Petrograd.
31 In other words 
Orlov’s arrest in October appears to have been an action taken against possible betrayal, 
encouraged by the presence of the Allies and his previous behaviour. Orlov’s fate is 
unknown and his name is absent in local sources from this point which suggests he did not 
return from Moscow. 
 
The attack on religion and terror in Olonets district 
As well as seeing enemies among anyone who had contacts with the Allies, however 
legitimate, the Cheka strongly believed the Orthodox Church to be a centre of opposition 
to the regime and showed little moderation when dealing with it. The conflict with the 
Aleksandr-Svirskii monastery mentioned in Chapter 2 flared up again in autumn 1918 
when the provincial revolutionary soviet executive committee decided to seize the 
monastery’s wealth, discredit the Orthodox Church and close down the ‘Union for the 
Defence of Religion and the Church’ which was affiliated to the monastery.
32 On 29 
October the provincial Izvestiia reported that the federation of Anarchists from 
Petrozavodsk accompanied by representatives of the provincial Cheka, the district Cheka 
and the chairman of the local kombed had made an inspection of the monastery on 22 
October. Over the next two days a Red Army unit under the control of the provincial 
Cheka confiscated the monastery’s valuables and property and arrested a number of 
clergymen on 23 October.
33 However, during the searches and confiscations the Chekists 
and Red Army men humiliated the monks by insulting their religious beliefs: they refused 
to remove their caps; barked out orders; got drunk on the monastery’s wine; and even 
opened up a shrine containing the remains of St. Aleksandr. According to a member of the 
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All-Russian Synod the Red Army men then invented a story, which was later published in 
the newspapers, that inside the shrine was a wax doll.
34 Atrocities followed: five of the 
clergymen arrested previously on 23 October were shot on the night of the 11/12 
November by the Olonets district Cheka, including the monastery’s father superior, 
Archimandrite Evgenii.
35 
  
Understanding this act is troublesome because the history of the Olonets district 
Cheka before and after these executions shows that, like the provincial Cheka, executions 
were limited and arrests and fines were more common. However, it appears to have been a 
shock measure that bypassed the Left SR dominated district executive committee which 
had refused to send representatives to the Olonets provincial soviet revolutionary executive 
committee and resisted the introduction of the kombedy and harvest registration (see 
Chapter 4). According to the provincial Cheka’s report the executions carried out by the 
Olonets district Cheka occurred with the sanction of the provincial Cheka and the 
provincial soviet revolutionary executive committee.
36 The shootings were therefore an 
extreme but intentional act perpetrated by the district Cheka with pressure and support 
from the provincial Cheka and provincial revolutionary executive committee to gain 
control in a longer standing feud with the monastery in a district where the Left SRs still 
dominated and where the Olonets district soviet executive committee was keen to curb the 
actions of the Cheka (see the Timofeev affair in Chapter 4).
37   
                                                 
34 Ibid. 101. A later report written by the provincial Cheka to the provincial revolutionary executive 
committee differed; according to this report an ordinary skeleton had been revealed in the shrine of St. 
Aleksandr. Vdovitsyna, “Aleksandro-Svirskii Monastyr’” in Urok Istorii Daet Arckhiv. 105. A commission 
set up on 19 December 1918 by the presidium of the Soviet of Commissars of the Northern Region to 
investigate what had been found in St. Aleksandr Svirskii’s shrine concluded that a partially decomposed 
corpse was revealed. Smith, “Bones of Contention”. 156-157.  
35 Vdovitsyna, “Aleksandro-Svirskii Monastyr’” in Urok Istorii Daet Arckhiv. 99-100. 
36 Ibid. 105. 
37 The relative docility of the Olonets district Cheka, this incident apart, is reflected in its unpublished records. 
These records state that from 15 August to 15 December 1918 the Cheka resolved 150 different cases and 
were combating counter-revolution and speculation by carrying out executions (on only three occasions, 
totalling 9 individuals), making arrests and imposing fines. From 22 October to 22 December the Cheka had 
collected fines worth a total of 45,446 roubles which were transferred to its own account and helped it to 
maintain a small Red Army detachment of 28 men. GARF, f.R-393, op.13, d.268, l.4; 8; Korablev, et al., 
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Chekist malpractice and the need for reform 
The Cheka in Karelia did not resort to wide scale executions in the last quarter of 1918 but 
it was corrupt, unruly and disorganised and change was required to resolve these 
deficiencies. In Chapter 4 we saw how the unclear boundaries of the Cheka’s authority in 
Olonets district (the Timofeev affair) led to clashes with the soviets and its institutions. A 
similar style conflict between the Cheka and the soviets overlapped the Timofeev affair 
and involved the chairman of the Olonets provincial Cheka I.V. Elpedinskii. On 9 August 
1918 Elpedinskii and another Chekist went to Vidlitskaia parish in Olonets district, got 
drunk, carried out searches in the local ironworks factory and then assaulted some local 
officials and stole their money.
38 The Elpedinskii case is important because it underlined 
the unclear lines of the Cheka’s authority in relation to the soviets. This became apparent at 
the provincial conference of district Chekas when Elpedinskii’s fellow Chekists believed 
they had the right to overrule the soviets and the party in order to keep the provincial 
Cheka chairman in his position, which they indeed managed to do for a short time. 
 
On 17 August the Olonets provincial revolutionary executive committee decided to 
act against the unruly Elpedinskii and recommended that a new chairman, I.I. Terukov, a 
native of Petrozavodsk, be appointed the chair of the Olonets provincial Cheka. However, 
by supporting Terukov’s nomination to the chairmanship of the provincial Cheka, the 
executive committee brought itself into conflict with the Cheka which did not support the 
move. The executive committee’s support for Terukov also complicated matters because 
his appointment was only a recommendation and Elpedinskii still officially remained 
chairman. The provincial Cheka at its session of 20 August discussed the ‘dual authority in 
                                                 
38 NARK, f.P-2, op.1, d.9, l.2. Born in 1887 Ivan Elpedinskii served in the Baltic fleet between 1908 and 
1909 before being discharged for health reasons. He became a member of the Bolshevik party in 1911 and 
worked in Vladimir province for a few years before becoming a telegrapher at Soroka station, Kem’ district, 
in 1915 and then a worker at Suna station, Petrozavodsk district, in January 1918. While at Suna station he 
helped organise a Bolshevik party cell. Shortly after he became a member of the Olonets province executive 
committee and was appointed the commissar for post and telegraphs for Murmansk County. E.P. Laidinen, 
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the Cheka’ and decided ‘to take all matters into our own hands and not to permit outside 
interference’ but ‘to work under the supervision of the provincial executive committee.’ In 
other words the provincial Cheka agreed that the executive committee could check up on it 
but not tell it what to do. Elpedinskii remained the chairman of the provincial Cheka while 
Terukov was appointed the head of the provincial Cheka’s department for combating 
counter-revolution.
39 
 
However, when Elpedinskii’s deeds in Vidlitskaia parish came to light at a session 
of the Petrozavodsk Country Bolshevik Party Committee on 29 August it condemned his 
actions. The party committee’s reaction was uncompromising: Elpedinskii’s behaviour was 
described as ‘disgraceful’ and it was proposed to dismiss him from all his elected positions 
and exclude him from the party.
40 Clearly, this mirrored the stance taken by the provincial 
revolutionary executive committee but also represented further Bolshevik party resistance 
towards the Cheka because not all members of the Petrozavodsk County Bolshevik Party 
Committee presidium sat on the provincial revolutionary executive committee in the 
summer of 1918.
41 On 30 August the provincial revolutionary executive committee 
restated its decision to remove Elpedinskii from all elected posts, including that as 
chairman of the provincial Cheka.
42 Ivan Terukov was then appointed temporary head of 
the provincial Cheka which, on 11 September, was made permanent.
43 However, having 
heard a statement from Elpedinskii himself, the Petrozavodsk County Bolshevik Party 
Committee backtracked from its original decision when it met on 14
 September because it 
believed that the statement cast a different light on the incident. What exactly was within 
Elpedinskii’s statement is not known but his appeal to review his case was accepted out of 
                                                 
39 Laidinen, “O.K. Kanter”. 192. Provincial Chekas were supposed to be divided up into five different 
departments. They were the departments for: combating counter-revolution, combating speculation, 
combating misuse of authority, territorial liaison and railway security. Leggett, The Cheka. 39-40. 
40 RGASPI, f.67, op.1, d.69, l.27. 
41 For the members of the Olonets provincial revolutionary executive committee and the Petrozavodsk 
Country Bolshevik party (and presidium) in the summer of 1918 see Chapter 3, fn.82; Chapter 4, fn.10. 
42 Laidinen, “O.K. Kanter”. 191. 
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respect for his previous work within local government
44 and ‘the current difficult time for 
the revolution’, presumably reference to the threat of the Allies and the recent declaration 
of the Red Terror on 5 September. As a result, the party committee decided to only 
temporarily exclude Elpedinskii and up to the conclusion of the investigation into the affair 
allow him to continue to work in soviet institutions.
45 
 
Elpedinskii’s position as chairman of the provincial Cheka was supported by his 
fellow Chekists at the first Olonets provincial conference of district Chekas. On 17 
September Cheka delegates stressed that the charges against him were ‘groundless’, it was 
‘the wish of the bourgeoisie to wrest him from the ranks of the proletariat’, ‘an artful ruse 
by counter-revolutionaries’ and that the County Bolshevik Party Committee had made a 
mistake and acted too hastily in supporting these accusations. The conference decided 
unanimously to sanction Elpedinskii’s rehabilitation, asked him to continue his work in the 
provincial Cheka and to work in soviet institutions.
46 Terukov’s chairmanship of the 
provincial Cheka lasted less than two weeks and Elpedinskii was reinstated. Terukov 
remained in the provincial Cheka and was appointed the Cheka’s head of staff for 
employees on 24 September.
47 Elpedinskii had therefore won the backing of his fellow 
Chekists and eventually the local party committee to remain provincial chairman of the 
Cheka, in contrast to the wishes of the provincial revolutionary executive committee. But 
re-elections to the Olonets provincial Cheka in early October (see below) meant that his 
victory was short lived and he was replaced.
48 
                                                 
44 At the First Olonets Provincial Bolshevik Party Conference, the Bolshevik commissar for post and 
telegraphs Ia.F. Igoshkin commended Elpedinskii. The Union for Post and Telegraphs initially refused to 
recognise the transition of power to the Soviets and had formed a strike committee. Igoshkin explained that 
Elpedinskii ‘purged’ the union and helped increase the number of communist sympathisers amongst the post 
and telegraph workers. At the Second Olonets Provincial Bolshevik Party Conference Igoshkin also 
commented that Elpedinskii had played an integral role in establishing a party cell in Suna, Petrozavodsk 
district. Mashezerskii and Slavin, Bor’ba. 502; 527.  
45 RGASPI, f.67, op.1, d.69, l.36; NARK, f.R-28, op.1, d.17, l.44. 
46 NARK, f.R-411, op.1, d.1, l.15-15ob. 
47 He was dismissed from all organs of security in September 1919 on the decision of the party court. He later 
moved to Kronstadt. Laidinen, “O.K. Kanter”. 192. 
48 Some time after the re-elections Elpedinskii left for Moscow and was appointed head of communications 
for the Sixth Red Army. RGASPI, f.67, op.1, d.69, l.66.   209 
The Elpedinskii affair is not only a good example of why the Olonets provincial 
Cheka was reformed through re-elections in October 1918 but it highlights an important 
point in the development of local power relations after the exit of the Left SRs from the 
provincial executive committee. Against those local Bolsheviks in the Cheka who 
supported this institution’s autonomy, other Bolsheviks struggled to preserve the authority 
of the soviet executive committees which to them were, in one historian’s words: ‘the 
pinnacle of revolutionary power.’
49 The Vecheka’s over-lordship was not welcomed by 
local Bolsheviks who opposed the autonomy of the Cheka which had been encouraged by 
unclear statements from Moscow. Dzerzhinsky’s circular telegram from 29 August 
announced that the Chekas should be in ‘close contact…with all local organs of soviet 
authority’ but at the same time:
50 
  
the Chekas are unquestionably autonomous in their own work and must carry out 
implicitly all orders issued by the Vecheka, the highest organ to which they are 
subordinated. The Chekas are only accountable to the soviets, but in no 
circumstances are the soviets or any of its departments to countermand or suspend 
the orders of the Chekas issued from the Vecheka. 
     
As Leggett has pointed out, this telegram seemed to undermine the authority of the 
executive committees.
51 In short local Chekas needed only to concern themselves with 
their own institution’s ruling body and their interpretation of its orders. As indicated at the 
Olonets provincial conference of district Chekas statements like Dzerzhinsky’s struck a 
chord with local Chekists who supported their own comrades and overruled the opposition 
of the provincial executive committee and the Petrozavodsk County Bolshevik party 
committee. For local Chekists the Chekas were, as Dzerzhinsky underlined above, 
‘autonomous in their own work’. 
 
                                                 
49 Melancon, “Revolutionary Culture”. 11. 
50 NARK, f.R-28, op.1, d.17, l.54. This statement is also available in Leggett, The Cheka. 124. It was decided 
by the provincial conference of district Chekas on 17 September to publish this decree in the localities of 
Olonets province as a guide for soviet organs. NARK, f.R-28, op.1, d.17, l.85. 
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Reforming the Cheka 
It was clear from the point of view of the local soviets that something had to be done to 
curb the autonomy of the Cheka and the encouragement this body received from above. 
The introduction of the Red Terror decree, discussed above, further encouraged local 
Chekas to make arrests, so much so that the provincial and Murmansk railroad Chekas 
came into conflict with one another.
52 On 19 September a board (kollegiia) member of the 
People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs, V.A. Tikhomirnov, sent a circular telegram to 
all provinces and districts which reflected the debates which were going on in the capital 
surrounding the Cheka and the soviets. He stated that: ‘The Vecheka insists upon the 
independent existence of the local Chekas’ but ‘we [The People’s Commissariat for 
Internal Affairs] consider it necessary to incorporate them as government subdivisions.’
53 
Leaders of the provincial soviet in Petrozavodsk were also keen to put a stop to the 
arbitrary nature of the cheka and resolved on 20 September to relay Tikhomirov’s telegram 
by informing the districts that the Chekas were divisions or sub-divisions attached to the 
soviets and subordinated to them, i.e. the provincial Cheka to the provincial executive 
committee and the district Chekas to the district executive committees.
54 
  
The following month, on 5 October, Petrozavodsk received another circular 
telegram from Tikhomirnov which blamed the soviets for the arbitrary nature of the Red 
Terror:
55  
 
…a considerable majority of soviets have not taken the appropriate decisive 
measures in securing the rear of our armies from all possible provocative 
statements and counter-revolutionary conspiracies and a few other soviets, not 
infrequently, have directed the red terror not against the eminent bourgeoisie and 
                                                 
52 On 19 September the Murmansk railroad Cheka wrote to the Petrozavodsk town soviet, copying in the 
provincial Cheka and the provincial soviet revolutionary executive committee and stated that a significant 
number of employees from the Murmansk railroad had been arrested by the provincial Cheka. The 
Murmansk railroad Cheka stressed that these arrests had occurred without its sanction and hindered the 
efficiency of work along the railway line. NARK, f.R-28, op.1, d.17, l.45. 
53 NARK, f.R-28, op.1, d.66, l.133. 
54 Ibid. l.132. 
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old authorities but against the petty bourgeoisie and the philistinism of the 
intelligentsia (intelligentsia obyvatel’shchiny).   
 
The telegram failed to take into account the contradictory statements that were 
coming from the capital concerning the independence of the Chekas but asked all 
provincial executive committees to clarify for the local soviets the type of hostage to be 
taken and that the ‘petty bourgeoisie’ could be released if the soviets forced them to work 
in labour companies (trudovye roty).
56 The Olonets provincial revolutionary executive 
committee recognised the ‘tactless activity’ of its provincial Cheka at this time and at one 
of its sessions on 8 October decided to reorganise the institution and carry out new 
elections to the provincial Cheka. The resolution passed by the committee stressed that 
new Cheka members should only be elected from experienced party workers and that 
Chekas were subordinate to the revolutionary executive committee and were to act in close 
communication with the department of soviet administration and the department of 
justice.
57  
 
This re-organisation of the provincial Cheka saw the Latvian Oskar Kristianovich 
Kanter appointed Olonets province’s new Cheka chairman. Born into a peasant family in 
Riga on 10 April 1885, Kanter finished four years of schooling at the Riga town 
gymnasium and in 1903 joined the Bolshevik party. In 1908 he was arrested and sentenced 
to four years penal servitude before being exiled to Karelia from 1914-1917. From 
September 1917 to February 1918 Kanter served as the secretary of a local regional council 
(uprava) in Petrograd province and in April 1918 was sent from the former capital to 
Olonets province to help organise local party organs and soviets.
58 Kanter’s appointment 
marked a significant turning point in the history of the provincial Cheka. As we shall see 
below and in Chapter 8, following his appointment the provincial Cheka progressively 
                                                 
56 Ibid. 
57 NARK, f.P-2, op.1, d.14, l.66. 
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operated less chaotically. He was the ideal person for his new position: he was young; a 
long standing member of the Bolshevik party; educated; an experienced revolutionary and 
organiser; and familiar with the region. It is testimony to his success as chairman of the 
Olonets provincial Cheka that he held the post for over two years (until 10 December 1920) 
and was elected to the joint presidium of the Karelian Labour Commune and Olonets 
provincial executive committee in August 1920.
59 
 
Kanter’s task was a difficult one; he faced a number of problems in running the 
provincial Cheka and it would take time to stamp his authority on the institution. 
Principally he had to: restore order to a hitherto unruly organisation while continuing its 
investigations; find reliable cadres to work in the Cheka; eliminate individual Chekist 
malpractice; and build a better relationship between different state agencies. However his 
work was hindered from the outset because of the chaotic state in which he found the 
Cheka. For one thing, the provincial revolutionary executive refused to hand over its 
records to the newly elected staff.
60 This would suggest that the Cheka’s former members 
had something to hide. One such incident which may have influenced this decision 
involved two Chekists who were accused by the provincial Cheka of abusing their position 
at a session on 1 October 1918. They arrived drunk at Petrozavodsk prison and without 
permission took a prisoner who had been arrested as a former gendarme into their vehicle 
to the outskirts of the town to shoot him. However, while en route the prisoner jumped 
from the moving vehicle and vanished without a trace. By April 1919 he had still not been 
found.
61 
 
                                                 
59 Ibid. For the rest of his impressive and eventful career see: Ibid 205-208.  
60 NARK, f.P-2, op.1, d.14, l.67. 
61 NARK, f.P-2, op.1, d.9, l.10; f.P-4, op.1, d.17, l.13. One of the guilty Chekists was excluded from the party 
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Despite the re-election of the provincial Cheka disorganisation and abuses of 
authority within this body continued but, fairly quickly after Kanter’s appointment, the 
Cheka was operating in a relatively more structured manner and members began to be 
disciplined for their crimes. Between the 31 October and 4 November a member of the 
provincial Cheka, Vasilii Bogdanov, along with three provincial Cheka employees carried 
out a general search of the merchants situated in the village of Ladva, Petrozavodsk district, 
and used torture in order to locate their valuables. Furthermore, on the way back to 
Petrozavodsk some of the requisitioned goods were taken to the flat of one of Bogdanov’s 
collaborators and therefore did not find its way to the provincial Cheka. However, by 
chance the commissar for the defence of the town came across the individuals at the 
moment they were sharing out the requisitioned goods and all four were arrested. Initially 
the provincial Cheka wished to execute the individuals but after a session of the provincial 
executive committee the sentences were reduced to imprisonment and compulsory labour 
on the basis that the individuals were young (Bogdanov was 19 years old) and under 
extreme strain due to their work in the Cheka. Bogdanov received seven years and on 18 
December, at a session of the Olonets provincial Bolshevik party committee, he was 
excluded from the party along with his associates.
62    
 
Such malpractices by individual Chekists can be attributed to the fact that because 
of its responsibilities the Cheka was different than other Soviet agencies. It was an internal 
security/political police force which operated under an officially declared Red Terror and 
was trusted to investigate and root out counter-revolution. Because the lines of the Chekas’ 
authority in relation to the soviets was far from clear, it is perhaps not surprising that the 
Cheka attracted careerists or criminal elements. The cheka lacked both members who 
would not tarnish the name of the soviets through malpractice and administratively capable 
individuals. This inevitably placed an increased burden on tried and tested administrators 
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and generated competition between institutions for them. On 25 November Kanter 
complained to the Petrozavodsk County Bolshevik party committee, which two days 
previously had appointed the bookkeeper of the provincial Cheka as secretary of the 
revolutionary tribunal. Kanter explained that the bookkeeper’s departure would have a 
considerable effect on the Cheka’s accounts and that he was irreplaceable.
63  
 
Because of the lack of reliable personnel it was common for individuals to take up 
more than one responsible post and to sit on several committees. For example, during the 
civil war Oskar Kanter was a member and secretary of the Olonets provincial executive 
committee, chairman of the provincial Cheka, a member of the provincial military 
revolutionary committee and the Red Army committee of assistance.
64 He was not the only 
Chekist taking up a number of positions within the provincial authorities. Kanter wrote to 
the agitation-propaganda department attached to the local Bolshevik party committee on 24 
December to complain about the overwork of one of the Cheka department’s members, 
K.A. Luzgin, who had recently been appointed to the agitation-propaganda department. He 
explained that Luzgin worked for ten hours a day as an investigator within the Cheka’s 
department for combating counter-revolution and malfeasance (prestuplenie po dolzhnosti) 
while in his free time worked in another commission attached to the revolutionary tribunal. 
As a result, Kanter asked the agitation-propaganda department to free Luzgin from his 
duties for the general benefit of the Cheka.
65 
 
A lack of capable administrators was also reflected in the severe lack of 
organisation, including the most basic of clerical tasks, within the provincial Cheka. A 
report compiled by an auditing committee at the end of March 1919 into the provincial 
Cheka’s department for the struggle with counter-revolution and malfeasance found that no 
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record of those arrested had been made, there was no record of a weapons registration, lists 
of the local bourgeoisie and former officers or even the addresses of employees and 
workers working in soviet institutions for 1918 or 1919.
66 Furthermore, journal entries for 
the activities of the department either did not exist or were in complete disorder. For 
example, the list of those arrested only contained the name of the individual but detailed 
nothing about when they were due for release or how long they had been imprisoned for. 
In order to find this out one had to actually travel to the prison and question the official in 
charge. Paperwork was left untied, unstamped with the Cheka’s seal and some remained 
unsigned by the person responsible. To add to the confusion many orders were also left 
undated and some distributed under various individuals’ signatures from the office 
secretary to the filing clerk. Over 100 important orders and documents, such as the minutes 
of the session from the 11 September which resolved to execute four individuals on 13 
September (see above), could not be found by the auditing commission.
67          
 
Because entry into the Cheka was prohibited for those in society who were targeted 
by the revolution such as members of the intelligentsia, merchants and bureaucrats 
(precisely those who were likely to have a higher level of education), the provincial Cheka 
came to rely on workers and Bolshevik party members or sympathisers which increased 
the illiteracy rates of its cadres.
68 Inevitably the Cheka attracted some careerists and 
criminal elements although, beginning with the appointment of Kanter, the provincial 
executive committee and the local Bolshevik party committee were beginning to pay more 
attention to the quality of the cheka’s members. At a session of the Second Olonets 
Provincial Bolshevik Party Conference on 12 December a party member warned against 
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67 NARK, f.P-4, op.1, d.17, l.12-14 
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the influx of ‘improper elements’ into the party while another proposed the ‘shadowing’ 
(slezhka) of Chekas for ‘ethical behaviour considerations.’
69   
 
There were also bloody incidents in the districts after the reorganisation of the 
Cheka. For instance in Olonets district after the dismissal of the Left SRs from the district 
executive committee in mid-November 1918, the suppression of a peasant rebellion in 
December was notably bloodier. Some of the rebels managed to escape to Finland but two 
were shot on the spot while others were caught and arrested.
70 However, proper procedures 
were followed. On the 10 January the chairman of the Olonets district Cheka, Pavel 
Chigar’kov, informed the Olonets provincial executive committee that attempts were made 
on the lives of local officials by the rebels and asked for permission to carry out executions. 
In response the executive committee appealed to the provincial Cheka: ‘to urgently send a 
few reliable members to Olonets town having given them wide plenary powers to 
investigate this affair. If it is necessary take the most drastic measures.’
71 Such measures 
were taken; at one of its sessions on 16 January 1919 the Olonets district Cheka decided to 
execute a further six leaders involved in the rebellion. Furthermore, the eleven remaining 
leaders who had escaped were declared outlaws and if discovered the population was given 
an open invitation to shoot them.
72 
 
In mid-January 1919 the Olonets district Cheka was also disciplining its members 
for malpractice and acted with an element of responsibility. On 16 January the case of a 
Cheka commissar from Olonets district, V. Matsnev, was discussed at a district Cheka 
session. Matsnev had been under arrest for a short time for illegally confiscating 
timepieces during the search of the Nikiforovskii monastery. The Cheka resolved that the 
short spell of imprisonment was a satisfactory punishment, the case was discontinued and 
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the gathering resolved to return the timepieces to the monastery.
73 When the Pudozh Cheka 
faced a short lived military mutiny at the end of 1918, it too acted in conjunction with the 
higher authorities. On 10 December the chairman of the Pudozh Cheka, O.M. Shishov, 
withheld cigarettes to be distributed to mobilised Red Army troops and incited a short-
lived mutiny: Shishov was briefly detained and the following day two Red Army men were 
killed and one injured for attempting to run away. Restoring order, a further 22 Red Army 
men were arrested; 12 were soon released but 10 were sent to the provincial Cheka.
74 Later 
when the Pudozh district Cheka acted without authority it received a rebuke from the 
provincial Cheka for the execution of four prisoners in early January without provincial 
approval.
75 
 
An end to political terror 
Disciplining and changing the structure of the Cheka in Karelia was complemented at the 
end of 1918 by Lenin’s announcement of a political amnesty, firstly for factions of the 
Menshevik party and then later for the SR party. The majority of local Bolsheviks reacted 
positively to this move but it was not the first time the local Bolsheviks hailed the arrival 
of former political adversaries to the ranks of the party. In September 1918 15 members of 
the Left Menshevik Internationalists, including their leader L.V. Nikol’skii, joined the 
Bolshevik party who welcomed the move. Under the title ‘A moral victory’ the Olonets 
provincial Izvestiia reported on 24 September that the victory of the Bolshevik forces at 
Kazan had been complemented by a victory for the ideas of communism in Petrozavodsk; 
the Left Menshevik Internationalists disbanded and placed all their funds at the disposal of 
the Bolsheviks. The acquisition of 15 members of the Left Menshevik Internationalist 
party was regarded as a moment of triumph and the newspaper report described Nikol’skii 
as ‘one of our most outstanding public figures’.
76 
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During discussions at the Second Olonets Provincial Bolshevik Party Conference 
(10-13 December 1918), local Bolshevik leaders welcomed new capable political 
administrators to compensate for the shortage of Bolshevik party cadres. Yet, there was no 
consensus between local Bolsheviks over the entrance of former political opponents into 
the party. In response to protests against the new soft-line approach towards the 
Mensheviks and SRs and calls for the continuation of the Red Terror another party member, 
A.F. Kopnin, stated his belief that the Mensheviks’ and SRs’ entry into Bolshevik 
institutions should be accepted but strictly regulated. He also supported the conciliatory 
move towards other socialist parties because of the need for more workers throughout the 
region and because the departure of communists to the front would leave the localities 
considerably weakened. The Olonets provincial revolutionary executive committee 
chairman, Petr Anokhin, also supported the Leninist stance:
77   
 
…when the stray Marxist-Mensheviks seek to make contact with us we 
should not be vindictive because in the past they were our brothers. Nor will we 
cast off the petty bourgeois ranks of the peasantry who have been inspired by the 
ideas of communism. To be afraid of them means not to believe in our own moral 
strength which is becoming stronger all the time.   
 
After Anokhin’s speech Elena Stasova supported Lenin’s olive branch to the other socialist 
parties and rejected the continuation of terror politics. The conference passed this 
resolution with three votes against it and six abstentions.
78 The policy seemed to work. A 
report from Lizhma station at the December party conference noted that a small number of 
Left SRs, who had dominated this locality up to August 1918, entered the local Bolshevik 
party organisation alongside a few Mensheviks.
79 However, conciliation was always kept 
within strict limits. At the end of the year the Bolsheviks had flexed their authority in the 
provincial press when they came into conflict with a group of journalists in December over 
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the balance of views being reported in the local Izvestiia concerning the Soviet regime.
80 
Five days later the Bolsheviks merged Izvestiia with two other local newspapers and 
renamed it Olonetskaia Kommuna. Its three man editorial board were all Bolshevik party 
members.
81  
 
Conclusion 
The above chapter has shown the inroads the Bolsheviks made into consolidating their 
regime and the role played by the reorganisation of the provincial Cheka. The Red Terror, 
which was perpetrated moderately in Karelia in terms of the number of executions carried 
out, gave local Bolsheviks a lever of control to strengthen the party’s position while the 
election of a new provincial Cheka chaired by Oskar Kanter, despite continued sporadic 
malpractice, meant a relatively better organised and orderly Cheka was evolving by the 
beginning of 1919. As we have seen in the previous chapter, at the end of 1918 the Second 
Olonets Provincial Bolshevik Party Conference took place and pointed to some of the key 
principles which they believed would help strengthen the party’s position. Chief amongst 
these were the need for stricter discipline amongst members. The above chapter has 
suggested that stricter discipline was to some extent already under way with the election of 
a new provincial Cheka and from this point clashes with the soviets, which had been a 
prominent feature of the Cheka’s activities until this time, began to disappear. Furthermore, 
a general political amnesty to the Bolsheviks’ former political opponents was receptive in 
Petrozavodsk and served to bolster the administrative capabilities of the local Soviet 
regime.  
 
                                                 
80 On the 8 December the journalists spoke out against their own suppression and resolved: ‘The organisation 
of soviet journalists reserves their integral right to relentless diversified criticism of local state institutions, 
while meanwhile not failing to record in the press the positives of local state work.’ Izvestiia Olonetskogo 
Gubernskogo Soveta. 10 December 1918. 
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Nevertheless, as the preceding chapters have shown, by the beginning of 1919, 
although the Bolshevik party had reformed the provincial Cheka and reinforced its political 
position in Petrozavodsk, it still struggled to exert control over the districts because of the 
incessant food shortages and a lack of reliable cadres to run government institutions. The 
intrusion of the kombedy and the Red Army in the countryside had also contributed to the 
outbreak of peasant rebellion at the end of 1918 and a decline in the prestige of the Soviet 
regime. The Bolsheviks needed to improve the food supply situation and build stronger 
links to the countryside but as we will see in the next chapter this was easier said than done. 
By the spring and summer of 1919 the party faced its most intense military crisis when the 
Allies and White Finns attacked simultaneously and peasant rebellion once again erupted 
in the Zaonezh’e peninsula. 
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Chapter 7 
The Hindrance of War, January-July 1919 
This chapter develops the “one step forward, two steps back” theme of the Bolsheviks’ 
consolidation of power in Karelia, a process which in the first half of 1919 was greatly 
complicated by the worsening situation at the front which intensified the familiar obstacle 
of acute food shortages. The previous chapter noted the positive steps made by the local 
Bolsheviks by means of reforming the provincial Cheka but this chapter will argue that 
these were put in jeopardy by the worsening military situation. The Bolsheviks’ limited 
progress manifested itself first in a successful mobilisation campaign, launched at the end 
of 1918, which, despite setbacks, provided local Bolsheviks with a Red Army to defend the 
region by the middle of the following year. Secondly, the Olonets provincial soviet 
accepted the Bolshevik leadership’s decision to merge the kombedy. On the other hand 
food problems remained intractable. In February 1919 the Olonets provincial soviet 
executive committee appointed the soviet’s fourth provincial commissar for food in the 
space of a year but like his predecessors he struggled to improve food shortages in the 
region. The situation became so bad that migration to the south of Soviet Russia took place 
for a short time in the spring and coupled with the military draft food shortages formed the 
basis for another peasant rebellion in the Zaonezh’e peninsula in May 1919 in the face of 
the Allied-White advance. 
 
The military threat, spring/summer 1919 
To contextualise the conditions under which local Bolsheviks worked in the spring and 
summer of 1919 it is worthwhile to briefly summarise the course of the conflict which 
reached its peak at this time. In April Maynard’s Syren Force, in support of White Russian 
troops, began an advance south which continued until the Allies’ withdrawal in the autumn 
of 1919.
1 On the night of the 21 April the first echelon of approximately 2000 White Finns 
                                                 
1 For more detail see C. Kinvig, Churchill’s Crusade. The British Invasion of Russia, 1918 1920. London: 
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also crossed the border and from May to June occupied large parts of Olonets district 
(Olonets town was captured on 23 April) and pushed towards Petrozavodsk.
2 In response 
the Petrograd Bolshevik party committee decided on 29 April to send 1000 communists to 
each of the Karelian and Olonets fronts.
3 To add to the military crisis Boris Pozern, the 
head of the Petrograd Military County, had caused confusion and disruption in 
Petrozavodsk by dismissing the Olonets provincial military commissar Arsenii Dubrovskii 
on 15 April, replacing him with his own candidate P.V. Iakobson (see Chapter 8).  
 
On 30 April a new Olonets provincial military-revolutionary executive committee 
was elected which met the military challenge by endeavouring to mobilise every resource 
available.
4 A draft of communist party members had been undertaken in February 1919 
and their mobilisation was accelerated to meet the growing military threat.
5 On the 23 
April the Bolshevik party Central Committee issued a decree instructing all party 
organisations to form special task force detachments (chasti osobogo naznacheniia). 
Initially established in Moscow and Petrograd these special task forces were created to 
provide all communists with military training and to act as crack fighting units.
6 A few 
days later the Olonets provincial Bolshevik party committee agreed to implement the 
                                                 
2 For more detail on the campaign against the White Finns who were in retreat by late June 1919 see: 
Rupasov and Chistikov, Sovetsko Finliandskaia Granitsa. 40-41; Tarasov, Bor’ba. 216-226; Siukiiainen, 
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of the Allies and their capture of Segezha. This committee was made up of P.F. Anokhin, O.K. Kanter, V.M. 
Parfenov, F.I. Galashev and N.N. Dorofeev. Because of the preoccupation of some of its members in other 
posts the new military-revolutionary committee consisted of P.F. Anokhin, O.K. Kanter, I.A. Danilov, Ia.F. 
Igoshkin. One representative each from the provincial military commissariat, the Petrozavodsk town soviet 
and the staff of the 1
st brigade, 19
th rifle division also entered the new commission. Balagurov and 
Mashezerskii, Kareliia v Period. 63-64; 586, fn.12.  
5 NARK, f.P-4, op.1, d.33, l.30.  
6 Tarasov, Bor’ba. 240-241; M. von Hagen, Soldiers in the Proletarian Dictatorship. The Red Army and the 
Soviet Socialist State, 1917 1930. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990. 71. Party members were generally 
recruited to act as shock troops and increase the fighting capabilities of military units because of their support 
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Central Committee’s decree.
7 However, the mobilisation of communists to the Red Army 
revealed the instability of the party’s cells in the periphery and the weak commitment of 
some party members. Reporting to the Third Olonets Provincial Bolshevik Party 
Conference (1-5 September 1919), a year after the event, a delegate from Pudozh noted 
that district party collectives sprang up rapidly after the first cells were established in 
Pudozh in October 1918. However he believed their membership to be ‘very very 
questionable.’
8 At the time of the White advance many so called communist party 
members in one particular parish left to join the Whites.
9     
 
In spite of this setback the mobilisation of the region was given further impetus 
when a group of White Russians also re-entered Russian territory from Estonia in early 
May 1919 and made rapid progress towards Petrograd which was briefly declared the most 
important military front.
10 Against the background of this new military threat a state of 
siege was declared in the city of Petrograd and the northern provinces of Petrograd, 
Olonets and Cherepovets on 2 May 1919.
11 On 6 May the Bolshevik party Central 
Committee appealed to the surrounding provinces to dispatch mobilised communists to the 
Petrograd front.
12 However, the request caused a degree of confusion for local Bolsheviks 
in Petrozavodsk. To be sure, the military threat was also severe in Karelia and the 
Bolsheviks there needed to retain as many men as possible to protect Petrozavodsk, a key 
junction on the road to Petrograd. On 13 May the Olonets provincial Bolshevik party 
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secretary, Ia.F. Igoshkin, appealed to the Central Committee to leave all mobilised 
communists in Olonets province:
13 
 
In view of the acute military situation in Olonets province all party 
members and sympathisers have been mobilised. Apparently the Central 
Committee, while issuing an order to dispatch everyone mobilised to Petrograd, 
had in mind a partial mobilisation. The dispatch of everyone including communists 
to Petrograd is tantamount to the exposure of the Olonets front which is a threat to 
Petrograd. We require an explanation. 
 
A telegram followed the next day from Elena Stasova, the Central Committee’s secretary, 
which clarified the issue: ‘While issuing the order, the Central Committee was speaking 
about the Petrograd front, including in this the approaches, which is Olonets [province]. 
The front line provinces are keeping their own mobilised soldiers, assigning them to their 
own standing military units.’
14 Despite this Karelia did provide troops for Petrograd. On 23 
May an unknown number were sent by the Petrozavodsk military commissariat to 
Petrograd and a further 105 troops were dispatched on 7 June.
15  
 
On 14 June Igoshkin informed the party Central Committee that local authorities 
were doing everything they could to defend Petrozavodsk and everyone available was 
armed or mobilised to dig trenches, including women.  A Red Army information bulletin 
for 20 June to 1 July also confirmed the increased efforts to mobilise everyone available: 
‘In the six parishes [of Petrozavodsk district] and in the town of Petrozavodsk even those 
citizens who are exempt from military service through illness have been called up to 
perform trench work.’
16 Nevertheless, despite efforts to channel all local resources for the 
defence of the region, Igoshkin believed he needed reinforcements of around 3000 men to 
hold off the threat from the Petrozavodsk (the White Finns) and Murmansk (Allies and 
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Whites) fronts. But, if help was not forthcoming, Igoshkin conceded that the region would 
do as best it could with its current forces.
17  
 
Large numbers of troops were rarely sent north to Karelia because of commitments 
to the strategically more important southern and eastern fronts. Only when the threat 
widened and endangered Petrograd were troops sent north but, that said, when Petrograd 
came under threat in May, local Bolsheviks were still required to send troops south at a 
time when Petrozavodsk itself was under severe threat. Nevertheless, despite the state of 
siege the White Finns were on the retreat by July 1919 and by September the Allies were 
on the verge of evacuating the whole region. To protect the Allies’ withdrawal Maynard’s 
troops and the Whites pushed as far south as possible. Between July and September they 
secured the Zanoezh’e peninsula and reached approximately eight miles south of 
Kiappesel’ga station, but in the face of increased Bolshevik resistance.
18 Skirmishes with 
the Whites continued after the Allies left in early October but by November the front 
stabilised until February the following year.
19 The Bolsheviks in Karelia, despite intense 
pressure and the loss of hundreds of men in battle from April to September, had survived 
the most serious military threat to their Soviet regime.
20 
 
Mobilisation in the Karelian districts, 1919 
As the civil war intensified nationally Bolshevik leaders sought to increase the size of the 
Red Army and mobilise every individual available. In Karelia this was hindered by 
resistance in the parishes, made worse by the development of the civil war fighting. As 
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mentioned in Chapters 4 and 5, a mass mobilisation campaign did not take place in Karelia 
until the end of November 1918 because of the priority of the harvest. Local conditions 
such as the sparseness of the population were also reflected in recruitment numbers, which 
were small. The priority of other more important fronts also meant that following the 
dispatch of men north during the late spring and summer of 1918 local Bolsheviks were 
left to make use of the current forces under their command and raise their own troops until 
the Allied and White Finnish attacks in spring 1919. A local Soviet historian states that by 
February 1919 8029 people in Olonets province had been called up to the Red Army.
21 
Other archival figures presented in Table 3 give a slightly lower figure because they are 
based on particular age groups but give a better representation of how many men joined up 
from the Karelian districts and how many were deemed suitable for service. By 1 June 
1919 6737 individuals were called up for service, the majority of whom were workers and 
peasants (4644) born 1896-1897 and former non-commissioned officers (2014) born 1890-
1897.
22     
Table 3 – Troops mobilised in Olonets province, 28 November 1918-1 June 
1919
23 
 
District  Workers 
& 
Peasants 
(born 
1896 
1897) 
Former non 
commissioned 
officers (born 
1890 1897) 
Total 
Petrozavodsk  475  147  622 
Olonets  354  86  440 
Povenets  164  39  203 
Pudozh  333  127  460 
Lodeinoe Pole  449  193  642 
Vytegra  708  217  925 
Kargopol’  680  353  1033 
Total  3163   1162  4325 
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together into an Olonets group division which was disbanded in November 1918 and came under the control 
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The reasons for the discrepancies in the number of men called up compared to 
those that actually entered the Red Army are shown in Table 4. The most striking figure is 
that of rejection on the basis of poor health, but what this was based on and how it differed 
from those deemed ill or crippled is unknown. According to information which was based 
on the call up throughout the country up to 9 July 1919 the percentage of those rejected in 
the Petrograd Military County on health grounds was 23.3% while the national average 
was 23.7%.
24 Based on the information below, for the age groups in Table 3 and from 28 
November to 1 June, 26% of the soldiers called up in Olonets province were rejected due 
to the condition of their health. 
 
Table 4 - Reasons for non-entry into the Red Army in Olonets province, 28 
November 1918-1 June 1919
25 
  
  Good 
reason – 
ill or 
crippled 
Without 
valid 
reason 
Granted a 
postponement 
Freed 
from the 
draft 
Unfit 
for 
military 
service 
Total 
Peasant 
worker 
recruits 
180  113  94  150  944  1481 
Former non 
commissioned 
officers 
40  171  210  254  177  852 
Total  220  284  304  404  1121  2333 
 
The more traditional form of recruitment, based on year of birth, ran parallel to a 
different kind of mobilisation from April-June 1919 which allowed local authorities across 
Soviet territory to choose who would be called up to the army.
26 On 25 April 1919 the All-
Russian Central Executive Committee introduced a decree which aimed to mobilise 
between 10 and 20 men from every parish. If a parish population numbered up to 1000 
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people then the parish was obliged to mobilise 10 soldiers, if it numbered 1000-3000 
people then the parish was obliged to mobilise 15 soldiers and if a parish had a population 
of more than 3000 then it was required to mobilise 20 soldiers. The parishes were also 
asked, if they had the means available, to supply recruits with uniforms, footwear and arms 
before forwarding them to the district military commissariats.
27 On 8 May a special 
Bolshevik party Central Committee representative, P.L. Pakhomov, informed Moscow that: 
‘In Olonets province…only one type of mobilisation is being carried out: 20 members 
from every parish.’
28 
 
As the civil war intensified a series of further drafts were introduced by the Soviet 
state. For instance on 22 May the Olonets provincial soviet of trade unions published an 
order to mobilise 10% of its members who had not already been enlisted.
29 Another draft 
on 1 June conditionally called up forestry, waterway and railroad workers as well as 
employees of the soviets, cooperatives, artels and food supply organs. Vacated positions 
were to be filled by people too old for the draft and women.
30 At the same time the more 
traditional method of conscription by year of birth continued; on 12 June the Petrozavodsk 
district military commissariat published an order calling up men born in 1900 to the Red 
Army.
31 Recently returned prisoners of war, born 1889-1898, were also called up in June.
32 
 
  Historians who have discussed the parish mobilisation campaign which differed 
from the more traditional call up by year of birth all agree that it was a failure. Most 
explain this failure by underlining the unfairness of the mobilisations and that peasants 
preferred the call up by year of birth because it affected everyone equally. In addition the 
parish mobilisation campaign coincided with the spring sowing season so many peasants 
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28 Balagurov and Mashezerskii, Kareliia v Period. 55. 
29 Ibid. 57-58. 
30 Olonetskaia Kommuna, 1 June 1919. 
31 Ibid. 12 June 1919.  
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were preoccupied with work in their fields.
33 The available evidence suggests that parish 
mobilisations were also unpopular in Karelia. A Bolshevik agitator situated in Pudozh 
reported in mid-June that mobilisation based on the volunteer principle of 10-20 recruits 
was unsuccessful.
34 A Red Army information bulletin for June stated that parish 
mobilisation in the whole of Olonets province was unsatisfactory and a few parishes 
completely refused.
35 One reason was the need to sow the fields and during May desertion 
also increased (see Chapter 8). Later, in August, when threshing was taking place, the 
peasants’ priorities at home resurfaced and mobilisation suffered because of this.
36 
 
However, evidence for the Karelian districts highlights that in May parish 
mobilisations also brought poor results because of the development of the civil war in the 
region. The intensification of the civil war in the spring of 1919 hindered the parish 
mobilisations, particularly in Petrozavodsk district. A military report from 21 May 
observed that in the Petrozavodsk sector: ‘There is a mass refusal from the parishes to 
mobilise.’
37 A telegram from the Tipinitskaia parish soviet executive committee informed 
Petrozavodsk on 12 June that the parish mobilisation of 10 to 20 men had not produced any 
volunteers and that the people there were unsupportive of the Soviet regime and awaited 
the arrival of better times under the Whites.
38 Of course, the development of the civil war 
and local conditions could affect all kinds of mobilisation, not solely the parish draft 
campaign. A Red Army information report for the period 20 June to 1 July reported that 
the mobilisation of men born in 1900 from Pudozh district was going well.
39 However in 
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November the mobilisation of men in Pudozh district, born in 1880 and 1881, was resisted 
in some of the distant parishes because in the neighbouring Kargopol’ district the 
recruitment limit was set at 30 years of age.
40 The importance of local conditions vis à vis 
the peasants’ response to the draft was evident again when the peasants of the Zaonezh’e 
peninsula rebelled again in May 1919 which is discussed below. 
 
Numerically the military threat was more severe in the spring/summer of 1919 than 
it had been in 1918 but because of their ability to enact a local mobilisation campaign and 
raise a Red Army the Bolsheviks now controlled a force which was easier to coordinate 
centrally than the independently raised partisans that the regime largely depended on to 
defend it the previous year. Furthermore, the Bolsheviks now had a recognisable apparatus 
to mobilise the troops and the provincial and district military commissariats formed the 
previous spring and summer were deeper embedded Soviet institutions. Partisan 
detachments did not disappear, one was created from a group of peasants from Povenets 
district in early June, but it was principally the Red Army which defended the Karelian 
districts at this time.
41 
 
Furthermore, despite the numerous military defeats, the Bolsheviks did have some 
capable military personnel and these few dependable and energetic individuals within the 
Red Army helped hold the mass of poorly fed and ill-equipped troops together.
42 A prime 
example in Karelia was Ivan Spiridonov.
43 He was an almost constant figure at the military 
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Sovetskoi Karelii, Poviashchennaia 100 Letiiu so Dnia Rozhdeniia V.I. Lenina i 50 Letiiu Karel’skoi ASSR. 
Petrozavodsk: Petrozavodskii Gosudarstvennyi Universitet im O.V. Kuusinena, Institut Iazyka, Literatury i 
Istorii Karel’skogo Filiala AN SSR, 1970. 20; Tarasov, Bor’ba. 175.   231 
front in Karelia who managed to keep his railway guard detachment together despite its 
deprivations.
44 In December 1918 his railway detachment of Petrograd Red Guards was 
replaced by a 530 strong Finnish Red Guard detachment and by the beginning of 1919 both 
of these detachments were reformed into regular regiments of the Red Army.
45 The Finnish 
detachment became the 164
th Red Finnish regiment while Spiridonov’s detachment 
received reinforcements and was reformed into the 41
st Urosozero rifle regiment of railroad 
defence. The Urosozero regiment became something of a patchwork unit of various 
nationalities: Russians, Finns, Latvians, Estonians, Belorussians, Ukrainians and Chinese 
all served in the Urosozero regiment.
46 It is testament to Spiridonov’s command that he 
was able to keep such an assorted regiment together. Furthermore, he remained an active 
participant at the front even after being shot at the battle for Segezha in 1919.
47 By April 
1919 at the latest Spiridonov was back at the front and issuing orders to his men for the 
defence of Masel’ga.
48 As the Whites and the Allies pushed further south and the pressure 
on the Bolshevik forces increased in the spring and summer of 1919 the demands on the 
Urosozero regiment intensified. A Red Army information bulletin for June 1919 reported 
that because of a prolonged period at the front Spiridonov’s men were tired and in need of 
a rest.
49 In spite of this the regiment’s resilience was rewarded. On 26 July 1919 
Spiridonov’s regiment was awarded the Order of the Red Banner in recognition of the 
regiment’s battles against the Allies and the White Russians.
50 
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Addressing the food crisis: the end of the kombedy, the introduction of the 
razverstka and the Fifth Olonets Provincial Congress of Soviets 
Chapter 5 showed that the kombedy were intrusive institutions which contributed to 
peasant unrest and had little positive impact on Karelia’s food supply shortages. As a result 
of similar circumstances in other parts of Soviet held territory, leading Bolsheviks at the 
Sixth All-Russian Congress of Soviets (6-9 November 1918) announced the decision to 
merge the kombedy with parish soviets. However, Bolshevik leaders would not admit 
directly that the kombedy project was a failure. Indeed the purpose and importance of the 
kombedy in the class struggle was underlined. During a speech at a meeting of kombedy 
delegates from the central provinces on the 8 November Lenin pronounced their success: 
‘we decided to split the village…And that is exactly what is taking place. The split in the 
village only served to bring about more clearly who are the poor peasants, who are the 
middle peasants not employing the labour of others, and who are the parasites and 
kulaks.’
51   
 
Local Bolsheviks in Karelia relayed Lenin’s stance. V.T. Gur’ev, the Bolshevik 
chairman of the Povenets district soviet, defended the kombedy in the Olonets provincial 
Izvestiia. At the time he suggested that the withdrawal of the kombedy may lead to 
assumptions that the Bolsheviks were wrong to introduce this institution into the 
countryside but, answering his own question, he refuted the notion:
52  
 
We were right, a thousand times right. We needed the kombedy, like we needed 
food, as a means for our own subsistence. The kombedy did us an indispensable 
service. They helped us divide the village, they drove away the bourgeoisie, 
speculators and marauders to the trenches and, on the whole, they were destroyed.  
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Although Lenin made no direct admission that the kombedy were unsuccessful he 
did admit to the party’s failings in the countryside more generally. Referring to the 
Bolsheviks’ attempts to spread their influence to rural areas the Bolshevik leader stated at 
the Sixth All-Russian Congress of Soviets: ‘work here is even more difficult than in 
industry and even more mistakes are being made by our local committees and soviets. But 
they learn from mistakes. We are not afraid of making mistakes when they are made by 
ordinary people who take a conscientious attitude to socialist construction…’
53 Again 
Gur’ev echoed the Bolshevik leader’s remarks but openly admitted the failings of the 
kombedy:
54    
 
We, comrades, do not need to close our eyes to our own deficiencies, it is necessary 
to expose [kleimit’] them in order to be cleansed [ochistit’sia] of them. It must be 
realised that the work of many of the kombedy was corrupt [and] many kombedy 
alienated themselves from the middle peasant…Comrades we must understand this 
circumstance, take stock and undertake a withdrawal. 
 
In other words the party realised that the kombedy project had failed but at the same time it 
highlighted the Bolsheviks’ need for a change of tactics. Something could also be salvaged 
from the demise of the kombedy; as shown in Chapter 5, the reorganisation of the kombedy 
served the purpose of increasing Red Army recruits through the organisation of special 
model regiments. Furthermore, the merger of the kombedy with rural soviets opened up the 
opportunity to undertake a short political agitation campaign in the countryside and the 
chance to oversee the election of new and potentially more supportive local soviets. On 20 
November the Petrozavodsk town Bolshevik party committee chose 25 members to go 
round Olonets province to organise model regiments of the village poor and to carry out 
the elections of the local soviets (see Chapter 5, p.180). Party members from the district 
towns and Petrograd also took part in the selection of individuals for the model regiments 
and oversaw the local elections.
55       
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The kombedy failed to alleviate the food crisis in the Karelian districts but a lack of 
food was a problem which plagued local Bolsheviks throughout the civil war regardless of 
the ‘solutions’ adopted. The Fifth Olonets Provincial Congress of Soviets (25-31 January 
1919) revealed an already familiar story of chronic shortages in the Karelian districts.
56 A 
congress delegate from Olonets district remarked that some of the population were mixing 
grain with sawdust and Tulmozerskaia parish had no money to purchase food products 
from the provincial commissariat for food. A member of the Povenets district soviet 
executive committee described his district as ‘a bare wasteland’ and remarked that the 
population there were enduring ‘enormous hardships.’ Because of the presence of the 
Allies further north fishing access was blocked off and some of the population were eating 
sawdust and tree bark. Furthermore, there was a mass exodus of families from 
Danilovskaia parish in search of food and over the past two years 57% of the districts’ 
cattle had been slaughtered. In short, the local peasant economy was disintegrating.
57 
      
To address the issue of hunger in the grain deficit regions and to supply the Red 
Army a significant change in central government food supply policy took place in January 
1919 when a surplus-appropriation system, the razverstka, was officially introduced as an 
alternative to the grain monopoly of the Food Supply Dictatorship. Under this system, 
whose origins under the Soviet regime are traceable from the summer of 1918, local soviet 
officials in the grain producing regions were handed a food supply quota to fulfil under 
threat of punishment if it was not carried out.
58 Gradually, more than cereal products 
became part of the razverstka but the system itself differed from previous food supply 
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campaigns in 1918 because quotas were now set and passed down from above instead of 
being passed up from below according to local surplus estimates.
59 
 
A wish for tighter centralisation and control over food supply between the capital 
and the grain producing provinces lay partly behind the switch to the razverstka. Without a 
form of centralised and co-ordinated action between centre and periphery, without the 
support of the capital, food shortages in a deficit region such as Karelia were 
insurmountable. Until now little analysis of what the razverstka meant for the grain deficit 
regions has been made.
60 The system which evolved was complex. Through its own agents 
the provincial commissariat for food carried out grain and fodder purchases in other 
provinces but supply orders were allocated by the centre, which were rarely, if ever, 
fulfilled in their entirety (see below and Chapters 4 and 8). Therefore, although a number 
of food supply detachments left the Karelian districts during the civil war to secure grain, 
individual agents representing the province were also active in the food producing regions 
endeavouring to dispatch foodstuffs to Olonets province. Local representation in grain 
producing provinces by agents from the grain deficit regions was not a unique feature of 
1919 but overlapped from the latter part of 1918. For example, a number of agents working 
on behalf of Olonets province were sent to Petrograd, Moscow, Tambov and Viatka 
between the 14 and 30 October to purchase various goods.
61  
 
Although the centre allocated food supply orders to Olonets province, it appears 
that local leaders still provided their own calculations for the amount of grain required. 
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However, influenced by their experience of delayed food supply orders in the past or the 
arrival of insufficient quantities, local food supply officials erred on the side of caution and 
produced high estimates. At the Fifth Olonets Provincial Congress of Soviets in January 
1919 S.K. Pukhov, the provincial commissar for food reported that at a recent food supply 
conference in Moscow the Olonets provincial food commissariat and the provincial land 
department had presented their own information to the conference delegates about the 
amount of seed required for spring sowing. However, Pukhov admitted at the Olonets 
provincial congress that if they only received 75% of the amount of seed suggested then 
this would still be enough because the information presented at the Moscow conference by 
the provincial commissariat for food was exaggerated.
62 Later in the year the head of the 
provincial agricultural department noted that Olonets province asked for 800,000 puds of 
spring seed but was assigned an order of 350,000 puds of which only 176,308 puds, or 
roughly 50%, were delivered.
63 
 
Pukhov also tried to put a positive slant on the food crisis at the provincial congress: 
‘at the current time the centre has already paid attention to Olonets and things have got 
better.’ By way of example he read out a telegram which stated that 7 million puds of grain 
were lying at collection points in Samara province waiting to be dispatched to Olonets 
province.
64 The grain lying in Samara could therefore be the answer to Olonets province’s 
problems. How much of this grain was actually allotted to Olonets province must have 
been trifling because the food crisis continued for the remainder of the year (see below and 
Chapter 8). Furthermore Pukhov admitted that it was impossible to get these loads moving 
out of Samara province because of the general disorder in railroad transportation and a 
shortage of rolling stock.
65 The irony, pointed out by another delegate, was that hundreds 
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of railroad carriages were being used by the Murmansk railroad workers as living 
accommodation.
66  
 
As part of the proposed solution to the food supply problem Pukhov appealed to the 
congress delegates to nominate 30 ‘experienced workers’ from amongst themselves to be 
sent to Moscow and from there to the provincial food supply commissariats of the grain 
producing provinces which were assigned grain orders for Olonets province.
67 Where and 
when these delegates were sent is unknown but the sending of so many local 
representatives to join food supply organs in other provinces was clearly considered a more 
effective means of improving the dispatch of food supplies to the periphery and was 
intensified by the new razverstka system. According to V.T. Gur’ev, speaking at the Sixth 
Olonets Provincial Congress of Soviets (26 September-1 October 1919), from the autumn 
of 1918 50 provincial representatives were sent via Moscow to join the local food supply 
organs of the grain producing provinces.
68  
 
Descriptions of the food situation around the Karelian districts during the civil war 
went hand in hand with words such as ‘catastrophic’, ‘desperate’ and ‘critical’ but at the 
Fifth Olonets Provincial Congress of Soviets Pukhov defended his position. He believed 
that without more grain deliveries and central assistance there was little he could do: 
‘Overall, comrades, the Provincial Commissariat for Food has done everything it can to 
obtain a little more grain for Olonets province and it is not our fault if for whatever reason 
we are not successful in receiving sufficient quantities.’
69 However, other party delegates 
criticised the food commissariat’s work which displayed the importance of local 
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circumstances. Pukhov received a complaint from Povenets district which queried the 
unusually high ration of grain sent to Tolvuiskaia parish in Petrozavodsk district (a parish 
that took part in the recent December Zaonezh’e uprisings) while in Povenets district there 
was widespread malnourishment. In response the provincial commissar for food replied 
that his commissariat distributed all foodstuffs available evenly and fairly according to 
requirement. Nevertheless, he explained that certain ‘technical conditions’, such as the 
difficulties of shipment or a lack of transportation, meant food loads were not distributed 
immediately to all districts.
70 
  
In spite of these criticisms the congress recognised that solving the food crisis was 
not possible through local efforts alone and decided to implement a number of measures 
and directives to try and ease the shortages. A 16 point resolution was adopted which 
reflected local Bolsheviks’ additional organisational efforts and adoption of new tactics, 
some based on central decrees, to try and bring greater efficiency to the regime’s food 
supply apparatus. For instance, for the first time during the civil war the transport of 
significant numbers of grain loads from the east to the Karelian districts was possible along 
the country’s waterways. The previous year’s navigational period was disrupted because of 
conditions elsewhere in the country; the Czech Legion was positioned along large sections 
of the Volga while the Whites held Samara until October 1918. Therefore to compensate 
for any further disruption or delay on the railroads the congress prioritised the need to 
organise water transportation and prepare workers’ artels to load barges and navigate them 
along the Mariinsk canal and river system.
71 At the same time the congress delegates 
resolved to enter discussions with Moscow and the Murmansk, Archangel and Northern 
railroad organisations about the urgent supply of grain loads by rail to Olonets province 
from the food producing provinces.
72 
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The congress evidently considered transportation deficiencies a crucial area for 
improvement. As a result the delegates also decided to appeal to Sovnarkom to temporarily 
put a stop to passenger movements along the railway line to let food loads pass with as 
little disruption as possible and to appeal to the capital to create a worker-peasant 
inspectorate from local soviet representatives to review the work of the Murmansk, 
Archangel and Northern railway lines.
73 However, the Fifth Olonets Provincial Congress 
of Soviets also took its lead from the capital. As seen in Chapter 5, on 10 December 1918 
Sovnarkom decided to allow all workers’ and trade organisations the right, with the 
permission of their local soviet, to purchase and import non-cereal products. The congress 
delegates confirmed the introduction of a monopoly on vital products which were not part 
of the grain monopoly.
74 They also supported the capital’s creation of a workers’ 
inspectorate to audit the Soviet regime’s food supply organs and requested the newly 
elected provincial executive committee
75 to assign a worker-peasant inspectorate to carry 
out a review and oversee all the province’s food supply organs.
76 
 
Finally the congress resolved to organise provincial offices (kontora) in both 
Moscow and Petrograd to assist in the distribution of food stuffs around the district food 
commissariats and to improve coordination between the centre and the provincial food 
authorities.
77 Furthermore, the congress delegates entrusted the new provincial soviet 
executive committee to assign the best workers to the province’s food supply organs and to 
organise the accounts of the provincial and local food organs’ bookkeeping more 
effectively.
78    
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  The resolutions taken at the Fifth Olonets Provincial Congress of Soviets 
concerning the food supply situation clearly marked a new drive to improve the food 
supply crisis. Local leaders sought an increase in coordination between centre and 
periphery through the sending of delegates to work in the food supply organs in the capital 
and grain surplus provinces. The congress also aimed to prioritise transportation and 
exploit the waterways while improving administrative organisation in local food supply 
organs by supporting the creation of inspectorates and audits. Despite this, in the 
immediate aftermath of the congress the food supply crisis in the Karelian districts 
remained critical and the results of the new razverstka system would need to wait until the 
new harvest season. In the meantime local leaders concentrated on trying to improve the 
administrative efficiency of soviet employees. Some time in early 1919 the Northern 
Regional government in Petrograd tried to weed out incapable personnel by making soviet 
institution workers culpable for both misdemeanours and carelessness. On 3 February the 
Olonets district executive committee agreed to transmit to all government institutions and 
soviets the Northern Regional Soviet’s recent order which stated that individuals, including 
party members, would be sent to the revolutionary tribunal not only for malfeasance in 
office but for negligence in their work, poor accountability (plokhaia otchetnost’), 
ignorance of their own work related responsibilities and procrastination.
79       
 
However, projected improvements in administrative competency could not 
significantly improve the food supply shortages by themselves and the Karelian districts 
could not survive without grain imports from other provinces. This was also true for non-
cereal products, some of which were part of the new food monopoly introduced by 
Sovnarkom in December 1918 (see above). Purchases of non-cereal products could be 
made in richer food producing provinces but the decree was of little use within the less 
productive Karelian districts. A report on the food situation in Olonets province sent from 
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Petrozavodsk and written on 11 February 1919, informed Moscow that livestock numbers 
were very limited and there was an acute need for domestic meat imports; cattle numbers 
were low in Olonets province at the time of the report and almost all were retained 
exclusively for fertilising the land. The report also described poultry production in the 
province as weak and the majority of eggs came from other provinces. Finally, because of 
the poor quality of land and the climatic disasters of 1918, the potato harvest produced a 
very poor yield. Market gardening efforts (ogorodnichestvo) were also underdeveloped 
which meant there was a shortage of vegetables.
80 
 
Food supply, migration and the ebb and flow of war 
Before any stabilisation could occur war intervened to disrupt the implementation of the 
resolutions on food supply which were approved at the Fifth Olonets Provincial Congress 
of Soviets. Indeed when the military situation intensified in the spring it only exacerbated 
the already difficult food supply situation. Pukhov did not remain Olonets provincial 
commissar for food for long following the Fifth Olonets Provincial Congress of Soviets. 
Overall, he lasted little more than three months in his post until like his predecessor, I.F. 
Petrov, his health broke down and he was relieved of his duties. Pukhov remained on the 
Olonets provincial food board but was replaced as provincial commissar for food by V.T. 
Gur’ev on 21 February 1919. This decision was confirmed by the People’s Commissariat 
for Food the following day.
81 Gur’ev was the fourth Olonets provincial commissar for food 
in little over twelve months and he faced similar problems to his predecessors. A military 
report from 10 March noted that Olonets province was experiencing ‘colossal shortages’, 
people in Povenets district were dying of hunger and with the introduction of food 
surrogates into the populations diet, such as straw, there was a mass outbreak in stomach 
illnesses.
82 Petrozavodsk district was also suffering and because of a lack of grain 
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deliveries the majority of its inhabitants were consuming all the remaining grain seed that 
was required for planting. The chairman of the Petrozavodsk district soviet executive 
committee believed the district population was ‘doomed to extinction.’
83  
 
Pudozh district was in a similar position to Povenets and Petrozavodsk at 
approximately the same time but the situation there was complicated further by the Red 
Army’s mobilisation of horses and the fact that Pudozh was particularly detached from the 
railway line and Petrozavodsk. On 11 March 1919 the Pudozh district executive committee 
resolved to ask the Petrograd County military commissariat directly to free its horses from 
mobilisation and remove its carting obligations because the district had no other means of 
transport and its horses were required to gather wood and transport food supplies from 
Petrozavodsk.
84 The people of Pudozh were further unsettled because the forthcoming 
spring thaw would turn sleigh routes to mud and effectively cut the area off from the 
centre.
85 As a consequence rumours reached the district centre that the rural population was 
about to come to Pudozh town and take any remaining supplies by force. At an emergency 
session of the district executive committee on 22 March the committee braced itself and 
ordered the district military commissariat to place armed units in the town and in the 
building of the executive committee. The committee also ordered the head of the district 
militia to organise night patrols in the town. Finally, the executive committee sought to 
distribute as many agitators as possible around the parishes to try and ease the local unrest 
by explaining the reasons for the current food shortages.
86 
 
Even before the fighting got underway, therefore, Gur’ev faced an almost 
insurmountable task to feed the whole of the Karelian region and to keep local unrest at 
bay without central help and more domestic food imports. The situation by now had 
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become so bad that from January 1919 evacuations were considered. It is not clear if this 
project was purely a local initiative or was adopted against the background of the de-
Cossackisation campaign in the Don, part of which involved the resettlement there of non-
natives and was declared official policy by the Bolshevik party on 24 January 1919.
87 
Whatever the case the Olonets provincial soviet executive committee commissioned the 
provincial department of agriculture to organise this resettlement program and to 
communicate with the centre and the grain producing provinces which would take the 
migrants. In turn the department of agriculture asked the People’s Commissariat for 
Agriculture for help in the resettlement program and to indicate resettlement points for 
Olonets’ population. Moreover, the local department of agriculture sent a number of 
anxious telegrams to the grain producing provinces only some of which responded that 
they were willing to accept some of the migrants from Olonets province. However these 
other provinces requested only a certain number of settlers and under the condition that 
they be able-bodied and fit for agricultural work. The problem for the Olonets provincial 
department of agriculture was that it could not meet the demand of those who wished to 
migrate; between January and April 1919 up to 5000 people from Olonets province applied 
to be resettled.
88 
  
Sovnarkom issued a decree on 24 April 1919 which introduced a more systematic 
character to the resettlements and commissioned the People’s Commissar for Agriculture, 
with a budget of 10 million roubles, to organise the movement of starving workers and 
peasants from the north to the southern grain producing provinces and the Don Region.
89 
Olonets province received finances, regulations and instructions from the centre and 
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despite some delays by July 1919 sent more than 1000 people to the Don Region.
90 
However, resettling the populations from the north was more than a potential solution to 
easing the food crisis there. Instead the objective of the resettlement programme was two-
fold: as Peter Holquist has shown, the colonisation of non-natives in the Don Region was 
also part of the wider de-Cossackisation programme.
91 A Petrograd Bolshevik party 
representative in Petrozavodsk, speaking to members of the Olonets provincial soviet 
executive committee on 7 May, believed that the workers from the north migrating south 
would act as a ‘revolutionising element’ amongst the local population there.
92 The 
resettlement programme was however only temporary and its success limited. It may have 
lessened the food supply burden slightly in some of the Karelian districts but the demand 
to be resettled was much higher than the food producing provinces were willing to accept. 
By May, just as some of the first settlers were arriving in the Don, the Red Army began a 
gradual retreat before the White armies of General Denikin. The potential to send further 
groups of migrants south therefore came to halt.
93    
 
Any small gain from resettling the population to the south was more than 
undermined by a resettlement campaign introduced by the Whites which caused an influx 
of migrants from the north. On the 31 March 1919 the White leader, General Miller, in 
Archangel gave the order to allow all inhabitants in the northern region (Archangel and 
Murmansk) the right, up to 20 April, to declare their sympathies for the Soviet regime and 
make an application to move south beyond the borders of the Allied and White 
administration. Movements south would commence on 10 April.
94 Hardships were at least 
equally as bad for the Whites further north as they were for the Reds in the south. From 
March to early April the Allies and Whites managed to diffuse potential wide scale civilian 
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unrest and military disorder in the territory under their control.
95 The food supply situation 
was little better; on 2 April the British food supply controller for the Murmansk region 
noted that he was bombarded by people on a daily basis asking for more flour.
96 
Approximately 8500 applications were made by the population under Allied-White control, 
which delayed the implementation of the decree, but the first 205 Soviet ‘sympathisers’ 
were escorted south and arrived in Petrozavodsk on 9 May.
97 Naturally local Bolsheviks 
were in a panic as to what to do with this new burden. As well as the further strain on the 
food crisis there was nowhere to house the arriving refugees. Shortly before the arrival of 
the first of the refugees, the head of the Petrozavodsk town soviet’s housing department, 
informed his soviet executive committee that the housing crisis was critical.
98 
 
On 9 May the Olonets provincial revolutionary executive committee proposed to 
Petr Anokhin to discuss the movement of these refugees with Zinoviev; the following day 
he sent a telegram to Moscow, copying in Zinoviev.
99 A few days later, on 15 May, a 
telegram from M.M Litvinov, the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, informed 
Anokhin that Moscow was sending a protest to the British government.
100 However, the 
response from the capital was not so much concerned with the further strain that would be 
placed on the food and housing crisis in Petrozavodsk but with the entry of potential spies 
or opponents of the Soviet regime. Of the 205 Bolshevik ‘sympathisers’ who arrived in 
Petrozavodsk five were arrested as ‘White Guard spies.’
101 On 13 May the Defence 
Soviet
102 commissioned the Vecheka to establish strict control over the entry of refugees 
into Soviet territory so that anyone suspected of sympathising with the Whites would be 
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caught. The remainder were to be sent to work under agreement with the People’s 
Commissariat of the Economy and the People’s Commissariat for Agriculture.
103 
Sometime shortly thereafter the Olonets provincial revolutionary executive committee 
ordered the provincial Cheka and the railroad Cheka to implement Moscow’s order and if 
required set up a filtration camp (zagraditel’nyi punkt) nearer the front.
104 
 
While the Karelian districts struggled to survive the spring of 1919, Gur’ev 
endeavoured to secure as much grain as possible from the grain producing provinces. 
However, this was only partially successful because the food producing provinces 
struggled to meet the quotas assigned to them as part of the razverstka system and grain 
supplies only filtered through to Karelia in small amounts. This often led to a conflict of 
interests and clashes between the grain producing and the grain deficit provinces, with 
Moscow acting as mediator. On 7 April Gur’ev asked Moscow to order Simbirsk province 
to fulfil its order to Olonets province in full otherwise the population of his province would 
starve to death. According to the report of an Olonets provincial representative, Simbirsk 
only promised to carry out 15% of its orders for Olonets province.
105 By 8 May Simbirsk 
province declared that no more than 10% of Olonets province’s orders would be 
fulfilled.
106  
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Why was Simbirsk being so uncooperative? Firstly, it was a general problem of the 
razverstka system that the designated quotas of the grain producing provinces were too 
high. During the 1918-19 procurement campaign Simbirsk fulfilled only 39.1% of its 
designated grain quota.
107 Olonets province was not necessarily being singled out or sold 
short. Rather Simbirsk could not complete its supply orders in full because of its inability 
to meet the state’s overestimated surplus target. Secondly, the development of the civil war 
in Simbirsk and the surrounding region was significant. Encouraged by Admiral Kolchak’s 
advance westwards which began at the end of December 1918, mass numbers of people 
(up to 150,000) were rebelling against the Bolsheviks on the Volga by March 1919 
because of a combination of economic and political grievances.
108 Subsequently the 
peasants stopped bringing grain to collection points.
109 The rebellions were suppressed in 
April but local authorities must surely have been keen to improve their relations with the 
local population by retaining grain for their own purposes.  
 
The response of some of the other food producing provinces was no better: they 
also refused or could not complete orders in full. On 12 April Gur’ev informed Moscow 
that Voronezh and Viatka provinces had only completed 5% and 14% respectively of their 
orders to Olonets province for the months of January and February.
110 Like Simbirsk 
province, Vitaka and Voronezh fulfilled relatively small percentages of their set quota, 
24.7% and 31.4% respectively. Out of a total of 12 grain producing provinces assigned a 
set quota during the 1918-19 procurement campaign Viatka produced the worst overall 
                                                 
107For the designated quotas given to twelve of the grain surplus provinces based on the 1918 harvest and the 
amount actually collected see the table in M.I. Davydov, Bor’ba za Khleb. Prodovol’stvennaia Politika 
Kommunisticheskoi Partii i Sovetskogo Gosudarstva v Gody Grazhdanskoi Voiny (1917 1920). Moscow: 
“Mysl’”, 1971. 153. For the grain quotas apportioned to the grain surplus provinces based on the 1919 
harvest see Davydov, Bor’ba za Khleb. 154. 
108 On the unrest see: Figes, Peasant Russia. 324-333; V.N. Brovkin, Behind the Front Lines of the Civil War. 
Political Parties and Social Movements in Russia, 1918 1922. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994. 
98-100. For a synopsis of Kolchak’s advance see Smele, Civil War in Siberia. 308-314. 
109 Davydov, Bor’ba za Khleb. 148-149. 
110 RGAE, f.1943, op.7, d.1773, l.7.   248 
percentage. Voronezh had the fourth worst percentage return.
111 Local conditions again 
offer an explanation for the poor fulfilment of the razverstka. For example, railroad 
workers went on strike at Voronezh junction in early April over non-payment of wages.
112 
 
In Viatka province the advance of Admiral Kolchak’s White armies, which entered 
eastern Viatka during the spring of 1919, naturally put increased pressure on local soviets 
there when peasants began to rebel against requisitioning. Viatka subsequently became a 
short-term military priority; if the province fell it offered Kolchak a greater opportunity to 
link up with the British-led Allied forces on the Archangel front.
113 Grain within Viatka 
was therefore at a premium until the Whites were pushed back, internal unrest was pacified 
and Red Army recruits were provisioned. In other words the grain supply requirements of 
Olonets province from Viatka province were put to one side; at the end of April Moscow 
received a complaint from Petrozavodsk that Viatka province categorically refused to carry 
out its previous orders and also the order for April. Consequently, local Bolsheviks in 
Petrozavodsk asked Moscow to place the burden of Viatka’s orders on another province.
114  
 
The receipt of small percentages of the grain orders allocated to Olonets province 
was a major concern for local leaders but justified by the central authorities because it was 
part of a general problem. In other words the Karelian districts were not alone in receiving 
small percentages of the overall grain orders. A report from the department of supply of the 
People’s Commissariat for Food to the All-Russian Central Executive Committee on 15 
May confirmed this. For the months of January, February and March Olonets province 
received only 8%, 7% and 29% of its orders respectively, or 15% of the total for these 
three months. However, the department of supply deemed this to be satisfactory because 
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part of the region was occupied by the Allies and the percentages were the same for these 
three months as that received by the provinces of Novgorod and Petrograd, more than 
Vitebsk and Smolensk but less than Kaluga, Kostroma and Vladimir.
115 
 
Local Bolshevik leaders in Karelia were therefore competing with other grain 
deficit regions for the capital’s support and the allocation of as much grain as possible 
from the grain surplus provinces. To repeat, the percentages received were so small 
because the planned orders to be extracted from the grain producing provinces during the 
1918-19 delivery campaign, based on surplus estimates, were overambitious. None of the 
grain surplus provinces met their target and the average percentage of grain collected from 
all these provinces was only 38.4% of the total target quota.
116 Therefore the percentages 
that reached Olonets province appear particularly scant but when considered against how 
much actual grain was successfully collected then it is slightly less striking than at first 
glance. It is therefore worth remembering that the percentage completion rates of the grain 
orders must be considered alongside the total amount of grain allotted to Olonets province. 
When compared to a few other grain deficit provinces Olonets received more grain overall 
(see Table 5); in the months of January, February and March the provincial food 
commissariat was due to receive 220,000, 220,000 and 400,000 puds of grain 
respectively.
117 
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 Table 5 - A comparison of grain received (in puds) by deficit provinces in 
January, February and March 1919
118 
 
Province  January  February  March 
Olonets  34,000  31,000  99,000 
 ovgorod  21,807  7,020  12,894 
Petrograd  11,159  103,000  11,254 
Vitebsk  33,000  4,997  14,957 
Smolensk  No Data  3,023  33,842 
 
However, any improvement in the food shortages in Karelia by spring 1919 was not 
much better than the previous year. People were starving and dying of hunger and disease 
in some of the outlying Karelian parishes in 1919 as they were in 1918, district and 
provincial authorities faced peasant unrest (see below) and fewer than the expected total 
number of grain loads arrived in the region. For the Karelian districts the razverstka system 
and the allocation of fixed grain supply orders appears a more methodical system but this 
was not synonymous with an immediate improvement in food supplies. Instead, as we shall 
also see in Chapter 8, deliveries to the Karelian districts still ebbed and flowed in 1919 as 
they had done the previous year according to the development of the civil war elsewhere. 
Furthermore, food shortages were generally worse before the harvest but improved 
somewhat after the harvest. 
 
Rebellion on the Zaonezh’e peninsula, spring 1919  
When the Zaonezh’e peninsula rose up once more in May 1919 it was against the 
background of the ever present food shortages throughout the Karelian region and the 
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action of the Allies and the Whites. A report from the Petrozavodsk district militia on the 
political situation in the region for the month of April 1919 noted that the contentment of 
the populace, in the majority of circumstances, was dependent on food supply.
119 Of course, 
food shortages were felt across the Karelian districts at this time but specific local factors 
in Petrozavodsk district accentuated the feeling of unrest there. On 9 May the Petrozavodsk 
district executive committee highlighted that the food stores of the district were empty and 
the perceived inactivity of the district authorities was alienating the population. The 
population were also demoralised because the distributed grain ration, per person a month, 
had been considerably less in Petrozavodsk district over the past few months than it was in 
some of the adjacent parishes of Povenets district.
120 
 
The state-peasant relationship in Petrozavodsk district was also put under further 
strain by the activities of the Red Army. A relatively successful local mobilisation 
campaign had provided troops for the Red Army but provisioning them in turn became a 
major stumbling block for the Bolsheviks and contributed to peasant unrest as military 
units were compelled to provide for themselves and use what local resources were 
available. On 22 March the military commissar of the 1
st brigade, 19
th rifle division was 
informed by one of his battalion commissars that his troops lacked clothing, boots and a 
satisfactory amount of food, there was an uneven distribution of bread rations between 
regiments and troops had not received their salary for almost half a month. Because of 
these deficiencies the battalion commissar informed the brigade commissar that a few 
military units were carrying out illegal confiscations of hay, milk and meat from the local 
population and did not pay for the use of peasants’ horses or carts.
121 The Petrozavodsk 
district military commissariat in general was ill-disciplined. On 7 April six employees of 
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the commissariat got drunk on vodka and things took a turn for the worse when two men, 
one of whom was the district military commissar, went to the military commissariat. The 
military commissar then raped a 16 year old girl who worked as a courier for the 
commissariat while his companion took a horse for a joy ride.
122 
     
Problems which continued to discredit the military authorities continued until the 
eve of the rebellion. On the 9 May the district executive committee learned that because of 
a lack of credit the commander of the 40
th railroad regiment had refused to pay 7,957 
roubles owed to local citizens of Tividiiskaia parish (a parish in the Zaonezh’e peninsula) 
for the use of their carts.
123 Shortly after the beginning of the rebellion on the peninsula the 
chairman of the Tividiiskaia parish soviet executive committee also informed the 
Petrozavodsk district executive committee on 11 June, that Red Army men had been 
stealing the local peasantry’s property.
124 
 
Together with the food shortages and injustices faced by the local peasantry it was 
the military draft which finally sparked the uprising. Everyone called up to the Red Army 
from Shungskaia parish was due to register in Kiappesel’ga on the 17, 18 and 19 May. By 
then much of Karelia was under martial law as the Allies and Whites reached the northern 
borders of Petrozavodsk district at this time, capturing Povenets and the important railway 
station town of Medvezh’ia Gora on 17 and 21 May respectively.
125 Many of those called 
up to the Red Army therefore did not appear at the assembly point in Kiappesel’ga because 
rumours had spread that the Bolsheviks’ authority in the region was about to end and the 
Whites were gaining the upper hand. As a result, some of the mobilised men scattered 
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themselves in the surrounding forests while others continued to agitate among the populace 
in support of the Whites.
126  
 
When news of the peasantry’s resistance became known to the Povenets district 
military commissariat the response was uncompromising: a Red Army detachment was 
dispatched to Shungskaia parish on 21 May to bring the drafted men to Kiappesel’ga; and 
the detachment’s commander announced that all those who remained at large would have 
their families taken hostage and their property confiscated and sold. If this had no effect 
then the commander proclaimed he would burn villages to the ground. Consequently the 
deserters gathered together and decided not to take action but wait until the troubles had 
calmed down while hiding on the islands of one of the lakes surrounding the parish. On the 
evening of the 21 May the mobilised peasants boarded boats and moved out onto the water 
where, by chance, they came across a boat of fellow Shungskaia parish peasants who had 
deserted from the front. Together they decided to return home and disarm the Red Army 
detachment; they did so, killing two Red Army men in the process, including the 
detachment commander.
127 
 
The following day, 22 May, an emergency session of the Povenets district 
executive committee took place where the delegates present proposed to offer concessions 
to the peasantry. The committee resolved to distribute allowances to families of Red Army 
men and a stipend to the employees of the soviet institutions in the parish. A representative 
from the district soviet executive committee and the Shungskaia parish soviet executive 
committee were sent to the parish to put the decision into practice. At the same session the 
committee also resolved to commission the district food commissariat to release grain seed 
to Shungskaia parish.
128 However, the concessions came too late to stop the rebellion. The 
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same day a stormy meeting of all the citizens of Shungskaia parish took place in the nearby 
village of Shun’gskii Bor. A summons was issued to gather all available weapons to arm a 
partisan detachment, a military commander was then elected and a four man delegation 
formed, which would make contact with the Whites and ask for reinforcements, weapons 
and food.
129 This delegation found the White partisan commander Captain Dedov and his 
men the following day.
130 In the meantime the other rebels, now amounting to about 60 
individuals, disarmed and arrested all local communists and set up courts. A number of 
communist and communist sympathisers were beaten up, a total of 14 were executed.
131 
 
According to the report on the Shungskaia uprising made by the secret-operational 
department (sekretno operativnyi otdel) of the revolutionary tribunal, 42 White soldiers 
arrived in the parish centre of Shun’ga by boat on 23 May. The troops were not from 
Dedov’s forces but arrived under the command of a drunken Colonel Krugliakov, a 
partisan leader aligned with the Allies. Krugliakov immediately set up a court-martial 
made up of three representatives of the White detachment and three of the villagers of 
Shun’ga. Floggings with ramrods were meted out to anyone who the Whites believed were 
sympathetic to the Bolsheviks and four individuals, including a 75 year old man who had 
two communist sons, were executed.
132 Following this Krugliakov’s men took control of 
the entire administrative and operational organisation of the revolt, further reinforcements 
arrived from Povenets and the local rebels joined the ranks of his troops which now 
amounted to approximately 200 well armed men.
133 
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The Reds were initially driven back by the Shungskaia parish partisans at 
Shung’skii Bor. However once they had regrouped the Reds, with artillery support from 
the boats of the Onega flotilla, managed to push the partisans out of Shun’gskii Bor. At the 
same time a section of the attacking forces was recalled to Petrozavodsk to defend the 
town against the advance of the White Finns but reinforcements arrived from Vytegra 
district on 3 June. A two pronged attacking movement then forced the Whites and rebel 
fighters from Shungskaia on 5 June almost without loss to the Reds. However at this point 
in the fighting the Whites with the help of the Allied flotilla on Lake Onega repulsed the 
next Red attack, inflicting considerable casualties on the attackers who withdrew to 
Tolvuia and then concentrated at Kuzaranda.
134 Some of the Shungskaia peasant rebels 
then managed to escape to Povenets with the Whites.
135 
 
Like the previous rebellion on the Zaonezh’e peninsula in December 1918 other 
uprisings also flared up at the same time in the surrounding region, most notably in 
Tolvuiskaia and Tivdiiskaia parishes.
136 Some of the causes of the peninsula rebellion 
mirrored those of the unrest of the previous year, for example food shortages and the 
military draft. However the peasant rebellions in the spring of 1919 also took on a different 
form than the previous year because the military situation was different and determined 
how the rebellion developed. Most significant was the proximity of the front and peasants’ 
perceptions of who was going to win the civil war. There was little point joining the side 
which at the time appeared to be facing defeat or a regime which struggled to provide for 
its soldiers and whose Red Army had perpetrated a number of injustices on the local 
population. However, when the Whites arrived, it quickly became apparent that they were 
equally heavy handed and the villagers’ resistance towards the Red Army mobilisation was 
in vain because they were quickly mobilised into the ranks of the White forces. As a matter 
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of fact General Maynard informed the War Office on 24 May that he favoured the advance 
of his Russian troops into the rebellious areas north-east of Petrozavodsk as it would 
facilitate good prospects for recruitment.
137 As a result, with the arrival of the Whites, the 
peasantry simply traded one intrusive and coercive regime for another. 
   
  It was not the case that the Bolsheviks did not know of the potential for unrest on 
the peninsula or the significance of the advance of the Whites. On 9 May the Petrozavodsk 
district soviet executive committee asked the Olonets provincial military commissariat, 
provincial food board and provincial party committee to pay serious attention to the hunger 
situation in their district. The district committee also sought to increase the issue of oats in 
the Zaonezh’e parishes according to the development of the military situation.
138 But the 
attempts to pacify the peasant communities came too late and in reality there was little 
grain to distribute in the first place. Once the rebellion began the Bolsheviks adopted more 
hard line tactics; on the 27 May the Petrozavodsk district military commissar informed the 
provincial military commissar that 150 Red Army men were in Tolvuia and a number of 
arrests had been made.
139 Furthermore, on the 2 June White Russian troops leaving 
Povenets by boat reported to the Allied command that they were forced to turn back after 
they encountered Bolshevik steamboats shelling villages.
140 Into July the Red Army 
continued to terrorise the population of Petrozavodsk district. A military report dated 31 
July noted: ‘The Red Army men are running riot (beschinstvovat’) around the district, 
instilling fear in the peasantry they plunder potatoes and steal livestock.’
141 
 
The Zaonezh’e rebellion was ultimately a sign of the Bolsheviks’ precarious hold 
on the region. They could not control the food crisis and therefore could not feed the 
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peasantry to stop it from rebelling and they could not effectively control the Red Army and 
stop it from looting. They tried to meet the challenge of the rebels with force and 
concessions but could not pacify the Zaonezh’e parishes because the unrest became 
embroiled in the civil war fighting with the Allies and White Army which at that time had 
the upper hand. On 3 June White troops under Captain Dedov landed at Shun’ga where 
they inflicted a heavy defeat on the Reds.
142 The Red Army also failed to retake 
Tivdiiskaia parish the following month; General Maynard informed the War Office on 14 
July that the Allies and Whites had defeated 500 Red Army troops under Ivan Spiridonov 
trying to capture the parish centre Tivdiia.
143  
 
Conclusion 
By mid-1919 the Bolsheviks in Karelia had a locally raised Red Army and the kombedy, 
institutions which had been a major cause of peasant unrest in the past, were effectively 
disbanded. Local Bolsheviks were also adapting to a new, more methodical food supply 
system in the form of the razverstka. But for every potentially positive step forward the 
Bolsheviks made, their attempts to gain more control over the problems they faced were 
held back by the vicissitudes of the civil war in Karelia and elsewhere. The implementation 
of the resolutions on food supply at the Fifth Olonets Provincial Congress of Soviets had 
scarcely had the chance to improve the shortages before the military threats made the 
situation even worse and peasant rebellion once again raged in the Zaonezh’e peninsula 
and became caught up in the Allied-White advance from spring 1919. By this time the civil 
war was reaching its peak in Karelia. The White Finns were on the retreat by July 1919 but 
the Allied-White advance lasted until September 1919 and inflicted numerous defeats on 
the defending Red forces. Yet, the Bolshevik regime in Karelia survived and the key 
reasons for this will be discussed in the final chapter. 
                                                 
142 Ibid., entry for 4 June 1919. 70 Red Army troops were either killed or wounded 
143 Telegram from General Maynard to War Office, 14 July 1919. WO 33/967a/131, No.2633. On 21 July the 
War Office was informed that the Bolsheviks lost 40 killed and 57 wounded. Telegram from General 
Maynard to War Office, 21 July 1919. WO 33/967a/143, No.2710.   258 
Chapter 8 
The Fine Lines of Victory, January-November 1919 
The last three chapters have shown that, although it was a case of “one step forward and 
two steps back”, a process complicated by the Allied-White advance of spring-summer 
1919, the Bolsheviks had introduced important measures to gain tighter control over the 
Soviet regime: a new Olonets provincial Cheka and Cheka chairman was elected; the Red 
Terror was introduced; former political rivals were absorbed into the Bolshevik party; a 
local Red Army was raised; the kombedy were merged with parish soviets and new 
organisational efforts were made to try and improve the food supply crisis. However, at the 
same time the Bolsheviks were regularly hamstrung by a lack of resources and a wide scale 
peasant rebellion broke out in the Zaonezh’e peninsula. But, ultimately, the Bolsheviks 
survived. 
  
This chapter will suggest reasons for their survival and their ability to consolidate 
their position. It will begin by exploring an issue touched on in Chapter 5, the demise of 
the Northern Commune and the increase in centralisation from Moscow after the Eighth 
Bolshevik Party Congress in March 1919, although this did not take place without 
problems; the dismissal of the Olonets provincial soviet’s military commissar in particular 
caused much upset and protest in Petrozavodsk. Second the implementation of the 
razverstka food supply system meant that grain supply orders were organised more 
systematically. Ultimately a lack of grain in Karelia persisted for the duration of the civil 
war, but nevertheless, there were small signs before the end of 1919 that some 
improvement even in the food supply situation had been made. Thirdly, the improvements 
seen in the discipline and order of the Cheka at the end of 1918 and early 1919 were built 
upon. In 1919 the provincial Cheka became a relatively more reliable and responsible tool 
of governance. Despite sporadic incidents of indiscipline within its ranks, by the time of 
the military crisis in spring/summer 1919 the institutional conflict with the soviets of the   259 
previous year had disappeared. Finally, the Bolshevik party managed to gain enough 
control over desertion and retain enough men by showing its increased intent, by decree 
and practically, to support the welfare of their soldiers and soldiers’ families. This allowed 
the local Bolsheviks and the Red Army to fend off the military threats to the regime and 
build a stronger soldier-state relationship than it had done before this time. By the autumn 
of 1919 the Bolsheviks had defeated the White Finns and the Allies had evacuated North 
Russia. Soviet Karelia was, to a large extent, secured. 
 
Centralisation: the Fedulov case and the Dubrovskii affair 
Chapter 5 touched upon the desire of local Bolsheviks in Olonets province to remain 
within the Northern Commune and the frictions that were apparent between Petrograd and 
the capital regarding Moscow’s desire to centralise power which would undermine 
Petrograd’s authority. Not all provinces wished to remain in the Northern Commune and in 
January 1919 Vologda and North-Dvina provinces had their request to leave the Commune 
accepted by the presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee. It signalled 
the beginning of the end for the Northern Regional government and party committee. At 
the Third Congress of Soviets of the Northern Region on 24 February 1919 the delegates 
present resolved to dissolve the Northern Commune and hand direct control of its 
provinces to Moscow. The Northern Regional party committee decided to continue to 
operate up to the Eighth Bolshevik Party Congress (18-23 March 1919)
1 and on 24 March 
it was dissolved by the party Central Committee.
2 
 
                                                 
1 P.F. Anokhin, Ia.K. Berztys and I.A. Danilov represented Olonets province at the congress. Vos’moi S’ezd 
RKP (b), Mart 1919 Goda. Protokoly. Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel’stvo Politicheskoi Literatury, 1959. 
457-458; 460. For a brief overview of the congress see R.H. McNeal, ed., Resolutions and decisions of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Vol.2. The Early Soviet Period: 1917 1929. Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1974. 50-54.  
2 Khmelevskii, Severnyi. 203-206. Together with other Bolsheviks Elena Stasova had again expressed her 
wish on 14 February, at a session of the bureau of the Northern Regional party committee, to retain the 
regional committee believing that the Central Committee would encumber itself with all the new party 
committees that would come under its guidance if the regional party administration was liquidated.     260 
A drive for centralisation was one of the key principles adopted at the Eighth 
Bolshevik Party Congress: ‘The party is in the position when strict centralism and the 
sternest discipline are absolutely necessary. All decisions of a higher authority are 
absolutely compulsory for those below it. Every decision must firstly be carried out and 
only then is it permissible to appeal to the corresponding party organ.’
3 The congress also 
recognised the centralisation of the military apparatus and formally approved ‘regular’ 
army recruitment, formations and discipline and the use of former tsarist officers, 
supervised by commissars. These resolutions were passed despite initial protests from the 
‘military opposition’ within the party who were opposed to Trotsky’s reliance on more 
conventional military principles, particularly the employment of officers who had served 
under the Tsar. However the ‘military opposition’ were successful in reinforcing the role of 
the military commissars, who oversaw the work of the military commanders, and 
advocating the need to pay more attention to communist opinion in the army.
4  
 
Prior to the congress Trotsky, who would not attend it because of the military threat 
on the eastern front, hoped to stave off criticism about the command structure of the Red 
Army by assuring his adversaries that the threat of ‘Bonapartism’ would be avoided 
because of the presence of the party in the Red Army and throughout the Soviet regime.
5 
Concerns regarding the emergence of a military dictator are important to mention here 
because they had direct repercussions in Karelia when in April, as we shall see below, the 
Olonets provincial military commissar A.V. Dubrovskii was dismissed by the head of the 
Petrograd Military County, B.P. Pozern.
6 Pozern was subsequently accused of 
‘Bonapartism’ by local Bolsheviks in Petrozavodsk. 
                                                 
3 Vos’moi S’ezd RKP (b). 426. 
4 On military policy at the Eighth Party Congress see Benvenuti, The Red Army. 92-128.  
5 Benvenuti, The Red Army. 93; 96-97. 
6 Boris Pozern (1882-1939) joined the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party in 1902. From 1917-1918 he 
was commissar for the Northern front and from 1918-1919 Staff Commissar of the Petrograd Military 
County. He was a member of the Revolutionary Military Soviets of the Seventh Red Army (August 1918-5 
May 1919), the Western front (5 June-1 August 1919), the Eastern front (11 August 1919-15 January 1920) 
and the Fifth Red Army (3 February-5 December 1920). Direktivy Glavnogo Komandovaniia Krasnoi Armii   261 
In Karelia local incidents in the military commissariats brought out clearly the 
changes in policy inaugurated at the Eighth Party Congress. Before the congress attempts 
at centralisation were not well received. In mid-January 1919 Petrograd ordered the 
Olonets district military commissariat to temporarily remove F.M. Fedulov, the district 
military commissar, from his post for getting drunk with a number of Red Army troops. 
The Olonets district executive committee was angered by Petrograd’s intrusion because the 
affair had already been discussed and dealt with by the local authorities. Experienced 
military personnel were a valuable asset and for this reason soviets or party committees 
often stood by them through bouts of indiscipline because of the shortage of capable 
personnel; Fedulov was reproached but pardoned by the local party for his actions because 
of his previous work in the district soviet. The Olonets district executive committee 
therefore asked the provincial and Northern Regional Bolshevik party committees to 
resolve the Fedulov case, stressing that he was an irreplaceable worker.
7  
 
The Olonets provincial executive committee also stood by Fedulov at one of its 
sessions on 24 January and recognised his value as a district military commissar and a 
member of the district party organisation, the provincial executive committee and the 
provincial military commissariat.
8 Fedulov did not remain without his post for long; on 25 
January 1919 Fedulov was re-elected as the Olonets district’s joint military commissar and 
one of two deputy chairmen in the Olonets district executive committee’s presidium.
9 In 
this instance the periphery prevailed in its support for their local military commissar but in 
a not too dissimilar incident shortly after the Eighth Party Congress, the centre’s will 
triumphed over the periphery and reflected the party’s shift towards increased 
centralisation and control over the regions. 
                                                                                                                                                    
(1917 1920). Sbornik Dokumentov. Moscow: Voennoe Izdatel’stvo Ministerstva Oborony SSSR, 1969. 828; 
Lenin, Polnoe. Vol.50. 553.   
7 GARF f.R-393, op.13, d.263, l.1; 8-8ob. 
8 Ibid. d.249, l.27ob-28. 
9 Ibid. d.263, l.5.   262 
On 15 April A.F. Kopnin of the Olonets provincial executive committee received a 
note by direct wire on behalf of Boris Pozern, the military commissar for the Northern 
military County. It stated that because of the weakness of Arsenii Dubrovskii, the Olonets 
provincial military commissar, he should be replaced with a more active worker. A 
provisional replacement, P.V. Iakobson from Petrograd province was being sent to 
Petrozavodsk. If the provincial soviet had its own candidate then it was to inform Pozern. 
Iakobson arrived in Petrozavodsk on 23 April with an official letter stating that he was to 
be shown full assistance in his post and Dubrovskii was to be given another position.
10 The 
Olonets provincial Bolshevik party committee and the provincial executive committee 
agreed to accept Iakobson as the province’s provisional military commissar on 25 April.
11 
Local Bolsheviks tried to replace him with their own candidate on 16 May 1919 and 
proposed to inform Zinoviev of this by direct wire and to submit a report to the party 
Central Committee.
12 However, for whatever reason, the local Bolsheviks’ candidate did 
not take up his post and Iakobson kept his job at least until the Third Olonets Provincial 
Party Conference in September 1919. 
 
 As noted in Chapter 7 Dubrovskii’s dismissal came on the eve of an attack by the 
White Finns, the first troops of which crossed the Russian-Finnish border on the night of 
the 21 April 1919. Pozern was informed by Dubrovskii on 24 April that Vidlitskaia, 
Tulmozskaia, Rypushkal’skaia parishes and part of Nekkul’skaia parish (all Olonets 
district) were occupied by the White Finns and Olonets town had been evacuated.
13 In a 
telegram to Moscow on 3 May the Bolsheviks in Petrozavodsk (the presidiums of the party 
and the Olonets provincial soviet executive committee) emphasised the significance of the 
military threat: if the White Finns occupied Lodeinoe Pole, Povenets and Petrozavodsk 
                                                 
10 NARK, f.R-28, op.1, d.30, l.105. 
11 Ibid. l.114ob. 
12 NARK, f.P-4, op.1, d.33, l.103. The name of the Olonets provincial Bolshevik party’s candidate was 
Kirilov. 
13 Balagurov and Mashezerskii, Kareliia v Period. 53.   263 
districts would be cut off from the rest of the country and the seizure of the river Svir’ 
would disrupt water transportation. The local Bolsheviks also explained that at the first 
sign of the White Finnish advance they announced a full mobilisation of party members 
and communist sympathisers in Petrozavodsk town and all the districts. Moreover: ‘At this 
moment Comrade Dubrovskii rose to the occasion, displaying a presence of mind and great 
resourcefulness.’
14  
 
The presidiums of the Olonets provincial party committee and soviet executive 
committee believed a change of military commissar at such a serious time for the region 
was unwise because Iakobson would need time to become acquainted with local conditions. 
Furthermore they were angered by Pozern’s attitude who, without any basis, had accused 
Dubrovskii of being weak whereas in their mind Dubrovskii had worked energetically in 
Olonets province from the moment the Red Army was formed. In response to Pozern’s 
accusation Petr Anokhin requested a full explanation. Pozern replied, but to Dubrovskii, 
copying in the provincial soviet executive committee on 24 April. Pozern stated that he had 
not been informed of events in Olonets or given detailed reports about the situation in other 
districts: ‘You and everyone were caught napping; you will be committed to the 
revolutionary tribunal. Immediately pass your position to Iakobson. Inform me when this is 
done.’
15 This ‘coarse attack’ in response to Petr Anokhin’s request to explain the charge 
levied against Dubvrovskii ‘filled the provincial executive committee and the provincial 
party committee with deep indignation.’
16 Speaking on behalf of the provincial executive 
committee and the provincial party committee Anokhin informed Pozern that they were in 
disagreement with the Petrograd County military commissar’s order and that they could 
not comply unless detailed facts were provided about the accusation cast against 
Dubrovskii.
17    
                                                 
14 NARK, f.R-28, op.1, d.30, l.105-105ob. 
15 Ibid. l.105ob; 114ob. 
16 Ibid. l.105ob.  
17 For Anokhin’s telegram to Pozern see Ibid. l.113-114.   264 
In short, local Bolsheviks believed that if Pozern wanted to remove Dubrovskii 
then this could have been possible without discrediting him and his services to the 
revolution. Moreover, because of the vagueness of Pozern’s accusation, the local 
Bolsheviks believed they had the right to be given more detailed facts but as yet had not 
received any. Pozern had also cast an accusation that Dubrovskii and others in Olonets 
province had been ‘napping’ and not informed him of the situation in good time. 
Conversely the local Bolsheviks believed they had passed on information regarding the 
movement of the White Finns as soon as they had received it from the districts. Therefore 
if any one was ‘napping’ then it was not the provincial military commissar who did not 
direct the operations at the front but the field staff. However, local Bolsheviks tried to 
dismiss apportioning any blame upon the field staff and did not believe that the men at the 
front were slow to react. Indeed they believed the field staff had done everything within 
their own power to save the situation but were helpless due to a lack of reinforcements. 
The White Finns had outflanked the military units in Olonets district and the Reds’ 
telegraph communications had been broken. Such an attacking movement had been 
foreseen by the Bolsheviks in Petrozavodsk who had in fact informed the centre and 
Pozern to prepare for such an attack. Yet, when A.F. Kopnin visited the Petrograd County 
military commissariat in the beginning of March 1919 and made a report on the military 
situation in Olonets province he received the answer ‘It is no business of ours.’
18  
 
Therefore local Bolsheviks believed that the responsibility for the defence of the 
region lay with the centre for failing to provide reinforcements for the men in the field, 
despite advanced warnings from Petrozavodsk but, as it turned out, Dubrovskii was cast as 
the scapegoat for the defeats by the White Finns. Reflecting the official party line which 
was resolved at the Eighth Party Congress, the Bolsheviks in Petrozavodsk agreed to carry 
out Pozern’s decision to replace Dubrovskii because it was a military order whose 
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fulfilment was obligatory. However, at the same time they exercised their right to protest 
and did so before the party Central Committee, the All-Russian Central Executive 
Committee and the Revolutionary Military Soviet of the Republic against Pozern’s actions 
which, they believed, smacked of Bonapartism. Pozern’s coarse attitude towards the 
provincial authorities and his dismissal of Dubrovskii at a critical time for the region had 
undermined the soviets and as a result they requested that Pozern be committed to the court 
of the military revolutionary tribunal and the discredited Dubrovskii be rehabilitated.
19 
Finally, the Olonets provincial party committee proposed to the party Central Committee 
to pay serious attention to the Pozern case while at the same time treat its cadres of 
‘ideologically minded party workers’ such as Dubrovskii more carefully because they 
worked tirelessly and carried the main burden of party and soviet work.
20      
 
  It remains unknown exactly why Dubrovskii was dismissed by Pozern as early as 
15 April, that is, before the White Finns crossed the border, because the Bolsheviks had not 
suffered any recent serious set back. They had lost the railroad town of Urosozero on 11 
April
21 but still held Medvezh’ia Gora, the most important point south of Segezha. A few 
further advances on the flanks of the railway were also successfully carried out by the 
White Russians, supported by the Allies in mid-April but these occurred after Pozern’s 
telegram ordering Dubrovskii’s removal for being weak.
22 However, when Pozern’s 
second telegram was received on 24 April and accused Dubrovskii and others of ‘napping’ 
it is clear he was making reference to the rapid advance of the White Finns. 
 
                                                 
19 Ibid. l.114ob-115. Although Pozern held a number of important military posts during the civil war (see 
above, footnote 6) Lenin personally questioned his ability on at least two occasions following the Dubrovskii 
affair. On one of these occasions in mid-September 1919 he expressed his concern regarding Pozern’s 
appointment as one of the men in charge of the Siberian front, describing him as ‘an old woman’. Lenin, 
Polnoe. Vol.50. 334-335; Mawdsley, The Russian Civil War. 151.   
20 Ibid. l.106-106ob. 
21 Syren Force General Staff War Diary, entries for 11 & 12 April, 1919. WO 95/5424. 
22 On the Allied and White Russian advances see: Syren Force General Staff War Diary, entry for 16 April, 
1919. WO 95/5424; Maynard, The Murmansk Venture. 218; telegram from Maynard to War Office, 18 April, 
1919. WO 33/966/142, No.1629.   266 
As described in Chapter 7, the attack of the Finns from April to May also coincided 
with an advance of the Allies and White Russian troops on the Murmansk front which 
stretched the Bolsheviks’ troops to the limit, but it came unexpectedly. Returning from a 
trip of the Murmansk front Petr Anokhin reported to the Olonets provincial executive 
committee on 18 April that he did not think the front would change because the enemy did 
not have enough men available to them.
23 He was mistaken; the Allies did have the troops 
available owing to some recently arrived reinforcements which, along with the advance of 
the White Finns, facilitated the Allied and White Russian drive towards Masel’ga, 
Medvezh’ia Gora and Povenets during May.
24 Anokhin was therefore ill-informed and 
underestimated the ability of the Allies and White Russians to advance. Although referring 
to a different theatre of operations Pozern may therefore have been close to the mark when 
questioning the ability of local Bolsheviks in Petrozavodsk to recognise the military 
dangers that faced them. However, in his report to the provincial executive committee on 
18 April Anokhin acknowledged that the Red Army units on the Murmansk front were 
poorly disciplined, few in number, lacked uniforms and had poor commanders. Anokhin 
also stressed that these deficiencies required serious attention and he had communicated 
with Pozern about them but as yet received no reply.
25 
 
In hindsight it appears that the conflict between Petrozavodsk and Petrograd 
reflected the recent resolutions at the Eighth Party Congress and the reservations held by 
the ‘military opposition’. The evidence available for the Dubrovskii affair suggests that 
local Bolsheviks in Petrozavodsk were amongst some of the Bolsheviks present at the 
congress who expressed their concerns about military commanders gaining too much 
power and acting arbitrarily. Admittedly Pozern was not a former tsarist officer but he was 
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24 On 8 April two volunteer companies of armed American railway engineers, numbering roughly 600 men, 
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flexing his authority as head of the Petrograd Military County without due consideration 
for the opinions of local communists and local military commissars. We also know from 
the work of other historians that Pozern was a Bolshevik who defended the centre’s 
viewpoint, that the army take on a more ‘regular’ and ‘professional’ form, and he was part 
of the majority who voted for the military resolutions adopted by the party at the 
congress.
26 The increased drive for centralisation and the resolutions on the Red Army 
therefore did not take place without teething troubles and controversy still existed 
surrounding the debates of the Eighth Party Congress at a local level.                        
   
In the end however local Bolsheviks were forced to fall in line with the decisions of 
the centre in spite of their protest and loyalty to Dubrovskii. Reflecting the shift towards 
stricter centralisation the Red Army forces in Karelia did not benefit directly from its 
victory over the White Finns at Vidlitsa towards the end of June; the captured Finnish 
supplies were handed over to Petrograd.
27 A telegram to Petrograd from Lenin on 30 June 
read: ‘The situation concerning cartridges in the south is desperate. In connection with this, 
having received three million cartridges and other supplies from Vidlitsa, you must 
economise the cartridges from all your forces, and your other military supplies.’
28 
Ultimately it was the prioritisation of fronts that mattered and increased centralisation 
made it easier to allocate scarce resources to the most important areas and thus helped the 
Bolsheviks win the civil war. Karelia however was rarely a military priority. By way of 
further example, in their telegram to Moscow on 3 May, mentioned above, the provincial 
executive committee and party presidium complained that Dubrovskii’s fellow provincial 
military commissar, M.F. Tarasov, was ordered to go to the eastern front at the time of the 
                                                 
26 Benvenuti, The Red Army. 105; 109. 
27 A large amount of war booty was captured which included artillery weapons, thousands of missiles, 
millions of rifle cartridges, 12 machine guns with boxes of ammunition, 2000 rifles, food stores and other 
military equipment. See Morozov, Onezhskaia Flotiliia. 96-97. On the Vidlitsa operation see: 92-93; 103-105; 
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affair leaving Dubrovskii to deal with the increased military threat by himself.
29 Only when 
the White Finns attacked and occupied large parts of Olonets district did the centre react. 
As stated in Chapter 7, on 29 April the Petrograd party committee decided to send 1000 
communists each to the Karelian and Olonets fronts. 
 
Food supply, May-October 1919 
The Eighth Party Congress was also significant because it underlined the party’s wish to 
try and diffuse the hostility of the countryside to the party’s policies. The congress 
resolved to conciliate the ‘middle’ peasantry: peasants who did not exploit the labour of 
others for personal profit. Previously Lenin had acknowledged the importance of 
recognising the ‘middle’ peasant in July and August 1918 and offering concessions to them 
but it was at the Eighth Congress that he clarified his stance.
30 The Bolshevik leader spoke 
about the party’s work in the countryside on 23 March and formed the resolution which 
was passed at the congress that stressed the party’s inexperience in government, the need 
to moderate its application of force in the countryside and support the middle peasant 
economically. He acknowledged the importance of knowledge of local conditions in 
helping the party achieve the distinction of who were the middle peasantry and recognised 
the difficulties of implementing policies locally. Lenin acknowledged that deeds were 
more important than words but at the same time defended the introduction of decrees, even 
if they could not be put into practice fully or immediately, for their propaganda value in 
teaching the practical steps to be taken by supporters of the regime. In short, Lenin’s 
resolution set forth a new path for the party which emphasised conciliation and the need to 
balance it alongside coercion.
31 
 
                                                 
29 NARK, f.R-28, op.1, d.30, l.114ob. 
30 For a brief summary of Lenin’s position towards the middle peasant in July and August 1918 see Lih, 
Bread and Authority. 146-147; Malle, War Communism. 369-370.   
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Centralisation was of course important for the allocation of food stuffs to the Red 
Army and the grain deficit problems. The Bolshevik regime had sought to achieve this 
when it introduced the Food Supply Dictatorship in May 1918 and again with the official 
introduction of the razverstka food supply system in January 1919. According to official 
statistics the procurement of cereal products did increase by more than twofold between 
the 1917-1918 and 1918-1919 campaigns.
32 However, any positive changes in the receipt 
of food supplies to Karelia in 1919 appear slight; the region’s food supplies ebbed and 
flowed according to the time of year and, more significantly because of its grain deficit 
status, according to the conditions and development of the civil war on its borders and 
elsewhere. Petr Anokhin sent a telegram to Moscow on 2 June stressing that he had 
received no reply from Moscow concerning the dispatch of foodstuffs to Olonets province 
and people were taking part in agitation against the soviets. In order to counterbalance this 
Anokhin requested grain. He also stressed that Red Army soldiers’ families were suffering 
from starvation, grain loads were again being detained and delayed by other provinces and 
planned orders set by the centre existed on paper only.
33 By referring to detained grain 
supplies Anokhin may well have been thinking of a recent incident when the Cherepovets 
provincial commissar for food refused to release ten carriage loads of oats which had 
arrived by boat from Rybinsk. The problem was that the oats were wrongly addressed to 
him by a Moscow official; the oats’ correct destination was supposed to be Olonets 
province.
34 
 
Because of the military threat of the Allies and White Finns the distribution of food 
supplies was disrupted by the need to evacuate the provincial commissariat for food from 
Petrozavodsk; it was evacuated to Vytegra on the 15 June.
35 The military situation also 
                                                 
32 See Malle, War Communism. 407. 
33 RGAE, f.1943, op.7, d.1773, l.73-73ob. 
34 RGAE, f.1943, op.1, d.290, l.180-181. 
35 Ibid. l.124. The Olonets provincial revolutionary executive committee did not decide to move the 
provincial food commissariat back to Petrozavodsk until 2 October 1919, when the Allies or White Finns 
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brought about a new complication as military authorities clashed with civilian authorities. 
For instance, the military head (rukovoditel’) of Shuiskaia parish, Povenets district, along 
with the local railroad commissar requisitioned all the foodstuffs in the Shuiskaia 
storehouse. The local authorities in Povenets and the provincial commissar for food 
protested on 22 June and demanded that the Shuiskaia parish military head immediately 
release the requisitioned foodstuffs so that it could be distributed to the population in the 
front line. If not he would be held responsible for any uprisings in these areas.
36 
 
June 1919 was in fact another critical month for the Bolshevik leadership and the 
Red Army in general. No sooner had Admiral Kolchak’s advance in the east been stopped 
than attention switched to the southern front where a now overextended Red Army had 
suffered internal unrest and military setbacks in the Don and the Ukraine. The limitations 
of the Bolsheviks’ resources provided a favourable opportunity for General Denikin’s 
White armies to advance successfully northwards between May and July 1919. Then in 
August, Don Cossack cavalry troops made raids deep behind Soviet lines, briefly entering 
Tambov and capturing Voronezh for a short time before returning south in mid-
September.
37 For the Karelian districts, this intensification of the civil war in the spring and 
summer of 1919 resulted in a pause in grain deliveries. For the month of June Olonets 
province was allotted a total of 170,000 puds of grain from Kazan’ and Simbirsk.
38 
However, Moscow received a telegram from Petrozavodsk on 29 June to say that Olonets 
province had not received a single load of grain since the beginning of the month and the 
last supplies had been distributed around the province.
39 
  
The food situation in the Karelian districts did not improve significantly in July. 
Moscow informed the Olonets provincial food commissariat on 7 July that within the next 
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few days 15,000 puds of grain would be sent to it from Vologda.
40 However, on 11 July the 
provincial commissariat for food complained to Moscow that not a single pound of grain 
had arrived in the province for a whole month and the situation was desperate; various 
local state institutions were demanding an issue of grain and crowds of people were 
besieging the parish and district commissariats for food. The provincial commissariat for 
food subsequently asked for the immediate dispatch of the loads from Vologda and the 
completion of their supply orders for June and July.
41 The total July order fell short of a 
now lower target but improved on what Olonets province had received in June. Of the 
50,000 puds of grain apportioned to it 15,000 puds or 30% of the order was fulfilled. 
However, the August supply plan was worse; Olonets province received only 7,000 puds 
of grain (from Kazan’ and Samara) or 14% of the allocated 50,000 puds for that month.
42 
 
Like the previous year the Karelian districts were also short of planting seed. On 6 
August the Pudozh district food board informed the provincial food commissariat that the 
district’s fields were not being sown to their potential because of the small amount of seed 
available.
43 This shortage was in part due to the large amount of spring seed consumed by 
the population because of the incessant shortages.
44 To add to the provincial food 
commissariat’s difficulties the receipt of orders from the grain producing provinces 
remained sporadic and short of delivery targets. Olonets province was even fobbed off with 
an order of 35,000 puds of grain and 2,000 puds of groats in September from Perm, which 
had been freed from the Whites on 1 July. However, there was no prospect of receiving 
any grain from this newly conquered province because of the shortages in Perm itself and 
the fact that an apparatus for procuring grain had not yet been established there. The 
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branch of the Olonets provincial food commissariat situated in Moscow therefore asked the 
department of distribution attached to the People’s Commissariat for Food to only give it 
grain orders from better supplied provinces, and to transport the loads by water instead of 
rail, which it considered easier. Specifically the provincial food commissariat asked for 
Olonets province’s October supply plan to be fulfilled from Samara and Saratov provinces 
and Pokrovsk district.
45 
 
Again, the intensification of the civil war outside its borders had a knock on effect 
on the supply and distribution of food to the Karelian districts. Between September and 
October 1919 Denikin made a decisive move towards Moscow; Kursk was taken on 20 
September and on 14 October the Whites captured Orel’. General Iudenich’s North-
Western White Army simultaneously advanced towards Petrograd in October and the 
Bolshevik regime faced one of the most serious threats to its existence since the start of the 
civil war.
46 The resources available to the Soviet regime were directed to the military 
fronts while the Bolsheviks simultaneously faced a breakdown in the transport system, a 
shortage of fuel and the onset of winter.
47 Consequently, supplies to Karelia were disrupted; 
Moscow informed the Olonets provincial food commissariat on 13 October that its supply 
order for that month would be lower than the 30% of the order received for the September 
allocation. Moscow explained that it was impossible to increase the October supply plan 
because of the general poor food supply situation and poorer procurement results.
48    
 
Local authorities therefore, as in 1918, were compelled to do the best with what 
food resources they could mobilise by themselves to supplement the grain loads that did 
make it through to them. In mid-August 1919 the Olonets district union of cooperatives 
                                                 
45 Ibid. l.235. Pokrovsk district, part of Saratov province, resolved to secede from Saratov province in June 
1918 and set up its own ‘republic.’ It remained detached for the duration of the civil war. Raleigh, Civil War. 
76; 105. 
46 Mawdsley, The Russian Civil War. 194-202.  
47 Davydov, Bor’ba za Khleb. 159-160. 
48 RGAE, f.1943, op.7, d.1773, l.236.   273 
organised an ‘efficiency department’ (proizvoditel’nyi otdel) for the purchase of local 
products which, despite a shortage of material resources and literate personnel, managed to 
gather a significant amount of fruit, vegetable and meat products by October which 
amounted to over 1 million roubles.
49 Local efforts in the fishing industry were less 
effective. On 23 September 1919 the first Olonets provincial congress of fisherman took 
place where the delegates agreed to try and raise the productivity of the fishing industry. 
Prior to the conference the industry failed to fulfil its potential because of a lack of fishing 
materials and the fact that fish were usually caught for individual needs only. A number of 
basic problems within the industry, such as the lack of storage for boats and caught fish, 
also proved inhibitive and had still not been solved by early 1920.
50 
 
Clearly Karelia needed central help and this arrived in the form of approximately 
200,000 puds of vegetable seeds, delivered to Olonets province from Moscow sometime in 
1919. In short, these deliveries were successful because the growing of vegetables 
provided a supplement to the grain harvest. At the end of September 1919 the head of the 
provincial agricultural department stated that market gardening had developed significantly 
that year, in part because brochures and posters had encouraged peasants to grow 
vegetables. However, even without these propaganda efforts, the general food shortages 
meant that the peasantry willingly became involved in this sector of the economy.
51 A 
report by the head of the agronomic sub-department of the Petrozavodsk district 
agricultural department on 20 September 1919 also noted the relative success of market 
gardening from the spring of that year in producing vegetables in the villages which were 
also sold in the towns. To develop the sector further he noted the need for more seed.
52  
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The above account of Karelia’s food supply problems is not comprehensive but the 
evidence available suggests that the improvement in food supply in 1919 was mixed when 
compared to the previous year. On the one hand, local agricultural conditions meant that 
the food situation in the Karelian districts depended to a great extent on the ability of the 
provincial food commissariat to secure as many domestic imports from the grain surplus 
provinces as possible. The food situation in Karelia was therefore dependent on central 
support and the local conditions and development of the civil war elsewhere. As 1919 drew 
to a close the threat of the Whites subsided and the grain quotas assigned to Olonets 
province began to rise again slightly. Grain loads were also assigned from provinces 
further east, thus reflecting the Bolsheviks’ conquests against the Whites.
53  
 
Karelia’s reliance on domestic imports meant that in 1919 food supply was more 
methodical; set orders were established for each month to be dispatched from the grain 
surplus provinces to Olonets province. Furthermore, fewer incidents of grain loads being 
seized by other soviets en route to Petrozavodsk were recorded by local leaders. On 27 
September, at the Sixth Olonets Provincial Congress of Soviets, V.T. Gur’ev noted that up 
to 20 carriages for Olonets provincial food commissariat had been detained on the 
Murmansk railroad.
54 Compare this with 1918 when I.F. Petrov noted at the First Olonets 
Provincial Bolshevik Party Conference in August that 130 carriages had failed to reach 
Petrozavodsk (see Chapter 4). Therefore the delivery of supplies to the Karelian districts 
was still a huge problem in 1919 but food procurement and distribution was 
administratively better organised than it had been before. Caution must also be applied in 
comparing the Bolsheviks’ level of efficiency in food procurement with pre or post-
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revolution levels. Although the receipt of grain did not match local leaders’ expectations 
and only small amounts filtered through to the Karelian districts, these supplies along with 
local resources were, ultimately, enough for the Karelian districts and the local Bolsheviks 
to survive.  
 
Creating order in the Cheka 
The first moves towards strengthening the provincial Cheka in 1919 can be traced to the 
re-election of this institution in October 1918 and the election of Oskar Kanter at its head. 
The process of gaining more control over the activities of the provincial Cheka and its 
members was gradual and greatly accelerated by the abolition of the district Chekas in 
February 1919. For instance, the Olonets district Cheka transferred its cases to the 
provincial Cheka on 8 February and dismissed its staff on the 15 February with two weeks 
advance pay.
55 Despite the structural reorganisation malpractice and disorganisation within 
the provincial Cheka’s ranks continued, but there were definite signs that it was becoming 
better organised and acting more responsibly. Again one of the chief architects of this 
development was Kanter and it was under his tenure as chairman that an audit of the Cheka 
took place in March 1919 which revealed many of the institutions deficiencies (see 
Chapter 6).  
 
Kanter also strove to restore public order and reduce the potential for malfeasance 
amongst soviet employees by decreasing the availability of alcohol. On 3 March he sent a 
telegram to the provincial Bolshevik party committee to demand, for a second time, a 
review of a case which related to the destruction of a quantity of beer available in the 
Oloniia timber factory in Petrozavodsk. The issue had been discussed at a session of the 
Petrozavodsk town soviet two days previous where the soviet resolved to retain the beer, 
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contrary to Kanter’s wishes who believed it should be disposed of. Kanter asked the party 
‘to commission the provincial executive committee without the knowledge of the town 
soviet to carry out the instructions of the party because otherwise the excessive 
consumption of beer will not stop.’
56 Efforts to curb the use of alcohol would also 
potentially ease the burden on the prison in Petrozavodsk which in March 1919 was 
overcrowded. The provincial commissar for justice, A.F. Kopnin, appealed to the 
provincial Cheka who in turn informed the provincial executive committee on 13 April to 
release 14 prisoners early, nine of whom were detained for either being drunk or distilling 
alcohol.
57 
 
Although Cheka malpractice continued into 1919 there was a clear improvement 
from the previous year; conflict with the soviet executive committee had disappeared, 
Chekist malpractice was punished and a more orderly provincial Cheka was developing. In 
March a provincial Cheka commissar was dismissed by Kanter for speculation.
58 Kanter’s 
diligence was also evident on 24 March when the Olonets provincial executive committee 
heard a complaint from the chairman of the Petrozavodsk Consumer Society (Obshchestva 
Potrebitelei) who had 1900 feet of leather confiscated by the provincial Cheka. Kanter 
defended the move and stated that if the Society could produce the correct documentation 
proving that the leather had been purchased legally from an agent of the provincial food 
board then it would be returned. Failing that it would remain in the hands of the provincial 
Cheka. In response the chair of the Consumer Society remarked he had many goods 
without accounts for them, not one leather item had been registered but they did have a 
permit to prove that they had permission to transport the leather from the dock. Kanter 
believed this did not necessarily prove that the leather had been bought legally. As a result, 
the provincial executive committee resolved to only return the leather if the Consumer 
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Society could produce a cover note from the food board and the permit for the right to 
transport the leather, indicating the quality and the amount.
59 
 
By the spring and summer of 1919 the improved organisation and efficiency of the 
provincial Cheka was also evident against the background of the desperate military 
situation faced by the Bolsheviks. The provincial Cheka helped with preparations for an 
orderly retreat. On 29 April the provincial executive committee ordered the provincial 
Cheka to destroy all spirits and vodka situated in the provincial wine store in the event of 
an immediate threat to Petrozavodsk from the White Finns.
60 In May many prisoners were 
refused bail upon the decision of the provincial Cheka and in the middle of the same month 
the Cheka refused to release 20 hostages. At the end of May, with the agreement of the 
provincial Cheka, the Vecheka ordered the most prominent hostages and counter-
revolutionaries to be sent to them in Moscow.
61 At this time the provincial Cheka also 
decided to evacuate to Vytegra and on 26 May began to move its paperwork and furniture. 
On 3 June the decision was taken to evacuate only female personnel with males remaining 
at their posts to help load up all items for departure on 5 June.
62  
 
The spring and summer of 1919 was militarily the most serious period for the 
Bolsheviks in Karelia and the Cheka’s activities intensified with the arrival of a wave of 
refugees from the Murmansk region (see Chapter 7). Oskar Kanter also headed a cavalry 
division sent to Shungskaia parish in May 1919 to engage the Whites.
63 Furthermore, the 
Chekists N.N. Dorofeev and M.S. Antonov headed two special task force detachments 
(otriad osobogo naznacheniia) which were sent to the Pudozh front and the Zaonezh’e 
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peninsula respectively in May 1919.
64 Not surprisingly it appears that the Cheka became 
more extreme in its duties against the background of the military threat and peasant 
rebellion. For example, the Olonets provincial Bolshevik party committee resolved on 16 
May to ask the provincial Cheka to ‘take urgent measures for the cleansing (ochishchenie) 
of the front-line area of counter-revolutionary elements in the Tipinitskaia soviet executive 
committee.’
65 M.S. Anotonov’s special task force, according to the findings of a Bolshevik 
investigatory commission, was also found to have acted unlawfully once it arrived in 
Tolvuiskaia parish on 7 July. According to the local peasants Antonov’s force took part in 
the wide scale requisitioning of their clothes, livestock and horses; in response to the 
peasants’ complaints Antonov threatened to carry out arrests and executions.
66 
 
The Cheka therefore intensified its activities at a time of crisis but the story of the 
Cheka in 1919 is not solely one of arbitrary abuses. Instead in the spring of 1919 elite 
Cheka units were assigned to key parts of the military front and to take back control from 
rebelling parishes. Although intermittent malpractice persisted it was resolved without the 
structural conflicts of the previous year. The former head of the Pudozh district Cheka, a 
certain Andreev, was under investigation by the provincial revolutionary tribunal in June 
1919 and on 26 August a Murmansk railroad Cheka commissar was arrested and 
imprisoned for rape and his case transferred to the provincial revolutionary tribunal.
67 One 
of the Bolsheviks’ responses to evidence of criminality within its ranks was education and 
on 18 July 1919 the provincial Cheka sent four of their employees to Moscow on a 
Vecheka training course.
68 In August Kanter also targeted his staff’s rudimentary 
deficiencies in reading and writing. Naturally, improvement in these skills was necessary 
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for the basic functioning of the Cheka’s books and would help to create a more efficient 
cadre of workers to draw upon. On 9 August 1919, at a session of the provincial Cheka, 
Kanter stressed the need to eradicate general illiteracy and raise the ‘political literacy’ of 
its members and employees. The result was an obligation placed upon all commissars and 
other semiliterate workers to attend a general course attached to the department of people’s 
education in Petrozavodsk. Furthermore, the head of Cheka reconnaissance was asked to 
gather literature for the Cheka’s library-reading room and to subscribe to various 
newspapers and a journal.
69  
 
Finally, towards the end of 1919 the provincial Cheka continued to work with an 
increased element of responsibility in comparison to the summer/autumn of 1918; in late 
November agents of the provincial Cheka successfully exposed a local citizen of 
Petrozavodsk who was involved in the large-scale speculation of alcohol. The speculator 
under investigation bribed the Cheka agents with 3500 roubles, which he believed to have 
been successful. However, the money was handed to the secret-operations department 
attached to the provincial Cheka and the investigation of the individual continued.
70 At 
approximately the same time Kanter also refused to allow individuals who were not 
recommended by the party or provincial executive committee to join the ranks of the 
Cheka. On 30 November an applicant with no party affiliation was refused permission to 
serve in the Cheka.
71  
 
The malpractice of Cheka agents provides an excellent illustration of why the 
Cheka had to be reformed. A turning point came with the abolition of district Chekas in 
January 1919 but in Karelia a period of reform began with the re-election of the provincial 
Cheka in early October 1918 and the appointment of Oskar Kanter as its chair. Following 
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Kanter’s appointment the provincial Cheka underwent distinct changes as its chairman 
sought improvement: investigations continued; erring Chekists were disciplined; an audit 
took place; institutional conflicts diminished; elite fighting forces were formed; and 
training courses were introduced. By the summer-autumn of 1919 the provincial Cheka 
still encountered problems but it was an organisation that was better organised and better 
controlled than in the summer/early autumn of 1918. 
 
Desertion and constructing a peasant-state relationship 
Arguably the greatest success of the Red Army in Karelia was not on the battle field but in 
the struggle against desertion. It was the anti-desertion campaign in the Red Army which 
was used to win over a reluctant peasantry to an accommodation with the regime and the 
establishment of a hierarchy of desertion commissions, from the beginning of 1919, 
marked a significant change in the reeling back in of soldiers who absconded. After a 
period of organisational setbacks for the desertion commissions in Karelia, often related to 
a shortage of resources, the Bolsheviks began to overcome the desertion problem by the 
summer of 1919. This was achieved for a number of reasons: the introduction of periodic 
amnesties; increased bureaucracy; the publicising of the state’s willingness to look after 
soldiers’ families; and propaganda efforts combined with threats and punishments. As a 
result the Bolsheviks, at a vital time of the civil war, managed to gain enough control over 
the desertion problem to keep as many soldiers in service as possible and withhold the 
attacks made by the White Finns, the Allies and the White Russians during the spring and 
summer of 1919. 
 
The various material shortages that affected almost every Red Army unit at some 
time during the civil war have been summarised by other historians and deemed as a 
primary reason for why soldiers deserted.
72 Therefore only a few examples are needed here 
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to underline some of the similar conditions endured by the Red Army troops in the 
Karelian districts. In the first instance the problem of supplying military units was not 
solely a problem of material resources but an administrative one. The lack of reliable and 
capable personnel affected the ability of the military commissariats to supply its troops. On 
3 January 1919 the Olonets provincial executive committee received a request from the 
head of the department of supply attached to the provincial military commissariat, which 
stipulated the formation of a commission to investigate the abuses of authority perpetrated 
by the employees of the department of supply.
73 A knock on effect of disorganisation in the 
supply departments was unrest in the military units; an information bulletin for the 7
th Red 
Army, from 30 January noted that: ‘On the Olonets front, in connection with the shortage 
of uniforms and equipment the mood of the units is one of dissatisfaction…In the Karelian 
region there is a shortage of uniforms, linen, tea, tobacco and soap.’
74 On 10 March 1919 
another military report for Olonets province noted the shortage of equipment, overcoats, 
blankets and mattresses.
75 Because of the absence of various kinds of military equipment in 
the province another military report from 24 March noted that commanders did not know 
what supplies to prioritise for their units.
76 
 
  Of course, as a grain deficit region, the food crisis in the Karelian districts also 
contributed to poor conditions in the Red Army units; it was impossible to consistently 
supply adequate rations to every unit. This often led to independent initiatives and 
contributed to the unlawful looting of the local population by Red Army troops. In the 
middle of February 1919, because of a lack of meat in the Red Amy units, the district 
military commissariats requested permission to carry out the purchase of meat 
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independently thus bypassing (pomimo) the supply departments.
77 The supply of army 
units was also dependent on their position at the front. On the 9 April 1919 General 
Maynard informed the War Office that cases of illness in enemy lines was due to poor 
quality and quantity of food but rations and ammunition supply for troops was better on the 
railway than on the flanks.
78 The shortage of food and cases of disease persisted as the civil 
war in Karelia reached its peak which naturally affected the morale of the Red troops. An 
information report on 21 May for the Petrozavodsk sector stated that a shortage of 
uniforms and food was provoking ‘complications and dissatisfaction’ in the 19
th rifle 
division.
79 The following month being positioned on the railway line no longer held the 
advantage of being better supplied; a political report for the 7
th Red Army on 6 June 
described the falling morale of a railroad regiment situated on the Petrozavodsk front as a 
result of constant fighting, a shortage of food and illness.
80 
 
In the face of these material shortages and poor conditions it is little wonder that 
some of the Red Army troops chose to desert from their units. However, the evidence from 
the Karelian districts points to other important reasons for desertion. Sometimes it was 
only a temporary problem based on the time of year. By May 1919 the approach of 
seasonal agricultural work meant peasants in the Red Army became preoccupied with 
preparing for the harvest. On 14 May a report on the conditions within the 7
th Red Army in 
the Karelian sector stated: ‘Desertion is growing because of the approach of summer 
work.’
81 Similar problems were underlined in a report on the 21 May 1919: ‘The Red 
Army men are agitated (volnuet) over the timely sowing of their fields.’
82 Two days later 
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another military report noted that desertion was increasing in the Karelian sector because 
soldiers wished to carry out work in the fields.
83 
 
However, in addition to seasonal field work, desertion patterns reflected the 
importance of local conditions, in this instance the proximity of the front and the intensity 
of the fighting. A Red Army information bulletin covering the period 1-20 June 1919 
stated that there had been no disorder in Pudozh’s Red Army units, the percentage of 
deserters was ‘very insignificant’ (samyi nichtozhnyi) and there had been no uprisings.
84 
More specifically, a Bolshevik agitator noted in mid-June 1919 that the anti-desertion 
campaign in Berezhnodubrovskaia parish was going well because of weekly inspections of 
Red Army men’s documents, the provision of soldiers’ families had improved and their 
fields had been sown.
85 On the other hand the Zaonezh’e peninsula, against the background 
of the Allied and White advance, had rebelled and refused to mobilise; in Velikogubskaia 
only 50 of the 400 men subjected to the draft appeared at the mobilisation point. In 
Tolvuiskaia parish only 24 men from the expected 280 appeared.
86 In part response the 
Petrozavodsk district military commissariat was in the process of forming an escort 
detachment to stop draftees deserting en route to mobilisation points.
87 
 
Desertion from the Red Army was, of course, a national problem for the Soviet 
state and it prompted the creation of a Central Commission for the Struggle with Desertion 
in late December 1918.
88 Reflecting the need to work closely with other state institutions to 
                                                 
83 Ibid. l.213. 
84 RGVA, f.6, op.10, d.30, l.40-41. 
85 NARK, f.P-10, op.3, d.40, l.59. 
86 100 men from Velikogubskaia parish had originally turned up but because of the lack of a boat to take 
them to Petrozavodsk many of the mobilised men returned home. When a boat did arrive the military 
authorities found that whole villages had disappeared and only with difficulty did they find 50 men from 
Velikogubskaia. The same problem explained the poor turn up of recruits in Tolvuiskaia parish. NARK, f.R-
573, op.1, d.672, l.15. 
87 RGVA, f.6, op.10, d.30, l.40-41.  
88 Dekrety. Vol.4. 254-256. On the 25 January this commission issued an order to the provinces to 
immediately create provincial and district desertion commissions attached to the corresponding military 
commissariats. S.Olikov, Dezertirstvo v Krasnoi Armii i Bor’ba s nim. Moscow: Izdanie Voennoi Tipografii   284 
tackle the desertion problem, the first sessions of the Central Desertion Commission, on 25 
and 27 December 1918, were attended by representatives of the People’s Commissariats 
for Food, Communication Routes, Social Security, Labour and Justice, the All-Russian 
Central Executive Committee’s military publishing department, the All-Russian bureau of 
military commissars’ agitation department and the Moscow Regional Military 
Commissariat.
89 In the western historiography not a lot has been written about the 
workings of this institution.
90 The main reason for this, it appears, is because the archive of 
the Central Commission for the Struggle for Desertion was destroyed after its files were 
transferred to the People’s Commissariat for Labour.
91 However records at provincial level, 
although fragmented, remain.
92  
 
An Olonets provincial commission for the struggle with desertion held its first 
session on 12 February 1919 where it resolved to immediately form subordinate 
commissions in the districts. In the parishes the responsibility for combating desertion was 
placed on the military commissariats, the soviets and the militias which were compelled to 
forward all detainees to the district commission for desertion. Up to early 1919 it is evident 
that there was a lack of information on desertion; the Bolsheviks wanted to know more 
about why the men were deserting and stop them disappearing back into society. At the 
above session the provincial commission for desertion resolved to print 2000 copies of 
deserter questionnaires to be sent to the districts and to inform all males aged between 18 
and 45, through the provincial press, to carry identification cards which proved exemptions 
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from military service. All provincial institutions, factories, offices and labour exchanges 
were required to carry out a weekly inspection of people’s documents and the provincial 
commission for desertion resolved to send sentries (pikety) to Petrozavodsk and along the 
railway line to check the documents of those travelling by train.
93   
 
The success of the desertion commissions was dependent on local implementation 
and often local resources. For instance, the provincial desertion commission initially 
suffered from a lack of capable personnel; just over a month after the provincial 
commission was set up its chairman was replaced on 22 March by the order of the 
provincial military commissariat.
94 The new head of the desertion commission was a more 
conscientious M. Dobrynin, who remained the commission’s chairman at least until the 
end of 1919.
95 He wrote a report on 10 April to the Olonets provincial military 
commissariat in which he underlined the inability of his commission to operate effectively 
because of a lack of reliable workers. He found the office records of the commission in a 
chaotic condition: there was no systematic register of deserters or orders; papers were filed 
away in a random fashion; and protocols of the commission’s sessions were not written out 
with the exception of its first meeting. It was therefore impossible to track what the 
commission had done or planned from the day of its establishment. Moreover, the 
commission had to share a room, had no premises of their own, lacked stationery and 
furniture and had no credit.
96 
 
To solve his commission’s financial difficulties Dobrynin referred to an order 
issued by the Central Commission for the Struggle with Desertion on 28 February which 
stated that the provincial and district commissions were to be maintained through the 
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provincial and district military commissariats. He therefore applied to the provincial 
military commissar for the material means which the provincial desertion committee 
lacked plus an employee from the provincial military commissariat to carry out the 
administration work of the desertion commission.
97 His requests were not met in the short 
term; on 28 April Dobrynin submitted another report to the provincial military commissar 
stating that all the work of the commission was being undertaken by him alone. He 
requested ‘for a third time’ an office secretary in addition to a copyist and a typist with 
typewriter without which the functioning of the desertion commission was impossible.
98                
 
The work of the Olonets provincial desertion commission was therefore hamstrung 
by material shortages and administrative deficiencies. Indeed S. Olikov, who had direct 
experience of working in desertion commissions during the civil war, believed that up to 
the end of April the Central Desertion Commission was in an organisational phase and it 
only began a more decisive struggle with desertion after this period.
99 In an order dated 29 
May 1919 the Central Commission for the Struggle with Desertion placed the burden for 
capturing deserters firmly at the feet of the parishes. Parish military commissars were 
required to check the documents of all citizens in their parishes, make regular trips to the 
villages, and carry out a strict accounting of everyone subject to the military draft. The 
military commissars were also obliged to work in close contact with the parish soviets and 
Bolshevik party cells in order to help search for deserters; together with the chairmen of 
rural settlements and parish soviets the military commissars were also responsible for 
detaining deserters who were then passed onto the district desertion commissions. All 
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parish authorities not conforming to this decree within two weeks of its publication would 
be brought to trial.
100       
   
Figes states that desertion commissions were also established at parish level and 
then merged with the parish military commissariats, which ‘brought the punitive power of 
the state closer to the rural strongholds of desertion.’
101 His conclusion is logical. The vast 
majority of the Red Army in Karelia by mid-1919 was drawn from the peasantry who lived 
in the countryside and this is where the majority of deserters inevitably concealed 
themselves. However, there is no evidence from the centre’s decree mentioned above or at 
the first session of the Olonets provincial commission for desertion that parish desertion 
commissions were ever formed in the Karelian districts. Instead the responsibility was 
given to the parish military commissariats, soviets and party cells, most probably because 
the parishes were even less likely to have the means to create and maintain another 
bureaucratic body in the form of a desertion commission.
102 The Central Desertion 
Commission’s decree from the 29 May also signified its wish to gain more control by way 
of gathering information not only about the number of deserters in the parishes but the 
population as a whole. In other words this order from the capital not only asked the 
parishes to hunt down those eluding conscription but to survey the whole populace, check 
everyone’s papers, increase the state’s contact with the countryside and improve 
coordination between local and central authorities. All this naturally made evading the 
draft more difficult.
103 
 
The evidence above and what follows below suggests that the desertion 
commissions in the Karelian districts were also in an organisational phase up until the end 
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of April and the anti-desertion campaign gradually became more successful. And yet, at 
the same time, a shortage of material resources and personnel were problems that were 
never fully eradicated. Data for the establishment of district desertion commissions in 
Karelia is incomplete but, from the evidence available, a Pudozh district commission was 
created on 27 February 1919. However, this commission became hindered in its operations 
by a shortage of manpower. A report detailing its work up to 20 October 1919 stated that it 
had not been able to organise reconnaissance parties or send military units around the 
district to hunt down deserters because preference for troops was given to regular Red 
Army units.
104 A Red Army military report for the last two weeks of September 1919 did 
in fact note that detachments for the struggle with desertion in Olonets province took part 
in military operations against the enemy.
105 Because of the shortage of manpower the 
Pudozh district desertion commission had only one detachment numbering 15 men in 
October 1919; six of these were permanently situated at landing piers to check the 
documents of those arriving by boat into the district while the remainder were used as a 
combat unit. As a result of the personnel shortages a detachment of troops from the 
Internal Guard for the Petrograd sector was operating around Pudozh district looking for 
deserters.
106 However, by November the Pudozh desertion commission had no armed 
troops at all because its 15 man detachment had left to join another regiment.
107 
 
Between 27 February and 20 October the Pudozh district commission for desertion 
registered 189 deserters, the vast majority of whom (141) handed themselves in 
voluntarily.
108 The high percentage of voluntary appearance can partly be explained by the 
introduction of the general amnesties mentioned below or the number of men who simply 
turned up late at the recruiting station. The soldiers’ belated arrival could have been for 
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numerous reasons, such as the late arrival of decrees, instructions, or mobilisation 
orders.
109 On 7 May a military report noted that because of the disconnection of Pudozh 
district, which was situated across Lake Onega, mobilisation was taking place belatedly.
110 
From the remainder of the 189 registered deserters 15 were caught, one of whom was 
categorised as ‘malicious’ (zlostnyi).
111 The remaining 31 were either still at large or an 
uncategorised remainder (‘priblizitel’no ostavshikhsia 31’).
112 
  
The path to the success of the anti-desertion campaign was uneven but, despite the 
difficulties faced by the Bolsheviks in tackling the desertion problem, they had identified a 
key lever to solving the problem the previous year: the welfare of soldiers’ families. On 24 
December 1918 Sovnarkom issued a decree which set forth its intention to supply the 
families of Red Army men with special monetary allowances.
113 Similarly, the preferential 
treatment of Red Army men’s field work reflected the state’s drive to tackle desertion 
effectively by meeting the peasantry half way. In response to an earlier Sovnarkom decree, 
the Olonets provincial military commissariat published an order on 19 May informing all 
local agricultural departments and village soviets to endeavour to plough and sow the 
fields of men called up to the Red Army.
114 At the Third Olonets Provincial Party 
Conference (1-5 September 1919),
115 one of the leading local communists, Iakov Berztys, 
summarised the Bolsheviks’ position: ‘The mood of the Red Army in which the peasants 
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are the overwhelming majority depends on our relations with the peasantry. The support of 
Red Army soldiers’ families ensures the stability of the Red Army.’
116  
 
Of course, Berztys’s words reflected the ideal, i.e. acquiring a reliable military 
force through providing for its soldiers’ families, but a lack of local resources meant that 
the implementation of Sovnarkom’s decrees was often undermined. The Olonets provincial 
revolutionary executive committee published an order on 25 May 1919 which stated that it 
had received a number of complaints from families who had not received their allowances 
which lowered the morale of the Red troops and encouraged them to desert. The Olonets 
provincial revolutionary executive committee believed that the delay in the issue of 
allowances was a result of belated information coming from the parishes about the families 
of those called up to serve in the Red Army. In turn this hindered the work of the 
departments of social security and the subsequent issue of credit.
117 A lack of reliable and 
competent personnel in soviet institutions undoubtedly contributed to the difficulties in 
providing for the families of Red Army soldiers. At the Third Olonets Provincial Party 
Conference the provincial military commissar noted the need for a closer working 
relationship between military and civilian authorities and sounded out the staff of the 
departments of social security for criticism: ‘In the localities civilian authorities, in 
particularly people in the committees of social security, loaf about and commit sabotage 
more than look after the needs of Red Army soldiers’ families.’
118 
 
This process of offering limited concessions to the Red Army men and establishing 
a stronger state-peasant relationship is what, in the following months, contributed to the 
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relative success of the Soviet regime’s anti-desertion campaign and the Bolsheviks’ victory 
in the civil war. Although the implementation of central policy in the periphery was 
usually impeded in one way or another the Bolsheviks’ objective to prioritise the welfare 
of its soldiers was important. It is therefore significant that the above order to help families 
of Red Army men was published in Olonetskaia Kommuna. For although it highlighted the 
deficiencies of the Bolsheviks attempts to implement their policy it also showed the 
newspaper’s readership the party’s intent to help soldiers’ families, offered a reasonable 
explanation of why their efforts had faltered and applied pressure on certain state agencies 
to help solve the problem. Sanborn argues that the Bolshevik leadership’s ability to learn 
from the feelers that came from the provinces and its ‘sensitivity to the dynamics of low 
politics’ helps explain the regime’s success in stemming the flow of desertion. This was 
achieved gradually and with setbacks but through the creation of a ‘contract’ between 
soldiers and the state whereby the soldier, encouraged by government legislation, a family 
welfare programme and propaganda, fought for the Red Army but was liable to 
punishment and the withdrawal of state sponsored entitlements if he deserted. Generally, 
combating desertion combined punishment, conciliation and agitation with the role of the 
soldiers’ family being of vital importance.
119 
 
The evidence for the Karelian districts makes it difficult to disagree with Sanborn’s 
assessment. For instance, on 11 June 1919 the Petrozavodsk district military commissar 
threatened to confiscate the property of those who refused to mobilise and to deprive their 
families of their food rations.
120 By 1 July desertion from Red Army units in Olonets 
province was recorded to be between 20% and 30% but in response armed detachments 
were dispatched around the province to catch deserters.
121 Yet, threatening and punitive 
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measures were rarely successful in combating desertion by themselves. Instead the correct 
balance with more conciliatory measures was crucial. The Olonets provincial desertion 
commission proposed on 28 June to create a ‘Commission to combat desertion and aid Red 
Army soldiers’ families’ (Komissiia po bor’be s desertirstvom i okazaniiu pomoshchi 
sem’iam krasnoarmeitsev). The provincial desertion commission was adamant that this 
project be approved by the provincial soviet executive committee, without alteration and 
implemented immediately. Local leaders hoped that the new commission would increase 
the population’s support for the regime and reduce desertion but foresaw that a lack of 
finances would hinder its creation. By way of improvisation, until the assignment of credit 
from the centre, the provincial desertion commission suggested using the unspent credit 
issued to the provincial commissariat for agriculture and the department of social security. 
In response, the Olonets provincial soviet executive committee approved the creation of 
the proposed commission and ordered the districts to immediately undertake the 
organisation of subordinate commissions.
122 
 
The solution was therefore in place but also overlapped previous attempts to 
provide for Red Army men’s families which brought central investment. Information from 
the Olonets provincial department of social security (Table 6) shows that money did reach 
the districts from January to August 1919 but in different amounts, presumably according 
to the occupation of various Karelian parishes at different times, the proximity of the 
military front, the strategic importance of certain districts, the availability of local 
resources and the efficiency of local institutions and personnel. Whatever the case, the help 
of the capital was vitally important to the anti-desertion campaign in Karelia; between 1 
January and 1 August 1919 the centre sent 19,289,000 roubles to Olonets province. In 
January 11,434 people were receiving rations which rose to 30,948 by 1 August.
123 
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Table 6 – Number of rations and the sum of money issued to families 
of Red Army men in Karelia, January-1 August 1919
124   
 
District   umber of people 
receiving rations 
Ration expenditure 
(roubles) 
Petrozavodsk  6913  3,618,155 
Olonets  983  1,915,000 
Pudozh  3454  2,815,000 
Povenets  980  305,000 
Total  12,330  8,653,155 
 
The Bolsheviks were thus making definitive moves to prioritise the welfare of Red Army 
men. Another commission to help provide support for Red Army men was introduced and 
attached specifically to the provincial agricultural department on 25 June 1919.
125 At the 
Sixth Olonets Provincial Congress of Soviets (26 September-1 October 1919) the head of 
the provincial agricultural department reported that this commission had received 1 million 
roubles from the centre and distributed most of it around the districts; support came in the 
form of monetary loans, agricultural implements, seed and manned labour.
126  
 
The evidence however suggests that the supply of Red Army men’s families with 
allowances was not effective across-the-board in Karelia because of local conditions and/or 
local resources. A case in point came at one of the provincial desertion commission’s 
sessions on 11 July where it learned that the Pudozh desertion commission was unable to 
support the families of Red Army men because it lacked money, food and household 
equipment (khoziaistvennyi inventar’). The Olonets provincial desertion commission 
warned the provincial commission for the showing of help to the families of Red Army 
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men and the provincial food commissariat that if urgent measures on a provincial wide 
scale were not taken to supply the district commissions with money, household equipment 
and food then the individuals responsible would be punished. This pressure from above 
was coupled with a wish to gain more knowledge of the problem in supplying aid to 
soldiers’ families. The provincial desertion commission asked the provincial commission 
for the showing of help to the families of Red Army men to inform it when money was 
received from the centre, how much and when the relevant amount was transferred to the 
Pudozh district commission for the showing of help to the families of Red Army men. Any 
leaks in the process could therefore be identified. Similarly the provincial commissariat for 
agriculture was asked by the provincial desertion commission to inform it when 
agricultural implements were received, what they were and when they were allocated to 
Pudozh. In the meantime the provincial desertion commission proposed to ask the centre to 
immediately dispatch food supplies to Pudozh and to make the Pudozh district desertion 
commission aware of an improvised solution in the neighbouring Vytegra district; ‘kulaks, 
speculators and parasite elements’ were mobilised into a workers’ detachment, under 
communist command, and sent around the parishes to show help to the families of Red 
Army men.
127  
 
The above case is a good example of the type of problem that persistently faced the 
Bolsheviks in Karelia and the root of the problem was shortages, in all its forms. Pressure 
by way of orders from above was applied to try and solve the desertion problem but 
because of a lack of money, food, or capable personnel the periphery was unable to 
effectively carry them out or adopted ad hoc solutions. In response the centre kept adapting 
its policies on tackling desertion, particularly from April to June 1919.
128 One of these 
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policies came on 3 June when Moscow introduced a decree which widened the scope of 
responsibility for deserters to their families and even whole villages. Those found guilty of 
concealing deserters or not helping to detain them could face fines, confiscation of their 
property or penal labour.
129  
 
The 3 June decree mentioned above was also significant because it was tempered 
with a significant concession which showed the Bolsheviks’ willingness to meet the 
deserters halfway and strengthen the soldier-state relationship: the party began to 
periodically publish general amnesties, whereby deserters could appear within a certain 
time limit before the military commissariats without punishment. S. Olikov stated that the 
weeks for voluntary appearance at military commissariats were decisive in combating 
desertion and marked an ‘irrevocable turning point’ in the Soviet regime’s relationship 
with the population.
130 The results of this measure are partially reflected in Table 7 by 
figures for the whole of Olonets province.
131 
 
Table 7 - Deserters detained in Olonets province, March-September 1919*
132 
 
  March  April  May  June  July  August**   September  Total 
Deserters 
detained  
532  94  185  80 
(56) 
148  
(6) 
391  
(191) 
212 
(109) 
 1642 
(362) 
 
As Table 7 shows, although the recorded number of deserters detained in Olonets 
province was relatively low, the percentage who appeared voluntarily in June against the 
background of the amnesty was good. The improvement in the number of deserters who 
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appeared voluntarily in August can also be attributed to another amnesty during that month 
which was circulated in the local press. In Karelia the conclusion of an amnesty for 
deserters was published in Olonetskaia Kommuna on 10 August which read: ‘Deserters, 
townspeople! Today is the last day to appear before the commission [for desertion]. Hurry; 
present yourself today as tomorrow will be too late! All as one to the ranks of the Red 
Army!’
133 As Sanborn has already identified, appeals to deserters went beyond the 
publication of decrees and in some cases underlined the important role of the family in the 
anti-desertion movement.
134 In the same edition of Olonetskaia Kommuna the Bolsheviks 
used moral persuasion to drive home the role of the family, drawing links between the 
abandonment of the Red Army and the betrayal of one’s family. A signed letter was 
reproduced in the newspaper which was, allegedly, written by the family of the military 
instructor from the Velikogubskaia parish soviet executive committee who had defected to 
the Whites the previous month. Within the letter the family accused the military instructor 
of being a traitor and promised to hand him over to the military authorities the moment he 
appeared at their home so he could be punished and receive his just deserts.
135  
 
Owing to its success the August amnesty was extended by another six days.
136 In 
the meantime Iakov Berztys made an appeal in Olonetskaia Kommuna on 14 August to 
galvanise the general pardon offered to the soldiers. In his address he stressed that Red 
Army units were ‘successfully pressing the bands of allied imperialism north…we cannot 
be but victorious.’
137 Red resistance against the Russian Whites, supported by the Allies, 
did stiffen in July and August but it is inaccurate to say that the Red Army were pushing 
the Allies north. As a matter of fact the majority of troops at the front line were White 
                                                 
133 Olonetskaia Kommuna, 10 August 1919. A previous amnesty in the region was declared a month 
previously, between 25 June and 1 July 1919. RGVA, f.6, op.10, d.30, l.97. 
134 Sanborn, Drafting the Russian  ation. 52. 
135 Olonetskaia Kommuna, 10 August 1919. 
136 The first amnesty week, 3-9 June 1919, was also extended because of its success in returning thousands of 
deserters to the Red Army. Figes, “Mass Mobilisation”. 206. 
137 Olonetskaia Kommuna, 14 August 1919.   297 
Russians. Any significant withdrawal made by the Allies was the planned action of the 
latter and did not take place until September, as part of the overall plan to evacuate the 
whole of north Russia. Nevertheless, Berztys’s words were an act of propaganda and 
designed to convince deserters that the Red Army could and would defeat the Allies and 
the Whites and it was not a folly to return to fight for the Reds. He also reminded deserters 
that if they appeared before 16 August they would not be punished but if they did not then 
they would be declared outlaws and their families would be deprived of all allowances.
138 
Based on figures for the number of deserters detained between 16-31 August (see Table 7) 
the amnesty appears to have been a success.  
 
The more conciliatory approach towards combating desertion therefore produced 
favourable results. Indeed, there is little evidence to suggest that Karelia’s deserters were 
severely punished, i.e. shot;
139 the victory of the Red Army in late 1919 and 1920 was 
achieved by ‘”second-chance” men.’
140 Many of those who were detained tended to find 
their way back into military units (see Table 8).
141 On 11 November 1919 Dobrynin asked 
the Olonets provincial military commissar to form a special detachment of 30 men, chiefly 
from ‘weak willed’ deserters, to work for the provincial desertion commission.
142 An 
individual case also reflects the turn-over of deserters back into the Red Army. On 26 
November the Pudozh desertion commission discussed the case of a soldier from a local 
village who had disappeared from the Petrograd front for 17 days before appearing 
voluntarily at the district desertion committee. The district social security department was 
                                                 
138 Ibid. 
139 The only exception I have found took place in Petrozavodsk district against the background of the military 
threat and the rebellion on the Zaonezh’e peninsula in mid-1919. Two deserters were shot in Kuzaranda on 
10 June and three in Tolvuia on 14 June. Vavulinskaia, Sovety Karelii. 64. 
140 Sanborn, Drafting the Russian  ation. 54. 
141 Also see the figures for the deserters in every military county for the second half of August 1919 and the 
month of September. RGVA, f.6, op.10, d.24, l.301; l.327. This assessment of the destination of deserters is 
also consistent with Figes’s study of the topic. See “Mass Mobilisation”. 204-205. 
142 The order originated from a conference held by the Petrograd County Desertion Commission which was 
attended by Dobrynin. NARK, f.R-879, op.1, d.13, l.1. To be registered as ‘weak willed’ a deserter had to be 
missing for less than a fortnight or had appeared after this with a rational excuse. Figes, “Mass Mobilisation”. 
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informed to deprive his family of allowances for 17 days but, combining punishment with 
restraint, the district desertion commission recognised that this was the first time the 
soldier had deserted, he was not considered a ‘malicious’ deserter and had stated his 
willingness to serve in the Red Army. Consequently he was transferred to the mobilisation 
department of the district military commissariat for reassignment.
143 
 
Table 8 – Destination of deserters in Olonets Province, 16 August-30 
September 1919
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  Own 
Unit 
Reserve 
Unit 
Mobilisation 
Point 
To 
Court 
Penal 
Unit 
Total* 
 
16 30 
August 
21  176 
 
29 
 
1  No data  227 
(391) 
September  2  176  14  No data  9  201 
(212) 
Total  23  352  43  1  9  428 
(603) 
  
As the civil war progressed from the end of 1918 the Bolsheviks managed to 
tighten their control over desertion in the Red Army. Its soldiers still suffered from bouts 
of indiscipline and a lack of supplies but the Bolsheviks developed a workable network of 
governing institutions to keep the majority of its men in military service. The introduction 
of a hierarchy of desertion commissions marked the beginning of a definitive drive to 
tackle desertion but because of a lack of local material and human resources in the 
periphery the work of these commissions was often constrained. However, despite constant 
material shortages, administratively and organisationally the party was taking more 
energetic and concerted moves to combat desertion. The adoption of a carrot-and-stick 
approach to the problem was crucial; desertion detachments, the threat and application of 
individual and collective punishment, the tightening up of bureaucracy, general amnesties 
                                                 
143 NARK, f.R-879, op.1, d.2, l.3. 
144 RGVA, f.6, op.10, d.24, l.301; l.327. *Figures in brackets repeat information from Table 2 and state the 
number of deserters detained during these months. Because of a lack of data it has not been possible to 
explain the discrepancies.     299 
and the commitment to soldier welfare, propagandised in the press, were the pillars of 
Bolshevik control in a relatively successful anti-desertion campaign. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter is about governance, discipline and the Bolsheviks’ capacity to enforce their 
authority through their control of the party apparatus, the food commissariats, the Cheka 
and the Red Army. The Bolsheviks suffered similar problems in 1919 to those that they 
had faced the previous year, almost all centred round a lack of sufficient material resources 
and personnel. However, they managed to gain enough control over certain key areas of 
their administration apparatus and the army to endure the hardships that they faced and 
successfully combat crucial deficiencies to an extent that secured their survival against 
their external enemies. Of course, the improvement in the Bolsheviks’ position in Karelia 
reflected the changing character of the civil war in other parts of the country and the 
decisions made in the capital by the party leadership. The provinces provided the capital 
with information of what was going wrong in the periphery and the centre based its 
decisions and orders on this correspondence. The Bolsheviks’ ability to learn and adapt 
through their experiences was aptly reflected at the Eighth Party Congress where strict 
centralisation was recognised and reinforced as a fundamental principle. In Karelia the 
implementation of central policies and centralised authority was often troubled but local 
Bolsheviks in Petrozavodsk generally submitted to the wishes of the centre, even if they 
felt hard done by. 
 
The above chapter suggests that there were four key measures through which the 
Bolsheviks ultimately consolidated their hold on power. First they went along with the 
decisions of the Eighth Party Congress on the concentration of all political and military 
authority which would make the Soviet state’s institutions more accountable to the centre. 
Second they worked consistently, if not always effectively, at addressing the food supply   300 
situation. Third, with the abolition of the district Chekas, they streamlined the security 
police and tried to deal with abuses of power and corruption. Finally, the Bolsheviks 
sought to become more responsive to the popular mood and appreciated how the campaign 
against desertion could be used to extend their influence over the countryside. The 
Bolshevik regime did not cease to be repressive but it dosed violence and intimidation with 
concessions and propaganda to try and remove some of the causes of popular discontent.   301 
Conclusion 
This thesis shows us how the Bolsheviks were able to establish control over an area where 
their support in October 1917 was negligible. Karelia was a region which despite its 
relative proximity to Petrograd was no Bolshevik stronghold. The region’s inhabitants 
were predominantly rural and few workers or revolutionaries lived outside of Petrozavodsk 
or, to a lesser extent, Kem’. Because of the climate in Karelia and the region’s physical 
characteristics good agricultural land was sparse and the population relatively small. It was 
these conditions to a large extent which determined the course of the local civil war. The 
Bolsheviks had to adapt to the local political environment which favoured Mensheviks, 
SRs and then Left SRs, but once in a position of unchallenged authority in Petrozavodsk 
used the Cheka and the Red Army not only to stamp out opposition but to build a 
relationship with the rural population. The process was not straightforward, there were 
steps forward and back and food was always scarce, but determined organisational work 
eventually had an impact and was enough for the Bolsheviks to survive. I will summarise 
here what the preceding chapters have emphasised and offer some broader speculations 
about our understanding of the civil war. 
 
  The first four chapters of the thesis focussed largely on the political relationships in 
Petrozavodsk and to an extent in the Karelian districts. A study of Karelia during the civil 
war has emphasised the weakness of the Bolshevik party there, the relative strength of the 
Left SRs and the working relationship of both parties in a dual alliance in Petrozavodsk up 
to July 1918, sometimes in cooperation with the Menshevik Internationalists. Had it not 
been for events in Moscow this political relationship would most certainly have continued 
to function and consolidate the Soviet regime. It is therefore worth underlining that on the 
periphery these political relationships were quite different from in the capital and towns 
and cities. Thus while the Left SR-Bolshevik alliance operated in Petrograd, Moscow and 
Petrozavodsk up to July 1918, in the Karelian localities the Left SRs’ influence lasted a   302 
considerable time longer. The social demographics favoured the SR parent party in Karelia 
and after this party split the majority moved to the Left SRs. The Left SRs also remained in 
the districts because the Bolsheviks remained numerically and influentially weak on the 
periphery and Petrozavodsk needed people to run the local soviets. However, this meant 
that Bolshevik policies could be resisted for longer. Nevertheless, the Left SR Central 
Committee’s uprising must be recognised as an important step towards increasing the 
Bolshevik party’s control of Petrozavodsk, if not the whole of Karelia, because Bolsheviks 
in the regional capital had the opportunity to rule independently and attempt to put central 
policies into practice for the first time, such as the registration of the harvest and the 
introduction of the kombedy and the food supply detachments. 
 
  The second four chapters have considered how, when ruling alone, the Bolsheviks 
grip on power was far from firm. In other words without authority in the districts, even 
after the Bolsheviks had taken control of Petrozavodsk in July 1918, they were not able to 
fully implement central policies across the whole region. They took some positive steps 
forward but at the same time these were undermined by the political resistance of the 
soviets for the best part of 1918. Even after this political resistance in the district centres 
had been overcome by the end of 1918, introducing decrees and orders from above 
remained easier than implementing them locally. A shortage of reliable personnel and a 
constant lack of resources, most persistently a lack of food, meant that the Bolsheviks’ 
policies were resisted, delayed, adopted in an ad hoc fashion or not at all. The problems 
facing the Bolshevik regime during the civil war were vast: rebellions broke out 
intermittently between 1918 and 1919, state agencies clashed with one another, support 
from the capital was limited, mobilisation campaigns faltered and fighting with the Allies 
or Whites ended in defeat more often than not. Nevertheless, despite the hardships, local 
Bolsheviks ultimately survived.    303 
It is difficult to identify an exact date when the tide turned for the Bolsheviks but 
there were a few key moments during the civil war that have been mentioned within the 
thesis. The introduction of the Food Supply Dictatorship in May and its offshoot decrees, 
most notably the kombedy and the food supply detachments, was the Bolsheviks’ first 
attempts to direct food supply from the capital while at the same time revolutionise the 
countryside. We have seen to some extent the negative results it had in Karelia but at the 
same time it marked the beginning of government centralisation and these experiences 
would point out to the Bolsheviks the party’s weaknesses in the periphery and provide the 
basis for future adjustments to their policies in the countryside. The importance of the Left 
SR uprising in Moscow and its repercussions for Petrozavodsk has also been noted but 
other events and orders such as the introduction of the Red Terror and the election of a new 
Olonets provincial Cheka provided the Bolsheviks with a lever with which they could 
exercise their control.  
 
The discussion of the Red Terror has suggested that local political and military 
factors were important in determining the intensity of repressions in Karelia. Even at 
regional level, it should not be regarded as a unified phenomenon which affected every 
district in the same way. Recent historical interpretations of the Red Terror also suggest 
that, like in the French Revolution, the terror bore down hard in some regions and less so 
in others.
1 The terror was a diversified not a unified phenomenon. Existing work on the 
civil war in the provinces confirms the peculiarities and nuances of the terror in different 
regions. For instance, Alexander Rabinowitch has argued that up to mid-summer 1918 
Petrograd resisted revolutionary extremism, unlike Moscow where the Cheka was carrying 
out executions and unofficial Red Terror ‘was in full sway’ in other Russian cities.
2 Part of 
the reason for this was the moderating influence of local leaders such as Uritskii, his fellow 
                                                 
1 For an overview of the regional aspects of the terror during the French Revolution see A. Forrest, “The 
Local Politics of Repression” in K. Baker, ed., The French Revolution and the Creation of Modern Political 
Culture. Vol. 4. The Terror. Oxford: Pergamon, 1994. 
2 Rabinowitch, The Bolsheviks in Power. 317-318.   304 
Left Communist Nikolai Krestinskii and the Left SR Prosh Proshian.
3 George Leggett has 
also suggested that the influence of the Left SRs helped tame the excesses of the Vecheka 
while they remained in this body prior to July 1918.
4 On the other hand Michael Melancon 
does not overstate the limiting influence of the Left SRs on the Vecheka but instead 
suggests that it was local Bolsheviks in the autumn of 1918 who tried to control the Chekas 
in the provinces.
5 A case study of Karelia supports both Rabinowitch and Melancon and 
suggests that, like in Petrograd, terror was not ‘in full sway’ up to the summer of 1918. 
Furthermore, this study has indicated that after the declaration of the Red Terror executions 
carried out by the Cheka in Karelia’s districts were far less numerous than in other parts of 
the regime.
6 
 
The thesis has also suggested that the election of a new provincial Cheka marked a 
turning point in the civil war in Karelia. From this point, under the guidance of its new 
chairman Kanter and despite sporadic indiscipline from individual Chekists, the provincial 
Cheka steadily became better organised and more disciplined. The Bolsheviks could 
exercise control better through the Cheka because Chekists were now held accountable for 
their actions and inter-institutional conflicts with the soviet executive committees were 
stamped out. The Cheka continued to carry out investigations and arrests but it did so 
under a chairman who by all appearances endeavoured to carry out organisational 
procedures with order in mind. Kanter rebuked erring Chekists, curbed the availability of 
alcohol in Petrozavodsk, sent Chekists on training and educational courses and provided 
shock troops, including himself, when the region endured its most serious military threats. 
                                                 
3 Ibid. 221-222; 274-278; 324-325. 
4 Leggett, The Cheka. 49-51; 58-59; 102-103. 
5 Melancon, “Revolutionary Culture.” 3-4 and passim.  
6 The district Cheka executed a total of 9 people in Olonets district from its creation on 15 August to 15 
December 1918. GARF, f.R-393, op.13, d.268, l.8. This pales in comparison to Petrograd and other towns 
and districts where executions by the Soviet regime were more numerous.  Leggett gives the figure of 
approximately 1300 executions for Petrograd from September to November 1918, an under-estimation by his 
own admission. He also gives official figures for other Russian cities where the executions were in the tens 
and hundreds between September and October 1918. The Cheka. 111-113. For figures from the districts in 
Viatka province which were also a lot higher than Olonets district see Retish, Russia’s Peasants. 190. On 
Saratov see Raleigh, Civil War. 65; 241; 250.    305 
This military crisis in the spring and summer of 1919 however was overcome because the 
local Bolsheviks from the end of 1918 managed to recruit a standing Red Army to support 
the relatively small number of troops sent to them from the centre. The new Red Army also 
proved useful in spreading the influence of the party in the districts. 
 
While never satisfactory during the civil war the food supply situation did improve 
slightly and became more systematic throughout 1919 with the adoption of the razverstka. 
Only small amounts of grain made it through to Karelia but organisation appeared less 
chaotic when compared to the previous year and ultimately, when combined with local 
produce, especially from the peasants’ own market gardening, this proved enough to 
enable the region to survive. Because of a lack of resources it made sense for the 
Bolsheviks to call for increased centralisation to Moscow which was one of the main 
outcomes agreed upon at the Eighth Party Congress. Supplies and manpower could then be 
allocated to the most important fronts of the civil war. Centralisation was accepted 
grudgingly in some instances in Petrozavodsk, for example during the Dubrovskii affair, 
but the Eighth Party Congress was also a significant juncture in the Bolsheviks’ victory 
because its delegates formally recognised the need to adopt a more conciliatory approach 
in the countryside. This approach was aptly reflected in the regime’s anti-desertion 
campaign as local desertion commissions rounded up deserters while at the same time the 
regime introduced amnesties for runaways and tried to provide for soldiers and their 
families’ welfare as best it could. Governance through a balance of repression and 
conciliation proved to be a decisive feature of the Bolshevik victory and was enough for 
the party to retain and reel back in enough men in the Red Army to fend off the Allies and 
the Whites.   
 
This thesis has offered several new insights into the history of the Russian civil war. 
Firstly, it is only since the fall of the Soviet Union that the influence and numerical   306 
significance of the Left SR party in the cities, provinces and districts during the civil war 
has begun to be given more attention. This research has demonstrated the importance of 
the Left SRs in Karelia, especially in the localities where they were able to exercise power 
and resist, or at least mitigate, Bolshevik policies, long after July 1918. It remains to be 
seen in detail how influential the party was in many of Soviet Russia’s other provinces and 
districts. However, the role played by the Left SRs in Karelia was enormous and helped 
shape local politics until the end of 1918. In the future other local studies will probably 
show that Karelia was not unique, but the continued importance of the Left SRs to politics 
after July 1918 is a major theme of this thesis. Secondly, this is the first regional study of 
the civil war to focus on a grain deficit province. It shows how the relationship with 
Moscow was supposed to work, local Bolsheviks’ attempts to implement the razverstka 
food supply system and the ad hoc nature of the arrangements actually adopted. It also 
shows that, as the area of grain rich territory under Bolshevik control shrank, so Karelia 
was thrown ever more back on its own resources with the local authorities acting in 
whatever way they could, a situation made worse by the influx of refugees from the north 
and the failure of the resettlement plans to the Don. Olonets province was amongst the 
most demanding of the Northern provinces which required domestic grain imports but it 
could not offer the capital much in return and was not of the highest strategic importance. 
 
Thirdly, a detailed study of Karelia has added to already existing knowledge on the 
civil war by providing new information on the role of the Bolsheviks in the provinces and 
the districts. The role of the Anarchists in 1918, an understudied party within the 
historiography, has shed new light on the Bolsheviks weakness in the periphery and 
emphasised the party’s pragmatism and willingness to collaborate with other parties to 
achieve political ends. Knowledge of the Bolsheviks’ role in the countryside has also been 
added to by exploring their attempts to register the harvest in 1918, the role of the kombedy 
in controlling grain grinding mills and the establishment of model regiments of the village   307 
poor which suggests that the kombedy project should not be considered an absolute failure. 
Finally our understanding of the anti-desertion campaign of 1919 has been complemented 
by a study of Soviet Karelia. This campaign not only allowed the Red Army to reel back in 
deserters but became a political tool for appealing to the peasantry. Repression and force 
would always be used by the Cheka and the Red Army against rebels but the anti-desertion 
campaign, coupled with the state’s welfare policies for Red Army soldiers, showed that 
loyalty to the Soviet regime would be rewarded. 
  
Fourthly, this thesis has offered observations about the centre-periphery 
relationship during the civil war between the capital and a provincial centre like 
Petrozavodsk. A study of Karelia indicates that the October revolution and the transfer of 
power to the soviets was a decentralised affair and until Moscow intervened after the 
events of 6 July 1918 and outlawed the Left SRs, the political environment in Karelia 
moved along its own trajectory. But even after that intervention from the capital the 
localities had to implement policies on their own initiative based on their evaluation of the 
situation at the front and the resources and personnel available to them. When the civil war 
intensified in 1919, in Karelia and elsewhere, the key to enforcing party centralisation was 
local implementation. In Chapter 5 we saw Elena Stasova comment that local Bolshevik 
party cadres in Petrozavodsk were making the best they could of what they were told to do. 
Stasova stressed the need to centralise the party apparatus but at the same time cadres were 
expected to display initiative and this initiative remained in the periphery at least up to 
1919, for example with the Cheka under Kanter. The Soviet regime was more centralised 
by the end of 1919 but complete centralisation was not possible during the civil war 
because it was complicated by the fighting, economic problems and the number of reliable 
party cadres available at each rung of the administrative ladder.  
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  Finally, this regional study of the Karelian districts has indicated the difficulty of 
making generalisations about the civil war. Evidently, the experiences of the civil war 
varied at parish through to provincial level for reasons such as the availability of food 
stuffs, the presence of the Red Army, the intensity of the fighting or proximity of the front, 
the strength of the Bolshevik party and according to the personality of local officials. 
Every region had different experiences of the civil war and central decrees had a different 
impact according to local conditions. Nevertheless, although it would be wrong to refer to 
the experiences of the Soviet regime’s provinces as uniform the reasons why the 
Bolsheviks ultimately emerged victorious from the civil war were generally the same. The 
problems faced by the Whites are generally accepted as a major reason for the Bolshevik 
victory but their experiences in Murmansk and north Karelia is not the subject of the thesis. 
Instead it concentrates on how the Bolsheviks’ own efforts enabled them to win the civil 
war. In short, the Bolsheviks gained enough control over the Cheka to use as a tool of 
governance, managed to mobilise and retain enough men in the Red Army, succeeded in 
providing enough supplies to the most important areas at the most important times and 
coupled repression of the population with conciliation.   309 
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